The current meeting was already the third round of the Soviet-American talks on this question at the political level. This year, furthermore, it was precisely this question that had been discussed in Moscow and New York. This fact in itself attracted the attention of Soviet-American relations. The talks proceeded in a very intense way, with both sides giving a great deal of attention to the substance of the Secretary’s comments, but first and foremost to the reaction of the Soviet Union to the Secretary’s comments. As the Secretary had promised, he would set out the Soviet attitude toward the agreement in the general state of affairs as regards preparation of the new summit agreement.
questions asked concerned the status of the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms. Did this not say a great deal? It did, indeed. Everywhere people were conscious of the great importance of this question and quite justifiably linked successful completion of the new Agreement with the general state of Soviet-American relations. People hoped that the new Agreement would become a milestone on the road to limiting and eventually ending the arms race, that it would provide an impetus to practical measures for genuine disarmament. It was not by chance, therefore, that the continuing delay in completing work on the new Agreement gives rise to a great deal of concern everywhere. There was hardly any need to point out that a delay had indeed occurred in this process; that was quite obvious.

All the above should be borne in mind as a clear reminder of the great responsibility of our two countries for the destinies of efforts to limit strategic arms. This referred not only to completion and conclusion of the Agreement currently under negotiation but also to making sure that on this basis headway be made in adopting more farreaching measures in this area in the near future. For its part, the Soviet Union, everywhere and at all levels, had come out with specific and positive proposals aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions to the remaining issues in keeping with the fundamental principle of equality and equal security. (Gromyko repeated and stressed the words "equality and equal security." It was necessary to realize that without full and realistic implementation of this fundamental principle one could not count on reaching an agreement. An approach based on this principle was of particular importance at the present concluding phase of the work on the Agreement. After all, the range of unagreed questions had now been substantially reduced to a minimum. Gromyko thought the Secretary would agree with that view. At this stage as at no other moment one could and, indeed, would have to judge the intentions of the other side concerning the accord not by general statements made, but by the positions it took on specific issues. This was the only objective indicator of such intentions. It was necessary genuinely to search for mutually acceptable solutions to the outstanding issues and to lead matters toward successful conclusion of the Agreement rather than strive to obtain something else at the expense of one partner at the negotiations, complicate the negotiations by raising more and more issues, or circumvent and erode understandings already achieved. It was absolutely clear that such tactics could not serve the purpose of making headway in the talks and therefore of reaching final agreement.

Gromyko said that he was mentioning this not because he wanted to use harsh words toward the U.S. side, but because the sides already had years of experience behind them at these negotiations. (He repeated and stressed the words "years of experience.") It
was this experience that justified the words he had used. The Soviet Union was in favor of resolving all outstanding issues in a businesslike way, to complete agreement without any further delay, to sign it and have it enter into force. It was from this position of principle that the Soviet side would approach the task of finding solutions for the few outstanding issues remaining.

At this point Gromyko wanted to express the following thought—-it was quite appropriate to express this thought here because there were people in the United States who tried to present matters in such a way as to imply that the Soviet Union was far more interested in achieving the SALT II Agreement than the United States. Here Gromyko would point out that anyone alleging that the constructive approach of the Soviet Union was due to a greater interest in reaching agreement, and who would draw the conclusion from this that one should simply sit and wait for more and more concessions on the part of the Soviet Union, would be making a great mistake. Gromyko said he had repeatedly found that those in the United States who shout the loudest had not even tried to read the proposals made by the Soviet Union carefully, or even the proposals of the United States; this could only lead to the conclusion that they did not know what our negotiations were all about. They kept repeating the stereotyped assertion: "The Soviet Union is more interested in concluding the SALT II Agreement than the United States—the Soviet Union is more interested in concluding the SALT II Agreement than the United States." Such repetition would not make these shouted stereotypes any more convincing. Gromyko felt no need to go into further details on this, since the Secretary would know them better than he did.

Gromyko said that he would take this occasion once again on behalf of the Soviet authorities and on behalf of Brezhnev personally to repeat and emphasize that the Soviet Union was resolutely in favor of reaching agreement and that in advancing its proposals it always took into account the position of the United States and worked toward finding mutually acceptable solutions. The Soviet leadership believed that the United States, too, should take steps to meet the Soviet side in reaching solutions that would be fully in accord with the principle of equality and equal security. "Let no one assume that we will sacrifice the interest of our security." An approach of that kind could only produce delay to the detriment of both our countries and to the detriment of world peace.

The still outstanding issues, and they were really few in number, were by no means any more complex than those already resolved, and they could have been resolved long ago, given a genuine desire to do so on both sides. There were many in the United States who multiplied the obstacles in the way of reaching agreement a hundredfold and even a thousandfold and themselves created new obstacles, while in reality the outstanding issues could be
resolved if both sides were guided by the "principle of principles" of which Gromyko had spoken a number of times and of which the Soviet side had spoken many times in the past. For its part, the Soviet Union would make every effort to work toward agreement, and it would expect the U.S. side to make similar efforts if the United States, too, wanted to reach agreement without further delay.

Here Gromyko wanted to digress and say that he had read a number of statements made in the United States, without naming names, which caused him to reflect on what such people really wanted to achieve. Reading their statements, that question arose quite involuntarily. His own reaction to these statements was not to make matters worse, but to remain cool. To a certain extent he understood the complexity of the situation and of political life in the United States. Nevertheless such a question did arise. Sometimes he and others on the Soviet side came to even sadder conclusions about some particular statement made in the U.S., and could only ask: did the speaker (still without naming names) really know what he was talking about, did he realize what direction he was taking? Sometimes speakers of that kind were so overcome by their own emotions that they themselves did not quite know what they wanted. Gromyko thought that, being partners in these negotiations, the Soviets had every right to express the following thought and wish. They would like to see responsible officials in the United States, and first and foremost President Carter and Secretary Vance, as well as others active in the political life of the country and in foreign policy, take a much firmer stand in defense of the new Agreement. Quite recently the Soviets had, indeed, noted more frequent statements in favor of the Agreement in the United States. Nonetheless he did want to express that wish and hoped that the Secretary would understand him correctly.

Gromyko said that the Soviet Union had advanced specific and constructive proposals on all the issues remaining outstanding, proposals that offered an avenue for resolving these issues. If one took a look at the question of new types of ballistic missiles (both ICBMs and SLBMs), the Soviet Union had offered the U.S. a choice between several variants which, although they were indeed different in their specific content, had one thing in common: they ensured equal conditions for both sides and their implementation would not upset the strategic balance. Gromyko wanted to remind the Secretary what those three variants provided. The first was that for the duration of the three-year Protocol there would be a ban on the flight testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs, with the exception that each side would be permitted to flight-test and deploy one new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle. Under the second variant there would be a ban on the flight testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs with the same exception as in the first variant, but the ban would apply throughout the term of the Treaty rather than the Protocol, i.e., through 1985. The third variant would provide a
ban on the flight testing and deployment of all new types of ICBMs without exception for the term of the Treaty. In other words, the ban would apply to MIRVed ICBMs as well as to ICBMs with a single reentry vehicle. At the same time, each of these variants would provide for a ban on the flight testing and deployment of new types of SLBMs, the first variant for the duration of the Protocol, the second and third variants for the duration of the Treaty. An exception to that ban would be provided for comparable SLBMs of both sides, namely for the Soviet RSM-52 missile and the U.S. Trident I missile.

Gromyko wanted to point out that the constructive nature of these Soviet proposals became all the more evident if viewed in the context of the major step the Soviet side had already taken toward the U.S. position on the question of new types of ICBMs. This was something that should not be forgotten; specifically, he would recall that the Soviet side had agreed to count as MIRVed missiles any missile that had been tested with MIRVs, even if it had been tested with such reentry vehicles only once. Naturally, this agreement of the Soviet side was contingent upon reaching agreement on other outstanding issues. The Soviets had told this to representatives of the United States on countless occasions. Each time the U.S. side had said that it did understand Soviet positions in this regard. He would also recall that Secretary Vance’s predecessor, Secretary Kissinger, had expressed his appreciation that the Soviet Union had agreed to take such a step. It had not been an easy decision for Soviet authorities to take, indeed it had been quite painful; nevertheless, the Soviet Union had agreed. By way of another example, he would point out Soviet agreement to limit the number of MIRVed ballistic missiles to 1,200 in the event that agreement was reached on the new types issue. He would add here that one of the reasons for their having agreed to this number was that it had been proposed by President Carter personally. He had expected that the U.S. side would duly appreciate this step of theirs.

All the three variants the Soviet side had proposed for a solution of the new types of ballistic missiles issue, which he had listed above, remained in force today as well, and the Soviet Union was prepared to reach agreement on any one of these variants. They were of equal standing, although he would emphasize that in the opinion of the Soviet side the one that would be most in line with the aim of curbing the strategic arms race was the third variant, which provided for a ban on the testing and deployment of all new types of ICBMs without exception. Adoption of such a solution would be a very far-reaching step indeed, one whose significance would go far beyond the limits of the present stage of the limitation of strategic arms. At the same time, if such a solution were adopted, it would not yield any advantage to either side.
Gromyko said that in coming to the present series of meetings, the Soviets had expected that the U.S. side would arrive with a positive response to the Soviet proposals. However, he would note that the considerations the Secretary of State had expressed this morning had not justified that expectation. The proposals the Secretary had presented clearly ensued from the ongoing programs of the United States to develop new types of strategic offensive arms. As a practical matter, they did not affect these programs and were aimed at obtaining a substantial one-sided advantage for the United States. After all, it was precisely this that was provided for in the U.S. proposal to permit the flight testing of a new type of ICBM equipped with MIRVs or with a single reentry vehicle, while at the same time banning its deployment for the duration of the Treaty, together with a ban on the flight testing and deployment of new types of SLBMs, except that such a ban would not apply to the Soviet RSM-52 SLBM and the U.S. Trident II SLBM. The Soviet side had repeatedly demonstrated and provided appropriate rationale to prove that the new types of SLBMs should be, for the United States—Trident I, and for the USSR—RSM-52. He would not repeat that rationale again. Moreover, this unacceptable proposal was linked to other proposals in a package, which was not acceptable as such.

For example, there was the question of long-range ALCMs. How could anyone expect the Soviet side to accept a proposal that was contrary to the principle of equality and equal security which Gromyko had emphasized several times in his statement today? Any such expectation would be vain indeed. The Soviet side proceeded from the premise that on this score a clear-cut understanding had been reached to the effect that heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles capable of a range of 600-2,600 kilometers would be counted within the 1,320 aggregate on a par with ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs. It followed clearly from this that no other kind of airplane, including transport airplanes, could be equipped with such missiles. It was also clear that the number of missiles capable of ranges in excess of 600 kilometers with which a bomber could be equipped must not exceed twenty. The Soviet side believed that the maximum number of such missiles, i.e., 20, must not be exceeded, and he had to tell the Secretary that the Soviet side was prepared to take this step in the interest of reaching agreement. Any attempt to evade this limitation, i.e., the right to deploy an unlimited number of cruise missiles on a bomber, would be seen by the Soviet side as aimed at circumventing and emasculating the understanding on cruise missiles in the hope of achieving a unilateral advantage. It was quite natural that this was something the Soviet side could not accept, and if anyone wanted to use this way of escalating the arms race, one might ask why, then, were we talking about reduction of strategic arms? These things were incompatible, and there should be no illusions that there was any way to make them compatible.
Gromyko wanted to repeat that the ban on the installations of cruise missiles on transport airplanes and the limitation of their maximum number on bombers ensued directly from the overall understanding on cruise missiles as well as the essence of the Agreement the two sides were trying to reach today. In the event and only in the event of an understanding on the establishment of such limitations and agreement on the criteria for limiting cruise missiles, the Soviet side would be ready to agree that in the process of modernization of existing types of ICBMs the number of their warheads must not be increased. This question, like other questions concerning modernization of existing types and the definition of new types of ballistic missiles, could be discussed between the two Delegations here in Geneva. They were not among the major issues on which, as agreed earlier, Gromyko and the Secretary should focus their attention.

Gromyko now wanted to say a few words regarding the timing of reductions of systems in excess of the aggregate levels of strategic delivery vehicles—2,400 and 2,250. The Secretary would not be surprised that Gromyko wanted to address this matter. He had mentioned this morning that, although the question of new types of ballistic missiles was the main outstanding issue between the two sides, they had somehow been unable to bring this matter of reductions into a safe harbor. He hoped the Secretary would not reproach him for raising this matter now. Quite frankly, it was difficult to understand why this issue was still outstanding; in other words, the issue of the timing of reductions to comply with established aggregate levels. Both sides agreed that such reductions should be accomplished within a 12-month period, in other words the sides had reached agreement both on the scope of reductions and on the time limit required to bring them about. The fact that the Soviet side was suggesting that these reductions be initiated in December of 1980 rather than January of that year was based on purely technical and practical considerations. There were no other reasons for that proposal: no political reasons. Were these not talks at the political level, the Soviets might simply shrug their shoulders and say, "look what a subject you found to have a difference on." He would therefore suggest that they now finally agree on timing on the basis he had proposed and instruct their Delegations in Geneva to formulate this understanding in the document being negotiated.

Gromyko wanted to say a few words regarding the Soviet medium bomber TU-22-M, called Backfire in the United States, in connection with the position taken on the question by the U.S. side in the course of discussions. Yes, this was a medium range bomber, it was not strategic. Nevertheless, displaying its good will, the Soviet side had stated its readiness to close out this issue on the basis of the unilateral statement it had offered. The Soviet side had gone very far indeed in this matter and had specified in that statement the matters of interest to the U.S.
side to the maximum extent possible. However, everything has its limits, and it was now high time for the U.S. side to appreciate the constructive attitude and patience of the Soviet side. In the absence of that, the Soviet side would only be reinforced in its conviction that from the very beginning it should not have made any statement on this bomber whatsoever. This airplane was something that had nothing to do with the ongoing discussions and he had told the Secretary that several times, and would repeat it today. Lowering his voice and looking straight at the Secretary Gromyko said that the Soviet side would not be able to agree to the change of even a comma in that unilateral statement. He would repeat that the Soviet side could not change that statement in terms of adding further specifics or new aspects. If it was a matter of eliminating something, "shrinking" the statement, that was something else again.

Gromyko said that, in concluding this review of the state of affairs relating to the outstanding issues, he wanted to stress again the carefully weighed and balanced nature of the Soviet proposals, which were aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions and concluding work on the agreement. The statement he had just delivered had two purposes: first to set out in specifics the constructive and positive proposals of the Soviet side, and second, to respond to the considerations the Secretary had expressed this morning. He would have one additional comment: naturally, there were various questions before the two sides, and it had been recognized by himself and the Secretary that some of them could be further discussed here by the two Delegations. There were some questions, indeed. He and the Secretary had talked about this during the Secretary's visit to Moscow and had a common understanding on this; thus, what Gromyko had said should not be news to the Secretary.

The Secretary suggested a five minute break and said that he would then respond to Gromyko.

Following a short break, the Secretary said that he had listened very carefully to what Gromyko had said today. He had noted that there was nothing new in any of the statements that were made. He would like to respond to some of the observations Gromyko had made and would start with one or two brief observations on our views concerning the strategic arms talks, their importance, and our desire to conclude these talks in a way that would be fair and acceptable to both sides, providing for equality and equal security.

The Secretary said that the President and himself, as well as Mr. Warnke and other leaders, had made it very clear on a large number of occasions that "we" are resolute in our desire to complete work in the SALT negotiations as promptly as possible and in a businesslike manner. Gromyko had suggested that we should be firmer in expressing our views on the talks. The Secretary would take exception to that suggestion. He thought that we had
been very clear about the importance we attached to these talks and their prompt conclusion. He had personally said as recently as the day before yesterday that we considered the SALT negotiations to be of paramount importance and of a special quality in nature, that both sides were obligated to conclude the talks in the interests of the people of our two countries and indeed in the interests of world peace. This was our position and this remained our position, but it will take two of us, namely both sides, to accomplish this result.

The Secretary now wanted to comment on the Soviet proposals which Gromyko had reiterated today. First, he would point out that the Soviet proposals would permit all Soviet programs to go ahead while putting restraints on the United States. They would give the Soviet side a successor to the SS-11 missile, and under the Soviet definition the Soviet side would be permitted extensively to modernize all of its ICBMs. This, he would submit, was inconsistent with equal security. Further, we would be unable to go ahead with any new ICBM since we had no need for a new ICBM with a single reentry vehicle, as Gromyko very well knew. Moreover, the Soviet side could deploy RSM-52 SLBMs, which had never been tested and were at an early stage of development. The RSM-52 was in no sense comparable to the Trident I SLEB, which had been undergoing flight testing for one and a half years and was directly comparable to the Soviet RSM-50 SLBM. The Soviet proposals would block our Trident II SLEB which was at the same stage of development as the Soviet RSM-52. Such a proposal was obviously inconsistent with the principle of equality and equal security. Further, Soviet proposals would allow replacement of the SS-11 missile, and modernization of SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 missiles, as well as the testing and deployment of RSM-52 SLBMs. They would not allow any new U.S. ICBMs or any new U.S. SLBMs. How, he would ask, did such a proposal meet the principle of equality and equal security?

The Secretary said that on the other hand we had tried to take into account Soviet concerns and problems not only in the proposal we had tabled today but on many occasions previously. In the new proposal we had made today we took into account what the Soviet side had proposed in its third variant when Gromyko had been in Washington last May, and had sought to find a way to meet Soviet concerns, while at the same time providing the means that would permit us to meet our needs. We believed that the proposal we have made today did just that. Gromyko's suggestion that our proposal proceeded from ongoing U.S. programs without affecting them, and that it was aimed at obtaining a unilateral advantage was not true. It would affect U.S. ongoing programs, in particular the MX missile which under our proposal could not be deployed during the term of the Treaty. Under our new proposal, as he had indicated, both sides would be free to flight-test but not to deploy a new ICBM. This would put us in an equal position; we would both be treated equally.

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The Secretary wanted to point out that it had not been our desire to provide an exemption for a new type of ICBM. That had been proposed by the Soviet side. Our original proposal was to ban the flight testing and deployment of all new types of ICBMs for the period of the Protocol. Gromyko had said that it was absolutely essential for the Soviet side to have one exemption from that ban. Thus, in order to meet the needs of the Soviet side, we had tabled our second alternative proposal which provided that each side for the period through 1985 would have the option to test and deploy one new ICBM, such ICBM to be either MIRVed or non-MIRVed, depending on the choice to be made by each side. Again, that would provide equality for both sides. Both of these alternatives which we had proposed remained on the negotiating table. However, Gromyko had indicated that neither was acceptable to the Soviet side. Therefore, as he had indicated earlier, in an effort to bridge the gap, we came up with a new proposal which he had submitted this morning. Under these circumstances the Secretary thought it was crystal clear that we had tried to proceed in a fashion that would be fair to both sides, and had tried to find ways to meet Soviet concerns. Our new proposal would meet Soviet needs while not prohibiting us from going forward with what was required by our own security. In conclusion, the Secretary would say that he had not tried to cover all the matters contained in Gromyko's statement. He had rather tried to go to the heart of the problem and stress the key points he had wanted to make in his preliminary response to Gromyko's statement.

Gromyko said he wanted to make a few comments concerning the Secretary's response, and then would go on to express some additional considerations on the issues under discussion.

Gromyko had noted that at the beginning of his statement the Secretary said he did not agree with the assertion that there was a need for a firmer defense of the Agreement against those who attacked it and who did not like to see the Agreement come to a successful conclusion. He would remind the Secretary that in his statement Gromyko had said that recently he had noted some statements in the U.S., including some by the Secretary himself, in favor of conclusion of the SALT Agreement. However, surely no one would seriously deny the fact that many statements made in the U.S. against the Agreement or statements aimed at subverting it had remained unanswered. No one in official circles had rebuffed them.

The Secretary said he had to disagree on that. We could not answer every statement anyone would choose to make. However, on countless occasions members of this Administration had emphasized the need for a SALT Agreement and had stressed the importance of SALT for the security of the United States. On countless occasions they had taken on critics of the SALT negotiations when these critics were of sufficient importance. It was impossible to take on every Tom, Dick and Harry who chose to speak against the Agreement.
Gromyko said that his comments had referred precisely to statements against the SALT Agreement made by people who had sufficient influence on public opinion in the United States. Of course, one could not appropriately respond to every Tom, Dick, and Harry. However, he would even go further; even when statements in favor of the Agreement were made, they seemed to contain a nuance of apology before the speaker actually got down to defending the Agreement itself. Such statements frequently contain words to the effect that the United States could never agree to the Soviet Union's having an advantage in strategic matters, while, he would point out, the Soviet Union had actually never pursued any such policy. In general, statements in defense of the Agreement often contain many words of this kind before the speaker gets down to speaking in favor of the Agreement.

Gromyko said the Soviet leadership understood that the Secretary did not agree with statements of that kind. But, after all, the Soviets, too, know how to count and analyze the statements they heard emanating from the United States. No statements of that kind passed unnoticed in this country. He would ask the Secretary if he could seriously state that he had heard something similar in the Soviet union. Obviously he could not say that he had seen any statement against the Treaty in the Soviet Union, in the Soviet press, on radio or television. These were the reasons that Gromyko had voiced a wish for firmer defense, a wish to which the Soviets had a moral right as partners in the negotiations. After all, both sides would place their signature under the Agreement that would eventually result from present negotiations.

Gromyko said he would go even further and say that the Soviets have not seen any attempts on the part of U.S. Government representatives to rebuff those speakers "of bad faith" who spoke out every day of the week and presented veritable scenarios of what would happen if there was a first strike. Of course, the assumption is always made that it would be the Soviet Union that carried out the first strike. Such speakers described what would happen in that case and painted all the horrors of nuclear war. For some reason they never carried things to the point of realizing where they themselves would be should a holocaust occur. Who would be able to find them then in order to analyze to what extent their vision of nuclear war corresponded to reality. The point was that these were not just writers of detective stories, but supposedly responsible people, he would even say officials, who came out with imagined possible scenarios of nuclear war. The villain in these scenarios was always the Soviet Union, and in this way they conditioned public opinion to accept the possibility of nuclear war. Sometimes it was presented as something as easy as a boat ride on the Lake in Geneva. Was this a normal situation he would ask? The Soviet Union found itself repeatedly in a position where it had to use strong language to condemn such statements. Why should people be educated, why should public opinion be educated to think of nuclear war, to discuss scenarios of nuclear war, scenario number 1, number 2, etc. Had anyone in
the U.S. Government spoken out publicly against it and pointed out the absurdity or even the criminal nature of such endeavors? The Soviets had not heard any statements to that effect on the part of the U.S. Administration. Nothing of the kind could be encountered in the Soviet Union, nothing except statements condemning nuclear war as such. All those who attempted to get public opinion used to the idea of nuclear war as something inevitable and imminent displayed a great deal of bravado. They do have the bravado to make such statements, but do not give enough thought to where they themselves would be in the event of nuclear war. The Soviets would welcome it if the U.S. Government would take steps to condemn such statements and such manipulation of public opinion in the United States.

The Secretary said that Warnke averaged at least three speeches a week about SALT, about the importance of SALT, in dealing with attacks on the negotiations for a SALT Agreement. In any case, he would not want to prolong this aspect of the present conversation.

Gromyko said that he was indeed familiar with those speeches. Continuing, he noted that the Secretary had said he had seen nothing new in the Soviet statement today. However, he would point out that the Soviet side had advanced a whole number of proposals previously. These could be considered new proposals, but the U.S. side had rejected them, although these proposals had been put forward as a result of careful analysis. In speaking of these proposals, Gromyko had not referred to them as new proposals. In this respect he would not disagree with the Secretary. They were not new; they were those that had been tabled in May and he had spoken in their support.

The Secretary said the point he was making was that Gromyko had suggested that the United States has not been putting forward constructive suggestions to bridge the gap between the two sides. That was not a fact, as he had pointed out. The fact was that we had on many occasions tried to bridge that gap, as recently as just today. Gromyko said that was exactly what he was coming to. He did not object to the Secretary's attempt to depict his statement today as a new proposal. The Secretary had called that this morning and again just now. However, the Soviet side did not regard this as a new proposal, because it preserved the unilateral advantage embodied in previous U.S. proposals. If he were go to into greater depth, he would have to repeat what he had said during their meeting on the occasion of the SSOD in New York. But, he did not think there was any need for that. Everything the Secretary had said on all the issues favored the U.S. position to the detriment of the Soviet position. This applied to cruise missiles, to the new types of ICBMs and SLBMs issue, and to all the other questions addressed by the Secretary's considerations. Of course, on some issues the Secretary had not said anything at all, neither in his first nor his second statement. On those Gromyko had nothing to add.
Now Gromyko wanted to express some additional considerations. It was now absolutely clear that among those relatively few outstanding issues the issue of new types of ballistic missiles was in the foreground of discussions between them. Gromyko had stated that it was related to a number of other issues and could not be totally isolated from others. Nevertheless this morning's discussions showed that it was the main issue for the United States.

Reading from a typed brief handed him by Korniienko, Gromyko noted that at all stages of consideration of this issue the Soviet side had made maximum efforts to find a solution that would take into account the interests of both sides and be consistent with the purpose of the Agreement being negotiated. The Soviet Union had proposed several variants for the solution to this problem, but the U.S. side evidently remained unprepared to accept any of those solutions without, he would note, marshaling any convincing arguments against them. The Secretary had said that in the new U.S. proposal one of the three variants had been taken into account. Gromyko would not take issue with the fact that it had been taken into account, but would note that it had not been accepted. The U.S. side had taken it and turned it around in such a way that, even if it were accepted, it would work to the advantage of the United States, providing it with a unilateral advantage, and would be inconsistent with the principles about which both sides had spoken so long and so much.

Continuing from the brief, Gromyko said that on the one hand the U.S. side has constantly spoken of the great danger represented by ICBMs as compared with other components of strategic offensive arms, sometimes even forgetting that there were also SLBMs, heavy bombers and cruise missiles. The U.S. side had put its main emphasis on limitations of precisely ICBMs, both existing ICBMs and new types of ICBMs. In this connection the U.S. side has repeatedly referred to the fact that limitations on ICBMs would, more than others, meet the purposes of the Agreement being negotiated. On the other hand, when the Soviet side had made a specific proposal on this score, one which provided for a ban on the flight testing and deployment of all new types of ICBMs without exception, regardless of whether or not they were equipped with MIRVs, for the duration of the Treaty, i.e., when the Soviet side had proposed to take a truly major step toward restraining the arms race, the U.S. side had made what he would call a 180-degree turn. It turned out that in fact the U.S. was not prepared to take such a radical step, and that all its previous arguments in favor of limiting ICBMs were now cast overboard. The trouble was that the United States wanted to have a new type of ICBM, MIRVed at that, i.e., arms that had the most destabilizing effect on the strategic situation. This ensued from the very nature of this kind of weapon. The U.S. side followed the same course in questions relating to new types of SLBMs, proposing a clearly unequivalent exception. Gromyko was
sure that the Secretary knew it, the Soviet side knew it and the U.S. side knew that the Soviet side knew it. Gromyko said that quite frankly there was not much logic in that kind of behavior on the U.S. side, because it inevitably raised the question of what it was the United States really wanted. A clear-cut and lucid answer to this question could only be provided by the U.S. side, and it would in many ways clear up doubts as to the attitude toward the Agreement as a whole; it would, as it were, dot all the i's and cross all the t's. Therefore, he would now ask a very direct question, and this was the core of his statement: "If the United States really attached paramount importance to the solution of the question of new types of ballistic missiles on the basis it proposes, will it be prepared to regard as agreed all other questions (cruise missiles on bombers, timing for reductions, backfire, etc.) on the basis of the Soviet proposals, in the event that the Soviet Union were to consent to U.S. proposals that for the duration of the Treaty, i.e., through 1985, within the limits of the relevant aggregate levels of strategic arms and MIRV'd vehicles, each side would have the right to flight-test and to deploy one new type of ICBM which it could equip at its own discretion either with MIRV or with a single reentry vehicle, while there would be no limitations whatsoever on new types of elements?"

Gromyko said the Soviet side needed to have a clear answer to the question of whether or not such a solution to the new types issue would remove the other obstacles in the way of completing work on the Agreement. It was entirely possible that if the Secretary could give him a clear reply to this question, after consideration of the Secretary's response, Gromyko might be in a position to provide a response to the Secretary's response before leaving Geneva.

The Secretary suggested that we study tonight what Gromyko had said in the core of his statement and return to this matter tomorrow.

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*Gromyko's last question was carefully checked against the Russian text of the paper he was reading from, and the part in quotes is a complete and accurate translation of it.*