A RECORD
OF THE MAIN CONTENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
BETWEEN COM. A.A. GROMYKO AND
THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE C. VANCE
HELD ON 27 AND 28 SEPTEMBER, 1978 IN NEW YORK
AND ON OCTOBER 1, 1978 IN WASHINGTON.

A.A. GROMYKO: First of all I would like to confirm the unchanging policy of the Soviet leadership on the question of the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. We resolutely are for successful conclusion of negotiations on this issue, for the signing of the agreement and its ratification as soon as possible. We are convinced that such an approach to the matter would be in the interests of both sides. It would be a weighty evidence of their intention to look for guaranties of their security and the security of other countries and peoples on the path of limitations and cessation of arms race, on the path of decreasing military dangers. Evidently the efforts of both sides are necessary. We, the Soviet Union are ready to do it.

We would like, however, to draw attention to the following two points.

First, in terms of time we approached a threshold beyond which the continuation of the negotiations without results would mean not only a waste of time but essentially would make doubtful the essence of the agreement that we negotiate and thereby undermine, in general, the process of strategic arms limitation. In short, the time has come to take final decisions - to put off the decision would mean a negative answer to the question: to have or not to have the agreement.

Second, objectively there are all the reasons to finish the preparation of the agreement in the near future and sign it. As a result of the work we have done there are a few unfinished questions. If we concentrate on them and will not bring up new questions then we can finish the preparation of the agreement very fast.
In the course of previous rounds of the negotiations among the unresolved questions, the American side used to give a special significance to the question of new types of ICBM and submarine-based ballistic missiles, emphasizing its own special interest in the new type of ICBM equipped with MIRV.

We, on the other hand, proposed several ways of resolving the question about new types of ICBM and submarine-based ballistic missiles which would be in accordance with a principle of equality and identical security of both sides, and would also better correspond to the goals of the agreement we are preparing.

Since the USA, however, did not show any readiness to agree with any version we have prepared, we, proceeding from the aspiration to reach an agreement on the whole, in the end of the negotiations with you, Mr. Secretary, in Geneva at the end of July of this year, put the question this way: will the USA be ready to reconcile the rest of the questions on the basis of our proposals in the case if we would give a consent to the American proposals? I mean the proposals that during the term of the treaty, each side would have the right to test and deploy -- within the limits of total level of strategic arms and carriers with MIRV -- one new type of ICBM which each side could equip, as it wished, either with MIRV or with a single warhead, and in regard to new types of submarine-based missiles would be no limitations at all.

Unfortunately, so far the American side did not adequately respond to our question. We unequivocally told that to Mr. Warnke when he came to Moscow in the beginning of this month. In the statements he made, the American side confirmed its previous proposals regarding new types of ICBM and MIRV but there were no real progress on the matter. Those additional clarifications that the American delegation in Geneva made recently, for example, on the question of the cruise missiles rather tell the opposite: that the USA retreats from the already achieved agreements. Honestly, this puzzled us. It is not so often when one raises the question of revising the already reached agreements.

What is it? On the one hand, reassuring statements are made, new assurances on the intentions of the American administration to resolutely move toward the conclusion of the negotiations, on the other hand, new proposals are made which cannot be assessed otherwise as directed at the complication of negotiations under way.

We hope that in the course of this meeting the American side will clarify its intentions, will confirm its statement about their readiness to solve the rest of the questions.

As far as the Soviet side is concerned, today I want to confirm, in principle, our consent that during the term of the treaty, i.e. until the end of 1985 within the limits of total levels of strategic arms and carriers with MIRV, each side would have the right to test and deploy one new type of light ICBM, which this side could equip, as it wishes, either with MIRV or single warhead. But there would be no limitations on testing and deployment of new types of submarine-based missiles. In this way we express the readiness to accept the American position on the questions that present a special interest to the USA, as you emphasized it many times.
However, it must be absolutely clear - and there should not be any misunderstanding here - that this our consent is conditioned on finding mutually acceptable decisions for the rest of the not yet reconciled questions on the basis of our proposals, and in the first place, on the cruise missiles based on bombers, on the time limit of arms cut back, on the aircraft TU-22M ("Backfire").

Having in mind that in the course of the previous negotiations we made concessions to the American side, beside the question of new types of ICBM and SLBM, the complex decision that we propose on the remaining questions is a radical step directed at the finishing the agreement as soon as possible. If the American side, however, will not show the same readiness to make an agreement on the questions that I have mentioned on the basis of our proposals, then our consent to resolve the question of new types of ballistic missiles, as the US wanted it, will be invalid.

I will remind you the essence of our position on those questions with the settlements of which we link our consent to the American proposal on the new types ICBM and MIRV.

In accordance with the existing agreement on the limitation of the cruise missiles and bombers by including the bombers in the total number of carriers with MIRV (1320 items), we firmly take the position that only the bombers, that is aircraft specifically constructed for equipping it with bombs or missiles may be equipped with long range cruise missiles, and that transport aircraft could not be used for these goals.

We also confirm our proposal on the limitation of the number of long range cruise missiles on one bomber to limit them to 20 units for the whole term of the treaty. The desire retreat from it means nothing more as an attempt to actually renounce the agreement on the limitation on cruise missiles, in essence to withdraw them from the stipulations of the agreement and thereby to open a new channel of arms race, which would have a dangerous destabilizing effect on the whole strategic situation.

Exactly at this are directed the American proposals concerning the range of the cruise missiles, introduced in Geneva in the past few days. We have reached a clear understanding: the limitations should be applied to the cruise missiles with the range from 600 km up to 2,500 km. But now under the pretext of establishing a technical definition of the cruise missiles it is suggested to increase by more than two times the lower and almost by half the upper limit of their range. What a technical definition! Is it really possible to seriously consider such a question?

To this we resolutely declare: no revision of the achieved accord. As for the technical definition of the range of cruise missiles we should talk about maximum distance defined by the projection of the trajectory of the missile on the earth sphere, and only about that. It also seems self-evident that all cruise missiles with a range beyond 600 km should be subject to limitation under the treaty regardless whether they are equipped with nuclear or non-nuclear warhead because of the impossibility to control it. The application of different approaches to the cruise missiles with nuclear and non-nuclear warheads would mean actual legalization of uncontrollable build-up of cruise missiles.
Finally it is also obvious that the treaty must stipulate the ban on equipping the cruise missiles with multiple warheads. Without such a ban, i.e. in the case of equipment of the long-range cruise missiles with multiple warheads, each such a missile should be included in the total level of 1,320 units of carriers with MIRV. I repeat each such missile should be counted.

Such are our positions on the whole range of questions concerning the long-range cruise missiles.

Then, I should honestly say that linkage, suggested by the American side, of the term of the protocol and the terms of implementing the cutbacks to the total level of 2,250 units is artificial. Such a linkage does not serve any constructive or practical goals. On the contrary, it only complicates the negotiations.

We proceed from the idea that the protocol as an integral part of the treaty must take into effect simultaneously with the treaty and be in force for three years as it was earlier agreed upon.

We also confirm our position on the time limits of cutting back the total level of strategic arms from 2,400 to 2,250 units. Such cut backs would be implemented during 12 months beginning from January 30, 1980 with the understanding that the treaty takes into effect no later than January 1 or at least March 31, 1979.

A few words on the question of the Soviet middle range bomber TU-22M ("Backfire"). Our position on this question was stated many times and very clearly. I want only once more and unequivocally to point out that the question about this aircraft can be resolved only on the basis of our unilateral declaration with which the American side is already familiar.

I will now say something about some other questions which were brought up by the American side in the course of our last meetings. I have in mind the questions concerning the non-increase in the number of existing types of ballistic missiles and the establishment of an upper limit on warheads for new types of missiles.

In regard to ICBM of existing types we already have stated and I again confirm that we are ready not to increase the number of warheads on ICBM during their modernization, i.e. to freeze the number of warheads on every existing type of ICBM at the maximum number of warheads with which these missiles have been tested in flight.

I will remind you that our consent on the limitation of warheads on the existing types of ICBM is conditioned by the obligatory accord on the limitation to 20 units of maximum number of the cruise missiles with a range beyond 600 km with which the bomber-carrier of such missiles could be equipped. It was also conditioned by the accord on the definition of new types of ICBM.

Touching upon this last point it should be noted that on the whole the position of both sides on the question of definition of new types of ICBM considerably coincide. Agreed upon pieces of such a definition, in our view, in a proper way solve the problem of establishment
of limits on modernization of existing missiles. At the same time we are not opposed to the fact that the delegations in Geneva were entrusted to additionally consider the possibility of more precise formulations defining new types of ICBM.

I want, however, once more to emphasize that if the mutually acceptable decisions on the mentioned questions are not taken, the Soviet side could not agree on the limitation on the number of warheads on the existing types of ICBM when they are modernized.

We have studied the American proposal that the number of warheads on the existing types of MIRV when they are modernized could not be increased beyond the maximum number deployed by either side at the present time, i.e. they should not exceed 14 units. Today I can inform you that we are ready to agree with that.

In regard to new types of ballistic missiles, we propose that the number of warheads on new types of ICBM and SLBM should be limited by 6 and 14 units correspondingly. The limitation, we proposed, on the number of warheads on the new types of ICBM by 6 units naturally arises from the fact that under the treaty both sides were allowed to have only one new type of light ICBM. And as is known neither side tested the light ICBM with more than 6 warheads. So, the same approach would have applied to new types of ICBM and SLBM - the number of warheads on them must not exceed the maximum number on existing missiles of corresponding categories.

Finishing the summary of our position, I would like once again to emphasize that the complex approach, proposed by the Soviet side, to the solution of the remaining questions appropriately takes into account the US proposals and it is directed at concluding more quickly the working out of the agreement on mutually acceptable basis.

As one can see from what has been said above, while preparing for this meeting we constructively have approached some questions raised by the American side. I tell you honestly, however, that we worry that lately the American side raises all kinds of new questions - during Mr. Warnke's visit to Moscow and then at the negotiations of both delegations in Geneva. In combination with the lack of progress in the American position on questions brought up earlier but still unresolved, this tendency only additionally complicates and slows down the negotiations. I think if we really want the agreement one should end such a tactics and make up one's mind regarding the agreement. Perhaps, what I am going to say is trivial but I would like to note the following: time can be an ally and an enemy to those who conduct negotiations and to those who wish them a success. I think it would be a good idea to take into account this consideration.

I want to add something to the question that I already have touched upon. We were struck, not today and not yesterday, by the fact that the American side put forward all the new proposals every time we meet, proposals that had not been mentioned at the negotiations and which often do not have anything to do with the agreement we are discussing. You think we could not respond in kind? I can assure you that to each of your new proposal we could respond with two and with more reason. One does not need a special ingenuity for it. But I must point out that neither side should take this path because the content of the agreement
we are preparing does not require it.

You know that some proposals you introduced earlier in the course of negotiations we did not particularly like but since they had a direct relation to the content of the agreement, we considered them and sometimes made concessions to the American side. But we cannot do the same regarding the proposals which were artificially introduced by the American side. And may be, they were introduced specifically to complicate the negotiations.

That is enough. I repeat neither side should be engaged in bringing up all the new questions. It would have been meaningless to strive to outwit each other or to make a damage to the other side. At the same time it should be clear that negotiations should be conducted on the basis of equality, mutual understanding of the interests and security of both sides. This is the only possible firm basis, I would say, guarantee, for negotiations.

I hope that you correctly understand this our statement. This is not personal. The point is that in your country there are a lot of people who would like to act in the opposite direction.

C. VANCE (after short interval): Today I would like to make only a short statement of the following. On behalf of the President of the USA I want to emphasize that the goal, our country pursues in the negotiations in the next few days during your visit here, is to finish the working out of the SALT agreement on which we are working for so long.

I want to say that the package of proposals with which P. Warnke arrived in Moscow was meant not only to give a response to the Soviet proposals introduced in Geneva in July of this year but also to serve a broader goal, precisely, the settlement and coordination of all the remaining difficult and unresolved questions. This package in combination with some new proposals on technical questions, which were introduced in Geneva, reflected our sincere efforts to overcome the remaining disagreements to quickly finalize the negotiations and then to sign the agreement without delay.

I must say that you did not respond to a number of proposals introduced by Warnke in Moscow. However, we are proceeding from the understanding that your visit here, to the US, will give a unique opportunity for achieving the goal of fast resolution of all the remaining questions.

I want to study all you have said here today so as to prepare our response which we will give you tomorrow. So far we can state that the positions of both sides are still in essential disagreement but we hope that in the course of following conversations we will be able to bring them closer.

Before I finish this short statement I would like to respond to the accusation that the US delays the finishing of development of the new agreement. What you called new questions which are being introduced in the negotiations by the American side, actually had been a clarification of our understanding of the earlier discussed questions. In essence, we were trying to achieve clarity on a number of questions in order to avoid any misunderstanding in the future.
Then the conversation continued tete-a-tete in the presence of interpreters only.

C. VANCE: When we meet tomorrow morning I will give you a detailed response to the considerations you set forth today. Then we, probably, should spend some time discussing some other questions. I know that you would like to talk about the Middle East. And I would like to talk about the comprehensive ban on nuclear tests and about our intentions in regard to the negotiations on this question that are under way. So, I believe that the SALT problems should be given a priority in our negotiations, but we have to spend some time on the exchange of opinions on other questions.

A.A. GROMYKO: I agree. I would like to get your advice on one question. Saturday we meet President Carter. I have an instruction from the General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L.I. Brezhnev to deliver to the President his message which is the response to the J. Carter's message delivered by Mr. Warnke. What do you think: should I do it in the presence of everybody or a few minutes before the start of the negotiations, because the President, perhaps, would like to know the message content before we start the conversation in full session.

C. VANCE: I think that it is better to deliver L.I. Brezhnev's message to the President before we start negotiations. I will inform the President on this question.

Now I would like again to emphasize what I already had said at the meeting. I am convinced that we have the unique opportunity to solve the rest of questions that related to the preparation of new agreement on SALT when you are still in the US. I believe it is vitally important for both our countries to try to find the solutions for these questions so that we can finish the working out of the treaty and sign it.

It is necessary to use the opportunity of your stay in the US even if this would mean that your departure is delayed for one day after the Saturday's meeting with President Carter. I cannot say right now if this will be necessary but I wanted to express my opinion.

Today you have emphasized the importance for the US of reaching the agreement on the ban on the development of new ICBM that would stipulate one exception for each side. I, on my part, take notice of the importance that you give to the aircraft "Backfire". Now, I want to note that if you could move toward the US position regarding some points in the proposals with which P. Warnke visited Moscow, that would have facilitated the progress in the solution of those questions which still divide us in regard to "Backfire".

And that is all so far that I have to say about the SALT problem. I want only to point out the importance President Carter and myself and, I am sure L.I. Brezhnev, yourself, and other members of the Soviet leadership, give to the efforts directed at achieving a just agreement on SALT in the near future.

A.A. GROMYKO: We do not think that those new proposals that P. Warnke brought to Moscow are an indicator of any desire on the American side to find solutions for the remaining questions. And some of these proposals are about issues that were not discussed in
our negotiations. And some proposals, introduced lately by the American side in Geneva, simply reverse our previous agreements. On this basis we will not find a common language. As for the question on "Backfire" this question does not exist at all. This is not a strategic weapon. So how can we make concessions on the really strategic weapon to the American side, linking these concessions with the non-existing questions? You, yourself, made up this question. You named our middle range bomber a strategic weapon which it is not. If we had taken the same kind of position then we could name quite a few of your weapons strategic, and say that this weapon is subject to a limitation in the framework of the agreement we are working out. We took into account the US proposals on some questions that are really related to the essence of the new SALT agreement. Among these, for example, is the question of the number of warheads with which new types of ICBM and MIRV can be equipped. You probably noticed this when I stated the Soviet side's considerations.

The question about delaying my departure following Saturday's meeting with J. Carter is better to decide, perhaps, after the meeting itself, although in principle there is no problem, if, of course, the delay would be justified by the circumstances.

C. VANCE: I understand this. As for the Soviet aircraft "Backfire", from the very beginning it was a strategic and political problem for us. You have a different point of view. But for us, it is actually one of the most difficult questions from a purely practical standpoint. We live in a practical world and it is meaningless to believe that this question is unreal if for us it is real.

A.A. GROMYKO: Even if we accept that for you it is a difficult problem we are not responsible for it. You, yourself, created this problem. Why should it have any influence on us? You made up the question so you have to find a solution. If some of your eccentric military man suddenly decides to say that this or that aircraft is strategic or this or that missile is strategic, although it is not, so should we be responsible for it? It is your business to put these people back in their places.

We too have military experts who if necessary could raise dozens of various questions but we do not do it.

C. VANCE: I repeat, the question on "Backfire" has been a real problem for us from the very beginning and will stay as such with taking into account the analysis conducted by our various experts in regard to this aircraft capabilities. Under our system the military leaders have the right to testify in Congress regarding the abilities of various kinds of weapons. They are not eccentric. They sincerely say what they believe in. So you cannot just dismiss their conclusions as extravagant ideas.

A.A. GROMYKO: This is your business how to solve the non-existing problem which you made up.

Can you tell me anything new about the fate of two Soviet citizens who are being prosecuted in the USA? Incidentally, when on the eve of our meeting in Moscow you asked us to postpone the trial on two American journalists we agreed. But you could not wait and began
the trial when we are still here, although we sent the same kind of request to you.

We would like to know what your plans concerning these two people? Are you going, finally, to stop the trial?

C. VANCE: I think we should talk about this matter and how we can solve this and the questions related to it. But probably we will do it later.

The negotiations about strategic arms limitations continued on 28 September.

C. VANCE: Today I’d like to begin with the response to the points you have in your yesterday’s statement.

I believe that both sides now are in agreement that the time has come to conclude of our long negotiations and to sign an Accord on the second stage of strategic arms limitations. We think that at this stage it is important to constructively concentrate on the still remaining questions. In the package of proposals with which P. Warnke visited Moscow we tried to achieve a realistic compromise between still differing positions of both sides on each of the remaining questions which we discussed with you in Geneva in July of this year.

Now, as I see it, it would be useful to consider each of the remaining questions, to determine the differences which exist and also to speak out on some solutions which are proposed in our complex package.

The question on new types of ICBM and MIRV. We believe that in this area we have more points of agreement than disagreement. We already agreed that the ban on the new types of ICBM must be in force until 1985 with the exception that each side would be allowed flight tests and the deployment of no more than one new type of ICBM which could be equipped with either MIRV or single warhead as each side wishes it.

Further, there is understanding that only a light missile might be permitted as a new type of ICBM and also that a new limit for warheads on such missiles would be established.

As for the existing types of ballistic missiles the number of warheads on each of them must be limited to the maximum number of warheads with which such missiles were tested in flight.

Besides, we have come very close to a full agreement on the limit on modernization of existing types of ICBM. The points that we already agreed upon can be the basis for satisfactory solutions of this question. We believe that the proposal you made that we would charge the delegations to elaborate the appropriate wording is constructive.

Then we agreed that there will be no limitations on new types of SLBMs with the exception that the number of warheads on them must not exceed 14 units. This is a maximum number of warheads which were tested on any SLBM.
We suggested a similar approach to limiting the warheads on new types of ICBM. The number of warheads on new types of ICBM must be limited to the maximum number of them which were tested on any existing ICBM.

In your statement you set forth a new, and in our opinion, unjust and unacceptable proposal that the number of warheads on one permitted type of ICBM should be smaller than the maximum number of warheads tested on existing missiles. According to your proposal the number should be limited to 6 units. An agreement with this would mean not only that the Soviet Union would be the only country that had heavy ICBM but also the only country that had ICBM equipped with 10 warheads instead of proposed, by you, maximum 6 units for new types of missiles. This is not only unjust but also does not correspond to that position which you, yourself, defended so consistently, that is that the heavy ICBM should not be singled out into a separate category. And your delegation in Geneva still is against the inclusion into the treaty of a separate category for the heavy ICBM when they discussed the question about a coordinated exchange of initial data.

We urgently request that, in order to avoid delay in the conclusion of the agreement because of new unacceptable Soviet proposals, that you agree to a maximum of 10 warheads, which corresponds to the number of warheads tested on the existing ICBM.

The question of the aircraft "Backfire". While discussing new types of ballistic missiles you repeatedly referred to the importance that the US gives its own proposals on this question. At the same time at each meeting you repeated that the question on the "Backfire" could be solved only on the basis of your proposals. I believe it is important that you recognize that we consider this question as important from the political and strategic point of view. The President asked me to emphasize this point once more.

We are trying, however, to take into account the concern of the Soviet side over the question of "Backfire". Prompt and positive response of the Soviet side on the proposals, that we put forth, on other remaining questions could facilitate the solution of the question on "Backfire".

The question of cruise missiles on the bombers. The Soviet Union proposes that we should agree to limit cruise missiles deployed on the bombers to 20 units, and that the equipping of the cruise missiles with multiple warheads should be banned. We already explained to your side that we cannot accept this proposal in the lack of any limitations on the Soviet anti-aircraft system.

In order to eliminate this disagreement in our position, P. Warnke, in Moscow, pointed out that we would be ready to make a unilateral official statement on this of approximately the following content:

"In regard to the air-launched cruise missiles the United States hereby informs the Soviet Union that until the end of term of the protocol, i.e. until 31 December 1980, the United States on a practical level will not possess the ability to deploy on any one aircraft more than 20 cruise missiles or to equip the cruise missiles with multiple individually targeted warheads."
The decision of the US government concerning the deployment of the cruise missiles on the aircraft and the equipment of these cruise missiles with multiple individually targeted warheads after the term of the agreement, will depend on the further development of the Soviet arms forces including the anti-aircraft system.

We are firmly convinced that this statement removes the concern of the Soviet side over this question since it solves this question for the moment and at the same time leaves it as a subject of discussion in the framework of negotiations on SALT-3. On the terms of dismantling or destroying the strategic arms that are being cut back and on the term of the protocol. There is still a disagreement on the term of the protocol and on the term of dismantling or destroying the weapons beyond the permitted limit, i.e. 2,250 units. Yesterday you said that the linkage we introduced between the question on the term of the protocol and the terms of completing the destruction is artificial and do not serves the goal of the agreement. We do not agree with such an assessment of our position and reckon that the establishment of the final date is necessary for avoiding any delay in the achievement of agreements on the further cut back of strategic arms in negotiations on SALT-3.

I must say that earlier, disagreement between us on this question earlier was more significant than now. Your position is that the term of the protocol must be 3 years from the moment it comes into force. And the dismantling or destroying must be conducted during 12 months beginning 30 December 1980. Our position is that both the date of the term of the protocol and the term of finishing the dismantling or destroying must be the same 31 December 1980.

We draw your attention to the fact that the term of the basic treaty is not linked with the date of its taking force but the definite date is foreseen when the term of the treaty expires. This approach should be used also for the protocol, taking into account that it is a basic part of the treaty.

In the course of negotiations in Moscow P. Warnke explained that we are ready to accept as the date of finishing the dismantling or destroying the strategic weapons beyond the permitted quantities, the 30 June 1981 under the condition that the Soviet Union will agree that the term of the protocol would be the same, i.e. 30 June 1981. This, our proposal means the extension of the term by 6 months in comparison to our present position and the extension by 9 months in comparison to our initial position. This is an essential step forward in the direction to the Soviet position on this question. We proceed from understanding that both sides strive to complete the negotiations and sign the agreements on SALT-2 in the near future. Therefore from our point of view the date 30 June 1981 is a more than reasonable move on our side toward the Soviet position.

At the same time these additional six months would provide enough time for dismantling or destroying the appropriate weapons. It also means on our part a step forward toward the Soviet side. Obviously the US position takes into account the Soviet concern and creates the basis for full resolution of both mentioned questions.

On the definition of the cruise missiles and the range of cruise missiles. We introduced a constructive proposal on these two questions. As far as the question of the definition of the
range of cruise missiles is concerned - the main disputed point - we proceed from the idea that the maximum distance on which the missile is capable to strike the target should be the that range. This idea is reflected in the American proposal on maximum fighting distance of the given arms system, which means that the cruise missiles will not be able to strike the targets beyond maximum agreed upon distance. In this connection we propose the additional per cent of leeway which would take into account the possibility of deviation of the missiles from the direct trajectory. We presented the specific data in this regard, however, without even discussing them, you preferred to reject them.

In conclusion I want once more to emphasize that we agree with you in that it is time to stop making pacifying statements. We propose to create a just basis for the solution of remaining questions. We are ready to listen to your practical counter-proposals and we will be ready to respond to them during your meeting with the President on Saturday.

A.A. GROMYKO: Having listened to the statements you set forth, Mr. Secretary, I must tell you that by ear we did not catch anything essential or new in comparison to the positions set forth earlier by the American position including those that had been introduced by P. Warnke in Moscow. All this does not make us optimistic. An even bigger question: does what you have said bring us closer to the conclusion of the negotiations or take us farther away?

Certainly, we will additionally study these considerations. But, I repeat, the first impression is that in the US position there is no movement which would open the possibility of overcoming the difficulties and would facilitate the way out to the mutually acceptable solutions of the remaining questions which are still unresolved.

In other words, we did not feel that the American side reacted in an appropriate way to those compromise proposals which we set forth. Just recall how many times in the negotiations in Moscow you repeated - and President Carter too has repeated it several times during our meetings with him - that the main thing is that both sides could have a possibility by their own choice to create one new type of ICBM either with a single warhead or with MIRV and that if that main obstacle had been overcome to the mutual satisfaction, then on the whole the preparation of the treaty would have been made easier. But now the USA acts as if no such statements about the importance and seriousness of the questions on new types of ICBM had been made.

We, certainly, have got accustomed to the fact that changes in the American position happen, and not infrequently. But this change has struck us especially. To tell you the truth, we did not get a feeling that the American side has a real desire to take practical steps for the acceleration of the preparation of the new agreement, and to take into account the time factor which does not necessarily act as an ally in the preparation of the agreement, and which in fact can be just the opposite. What you have said today rather confirms this conclusion. In this regard, not going into details, I would like to remind you of the basic points of our position since you have used this method reminding us about your position.

First, we would be ready to agree with the American proposal on the new types of ICBM or SLBM under the condition - and only under the condition - that the American side would
agree to solve other questions on the basis of our proposals. In particular, we have in mind the issues of the cruise missiles on the bombers, on the time frame of the arms cut back, and on the aircraft "Backfire."

I will remind you also that we again demonstrated a constructive approach moving toward the American position on the questions of establishing the limits to the number of warheads on the new types of ICBM and SLBM. We already gave concrete figures in this regard and there is no need to repeat them.

We should have had a right to expect a positive response from the American side to our proposals on the whole complex of questions related to the cruise missiles. Precisely: on the maximum range of these missiles, on the limitations on the cruise missiles regardless of whether they are equipped with nuclear or conventional warheads, on non-equipment of the cruise missiles with multiple warheads, and also on the limitation of maximum number of long-range cruise missiles on one bomber. In this regard we gave appropriate reasons and we are convinced that they are correct. It should especially be pointed out that our readiness to limit the number of warheads on existing types of ICBMs when they are modernized is conditioned by the American acceptance of the obligation to limit the number of the long-range cruise missiles on a bomber. We linked these together and gave reasons why.

We firmly proceed from the idea that the number of long-range cruise missiles with a distance exceeding 600 km with which bombers could be equipped, should not be unlimited. Already, I do not say how many times we moved toward the American position on the questions of proportions into which the cruise missiles should be included. It is true that the American representatives that are present here today, did not take part in the negotiations at that time, but believe me that there had been long and difficult negotiations between us on this question. In one word, there was a long and difficult path that led to our present proposals.

Incidentally, it was difficult to decide even among ourselves exactly which proposal we should put forth for the American side, what the initial proportions should be when including the cruise missiles in the level established for the number of carriers with MIRV, i.e. 1,320 units. And we still believe that it would be correct to agree upon the limitation on the number of the cruise missiles with the range exceeding 600 km on one bomber to 20 units for the whole term of the agreement, I repeat, for the whole term of the agreement. This is an optimum amount to which we can agree in the interests of facilitating the possibility of reaching an agreement. Actually, even 20 of such missiles on one bomber is too much. Indeed, why it should be 20? Everybody knows what power every cruise missile has.

At the same time, in the interests of facilitating the possibility of reaching an agreement on this question we would be ready for such a wording in the treaty on the limitation of the cruise missiles with the range beyond 600 km on bombers, that both sides could have bombers with more than 20 units of the cruise missiles.

But in this case, then, the bombers must be included in the total number of carriers with MIRV (1,320 units) with an appropriate coefficient, and precisely, that a bomber equipped with from 21 to 40 units would be included in the mentioned level as two carriers, and those bombers equipped with between 41 and 60 missiles as three carriers. Consider this version.
I repeat we still prefer that a bomber could be equipped with no more than 20 cruise missiles. This would be more reasonable than to race to produce bombers with bigger and bigger bellies. But as a step to facilitating an agreement we can agree also with the variant I just put forth. Any sudden thoughts that you have that we may yield this position is absolutely not realistic. Let us proceed from the idea that each side may have something possible and something impossible, I emphasize, not undesirable but impossible. However, the Soviet Union will not agree to increase the number of cruise missiles on one bomber beyond 20 units, or on such a version of coefficients where one carrier with MIRV would be equal to more than 20 cruise missiles.

We believe that there are no grounds for any re-evaluation which would result in an increase of both the lower and upper levels of the cruise missiles range under the pretext of working out a technical definition of the range of such missiles which are subject to limitation. We have in mind the proposals which, as dashingly as a cavalry attack, were introduced in Geneva.

The agreement that was reached earlier, that cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 km are subject to limitations, must remain in force. Both sides should not introduce proposals, even bold ones, which were not thought out. The mentioned range must be determined by the only possible and in our view simple method: by the projection on the earth sphere of the trajectory of the missile flight in a normal designed regime. This a reasonable proposal which does not give neither side any advantages and at the same time does not take anything away.

Any references to the idea that when defining the range of the cruise missiles any zigzags in the horizontal flight should not be counted, makes meaningless the already achieved agreement on 600 km range which separates the cruise missiles into two basically different categories, one which is subject to limitations and the other one which is not.

As for the earlier agreed upon upper limit of the range of the cruise missiles - 2,500 km, the striving of the American side under the same pretext to increase this range by the amount that suits the American side, cannot be substantiated from any point of view. For us, this is absolutely unacceptable. It is better, then, not to establish any upper limit range of the cruise missiles. We would prefer to have it since otherwise it would mean breaking the earlier agreement but if you are pressing for it, then it is better not to establish the upper limit at all. Of course breaking the agreement does not improve the atmosphere of our negotiations. I can imagine how the American side would look like in the eyes of the world public if we had announced that the agreement was reached but then it was broken because the US decided to throw it away in the garbage can. What excuses would you make? We did not do it, however, following the ethical principle that always should be present at negotiations, especially on such a topic as the limitation of strategic weapons.

In short, in this case we propose the following variant: in regard to the 600 km range the American side agrees with the definition of the cruise missiles range proposed by the Soviet side and the upper limit of their range (2,500 km) is eliminated, i.e. the maximum range of the cruise missiles would not be limited at all.
I think that we in detail stated our views on the establishment of clear norms for the definition of the cruise missiles on bombers.

Another closely related question is the question of the essence of the obligation to limit the number of cruise missiles with which one heavy bomber may be equipped. In our opinion this question should be ruled by the treaty, and I repeat, by the treaty. No attempts to link this question with the question of an anti-aircraft system can be justified. Today we heard the reasons for such a justification. But they are not convincing. The questions concerning the anti-aircraft system do not have anything to do with this problem. This a separate question, not related to the tasks of the second agreement on the strategic arms limitations that is now being developed. These issues related to an anti-aircraft system will not have anything to do with the future negotiations on this topic either. The attempts to make an artificial bridge between strategic arms and the anti-aircraft system are absolutely unjustified. This is a made up device and I do not know why are you using it.

Now I would like to touch upon one more aspect of the cruise missile question in connection with the SALT Treaty. Any obligations that put a limit on the cruise missiles on the heavy bombers must be included in the treaty, I emphasize, the treaty, not the protocol or any declaration.

Indeed, could a reasonable man explain why the questions concerning the ballistic missiles would be included into a treaty but the question on the cruise missiles on bombers (and this is one of the main types of the strategic weapons) would be left outside the frameworks of a treaty and be included in a protocol or even a unilateral document. Nobody can explain it and, incidentally, we will not accept it. We would like you approach this question more objectively. I am convinced that you, yourselves, understand very well the significance of this question.

We would like to hope that you are not going to transform the question on the form of the appropriate obligations as well as the questions on the terms (i.e. timeframe) into an obstacle in the path of concluding the new treaty.

Now a few words on dismantling and lowering the number of strategic carriers to the level stipulated by the treaty. As much as you try to present your position in a most flexible form, the Soviet Union is left, nevertheless, only with 6 months during which it must dismantle and destroy the appropriate number of missiles.

The date we proposed - 31 December 1980 - as the beginning of this process is the ultimate term. We cannot agree with other terms, not that we do not want it, but cannot. The date for finishing the process of dismantling and destroying (30 June, 1981), that you proposed, does not give a solution.

So should the dispute about the timeframe of this process be an obstacle on the path to a conclusion of the negotiations and the agreement?

We are not talking about building a new terrible type of weapon but about its destruction.
There is no danger for the other side regardless whether it will take 6 months or 12 months, or whether we will begin on December 31, 1980 or earlier as you proposed.

Is there some strategic danger for the USA? Of course not. And you know it very well. Is it possible that some non-business like principle will prevail? I think we should be above it.

You would be surprised, perhaps, if in our today's conversation I had not touched upon the issue on our aircraft which you call "Backfire". I will not surprise you but I will still tell you that it is not a strategic weapon. This is a medium range weapon and therefore we have a right not to discuss this question at all. The fact that it is a medium range bomber is very well known to the American side, is known to everybody: military men, civilians, political leaders. I have no doubts that this is so. I also have no doubts that you know that it is impossible to turn this medium bomber into a heavy bomber especially because we have no intentions to do so. But probably there are people who whisper to you not to remove this question from the agenda in order to keep the temperature high during the negotiations.

But we think it is unreasonable to maintain high temperature during the negotiations by raising questions that have nothing to do with the negotiations.

We can not go any further on the "Backfire" than we have already said. A unilateral declaration where we could state our views in this regard, we are ready to make, although, quite honestly, if our negotiations had started today we would have refused to talk about this at all. But since we agreed to make a unilateral declaration we would keep our word.

I will not dwell on other questions, bearing in mind that our position have been thoroughly stated yesterday and before that. One needs to restrain appropriately the range of questions being discussed and not to discuss again those which are already solved. The main thing is to keep in the center of attention those questions on which there is no agreement at all or only a partial agreement.

We are convinced that our general approach and our specific proposal on different questions that are related to the treaty that is being developed, give us the opportunity to move the negotiations on SALT on a practical tract so that we could finish them in the near future if, of course, both sides equally wish it. As far as we are concerned we do wish it.

C. VANCE: I do not want to plow what already had been plowed. I listened to you with attention and will carefully study everything that you have told us. I know that you will do the same. I suggest that we stop here so that both sides can study what we have told to each other.

I only would like to repeat what we have already said at the beginning of today's conversation. It is time to finish our negotiations and to sign the new strategic arms limitation treaty. Like you we are trying to move forward making practical steps directed at achieving our common goal - a successful conclusion of the negotiations and a signing of the strategic arms limitation treaty.
The negotiation will continue on Saturday, September 30, in Washington, with President Carter.

October 1, 1978

A.A. GROMYKO: Today, we want to shortly respond to the proposals set forth yesterday by the American side at our meeting with President Carter.

We think that we have to sum up the discussions on strategic arms limitations so that we can more clearly understand on what we should further concentrate our efforts.

On the whole there are reasons, apparently to say that we conducted intensive and fruitful discussions for closing our positions on some questions. I believe that it is a sufficiently thought out assessment if one wants to stay on the ground.

Now, I would like to dwell on some specific questions so that we could compare our positions and see where we were able to achieve something and where we were not. Although an accounting here is very complicated, still it is possible to make an analysis of the present state of affairs precisely from this point of view.

I deliberately am not going to reproduce the positions on all questions, to repeat everything that already had been said. However, the fact of omission of any question does not mean that this question is removed or is considered solved.

Besides I would like to emphasize again something that I already had an opportunity to speak about: one cannot consider any questions finally solved if the remaining questions are not solved. In this regard I would like to remind you once more that our agreement with the American proposals on new types of ballistic missiles still remains conditioned on finding mutually acceptable solutions on other questions on the basis of our proposals.

Understandably, considerable attention in our discussions was devoted to the complex of questions related to cruise missiles and, specifically, to the limit of number of such missiles on one bomber.

We proposed two variants of its solution: to limit the number of long-range cruise missiles on the bomber by 20 units or to use an appropriate co-efficient while including bombers into the number of MIRV in case of equipping these bombers with more than 20 missiles. We did get a satisfactory response on these our proposals and we hope that the American side will study them with attention.

In turn, you too put forward two alternative variants. We note that in both cases the American side now talks about the limitations on the cruise missiles not for the term of the protocol, as before, but for the term of the treaty, i.e. until 1985. This is an acceptable solution, this a positive move. Here our approaches coincide. Any other approach to this question eliminates the possibility of an accord even if all other aspects of this questions had been agreed upon.
I will immediately tell you, however, that the variant of a unilateral declaration from the American side on the question of cruise missiles, not even mentioning the artificial linkage of this question with others related to the systems of arms which are not strategic, like the antiaircraft systems, is unacceptable in principle.

Your second variant that suggests stating the obligations on the limitation of cruise missiles directly in the text of the treaty is more realistic, from this point of view. However, the specific numbers you suggested are unrealistic and unacceptable. We cannot agree that instead of 20 cruise missiles on a bomber 35 would be placed there, i.e. two times more. And at the same time such a bomber would be counted as one carrier with MIRV. I would like to hope that the American side will evaluate our proposals in this regard, having in mind that our consent not to increase the number of warheads on the existing ICBM is firmly conditioned by the solution of this question. I want to point out again that we will not agree to increase the number of cruise missiles even by 1 unit over 20 units. It is impossible to demand that of us. And, in general, if we had only started discussions on this question we would have not given our agreement even to 20 cruise missiles on a heavy bomber as one carrier with MIRV, in the light of your position that kept revealing itself in connection to the question of the cruise missiles. But this is past. We gave our consent and are not going to reverse it.

It seems that there is some progress on the question of the range of cruise missiles: we expressed our readiness to remove the upper limit of 2,500 km and the American side agreed to fix the lower limit at 600 km on the basis of the definition we have proposed, that the maximum distance is determined by the trajectory projection of missile flight on the globe.

However, as in the number of other questions, here too efforts were manifested to link the progress on one question with the attempts to get an advantage in another one. I have in mind the continued attempts by the USA to remove the limitation on significant number of cruise missiles under the pretext of classifying them as equipped by nuclear and non-nuclear charges. The references to some sort of distinctive characteristics do not change the essence of the matter, since no outside characteristics can give us an assurance that a missile does not have a nuclear charge. This is an axiom to us. We are talking about too serious and dangerous issues lest there be any doubts. That is why we cannot accept such linkage.

Then I want to confirm our position in regard to a 3-year term for the protocol. We have heard no convincing arguments for the revision of the earlier achieved accord on this question. And there can not be any. The protocol certainly must have a 3-year term. And what kind of negotiation is it if today 3 years are proposed and tomorrow 2.5 years. And in some time in the future this term will be diminished to 2 and even 1.5 years. By such a method the basis for the negotiations is being eroded.

As a positive sign we note the consent of the American side to lower the total number of carriers from 2,400 to 2,250 units during the 12 months beginning from 30 December, 1980. At the same time the additional conditions that are being put forward are superfluous. In any case this question requires additional consideration.

It is good that the American side finally expressed its readiness to move to an agreement on
the solution on the aircraft TU-22M ("Backfire") on the basis of our unilateral declaration. As we understood the President's statement yesterday, you accept without any additions the text of our declaration, with which we familiarized you. As for removing from this declaration some of the specific numbers we included there by your request, I think that there won't be any difficulty to do so. At the same time the desire of the American side to make some kind of declaration concerning its right to create an aircraft analogous to "Backfire" is perplexing. We do not understand what the meaning of this, if you are really talking about a plane which would not be a strategic bomber in any case and could not reach the territory of the other side and, consequently would not be a threat to the Soviet territory.

Not having the concrete considerations of the American side it is difficult for us to make a thorough assessment of the American proposal to ban testing of submarine-based ballistic missiles on the basis of the so-called grazing trajectory or an assessment of the expediency of introducing this question into the negotiations that are under way. In general, raising all the new questions - and we too could have brought up a new question, for example, about some specific conditions of cruise missile testing - this is very simple and it does not need great ingenuity. - in our opinion, does not serve a useful goal but only distract us from the essence and makes more difficult and delays the conclusion of the negotiations.

On the question which was brought up on the ways of transmitting telemetric information from missile flight tests, our delegations, it seems, could talk further in Geneva. I think, however, we should not give to this question an artificial significance as the America side does. It looks as if you see some questions through an electron microscope where a microbe looks like an elephant. So this too is one of the artificially made up questions, of the kind you could produce by hundreds without benefitting the treaty in any way, and actually doing it damage.

Concluding my short review I would like to hope that by mutual efforts we will be able to finish the preparation of the treaty and sign it in the near future. In any case, we would like to understand President Carter's statements yesterday as an intention to do it. As for the Soviet side, we, as before, will do everything that depends on us.

Yesterday we heard with satisfaction the statement of President Carter that it would be good to finish the preparation of the new agreement on strategic arms limitations and sign it in the nearest future. This statement made positive impression on us and we reported it to L.I. Brezhnev personally and to the whole Soviet leadership.

However, if one takes specific questions, then, although on some of them there was some movement in the U.S. position, the American side then attached to them many kinds of reservations and provisos. As a result when we try to assess which we found more of here - progress or a step back or no movement at all -- it is very difficult to come to any definite conclusion. The impression is that you so much aggravate some questions that we do not see that we are near to concluding the negotiations.

Besides, you elevate some questions to such an abstract level, and most of these relate in now way to the security of the USA. We also see the attempts of the American side to damage
our interests, our security every so often. On such a basis, of course, it is difficult to move to our common goal. We want to conduct this business only on the basis of full equality.

How is it possible at all to say that 20 cruise missiles are not enough for countering them as one carrier equipped with MIRV. Simple arithmetic shows that if one multiply 20 cruise missiles by 100 aircraft we will have 2,000 missiles aimed at the Soviet Union. It is a real missile rain. And we should, according to you, close our eyes and not see it. One cannot conduct business this way.

There are still many questions for which we do not see solutions. I am telling this to you not in a preliminary way. This is our assessment of the real situation. This is our definite answer to your proposals.

Look at all this from a broad point of view and try to find such an approach which would allow to both sides, on a mutual basis, to propose various combinations and concessions. Only in this way can we move forward to the completion of the negotiations and to the signing of the new treaty.

C. VANCE: I attentively listened to your thoughts on the general state of affairs in our negotiations and your reaction to the very constructive proposals which yesterday were set forth by President Carter. I must sincerely tell you that I am disappointed. In your response you ignore those tremendous efforts which President Carter made in order to move half-way to the Soviet Union on the questions of great concern to him and which guarantee the same level of security to both sides.

I hope that you together with your colleagues in Moscow will thoroughly study everything that was said yesterday by the President.

I will not try to give comments to all unsolved questions now. But if I will not comment any specific question this should not be viewed by you as a sign of our consent with the Soviet position.

Further, I would like to clearly state, as you have, that an agreement on a specific question is conditioned by the agreement on all remaining questions. And now, some considerations on the remaining questions.

About the number of cruise missiles on a heavy bomber.

The president yesterday set forth 2 alternatives:

A) The American side is ready to make a declaration in which it will be indicated that we will continue the development and testing of various types of cruise missiles and carriers for them but we will not deploy the carriers capable to be equipped with more than 20 cruise missiles or to deploy cruise missiles with MIRV during the term of the treaty depending on the level of the Soviet anti-aircraft system and other forces including the total amount of warheads at the disposal of the Soviet side.
B) A provision limiting the number of cruise missiles on a heavy bomber to 35 units will be included in the treaty, the term of which expires at the end of 1985. Simultaneously the American side will make a declaration that the USA does not intend to deploy the cruise missiles with MIRV until the end of 1985.

I think nothing better confirms the seriousness of President Carter's intention to conclude our negotiations in the nearest future than his proposals on this question in combination with his readiness to solve the question of "Backfire" taking into account the concerns of the Soviet Union.

As I already said in New York, a bomber and a ballistic missile are two different systems of strategic weaponry. There is no defense against a ballistic missile. But there is one against a bomber and a cruise missile - anti-aircraft system. The President made a big concession to the Soviet side having introduced the above-mentioned proposal without a simultaneous demand to introduce the limitations on the anti-aircraft system in the framework of SALT-2.

As for your proposals on this question, the coefficient approach and the version under which the number of cruise missiles on one bomber would be limited to 20 units are not just and are unacceptable to the US.

In the light of President Carter's proposals yesterday, I must emphasize that the question now is not reduced only to the question whether limits on the number of cruise missiles on heavy bombers will be introduced or whether there will not be such proposals at all. What the President proposed yesterday is feasible and just. The President clearly indicated his readiness to go half way to the Soviet position having agreed that the number of cruise missiles on a heavy bomber would be on average 35 units. And we are not prepared to accept any of your alternatives.

**On the definition of the range of cruise missiles.**

Yesterday the President expressed his readiness to accept the proposal to eliminate entirely the upper limit on the range of cruise missiles (2,500 km), saving only the lower limit of 600 km which will be included in the treaty, which will be in force until the end of 1985. And we expressed agreement with the Soviet wording of the definition of the range of cruise missiles. I want to repeat that the agreement of the President with the Soviet Union proposal on the cruise missile range is conditioned by the Soviet Union's agreement with the definition of the cruise missile introduced by the American side in Geneva.

While the protocol is in force, this definition will cover all types of armed cruise missiles. But in this definition it will also be indicated that after the term of the protocol there be no limitations on cruise missiles with conventional warheads if the decision will not be taken in the frameworks of the 3rd round of the negotiations on SALT.

As the President indicated yesterday, the design of the cruise missiles will have distinctive features which will make it possible to distinguish cruise missiles with nuclear warheads and cruise missiles with conventional warheads. We cannot agree with your assertions that such
distinctions are impossible to make.

On "Backfire."

We are ready to accept your proposal to solve the question on "Backfire" issue on the basis of the unilateral declaration of the Soviet government. I want to repeat that we proceed from an understanding that the current rate of production of this aircraft is approximately 30 units per year.

I want also to repeat what was said yesterday by the President, precisely: the USA upon signing the treaty will make a declaration which then will be handed over to the Congress that the US reserves the right to deploy an aircraft comparable to "Backfire".

On the timeframe for dismantling and the period of validity of the protocol.

As the President said yesterday we are ready to agree that the dismantling process of missiles [held by each side] above the established numbers would start on December 30, 1981 if the Soviet side agrees to accept June 30, 1981 as the date when the term of the protocol expires. We also are ready to agree that by that date all the weapons subjected to dismantling in order to achieve the upper limit of 2,250 carriers, would be made irreversibly unusable.

Already in New York I explained to you why the protocol as an integral part of the treaty as well as the treaty itself must have a fixed term.

We are ready to discuss in Geneva the question of the criteria of bringing strategic weapons subjected to cut back to a state of irreversible uselessness. This concept was introduced by the Soviet side in Geneva not so long ago but was not discussed in detail.

The encryption of telemetric data for purposes of secrecy.

We believe it is necessary to achieve a common understanding on the basis of our proposal that neither side will deliberately hide telemetric information on the tests of missiles by way of encryption these data for secrecy purposes which would make it more difficult the implementation of control over the observance of the treaty’s provisions. For us this is an important question and there should be clear mutual understanding on it.

In conclusion, I will repeat that we want to quickly conclude negotiations and sign the treaty in the nearest future. This our sincere and deep desire.

I hope that you together with your colleagues in Moscow will study the President’s statement with great attention, after which we can contact each other. I would like to ask you at the same time what do you think about the procedure of our further work so we could solve the remaining questions. I, personally, do not see before me any question which would have more important significance. And I am ready to do everything necessary to meet you practically any moment for a full completion of the preparation of the treaty.
A.A. GROMYKO: In your statement I did not catch anything new in comparison to what President Carter spoke about. Therefore there is no need for me to repeat what I have already said today. I will only touch upon two issues.

You very often speak about cruise missiles and the number of them on heavy bombers. And you are saying so as if you are making great concessions to the Soviet Union. In fact, you are making no concessions. Just the opposite.

For us, it is absolutely unacceptable to increase the number of cruise missiles on a heavy bomber over 20 even by 1 missile, not even mentioning the increase by 15 missiles. We will not agree with that. I won't speak about other aspects of the cruise missile problem since I would have repeated myself.

Now a few words about our middle range bomber TU-22M ("Backfire"). We wonder why you still support this question, why you don’t want to drop it. It would be easier for you to drop it in order to settle the whole package of questions and it would be easier to explain it at home in your country if there is any need at all to explain.

We appreciate the readiness expressed by the President and yourself to be satisfied by our unilateral declaration on "Backfire". If you believe that something should be excluded from the declaration we do not object.

C. VANCE: The data related to the distance and the profile of the flight of this aircraft should be excluded. But it is very important to preserve in the declaration the question of the rate of production of this aircraft.

A.A. GROMYKO: As you wish. We can exclude the references to the profile of the flight and the distance range of this aircraft.

As I said, your words to the effect that upon signing the agreement the American side will make a unilateral declaration on its right to create new middle bomber perplex us. Because if it is going to be really a middle bomber rather than a strategic weapon then no declaration is needed. Both sides have a right to produce such planes. If such a plane will not be capable to reach the Soviet territory and will not get such a capability there will not be any problem. But if such an aircraft will have such a capability then the question will be different.

C. VANCE: I only said that it would be an aircraft similar by its characteristics to the Soviet aircraft "Backfire"

A.A. GROMYKO: This algebraic formula says very little. If this aircraft is based in Europe then it has a strategic role.

Now I want to say this. On a broad range of issues your tone was as if the American side made concessions to us. But this is not so. You have moved a bit from your previous positions on some questions but you neutralized these changes by all sorts of stipulations. Let us put everything in its own place.
There is not a single fully agreed upon question after you have set forth the American position. On all questions you hang some kinds of pendants which complicate the matter. You put them even on the questions which have no bearing on the US security. It is incomprehensible for what reason you do it.

C. VANCE: We do not think that we are hanging pendants which complicate the matter on any questions. I already stated quite clearly that both the President and I, and our government as a whole, believe that we come a long way toward the Soviet Union’s position by offering what you call "pendants." These are factors which need to be taken into account in order to provide equality and equal security of both sides, i.e. for observing the principle which you constantly emphasize and with which we agree.

I agree that the questions we are facing are complex and I again express my hope that you, together with you colleagues, will thoroughly study everything that was said by President Carter yesterday.

A.A. GROMYKO: I too hope that you will study everything that we said about the Soviet Union’s position. So here we are in absolutely the same situation.

You raised the issue of a procedure for further discussions of the questions we face. Let us agree that when anyone of us is ready he would give an appropriate signal. Although, even now we can tentatively agree on the next meeting.

C. VANCE: I think it would be useful. Let us meet in two- three weeks in order to give enough time to both side for reflection.

A.A. GROMYKO: let us agree today that the next meeting will take place in the last part of October.

C. VANCE: I agree. I will be glad for this meeting to come to Moscow.

A.A. GROMYKO: On the place of our meeting, I am sure, we will be able to come to an agreement without any difficulty.

(After the meeting, in which took part from the Soviet side: comrades G.M. Kornienko, A.F. Dobrynin, and V.M. Sukhodrev, and from the American side: P. Warnke, M. Toon, and W. Kramer (interpreter), a tete-a-tete conversation took place between A.A. Gromyko and S. Vance in the presence of interpreters of both sides.

A.A. GROMYKO: Return to the question of strategic weapons I would like to say that in the US Government not enough attention is given to one question - the question about what is possible for us and what is not. We can not and will not agree on what is impossible. Quietly you think that this is a kind of demand on our part. Of course, it happens sometimes that someone introduces proposals and then weighing them against the proposals of the other side he sees that there is space for compromise. But there are things where it is simply impossible to make compromises. This thought I wanted to leave to you before my departure.
Do not think that we do not appreciate what the President said yesterday. We do appreciate but we want you to correctly assess our position and our possibilities. And so on this point I would like to end our conversation today.

C. VANCE: I appreciate your words. In fact, we proceeded exactly from this while developing our new proposals concerning the terms of dismantling and improving the missiles over the established limits. We took it into account while deciding the number of cruise missiles on heavy bombers. Exactly for this reason we introduced the proposal to decide on the number of cruise missiles in terms of average levels.

It is important, however, also to take into account our position. The American side is now trying to overcome all the remaining obstacles and to sign the agreement in very near future.

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As can be seen from the transcript of the conversations with Vance that held in New York on 27 and 28 of September, in the beginning the Americans took a very rigid position on the questions related to strategic arms limitations.

In the meeting with Carter in Washington on September 30 our side severely criticized such a position of the USA. As a result of the long conversation with Carter, followed by another meeting with Vance on October 1, some changes in the US position begin to show. The Americans showed the most progress on the following questions:

The terms of arms cut back. The Americans expressed their readiness to accept our proposal on that the cut back of total levels of strategic weapons from 2,400 to 2,250 would be carried out [...]