NOTES FROM JUNE 4, 1979 CONVERSATION BETWEEN W.A.H. AND AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON

I called on Ambassador Dobrynin at 12 noon today, at my request.

He asked me to tell Pam that he sent her questions about Braniff to Moscow because he couldn't answer them.

He spoke of MBFR and indicated that the Soviets had proposed as a first step, and independent of multilateral negotiations, the reduction of 30,000 men and 1,000 tanks against 14,000 Americans--and we didn't have anything to do with it, as we are still arguing over the size of the Warsaw Pact forces.

On CTB, he said they were ready to move but we weren't. He said the British were refusing to have any black boxes in the U.K.

I said I thought it was a mistake to bring it in until we had concluded SALT.

He said that he was doubtful about the anti-satellite, as the technicians were still arguing.

I tried to make him understand the importance of the two leaders underlining their commitment to start SALT III promptly and vigorously.

On trade he was very firm that they would not tie it to immigration and didn't see what could come out of the meeting.

He said too many questions should not be taken up. Brezhnev would not know about them and it would waste time. He mentioned Law of the Sea, world conference on ________, etc. I said I
thought they might be listed as matters that the two men thought could be given attention. He said he thought they might be referred to the foreign ministers for expeditious consideration.

He urged the President to take a broad approach. Not too many details, which would bother Brezhnev. He suggested the President might well tell Brezhnev of the difficulties he was going to have over the SALT Treaty in a confidential manner and ask for his help if something might arise that was reasonable to discuss. It should not in any way be put up as a military consideration, entirely political. The President should discuss this as he might with a friend in sharing his difficulties. Treat Brezhnev as an equal and as informally as possible.

The President might ask Brezhnev to do something he might specifically have in mind—say, about verification, as the subject is important for Congress. None of these matters should be discussed on a military basis.

I asked him about Zorza's article in the New York Times playing down the influence of Kirilenko and depicting him as a hardliner and speaks of Chernenko as the coming man. Dobrynin pooh-poohed this and said that "Chernenko could not possibly have such a rapid rise. Everybody thinks they are a Kremlinologist!"