MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 27, 1978
Time: 8:00 a.m.-12:20 p.m.
Place: Cabinet Room, The White House

SUBJECTS: SALT, CTB, Africa, Human Rights

U.S. PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Ambassador Paul C. Warnke
Ambassador Malcolm Toon
Mr. David Aaron
Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
Mr. Hamilton Jordan
Mr. Jody Powell
Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter

USSR PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko
Ambassador A. P. Dobrynin
Deputy Foreign Minister G. M. Korniyenko
Ambassador V. Makarov
Minister Counselor A. A. Bessmertnykh
Mr. V. G. Komplektov
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Mr. V. M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Drafted by: Wm. D. Krimer/OPR/IS
May 27, 1978

Approved by:

SECRET/NODIS
President Carter was pleased to welcome Foreign Minister Gromyko at the White House and said he was honored that Gromyko had come to meet with him again. It was obvious to the President that they had made good progress during their previous meeting last year. When Secretary Vance had met with President Brezhnev in Moscow recently, he had made some new proposals aimed at resolving the remaining differences at the SALT negotiations. The President would be pleased to hear Gromyko's response to these proposals now, confident that the Soviet leadership had had a chance to study them thoroughly. He appreciated Gromyko's having conveyed to him President Brezhnev's good wishes and would ask the Minister to reciprocate in expressing his best wishes to President Brezhnev. If the two sides here could be successful in narrowing further the differences at the SALT negotiations, President Carter would be pleased to have President Brezhnev come to the United States in order to sign the final SALT TWO agreement.

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that yesterday he had deemed it necessary to express certain considerations from the rostrum of the U.N. General Assembly. He had said for all the world to hear that the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership and L. I. Brezhnev personally had always been in favor and were now in favor of concluding a SALT TWO agreement. They had never wavered in this resolve and had conducted a policy that had been and remained consistent with that objective. They believed that the new agreement would be beneficial for the United States as well as the Soviet Union, indeed for the whole world. He wanted to take this opportunity to re-emphasize this thought to the President personally. He had been deeply gratified to hear the President's words to the effect
that the United States, the Government of the United States and the
President personally were also in favor of concluding the new agreement
on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. He considered this to be
of particular importance since various recent statement in the United
States had raised some questions in this regard in the minds of the Soviet
leadership. Therefore, the President could be assured that Gromyko would
convey what the President had said to the Soviet leadership and to Brezhnev
personally.

Gromyko said that the world forum of the United Nations General
Assembly was now considering the problem of disarmament as a whole. Of
course, that was an even more complex task--it was hard to say whether
it was 10 times or 100 times or 1,000 times more complex than the task of
limiting strategic arms. However, objectively speaking it should be pos-
sible to resolve that problem too, given the will to do so. In the stra-
tegic arms area under discussion between our two countries, however, a
considerable stretch had already been travelled. Therefore, the Soviet
leadership believed that our two sides should not lose the opportunity of
preparing a new accord that would benefit the entire world, strengthen
peace and have a positive effect on the overall relations between our two
countries. Now Gromyko would turn to this problem in specifics.

In embarking upon discussion of SALT problems, Gromyko wanted first
of all to note the positive outcome of Secretary Vance's last visit to
Moscow. It would be hard to measure in specifics how much had already
been accomplished. At the same time, other issues serious problems
remained. The President was surely aware of the Soviet leadership's
positive assessment of the state of affairs today in terms of working out agreed limitations on strategic offensive arms, and the approach based on principle, which the Soviet side had brought to the negotiation of that accord. These principles had recently been clearly set forth to Secretary Vance during his last visit to Moscow by L. I. Brezhnev and by Gromyko himself. He would not hesitate to repeat what he had already said—that the Soviet side was most resolutely in favor of completing the work on the new agreement and signing it as soon as possible. He was convinced that this would meet the national interests of both our countries to an equal degree, and would have long-term positive effects on our relations with each other. Furthermore, it would break the dangerous trend of the continuing arms race. The fact that the arms race was unfortunately continuing could hardly be disputed by anyone familiar with the facts. The Soviet approach was now concretely embodied in the specific and truly major steps taken by the Soviet side with the objective of finding mutually acceptable solutions, i.e., solutions acceptable to both the Soviet Union and the United States. Naturally only an approach of this kind could produce appropriate results. It should be sufficient to recall the major steps the Soviet side had taken here in Washington last year during the meetings with the President to which the President had referred in his remarks. After those meetings the Soviet side had acted accordingly, appropriately dealing with the strategic problems involved in the limitation of strategic arms, and that policy had also been consistently pursued by the Soviet Delegation in Geneva.
Gromyko noted that unfortunately it had not yet proved possible to complete the new agreement. Way this was so had been addressed by the Soviet side in its assessment of the current state of affairs at the negotiations; the Secretary was surely aware of that assessment and Gromyko would not want to lose time repeating it. He simply wanted to emphasize again that the Soviet approach, based on principle, had not changed; as demonstrated during the recent discussions with the Secretary of State in Moscow, the Soviet side continued to do all in its power to resolve outstanding issues. It would go without saying that in that process it was absolutely necessary not to deviate from the agreed principle of equality and equal security. That principle was the very cornerstone on which the SALT negotiations rested. Without observing it strictly it would not prove possible to find appropriate solutions for the issues before our two countries. When Secretary Vance was in Moscow about one month ago, he had told the Soviet leadership that President Carter personally and the U.S. Government were resolutely in favor of prompt resolution of the questions still at issue. The Soviet side was in favor of that, too, believed that all remaining issues must be resolved and was prepared to make every effort toward that end.

Gromyko would first address the question of a ban on new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. This was not a new question; it had been discussed with the President last fall, and with the Secretary of State quite recently. In Moscow it had been discussed in the context of the agreed maximum level for launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs. The Soviet side had informed the Secretary of State, and Gromyko wanted to confirm this today, that in the event, and
only in the event of mutually acceptable resolution of the question of new
types the Soviet Union would be prepared to agree that the level for MIRVed
ballistic missiles be established not at the earlier figure of 1,250, but
at 1,200. In taking this decision the Soviet side had taken into con-
sideration the importance President Carter personally attached to the
question of levels, to which he had referred on several occasions. He
would recall that at their second meeting here in Washington last Sep-
tember President Carter had said that if the Soviet side agreed to estab-
lish the level of MIRVed missiles at 1,200, the United States might meet
the Soviet side in the question of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. Origin-
ally the Soviet side had proposed that for the period of the Protocol
a ban be placed on all flight testing and deployment of new types of
ICBMs, except that each side could flight-test and deploy only one new
type of ICBM equipped with a single reentry vehicle. The flight testing
and deployment of new types of SLBMs would also be banned for the same
period of time, except that such a ban would not apply to RSM-52 SLBMs
for the USSR and to Trident-I SLBMs for the United States. In view of
the fact that, as the Soviet side understood it, the U.S. side preferred
that the question of new types of ICBMs be resolved within the framework
of the Treaty with a term through 1985 rather than within the framework
of the three-year Protocol, the Soviet side had in the course of the talks
in Moscow expressed its readiness to accept this variant of resolving
the question, bearing in mind that in that event an exception would be
made for one new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle, which each
side would have the right to test and deploy during that period. At the
same time, there would be a ban on new types of SLBMs, except that it would
not apply to RSM-52 SLEMs for the USSR or Trident-I SLEMs for the United States. If the U.S. side preferred that the aforementioned provisions for SLEMs remain in effect only for the term of the three-year Protocol rather than for the term of the Treaty, the question could be resolved in this manner as well. The Soviet side had repeatedly set forth appropriate arguments and had frankly stated the reasons why it believed it necessary to have an exception for one new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle. Gromyko was sure that even if the Soviet side had not marshalled its own arguments in favor of that exception, the President's experts would have explained the reasons to him. That need had been prompted by the actual state of affairs in this area, and was in large measure due to the steps the Soviet side had taken to meet the U.S. position with regard to MIRV verification. In this connection he had in mind, above all, the preliminarily agreed principle of counting all ICBM launchers of a type as MIRVed if they had at least once been tested with MIRVs. That had been a major concession on the part of the Soviet Union and had been appropriately regarded as such by the U.S. side as well. This, in conjunction with establishing a special maximum level of 820 for MIRVed ICBMs had been agreed upon at this very table in Washington last year. The Soviet side had also agreed that all ICBM launchers at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk would accordingly be counted as MIRVed, although most of them even today had not been MIRVed, as the President must surely be aware. At the same time, the testing and deployment by each side of one new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle, the need for which, he would repeat, was prompted for the Soviet side by practical necessity, would not in any way change the strategic situation that had emerged, and thus would not
be contrary to the objectives of the agreement being worked out. (Gromyko
repeated "would not be contrary to the objectives.") However, there was
no way that the Soviet side could agree to the U.S. having the right to
test and deploy one new type of ICBM equipped with MIRVs rather than with
one reentry vehicle, since these were an entirely different category of
missiles and were different, inter alia, from the standpoint of their
impact upon the strategic situation. Gromyko doubted if anyone would
dispute this fact. After all, it was the U.S. side itself that had on
many occasions emphasized the destabilizing impact of MIRVed ICBMs. There-
fore, he would repeat, the Soviet Union could not in any way agree to
this variant of resolving the issue.

As for SLEMs, Gromyko recalled that some time ago the U.S. side had
proposed that an exception be made from the ban on flight testing and deploy-
ment of new types of SLEMs, for one new type of such missiles for each
side. The Soviet side had agreed to such an exception, but it could not
in any way agree and could not accept that such an exception violate the
principle of equality, equal security and inadmissibility of unilateral
advantage. And yet, in actual fact the U.S. proposal was aimed at precisely
such unilateral advantage in providing that the exception should apply to
Trident-I SLEMs for the United States and to RSM-50 SLEMs for the USSR,
rather than to RSM-52 SLEMs. Such an approach could not be justified
from the standpoint of both the substance and the letter of the Treaty
being worked out. After all, both RSM-52 SLEMs and Trident-I SLEMs
were new missiles, missiles of the second generation of MIRVed SLEMs.
At the same time, already agreed provisions of the Treaty stated quite
directly that existing types of MIRVed SLEMs were Soviet RSM-50 SLEMs
and U.S. Poseidon SLEMs. How then could one now refer to RSM-50 SLEMs as new missiles? That would be tantamount to calling a chicken a fish.

For this reason the Soviet Union had resolutely defended its position that the exception from the ban on new types of SLEMs apply to RSM-52 SLEMs for the USSR and Trident-I SLEMs for the United States. Both were new types of missiles. In that way each side would have the right to develop one new type of missile. Thus there would be no grounds in the future for any disputes or arguments about these SLEMs.

The Soviet Union considered the two aforementioned variants for a solution to the question of new types of missiles as being fully justified, and was prepared to reach agreement on that basis. He would ask the President to take a look at these proposals very closely.

Nonetheless, having once again carefully weighed all the aspects of the question of the ban on new types of missiles, the Soviet Union believed it possible to reach agreement on the basis of still one more variant for resolving this question. The U.S. side had proposed that the flight testing and deployment of all new types of ICBMs be banned for the term of the Protocol. The Soviet Union was now suggesting to go even further and to ban the flight testing and deployment of all new types of ICBMs, without exception, for the term of the Treaty, i.e., through 1985, regardless of whether they were equipped with MIRVs or with a single reentry vehicle. Along with that there would also have to be a ban for the term of the Treaty on the flight testing and deployment of new types of SLEMs, here again with an exception from such a ban for RSM-52 and Trident-I SLEMs.

In stating its willingness to accept such a solution of this issue, the Soviet side would indeed forfeit the opportunity to satisfy its practical needs to which he had earlier referred. What those needs were the President...
would be well aware of on the basis of what his experts could tell him. Nevertheless, guided by the interests of successfully completing the new agreement, the Soviet Union was once again demonstrating its good will in taking into account the U.S. position on this question.

Contingent upon agreement by the U.S. side to one of the variants of resolving the question of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs, as set forth above, the Soviet Union would be prepared to take one more step to meet the position of the U.S. side. Gromyko had just presented three variants for a solution to this issue, and it would be up to the United States to decide which would suit it best. For a long period of time now it had been a matter of importance of principle for the United States to put a limit on the number of additional warheads that could be placed on Soviet ICBMs, above all on Soviet heavy missiles. Countless were the fears expressed in connection with those missiles in terms of a Soviet threat, a first strike, etc. The Soviet Union would now tell the United States officially that it was prepared to include in the Treaty a provision to the effect that in the course of modernization of existing types of ICBMs, which had been flight-tested as of January 1, 1977, the sides undertake not to increase the number of warheads on such missiles. Gromyko was well aware of the fact that the U.S. side had attached great importance to such a limitation. Secretary Vance had made that very clear during his recent visit to Moscow. Thus it would be possible to find a solution to this question as well in the context of the proposals Gromyko had presented today. He repeated that the Soviet Union would be prepared to include such a provision in the Treaty on the condition that the U.S. side agree to one of the aforementioned variants for resolving the question of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs,
and also bearing in mind the following: (a) that a mutually acceptable solution be found for the definition of new types of ICBMs, i.e., that the sides agree on the criteria with the help of which limits would in fact be established on the modernization of existing types of ICBMs; (b) that the sides assume the obligation to limit the maximum number of cruise missiles with ranges between 600 and 2,500 kilometers that could be installed on each bomber carrying such missiles, namely that that number be no more than 20; (c) as the Soviet side understood it, the U.S. side had now agreed that the overall aggregate of strategic offensive arms be reduced from 2,400 to 2,250. That, too, was a question to which the President had always attached great importance. Taking this into account, the Soviet side would be prepared to agree that such reductions be carried out over a period of 12 months beginning December 30, 1980. Thus, the Soviet side was prepared to shorten the time for reductions by 6 months as compared to the time it had earlier proposed for achieving necessary reductions, although for purely practical reasons this was a very difficult decision for the Soviet side to take. In this connection, Gromyko would ask the President to take into account the fact that any other solution to the question of timing of reductions, one that would come closer to what the U.S. side had suggested, would, for purely practical reasons, be totally impossible for the Soviet Union to comply with. Gromyko would therefore ask the President not to insist further, and to accept the Soviet proposal in this regard, bearing in mind that the Soviet side could not go any further. Indeed, in this connection, what was it we were talking about? After all, what was involved here was dismantling or destruction of systems in excess of established limits. Surely there could be no question
here of threatening or undermining the security of either side. The Soviet side was once again moving to meet the position of the U.S. side in order to finish with this question as well, thereby ensuring genuine progress toward completing the new agreement. He would like to hope that the question of reducing the aggregates of strategic offensive arms and of timing of reductions could now be considered as agreed. He would hope that the President would simply say yes.

Gromyko handed the President a one-page document listing the three variants for resolution of the question of new types of ICBMs and SLEMs, together with a working English translation. He asked the President to regard the proposals on new types set forth in that document as alternative proposals. The text of this document reads as follows:

"ON NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLEMS"

The Soviet side proposes the following three possible variants for resolving the question of new types of ICBMs and SLEMs:

**First variant.** The flight testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs must be banned for the term of the three-year Protocol, except that each side could flight-test and deploy only one new type of ICBM equipped with only a single reentry vehicle.

The flight testing and deployment of new types of SLEMs must be banned for the same period, except that such a ban would not apply: for the USSR, to the RSM-52 missile; and for the U.S., to the Trident-I missile.

**Second variant.** The flight testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs must be banned for the term of the Treaty, i.e., through 1985, except that each side could flight-test and deploy only one new type of ICBM equipped with only a single reentry vehicle.
The flight testing and deployment of new types of SLBMs must be banned for the term of the three-year Protocol or for the term of the Treaty, except that such a ban would not apply: for the USSR, to the RSM-52 missile; and for the U.S., to the Trident-I missile.

Third variant. The flight testing and deployment of all new types of ICBMs, without exception, i.e., of those with a single reentry vehicle and those with multiple reentry vehicles, must be banned for the term of the Treaty, i.e., through 1985.

The flight testing and deployment of new types of SLBMs must be banned for the same period, except that such a ban would not apply: for the USSR, to the RSM-52; and for the U.S., to the Trident-I missile.”

Gromyko said that he had one more final question to address, one of an entirely different category. This was the question of the Soviet medium bomber TU-22-M, the Backfire, as it was called in the United States. He could only express regret over the fact that this issue was still being raised at the negotiations, although there was no justification whatsoever for that, neither de facto nor de jure. He had told Secretary Vance the other day that perhaps the Soviet side had been mistaken to discuss this airplane in the first place, because it was clearly not a strategic weapons system. However, the Soviet side had assumed that the questions raised about this bomber might be based on someone harboring an honest misconception about it. Still, he would not rule out that at some point the Soviet side might simply refuse to discuss this airplane any further.

The President was surely aware of the fundamental position of the Soviet Union in this regard, which had been clearly set forth in the course of previous meetings.
and discussions, including the meeting with the President last year. That position had not changed and could not change, simply because the airplane itself had not changed. The fact that the U.S. side continued to raise this issue, and the way in which that was done, gave rise to serious doubts which went far beyond the limits of the issue itself. Frankly, he believed that the President and his advisors had been fed some false information concerning this bomber. It would be hard for him to tell whether or not this had been done deliberately. Whatever the reason, the Soviet side felt that the motivation for supplying wrong information about this bomber was opposition to the very idea of concluding a strategic arms agreement between our two countries. After all, there were surely those on the U.S. side who knew the true state of affairs. The bomber was not a needle in a haystack that could be hidden, never to be found. In any case, he could only sympathize with the President for having received such erroneous information. [If the Soviet Union was now expressing its readiness unilaterally to provide certain clarifications, this was a reflection of its good will at the negotiations, and it should be properly appreciated. It was now high time to close out this contrived question.] The fact that the question was still open made it difficult for the Soviet side to escape the conviction that those who were raising it constantly were pursuing much more far-reaching objectives. They surely knew very well that the Soviet Union had much more reason to raise questions about American aircraft that were not covered by the term 'heavy bomber,' but could in fact strike Soviet territory. Thus, if the Soviet side had
wanted to put obstacles in the way of concluding an agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, it could have raised much more justified questions about U.S. aircraft. He believed, therefore, that this matter should be approached from a position of principle and not be allowed artificially to block agreement until the very last moment, in the hope that this would enable the U.S. side to obtain something further from the Soviet side. An approach of that kind will not lead to anything useful. The Soviet leaders sometimes engaged in half serious speculation concerning the reasons why that airplane was so awe-inspiring for some Americans. They had speculated that perhaps it was the name given that aircraft in the United States, or some feature of the external appearance of that aircraft that had so frightened many Americans. In any case, they had come to the conclusion that those who raised questions about it pursued more far-reaching aims than met the eye. He would ask the President to take another look at this matter.

In this connection, Gromyko once again confirmed the readiness of the Soviet Union to make a unilateral statement concerning the TU-22-M airplane. The text of that statement could be communicated to the U.S. side subsequently. Moreover, in view of the insistent wishes voiced by the Secretary of State during his recent visit to Moscow, the Soviet side had deemed it possible to revise the content of such a statement in a way designed to meet the wishes of the U.S. side. The President would recall that Gromyko had informed him of the content of such a statement when they had met at this very table last year. Thus, he was sure, the President would immediately see that the Soviet side had moved further than it had intended in an effort to demonstrate good will.
For all the above reasons, the Soviet side would be prepared to make
the following unilateral statement which took into account the additional
issues Secretary Vance had raised during his visit to Moscow. The Secre-
tary's questions in Moscow were not answered at that time due to lack of
time, since they had been raised toward the end of his visit. The text
follows:

"As a gesture of good will, the Soviet side informs the U.S. side that
the Soviet medium-range bomber TU-22-M, called Backfire in the United States,
has a radius of action of 2,200 kilometers when flying at subsonic speed
with a normal payload at altitudes of 8,000 to 12,000 meters, and that it,
i.e., the Soviet side, does not intend to give this airplane the capability
of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection, the Soviet
side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this aircraft
in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the
United States. It does not intend to give that airplane such capability
in any other manner, including by way of in-flight refueling. At the same
time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rate
of this airplane as compared to the present production rate."

Gromyko pointed out that the statement as just read included exhaustive
data concerning the flight profile of the airplane in connection with its
stated radius of action. These data had not been supplied earlier not
because of any lack of good will, but simply because the Soviet side had
thought the statement to be sufficient as it had then been drafted.
Representatives of the U.S. side had repeatedly asked questions about the
flight profile at which this aircraft had a radius of action of 2,200
kilometers. The answer was now contained in the statement as read. It specified the speed as subsonic, the altitude as 8,12,000 meters and the payload as normal. These data definitely confirmed the fact that the Tu-22-M was a medium range bomber although, he would repeat, the Soviet side was sure that the President's experts had been well aware of that fact all along. If any of them had not known these facts, the statement in its present form would raise the level of their awareness. Apart from that, and here again at the insistence of the U.S. side, the Soviet side had deleted the words "by way of information" from the last sentence of the statement, since Secretary Vance in Moscow had strenuously objected to these words. In fact, however, this had not changed anything since it would go without saying that this editorial change did not in any way change the nature of the Soviet statement; it was a unilateral statement made to demonstrate the good will of the Soviet side. Gromyko expressed the hope that the President would correctly understand and appreciate the willingness of the Soviet side to take into account certain wishes of the U.S. side and to make that unilateral statement more specific.

Gromyko said that this should finally put the Backfire issue to rest, and put it to rest right now, so that neither today nor in the future it be raised as an issue on which reaching agreement depended. Judging by everything said about the Backfire in the past, there were some people who did indeed wish to block agreement by using false information about this airplane. It was not in the interests of either country to encourage such people.

Gromyko had a few more words to say regarding the Backfire. The Soviet leadership had carefully followed discussion of this issue in the United
States and had tried to identify those who made statements about it. Such statements were frequently made by representatives of the U.S. Congress, but sometimes also by representatives of the U.S. Administration. In this way one statement by one group provides a stimulus to statements by another group and reinforced and inflated the current myths that had been created around this aircraft. Eventually some of those who created the myths might even begin to believe their own misstatements. Since this whole issue was based on myths and not on reality, what was needed to resolve it was common sense and reason. It could be resolved much easier than many of the other issues already resolved. And yet, statements were still being made referring to the Backfire as the main political issue at the negotiations. The Soviet leadership simply could not understand such an approach. (Gromyko repeated the words "could not understand.") He believed that it was necessary for both sides to approach all the questions at the negotiations from the standpoint of reason and facts. If the U.S. side agreed with that premise, then it was necessary for the U.S. Administration to take active steps to prove that this aircraft is not a strategic weapons system and cannot in any way constitute a block to reaching agreement.

To what he had already said Gromyko wanted to add that the unilateral text he had read would be transmitted to the U.S. side in written form at the appropriate moment. This would be done on the condition that no one say or imply that this statement was part of the agreement or that it was an official document. If anything to that effect were said, the Soviet side would deny it. Today he would limit himself to having read the statement verbally, but it would eventually be transmitted in written form.
Before concluding his presentation, Gromyko wanted to note the great importance the Soviet side attached to the fact that in the course of the recent meetings in Moscow it had proved possible to agree on the text of the Treaty article dealing with the obligation not to circumvent the provisions of the Treaty. Agreement on this article had been reached mainly as a result of the concessions made by the Soviet side. In this connection, the Soviet side would continue to proceed from the understanding of the obligations contained in that article as discussed in the course of reaching agreement on the text of the non-circumvention provision. What that understanding was was clearly recorded in the memcons of each side.

In conclusion, Gromyko wanted to draw the President's attention to the new and major steps the Soviet side was prepared to take in the interests of finding mutually acceptable solutions to the remaining questions at the negotiations. He expressed the hope that the U.S. side would reciprocate by similar efforts and that they would be able on that basis to conclude working out the agreement at last, ensuring that it would be signed and enter into force at an early stage. He would conclude his statement on this note and would be pleased to hear any comments the President might want to make.

The President first wanted to tell Gromyko that he had learned a lesson this morning. He could see that it had been a mistake to start their meeting so early. Had they started later, Gromyko might have been more forthcoming and cooperative. He wanted to respond briefly to Gromyko's comments on SALT and put the whole discussion in perspective.

The President pointed out that we were talking about a Protocol period that would be relatively short—according to our proposal the Protocol would
expire at the end of 1980. We were also discussing a more extensive agreement to last through the end of 1985. The two sides had agreed on some key numerical levels for the agreement. Referring to the various categories of arms, the significant numbers were 820, 1,200, 1,320 and 2,250. The Soviet Union had a special advantage in having 308 very large missiles which it had moved to MIRV. That continued to be a constant source of concern to the United States. However, this matter had been resolved with mutual concessions he believed, and we were willing to live with an agreement on the basis of these numbers. Two major items remained: one concerned the issue of new types of missiles and the other the characteristics and capabilities of the Backfire bomber, an issue Gromyko had discounted, although we attached importance to it.

We had some important differences concerning the ban on new types of missiles as it applied to SLEMs. In terms of their relative importance and advanced stage of development we equated the Trident-I SLEM to the Soviet RSM-50 SLEM. As an alternative, we equated our Trident-II missile to the Soviet RSM-52 missile. If the Soviet Union could not accept these equations, our position would be that during the term of the agreement through 1985 there should be no ban on new types of SLEMs. However one viewed any of the three options offered as a basis for agreement, we cannot accept that the Trident-I SLEM, a missile in an advanced stage of development, was equivalent to the Soviet RSM-52 SLEM, which we called the Typhoon, which was still in the conceptual stage.

On ICBMs we had put forward two alternative proposals. One applied to the Protocol period which was relatively brief, and would not impose a significant limit because after expiration of the Protocol there could be
rapid deployment of new types of ICBMs. Our preference was that for the entire period of the Treaty through 1985 we put a significant limit on the testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs with one exception for each side. Since a new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle would not have any significance for us, we would prefer to have a reasonable and significant limit established for the Treaty period by providing one exception for each side, the excepted type of ICBM to be equipped with MIRVs or with a single reentry vehicle at the discretion of each side. We would in any case be bound by the 820 maximum limit for MIRVed ICBMs, but how we chose to use that limit should be a matter for us to decide. Either alternative was acceptable to us, but our preference would be one exception for each side, MIRVing to be decided at the discretion of each Party, and to be included for the Treaty period through 1985.

The President said there was another subject he wanted to touch on in passing—the dismantling schedule for excess systems. While it could best be negotiated at the level of the Secretary of State and the Delegations in Geneva, he saw no reason to extend that schedule an additional year. He noted that the two sides might reach agreement this year. As he understood the Soviet proposal, dismantling of excess systems would not be completed until the end of 1981, i.e., 3-1/2 years from now. We were convinced that if dismantling commenced at the beginning of 1980, the missiles to be dismantled could be rendered inoperable within 2 or 3 months, and dismantling could be completed by the end of 1980. In this connection we were talking about 150 missiles and, as he understood it, this certainly
was within the bounds of Soviet capabilities. On occasion the Soviet Union had built missiles faster than that; thus it should be able to dismantle missiles already deployed within the time period we had proposed.

The President turned to the Backfire issue. On the basis of the information he was receiving from all his advisors, who had no motive or desire to mislead him, he felt very strongly that this bomber had intercontinental capabilities, certainly if it were refueled in flight or stationed at advanced Arctic bases. In a time of crisis the total range of this aircraft was what concerned us and not just the radius of action. We believed that Gromyko had taken a step in the right direction in describing the flight profile related to the stated radius of action.

However, the President noted, this language did not preclude substantial increases in the range of the Backfire, and did not preclude refueling capabilities. We were concerned about this just as we were about the absence of a ban on mounting long-range cruise missiles on the Backfire bomber. Further, the statement Gromyko had read also had not provided specifics concerning a production rate base on which we could depend.

Was the Soviet side willing to accept our estimate of the production rate? This was a question Gromyko might answer, since we needed to have mutually agreed numbers for the production rate in order to eliminate this matter. The President's own belief was that the more specific the Soviet side could be, the easier it would be for us to resolve this question. As he had understood Gromyko's statement, the Soviet side felt that this was not a concern for the Soviet Union and should not even be discussed; for us, however, the Backfire was a formidable weapon system if stationed at advanced Arctic bases or equipped with long-range cruise missiles, or produced
at a higher rate. All of these were serious problems for us, to which we attached great significance.

The President said that these very briefly were his concerns with the differences between us he saw as still remaining. He asked if Gromyko might want to respond briefly before the President turned to discussion of questions other than SAINT.

Gromyko first addressed the possibility of the Backfire being equipped with long-range cruise missiles. He said that, as regards this, the Soviet Union would certainly very strictly abide by the obligations the sides would assume in their regard under the Treaty. The Soviet Union would abide by these obligations just as, he was sure, would the United States. Here he could not add or subtract anything. As for the production rate of the Backfire bomber, on several occasions the U.S. side had been informed in official statements that the production rate of that airplane would remain approximately at the present level. This had also been said to President Carter's predecessor in practically the same terms. As for in-flight refueling, there was nothing Gromyko could add to what he had said. The draft statement he had read stated very clearly that the Soviet side would not give that aircraft intercontinental capabilities, including by means of in-flight refueling. If anyone wanted to indulge in speculations to the effect that this aircraft could be refueled five or six or ten times, he would only ask the President to consider how many American aircraft could be refueled in the same manner. In that event the Phantom would certainly have to be considered a heavy bomber. He was sure the President would not agree to have it so considered, but would ask him to let the
Soviet side know if he did agree. As for the Phantom, this would not simply be theory. Phantoms had actually crossed the Atlantic a number of times; thus, if anyone were to raise such questions, it should be the Soviet side rather than the U.S. Phantoms could certainly reach the territory of the Soviet Union, particularly with in-flight refueling. Furthermore, some of them were based in various areas from where they could easily reach Soviet territory. What could the President reply to this?

The President said that one could, of course, speculate back and forth. He believed that a clear statement from the Soviet side would be helpful here. Would the Soviet Union disagree with a unilateral statement to be made by the United States, specifying that it was our estimate that the Soviet Union was producing two Backfires per month? We needed to have clear understanding in this matter.

Yergoyko pointed out that the Soviet statement would be at the disposal of the United States. It clearly said that the rate at which this aircraft had been produced and was being produced now would remain in effect. He recalled that the same thing had also been said to President Ford in Helsinki at a meeting he himself had attended. This had been the occasion of signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. At a meeting between President Ford, L. I. Brezhnev and Secretary Kissinger, President Ford had been told that the production rate of that bomber would not be changed. Also at that same occasion the Soviet side had not disputed the production rate data in the possession of the U.S. side. There a statement had been made, and Yergoyko had repeated it today. Of course, it would be up to the President how best to explain this to the U.S. Congress and U.S. public opinion.
The President repeated his question: if we made a unilateral statement to the effect that the production rate of the Backfire bomber was two aircraft per month, and that the Soviet Union agreed with that figure, would that statement remain unchallenged?

Gromyko said that the Soviet Union would take responsibility for its own statement. What was included in that statement had not been questioned by the U.S. side. Surely the President had data from his own experts. The production rate would remain approximately the same. As to how this should be explained, that would be entirely up to the President. Gromyko would only ask him not to force the Soviet Union to specify numbers; for the Soviet Union this was a matter of principle. There should really be no question here. The Soviet Union knew that the U.S. knew what the production rate was, and the U.S. knew that the Soviet Union knew that the U.S. knew, etc. It would seem there should be no question here at all and no need for polemics between the two sides. Indeed, how could one take two different figures for the production rate? One figure had been stated in Helsinki, and a different one here in Washington. If this was going to continue, Gromyko could not hope to keep up. Just last year the President had named a figure that was different from the one he had named today. Surely his experts could be more precise.

The President said we needed to have a clear understanding here. We had spoken of a figure of 2-1/2 planes per month, i.e., 30 per year. The President needed to tell the American people that our assessment of the production rate was reliable, and that that production rate would not be exceeded. He did not want to find himself in a situation five years from now to discover that the production rate had been, say, 4 planes per month. We needed to tie down this matter.
The President had an additional question to ask: did the Soviet Union intend to retain the refueling capabilities of the Backfire bomber? This was a question to which we needed to have an answer.

Gromyko pointed out that, after all, he had never said that the Soviet Union would assume the obligation to deprive the Backfire bomber of any refueling capability. He had emphasized several times—in Moscow and here—that the Soviet Union would not give that aircraft an intercontinental capability in any manner, including by means of in-flight refueling. This was what he had particularly emphasized today. As for the production rate, he believed he had answered the President's question. The Soviet formula remained. If the President would translate that rate into numbers, and if he would not deviate from the numbers he had when the Soviet Union first proposed that text, there would be no grounds for any polemics between the two sides now, or two or three or four years from now. However, in this connection, he would not want the U.S. side to speak on the basis of one figure one year and a different figure next year.

The President thought he should be frank to tell Gromyko that the Backfire statement suggested by Gromyko was not satisfactory. The total range of that aircraft, that would not be increased in the future, was adequate now with one refueling to strike our country. This would be a serious problem for us, because on a one-way flight without refueling the Backfire could cover 4,400 kilometers, and with refueling could easily reach U.S. territory. The President did not discern anything in the statement Gromyko had read that would state that the 2,200 kilometer range would be
retained, that the aircraft would not have refueling capabilities. Above all, he did not want Gromyko to underestimate the difficulty this aircraft presented for us in terms of a SALT agreement.

(The meeting was briefly recessed to allow Mrs. Rose Kennedy to say hello to Gromyko. After resumption of the meeting, and some kind words by the President and by Gromyko with regard to Mrs. Kennedy, Gromyko returned to the subject under discussion.)

Gromyko said that when he returned to Moscow he would have to report to his colleagues in the Politburo, chaired by Brezhnev, that President Carter and Secretary of State Vance had argued that with additional refueling the TU-22-M bomber could reach U.S. territory, and that this was a matter of major concern to the United States. He would ask the President to imagine what the reaction of the Politburo would be. It would mean that in preparing the new agreement the U.S. side was thinking and talking about a Soviet aircraft which could reach the United States with one refueling. This will naturally also mean that the same arguments could be turned around and applied to large numbers of U.S. aircraft. Could one really say that the two sides were thereby enhancing mutual trust during preparation of the new SALT agreement? No one in the Soviet Union will have an understanding for such an approach. He apologized for saying this to the President quite forthrightly. It was better to say this directly than to harbor such thoughts secretly. He would ask what the real reason was that the U.S. Administration was frightening itself over this question. During the recess he had already said jokingly that the United States seemed to be putting out too many detective stories.
The President said that we were not trying to be contentious or argumentative. This question was one of major concern to the United States.

The President now wanted briefly to address the comprehensive test ban negotiations and then turn to African matters if time permitted, and discuss the problems we saw evolving from that.

As for CTB, the President did not see any need for detailed discussion here of verification and other matters. He believed that one primary issue he and Gromyko might discuss was the duration of the agreement being negotiated. We would like to see it have a five-year term, and then renegotiate the agreement if both sides considered it advisable to enter into a new agreement. To be perfectly frank, we had concerns with our own nuclear arsenal which required occasional testing in order to assure us that its capabilities were intact. We believed that five years was the maximum period of time we could go without some testing. He hoped that this would be satisfactory to the Soviet Union. As for the details, they could be left up to the negotiating teams.

Gromyko said that in the course of the negotiations encouraging progress had been achieved on this issue. There were still some unagreed questions--not many--including the question the President had just mentioned, i.e., the duration of a possible accord. He would ask the President to take into consideration some of the other outstanding matters involved in the CTB negotiations. Immediately prior to his departure from Moscow Gromyko had looked into the status of those negotiations and could say now that if the other issues can be resolved--and on some of them U.S. representatives had taken a very hard position--he believed that a positive solution could
be found to the question of duration of the agreement.

The President asked Ambassador Warnke to touch on the other issues involved.

Ambassador Warnke said there appeared to be agreement in principle on the concepts of authenticated national seismic installations and on on-site inspections. Considerable differences still existed on the extent to which specific equipment to be used would be agreed upon at the present stage of the negotiations. There were also differences on the question of how on-site inspection would be carried out and what equipment would be permitted for that purpose.

The President said there was no need this morning to discuss the technical questions involved. He believed that one political question could be resolved, i.e., the length of the agreement. He thought that as termination of the agreement approached, negotiations could be held regarding extension of the agreement. His position was that five years was a reasonable term. As termination approached, negotiations could be resumed.

Gromyko repeated that if the other questions could be resolved in a positive manner, if the President's negotiators would manifest greater flexibility, he did not think a five-year term would present any difficulties.

The President noted that there were still differences between the United States and the Soviet Union at the SALT negotiations and at the CTE negotiations. He believed, however, that they could be resolved. There were two other items, however, which had now reached serious proportions and were tearing apart the mutual trust and friendship between our two countries which he believed were necessary to assure detente and future peace. These two items were different in nature, but equally important.
Africa

The first of these items concerned Soviet-Cuban intrusion and adventurism in Africa. We were refraining from having a military presence in Africa, but the Soviet presence there had increased to alarming proportions. We knew that the Soviet Union was in a position to exert a strong influence on the Cubans. The Soviets usually claimed that Cuba was an independent country that made its own decisions; we knew, however, of the enormous economic support the Soviet Union was rendering Cuba and could not believe that the Cubans could put 40 or 50 or 60 thousand men into Africa without the Soviet Union's tacit approval or encouragement.

Referring to Zaire and the Katangans' invasion into that country, the President said we did not believe it to have been possible without Cuban assistance. As for Eritrea, he hoped that the dispute there could be resolved without Soviet or Cuban presence or involvement. With the United Nations we were trying to resolve the difficult questions involving Rhodesia and Namibia, and were doing so without any support on the part of the Soviet Union. He believed that it would be to the advantage of the Soviet Union and of our country to see all the parties involved come together in order to resolve the Rhodesian dispute by peaceful means. In this regard we were also consulting with Britain and other nations. If the Cubans were to refrain from interfering and if the Soviet Union were to lend its active support to our efforts, the Rhodesian problem could be resolved by peaceful means. Namibia was another instance requiring peaceful resolution. The Soviet Union did have an influence it could exert, all the way from public support of our efforts in Rhodesia and Namibia to exercising restraint in the Horn of Africa. He believed that elimination of Soviet-Cuban involvement in Africa would be a contributing factor to the
improvement of Soviet-American relations. We were quite concerned and believed the Soviet Union knew that many other nations were equally concerned over Soviet efforts to increase Soviet influence in Africa by supply of weapons and by encouragement of Cuban involvement. The President wanted to express this concern to Gromyko and ask him to report to President Brezhnev that we considered this to be an alarming development, one that was still in progress.

Gromyko said that the Soviet leadership had certainly noted some of the President's recent statements on African matters, which, whether the President liked it or not, also somewhat exacerbated and heated up the atmosphere as regards relations between our two countries. In this connection he was now talking about the specific matters the President had raised in connection with Africa. There was no increasing Soviet presence in Africa. The Soviet Union did not have a single soldier with a rifle in Africa and did not intend to send any to that area. The Soviet Union had indeed sent some quantities of arms to some African countries, as well as a very small number of experts who were helping the Africans master the use of the arms supplied. Not a single Soviet individual had fired a single shot in the course of the latest clashes in Africa, and not a single Soviet individual had taken part in any operation in that part of the world.

The Soviet Union had condemned the Somali invasion of Ethiopia, had called it open aggression and had said so directly to the President of Somalia during his visit to Moscow. Later on President Siad Barre had acknowledged that he had committed aggression. He had asked the Soviet Union to help him extricate himself from that dirty war. The Soviets had told him by way of advice to withdraw all his personnel from Ethiopia and to settle
his dispute with Ethiopia by peaceful means. Quite recently, virtually several days ago, he had admitted that his invasion of Ethiopia had been a mistake and had asked the Soviet Union for help. The Soviet Union had given him some good advice—to withdraw all his personnel and arms from Ethiopian territory. Further, Gromyko had already told Secretary Vance that the Soviet Union had insistently advised the Ethiopians, including Mengistu, to refrain from having Ethiopian troops invade Somali territory. The Soviet Union had indeed supplied weapons to Ethiopia since Ethiopia had been a victim of aggression. Frankly speaking, he felt the United States, too, would have been fully justified if it had helped Ethiopia, since under the U.N. Charter a victim of aggression is entitled to receive assistance on an individual as well as a collective basis. That would have been up to the United States, of course, he was just mentioning this in passing.

Gromyko expressed the hope that the President was in possession of authentic information regarding the role of the Cubans in Ethiopia. The Ethiopians had asked Cuba for assistance just as they had asked the Soviet Union and other countries for assistance. It was very hard indeed to speak of numbers, because the numbers of Cubans involved there, as mentioned by the President, were exaggerated at least tenfold. He believed that the Somalis were deliberately exaggerating these numbers and that the United States was not sufficiently critical of the information it received from the Somalis. Incidentally, the Cubans, like the Soviets, had advised the Ethiopians not to cross the border into Somalia. The Soviet Union was indeed consulting with Cuba from time to time, but to speak of some sort of coordinated Cuban-Soviet plan, etc., was absolutely wrong.
As for Eritrea, Gromyko pointed out that the Soviet position was that Eritrea should enjoy a broad autonomy within a united and sovereign Ethiopian state. The Soviets had said this many times to the Ethiopian leadership. This was not the same situation as had been the case with Ogaden. Each of these issues had its own specific aspects which were quite different from case to case. The Soviet Union had called upon the Ethiopian leaders not to permit any bloodshed in Eritrea and to settle the dispute there by peaceful means. The Soviet Union had expressed this position to the Cubans as well, and they in turn had told the Soviets that their position in this respect was identical. There was not a single Cuban soldier fighting in Eritrea today. The Soviet leadership had been informed that this was Fidel Castro's firm position. As for further developments in that area, he was not at all sure that there would not be further bloodshed there. After all, there were certain circles outside that area, who urged the Eritreans to resist a peaceful settlement. What was more, Ethiopia, too, was not totally in sympathy with arriving at a peaceful settlement. If the Ethiopians had not been restrained by the Soviets and by the Cubans, blood would have flowed there long ago. Whether or not one could succeed in restraining them over a period of time, Gromyko did not know, but the Soviet Union was working in that direction. In Ethiopia the Soviet Union was a factor restraining hostilities rather than a factor prodding military action. To what extent this would be successful in the future he could not now predict. The Soviets had learned that one could not rely on the word of Siad Barre. If the United States had not learned that lesson yet, he was sure it would reach that conclusion soon. At the time when the Soviet
Union had supplied weapons to Somalia, it had been done on the condition that these weapons would not be used against third countries, but only for self-defense. Siad Barre had given the Soviet Union a pledge to that effect, but everyone knew what had happened subsequently.

As for Rhodesia, Namibia and Zaire; he could tell the President firmly that the Soviet Union had no representatives in that area, not even news correspondents, and did not intend to send any representatives there. The Soviet Union knew absolutely nothing about the recent actions of the so-called gendarmes of Katanga. The very word brought back memories of the period when Tshombe had been in charge.

Gromyko noted that the President had spoken of the influence the Soviet Union had in Rhodesia and Namibia. If he had referred to ideological influence, he might have been right, because for many years the Soviet Union had argued against colonialism and racism. That was no secret. He would only point out that ideological influence knew no barriers at all. As for anything else, absolutely nothing was being done. He would guess that the President had received reports to the effect that the Soviet Union wanted to lay its hands on the entire area; he would tell the President, however, that the Soviet Union was doing absolutely nothing in that area, and knew nothing of the developments there except what was reported in the press. The Soviet Union was not sending any people to that area. He could imagine the hue and cry throughout the world that would be raised if any Soviets or Cubans travelled to Rhodesia or Namibia. They did not have a single representative there, unlike the United States.
Gromyko wanted to say a few words about Zaire. Whatever he knew about the recent invasion there, he knew from the reports of various press agencies and the reports of the Soviet representative in Zaire. The Soviet chargé d'affaires had been called in to see Mobutu recently and had been informed that some Katangan gendarmes had invaded the territory of Zaire from Angola. The Soviet Union had not even known of their presence in Angola. As for the Cubans, not a single Cuban had been caught or even seen in that invasion. Yet, for some reason people had started to blame first the Soviet Union and then the Cubans. He had questioned the Cubans at a very high level about this invasion and had been told that Cuba had absolutely nothing to do with the whole matter. The Soviet Union wanted to maintain good relations with Zaire and the Soviet chargé had said so to Mobutu. After all, what would President Carter want done? If there were some refugees in Angola who subsequently crossed the border into their own country, what should be done with them—should they be shot? They seemed to be running from repression. So much for the situation in Zaire. The President would note that Gromyko had said quite a few things about all these areas. As for Namibia, the Soviet Union was not looking for anything at all in that country and it had accordingly informed the British. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was totally against keeping the blacks in Rhodesia in bondage. 24 out of 25 people there were black, and the Soviet Union had stated that it was in favor of the majority of the people themselves deciding what kind of a government they should have. He could not agree with the thesis that foreigners would know best what should be done in Rhodesia. The Soviet Union was saying this, and that was no secret. That was its position of
principle, based on its ideology. Soviet policy throughout the world was based on the premise that people were their own best masters.

In conclusion, Gromyko wanted to thank the President for the great patience he had displayed. Knowing how busy the President was, Gromyko had nevertheless taken a great deal of his time, but this was so because the questions they had discussed were very important. The President had made some statements, as had others, reflecting on the state of our bilateral relations. That, too, was important and therefore Gromyko had provided appropriate explanations. The Soviet Union had no designs on Africa at all. The President could rest assured that the Soviets did not want to lay their hands on Africa; the Soviet Union had a large enough territory of its own with much to do there. He would draw the conclusion that it was necessary for our two countries to consult with each other more frequently, and to explain our respective views of the situation to each other. That should be done in person rather than just by written communications.

The President said he would respond briefly. U.S. assessment of the same situation was quite different from the assessment Gromyko had provided. We looked at the Horn of Africa with a great deal of concern. From our perspective, the Somalis had invaded Ogaden using Soviet weapons. We understood that the Ethiopian response there had been directed by a Soviet general. While the Soviet Union had not sent troops to the area, the Cubans had sent more than 15,000 men. We recognized that the Soviet Union and the United States had persuaded the Ethiopians not to cross the Somali border once the Somalis had been pushed out of Ogaden. However, Soviet generals and Cuban officers remained, perhaps directing combat
against Eritrea. The Cubans had said that they were not involved directly, that they had no troops in combat status in Eritrea. We certainly hoped that was the case. In Angola the Cuban presence had recently increased to 20,000 troops plus service personnel. The Katangans, to whom Gromyko had referred as refugees, had certainly been trained and supported by the Cubans in Angola and perhaps by some East Germans. In Zaire a major military force had appeared, well supplied with Soviet weapons. It had destroyed Kolwezi with major loss of life. The President had no doubt that the Soviet Union could have prevented that if it had used its influence with the Angolans, the Cubans and the East Germans, all of whom depended upon the Soviet Union to a great extent. The President had not claimed that the Cubans had troops in Zaire, but he did not doubt that the invaders had been encouraged and supplied by those allies of the Soviet Union.

The President said there were also some other concerns in Africa which he would not have time to discuss now. The Libyans, allies of the Soviet Union, had moved into Chad. We had no interests in the area except that we did not want to see borders violated by military action. There was a broad pattern emerging of Soviet supply of military weapons, some of which Cubans used to train black troops to keep military action going in many African areas. This situation had escalated in scope and intensity, and we were very concerned about it, as the President had said earlier. In addition to refraining from military action, we would like to have the Soviet Union's positive support for our efforts in Rhodesia and Namibia. The President had understood the statements Gromyko had made, and hoped that Gromyko understood the seriousness with which we viewed these developments.
There was one more item on which the President wanted to put great emphasis—that was the question of human rights. Trials were underway in the Soviet Union against people who had organized to monitor compliance with the Helsinki agreement. We did indeed look on this as an internal matter for the Soviet Union, and recognized that we had no authority to intercede. However, the President felt that he had the duty to express concern when the people tried were given maximum sentences, in violation of even Soviet laws. He was quite concerned over future plans in the Soviet Union to repeat the circumstances of the Orlov trial in the cases of Scharansky and Ginzburg. These were matters of intense interest in the United States. The President was not questioning the right of the Soviet Union to act in these matters as it saw fit, but he did have to point out what detriment to mutual trust and respect between our countries and to certain other matters such as trade and scientific and cultural exchanges would come as a result of these trials. The President recognized the sensitivity of these matters for the Soviet Union, but wanted to be sure that Gromyko understood their sensitivity in the United States. The Soviet Union never refrained from criticizing us when it felt that we were acting improperly toward our own citizens. The President felt no restraint, therefore, in expressing the concerns he had just expressed.

Gromyko continued his response to the President on African matters. He called the presence of a Soviet general in Ethiopia a myth. Had the Soviet Union been invited to send a general there, it would have refused. There was no Soviet Napoleon in Africa. Evidently the President was being fed completely fantastic information. As for the Cuban presence, the Soviet Union had information that in Angola the number of Cubans was being
reduced rather than increased. The President's reference to GDR personnel
in connection with Kolwezi could not be regarded as authentic. Even the
U.S. press had not alleged anything of the sort. As for the invasion into
Zaire, the press had first reported that Mobutu's soldiers in the area were
shooting blacks, then that blacks were shooting whites, whites were shooting
blacks, and had spoken of certain rebels. The situation appeared to be
totally confused, but there was certainly no Soviet or Cuban involvement
there.

Turning to the question of human rights, Gromyko wanted to tell the
President quite frankly that no matter how close to the President's heart
were his feelings about these matters, he would ask him to realize that
these were internal affairs of the Soviet Union, and that they would be
decided in accordance with Soviet laws. No one else could tell the Soviet
Union how to resolve these matters. Gromyko asked the President not to
regard this statement of his as being directed at the President personally
or at his concept of human rights. Human rights was a general concept,
while what the President had been talking about involved domestic affairs.
Throughout the entire world international law, as well as the Helsinki Final
Act recognized that internal matters were resolved in each country internally,
on the basis of its own domestic laws. With all due respect for the Presi-
dent, Gromyko felt he would be wrong if he failed to tell him this. No
one in the Soviet Union was now being condemned or would be condemned in the
future for something that he was not guilty of. That was not part of Soviet
practice.

The President thought that the exchange he and Gromyko had today had
been constructive in that he now understood the Soviet position better,
and that Gromyko understood the concerns on our side. He knew that there were serious differences between us, but firmly believed that we had every opportunity to resolve them. Both our countries stood for peace and for reducing the level of destruction and loss of life throughout the world. We both wanted to have better trade relations with each other and greater friendship between our peoples. The President's total commitment as President was to realize these objectives. He would ask Gromyko to convey his best wishes to President Brezhnev and express the hope that within the next few weeks we would be able to resolve the remaining issues at SALT and perhaps those concerning the test ban, leading to a personal meeting between Brezhnev and the President. He wanted to express the good will of the American people to the people of Gromyko's country. Their hope was for improved relations between us, for resolution of differences and for conclusion of a SALT agreement as soon as possible. In closing, the President would promise Gromyko that their next meeting would be scheduled for a later hour.