DATE: July 12, 1978
Time: 1030 to 1125 am
Place: Botanic Building, Geneva

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

Secretary Vance
Ambassador Warnke
Ambassador Toon
Ambassador Shulman
Ambassador Earle
Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
Mr. Leslie H. Gelb
DAS of Defense Slocombe
LT. Gen. Rowny
Mr. William T. Shinn, Jr.
Mr. William D. Kriemer
(Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister Gromyko
First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko
Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. V. G. Makarov
Academician A. N. Shchukin
Mr. V. G. Komplekov
Mr. N. N. Detinov
Mr. V. M. Sukhodrev
(Interpreter)
Mr. A. A. Obukhov (Note Taker)
Mr. Kochetkov (Note Taker)

New Types of ICBMs and SLBMs

The Secretary first wanted to welcome Minister Gromyko and his colleagues and express his pleasure at having them here with us for the purpose of resuming discussions of the important matters before them. This morning he proposed that they focus on one of the most important issues remaining to be resolved in the Agreement: limitations on the introduction of new types of strategic missiles and on modernization of existing types of strategic missiles.

First, he wanted to review where we stand on the issues of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs and of modernization of existing types.

The Secretary wanted initially to address U.S. proposals on ICBMs. In previous discussions we had proposed a ban on testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs in the Protocol. This would
prohibit introduction of new types of ICBMs through 1980 while they discussed how to deal with this issue in SALT III.

We had also indicated that we could accept a ban on testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs through 1985, except that either side could test and deploy one new ICBM, MIRVed, or non-MIRVed. This would permit the Soviets to go ahead with the new, single RV ICBM, which fits their force structure, and would permit us to proceed with a new MIRVed ICBM, which would fit into our force structure. This would provide for equality and equal security on both sides.

Either of these proposals would represent a satisfactory solution of the ICBM new types issue.

The Secretary next turned to the question of U.S. proposals on SLBMs. He said that in the context of a Protocol ban on new types of ICBMs, we could agree to a ban on new types of SLBMs, allowing for continued testing and deployment of Trident I and the SS-N-18.

In the context of a ban on new types of ICBMs through 1985 with one exemption, MIRVed or non-MIRVed, for each side, we could agree to a ban on new types of SLBMs for the same period, with one exemption. In our case this would be the Trident II, and in the Soviet case this would be the Typhoon, which they called the RSM-52. Under this proposal, Trident I and the SS-N-18 would be considered existing types.

The Soviet side had proposed a ban on new types of ICBMs for the Protocol period, except that each side would be permitted to test and deploy one new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle. This proposal would prevent us from testing any new missile, while allowing the Soviets to go ahead with a new single RV ICBM for which we have no program and no need. This was inequitable and unacceptable to us.

The Soviets had also proposed a ban on new types through 1985, with the same exemption for a new single RV ICBM. This proposal was even more one-sided:

---The U.S. would have no new ICBM for the duration of the 1985 agreement, since we have no program or requirement for a new single RV ICBM.

---The Soviet Union would, however, be able to deploy its entirely new type of single RV ICBM.

Finally, the Soviets had proposed a ban on the testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs through 1985, without exception. This proposal indicates that they can forestall a new single RV ICBM. In that sense, it represents a constructive step to which we have given consideration in our own thinking. The logic of this proposal
argues that the Soviets should be able to accept our proposal for a Protocol ban on all new types, which would impose equal constraints on both sides.

As for SLEM new types, the Soviet proposal was the same for all variants: a ban on flight testing and deployment for either the Protocol or the 1985 period, with an exception for Trident I and the Typhoon. This was not equitable. Trident I has already begun flight-testing and should be treated the same as the SS-N-18. Soviet rights to a new, untested SLEM must be balanced by equal rights for the U.S. This means that Trident II and Typhoon must be treated comparably. Either they must both be banned or both be exempted.

There was also the question of how to define a new type of ICBM, which is being addressed by the Delegations. The U.S. has made a major move in the direction of the Soviet side, so we are closer to agreement on this issue. However, significant differences remain.

The Secretary wanted to emphasize the importance of a prohibition on an increase in the number of reentry vehicles on existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs. The U.S. side notes the Soviet inclusion in its May 1978 proposal of the rule that in the course of modernization of an existing type, the number of RVs on that type should not be increased. We welcomed this indication that the Soviets agreed that fractionation limits for ballistic missiles are a valuable part of dealing meaningfully with the new types issue.

In this connection, we believed each side should specify how many RVs have been tested on existing types.

The U.S. also regarded as important the elements of our definition of new types about restricting changes in individual stages and in the relevant characteristics of what we called the post-boost vehicle for current missiles.

We also believed that an exempted new type of ICBM should not have more than 10 reentry vehicles, which is the maximum number tested to date on an ICBM on either side. Similarly, if we agreed to exempt a new type of SLEM, there should be a limit on the number of reentry vehicles at 14, the maximum number tested by either side to date on an SLBM.

It was clearly important to limit the number of reentry vehicles on exempted missiles. This provision, along with the ban on increasing the number of reentry vehicles on existing ballistic missiles, would make a significant contribution to the effectiveness of a new types ban and to the stability of the strategic balance.
New U.S. Proposal for a Ban on New Types

We had explained the rationale for the two alternatives for a ban on new types of ICBMs we had offered, and he continued to believe that either would lead to an equitable solution of this issue.

As he had said at the beginning, the new types issue is one of the most important political-level issues remaining to be resolved in the agreement. If we were able to reach a satisfactory solution, he believed we will have made a great stride toward a final agreement.

In recognition of the importance of the issue for the progress of these negotiations, and in light of these constructive elements of the Soviet May 1978 proposals, and in an effort to bridge the gap between Soviet proposals and ours, the Secretary was prepared to offer the following compromise.

He wanted to emphasize that in our view the new types issue has several related elements which apply to both ICBMs and SLBMs: namely, a ban on new types; a definition of permitted modernization of existing types which prevents increases in the number of RVs on an existing type; and possible exemptions for new types. Our new proposal has been designed to resolve all these elements as a whole. It forms an integrated package and cannot be broken into individual parts.

--We were prepared to prohibit testing and deployment of any new types of ICBMs through 1985, except that each side would be permitted to flight-test one new type of ICBM, MIRVed or non-MIRVed. However, deployment of new types of ICBMs would be prohibited through 1985.

--New types of ICBMs would be determined by the definition which we have proposed, including a ban on an increase in the maximum number of reentry vehicles on any existing type of missile. The exempted ICBM could have no more than 10 reentry vehicles.

The Secretary wanted to point out for clarity that when he spoke of exempted ICBMs, he meant ICBMs whose flight testing would be exempted from the ban, but not their deployment.

--This proposal, when considered in relation to the 820 limit on MIRVed ICBMs, represents a meaningful arms control step. Yet it gives both sides flexibility in deciding how to structure their mix of MIRVed and single warhead ICBMs.

--We were also prepared to agree to a ban on new types of SLBMs through 1985, except that one new type of SLBM could be tested and deployed. The SLBM exemption would apply to Typhoon on the Soviet side and Trident II on our side. The Trident I and SS-N-18 would be considered existing SLBMs.
--There would be a prohibition on increases in the number of reentry vehicles for existing types of SLBMs. The maximum number of reentry vehicles on an exempted SLBM would be 14.

This proposal takes into account the essential elements of the approaches taken by both sides: the Soviet side wanted to ban new ICBMs through 1985, and they could be banned. We had sought to obtain equality of constraints on both sides. It is good arms control and it gives each side flexibility to structure its own forces.

In making this proposal, the Secretary wanted also to make it clear that the U.S. cannot accept a limit on the number of ALCMs carried by an aircraft limited under the 1320 ceiling, and this new proposal was contingent on Soviet agreement that there be no such limits.

As he had said, this new proposal is offered as an integrated package and cannot be broken into individual parts. We offered it in an effort to seek a fair and prompt resolution of this issue.

In conclusion, the Secretary wanted to make two points:

The United States had had no new ICBMs since the Minuteman 3, first deployed almost a decade ago. The Soviet Union has deployed several ICBMs in that period, most of them MIRVed and far larger than Minuteman 3.

The Secretary had to emphasize that by making this proposal the U.S. has made a serious and substantial political commitment to conclude a new agreement.

Gromyko suggested a recess for five or ten minutes, to enable him to consult with his Delegation on how to proceed further.

Following a brief recess, Gromyko said that he would need some time in order to examine the Secretary's proposals carefully. He would tell the Secretary now, however, that these proposals did not instill particular optimism in his mind, but he would return to them this afternoon. If acceptable to the Secretary, he would suggest they recess the talks until 3:30 p.m., at which time he thought he would be able to express Soviet considerations on the current state of negotiations and on the proposals advanced by the Secretary today. During the time before resuming their meeting at 3:30 p.m., he would have some internal work to do.

The Secretary agreed.