The criticism regarding consultation with the Senior Staffs obviously is directed at a failure to obtain available competent advice. Undoubtedly, the Senior Staffs had good officers who could have been helpful. The judgment involved, however, was at what point do you draw the line when you have operational activities to be accomplished. Each of the Senior Staffs assigned officers to work with the project staffs. No Senior Staff officer not so assigned could have been kept sufficiently well-informed without full and constant briefings. In view of the briefing obligations already in existence, it was decided that additional briefing burdens were unacceptable. Moreover, as indicated above, a line had to be drawn and it was felt that sufficient senior personnel were fully involved. The Survey's criticism in this connection is based on a concept of a normal DD/P project rather than an extraordinary one like Cuba. In this connection, it should again be emphasized that participation by other elements of the Government is wholly omitted by the Survey.

The Project Review Committee's (PRC) clearance at the most under PRC procedures would have involved a review of the proposed project in its early stages with a view to determining whether or not it should proceed. The peculiar nature of the Cuban project resulted, as already indicated, in clearances throughout the Government at levels which make it hard to comprehend how the PRC would have affected the process. Moreover, even
internally in the Agency, the PRC is only advisory to the DCI and it is doubtful if its normal procedures were intended to apply to this type of project.

The Agency, particularly the DD/P, is criticized for failing to deprive the Development Projects Division (DPD), the Agency's air arm, of its independence by placing it within the organizational structure of the project. The proper organizational positioning of an air commander in relation to the ground commander has long been a matter of argument in the Armed Services. The same difference evidenced itself in the Cuban project with WH-4 favoring the Marine view of complete sub-ordination of air conflicting with the DPD air view advocating a separate command with responsibility to support. This conflict was never fully settled and did cause friction (and probably in a broader sense never will be to the full satisfaction of all the services). It is not felt that it created any more serious difficulties. At any rate, the DD/P dealt with this difference in the only possible practical way in early October 1960. On 5 October the Paramilitary Chief sent a study through C/WH to DD/P expressing at length his views on the command relationships for air operations. On 12 October 1960, the DD/P wrote an answer which set forth the controlling decisions. A copy of this memorandum is attached as Annex B. Operational control of air forces and facilities required for the project was assigned to Chief of the Task Force. An air staff
section for air operations was created in the Task Force. The Acting
Chief of DPD was designated chief of the new air section which was to in-
clude all DPD personnel when actually employed on project business.

Since DPD had many air commitments to service outside of the
Cuban project, AC/DPD was directed to report to the DDP in the usual
manner as to this non-Cuban business.

In view of the foregoing, the Survey is simply wrong when it says
"The project chief had no command authority over air planning and air
operations. The DPD unit established for this purpose was completely
independent." [Para. 7, page 39].

The Survey is also wrong in stating that there was no day-to-day
continuing staff relationship. Two DPD officers (one, an air operations
officer) were assigned full-time from DPD to the project and were physi-
cally located with it. In addition, a senior air operations officer attended
daily staff meetings. He also spent all of his time with and on the project.
Consequently, the air unit was organized to be completely responsive
to the requirements of the Task Force with the exception of air safety
considerations. In addition, DPD facilities (e.g., weather, communications
mapping and planning air operations, photographic intelligence and related
interpretation services) were made available as needed. These were not
physically moved as they were more effective in place and were able by
remaining to service other Agency requirements as well. In fact the DPD
relationship with WH was much closer than quite effective relationships which it had with other Area Divisions having similar requirements.

The Survey devotes several pages to criticism of the WH-4 intelligence collection (pages 75-80) covering a number of points. The most serious allegation is that the interpretation of intelligence was "entrusted to officers who were so deeply engaged in preparations for the invasion that their judgments could not have been expected to be altogether objective." (Para. 13, page 78). One of the essential items referred to is the estimate regarding the effect of the strike force landing in triggering "an uprising among the Cuban population". (Para. 13, page 78). The Survey's lack of understanding of the project's theory on this point and the evidence for the judgments reached has been discussed in detail elsewhere.

It might be noted again that one of the supporting memoranda to General Taylor's oral report concluded "we do not feel that any failure of intelligence contributed significantly to the defeat". Moreover, two members of General Taylor's four-man Cuban Study Group, even in retrospect, still felt after hearing all the evidence that the operation might have been successful had the Cuban air power been eliminated.

Probably if any similar effort were to be attempted in the future an even greater association between DD/F and DD/I should be worked out.
for evaluation purposes. In view of the above conclusions, however, it
would seem fair to say that admitting failures (which indeed is done) they
were not as obvious as the Survey suggests. In fact a case can still be
made that the estimates were right.

The Survey's other criticism regarding WH/4 intelligence activities
will be dealt with briefly. The creation of a G-2 in the paramilitary unit
rather than with the Project FI Section is strongly criticized. (Pages 77-79
The alleged bad consequence of this error, i.e., improper estimates, has
just been discussed. In other respects on this point the Survey is inaccurate.
The Chief of the FI Section did attend WH/4 staff meetings (Para. 10, page 77)
There was liaison between the G-2 and FI Sections (Para. 11, page 77). The
both saw cables (Para. 10, page 77). They exchanged intelligence and
generally supplemented each other (Para. 11, page 78).

The remaining criticism regarding intelligence is directed at a failure
to support the Miami Base. Since the Base raises a number of other
considerations, they will be discussed together.

The Survey, in effect, commends many of the operational results
achieved by the Miami Base. The FI and CI activities are mentioned in
paragraphs 10 and 11 on page 70 and, it is believed, that these accomplish-
ments are commendable.
The PM side involves a more complicated picture. The Survey is critical of the fact that Headquarters in Washington kept too tight a control on Miami. Consequently, too little authority was delegated to enable Miami to function effectively. There is no doubt that a number of Miami officers felt that they were being over-controlled. No good operations officer ever feels differently or if he does, he is not doing his job. Consequently, the normal, healthy operating effort to shake the bit and run free was part of the attitude held by Miami operators in relation to Washington.

Washington, on the other hand, was anxious to avoid moving Headquarters functions to Miami or treating Miami as a field station which it clearly was not. Miami was not Cuba. Communications from target areas could be received and handled just as fast in Washington as in Miami. Many aspects of operational planning could be handled just as well, if not better, in Washington than Miami. Coordination with other operating areas was better handled in Washington. There were, of course, exceptions. Some of the more obvious exceptions were that Miami was a center for Cubans and an active interchange by sea between Miami and Cuba was a fact of life. The project organizational concept, therefore, was to provide Miami with people and the authority needed to take advantage of these potentials. Mainly, of course, this meant FL and CI activities.
some propaganda activities, some special training, and the handling of
the Cuban exile leaders. The Survey apparently does not find major fault
(except as noted in the following paragraphs) with respect to Headquarters-
Miami organizational relations in these fields, whatever the Survey may
say about these activities in other respects.

The Survey does to some extent criticize the training run by Miami
by saying that there was no full-time chief of training, no training objectives
or plan and that much of it was merely a case officer doing the best he
could. (Paras. 24-26, pages 133-134). The results allegedly were
haphazard. For example, "one man was trained in a hotel room to make
a parachute jump". (Para. 25, page 134). Obviously a full jump course
would have been preferable but the Survey's comment indicates a lack
of understanding of the problem. In WW II, many officers did successful
operational jumps with only minimal ground training. Combat pilots and
air crews, when forced to jump, did so without having even been trained
in a hotel room. Anyhow, as the Survey says the hotel-trained jumper
"made one (jump) successfully!" It might also have been stated by the
Survey that the man in question was in his early thirties, in excellent
physical condition and an expert tumbler. Moreover, his one successful
jump was the only one he was asked to do. This case, unimportant in
itself, is referred to because it brings out several relevant points, i.e.,
in projects of this kind operating necessities are handled in the best possible way. Agents are often used without adequate training in the hope of getting some benefits; training sites are often inadequate but are accepted as the only available ones in view of all applicable conditions; operational equipment is not selected as being the best for the job but the best for the job in the light of applicable limitations; drop zones, reception committees and internal organization are rarely what would be described as ideal in the training textbook. Communications are difficult, oscars hard to identify and agents are on the run and harassed. Since the Survey at no point suggests the existence of these problems, some reference to their presence seems essential.

The hotel room as a training site for parachute jumping is only one of many examples of the Survey applying unrealistic criteria. We repeat what has been previously stated that the project surely had many faults but they should be tested against what was possible not against a theoretical and impossible ideal.

Moreover, the Survey provides some evidence inconsistent with the foregoing. In paragraph 9 on page 126 the care taken in selection and screening of Useppa Island trainees is described. Paragraph 12 on page 129 sets forth the training given to 178 trainees originally prepared for infiltration. "In all," the Survey states, "178 men (including 23 radio
operators) had been trained in security, intelligence collection, and reporting, propaganda and agitation, subversive activities, resistance organisation, reception operations, explosives and demolitions, guerrilla action, and similar matters." This would seem reasonably complete and organized. Granting a normal complement of faults and failures, it is still believed that the Miami PM operational and training record is a good one and that this will be supported by the results.

After November 1960 the PM focus was away from Miami. Under the "invasion" concept training, air operations, and planning were the major problems and these were primarily located outside of Miami. Nevertheless, Miami had much to do in connection with portions of these activities. Recruitment was largely done in Miami. Despatching of material and recruits took place from Opalocka; PM agents were infiltrated from and exfiltrated to Miami; communications and certain other limited training was handled in Miami, and the efforts to find and maintain maritime assets centered in Miami.

As between the two offices, Headquarters retained the final decisions on any operation activity directly involving Cuban soil or territorial waters. The concern of non-Agency elements of the Executive Department, already described, meant that it was advisable to permit operational decisions involving Cuba to be made outside of Washington. Moreover, with the speed of communication the extra time required was normally
acceptable, since not operationally fatal, even though aggravating to those involved [i.e., mainly Miami officers]. Of course, overflight decisions had to come to Washington as did landings of any substantial amounts of materiel. Small exfiltration and infiltration operations could have been decided in Miami but policy limitations, such as no entry into Cuban territorial waters of boats having Americans aboard, made close Washington supervision advisable. Moreover, delay in obtaining decisions on these latter type operations was especially minimal since in substantially all of these cases WH/4 was authorized to make the decision. Actually, as pointed out by the Survey, Headquarters seldom had any difference of view with Miami. (Para. 27, page 118).

As far as PM results were concerned, the statistics were that in mid-April 1961, 43 trained PM agents (these are in addition to the 31 FI agents mentioned in Para. 19, page 70 of the Survey) were on the ground in Cuba of which 13 were regularly functioning, non-doubled radio operators and four more were radio operators but in reserve since they had no sets of their own. The geographic distribution of both these agents and radio operators was pretty good, covering most of the island.

The maritime operations handled by Miami had by mid-April landed 88,000 pounds of materiel (which with the 27,800 lbs. actually delivered by air provided the resistance up to 17 April with a total of 115,800 lbs.).
had infiltrated 79 bodies and exfiltrated 51 bodies. Admittedly, much of the material, though by no means all of it, was landed on the north shore in Havana Province since this was a resistance center. Consequently, those who wanted it and those who could handle it were concentrated there—particularly in the early days. Of the 88,000 lbs. total, however, about 45,000 lbs. was in provinces other than Havana, i.e., about 19,000 lbs. in Matanzas and 25,000 lbs. in Pinar del Rio, Las Villas and Camaguey. In addition, some matériel was landed on the south coast at both the west and east ends, i.e., a small amount, perhaps 800 lbs. in Oriente and 20,000 lbs. in Pinar del Rio. In the early days after a ship with the range was available, a few efforts were made to land some matériel in the central part of the south coast but connections were never made with the reception parties. For a substantial period (at least two months) prior to the landing the central south coast was intentionally avoided since it was felt to be vital not to provide even the slightest suggestion of operational interest near possible landing areas.

Some of the specific criticisms of the Miami Base should be mentioned.

1.) Conflict and confusion between Headquarters and Miami was said to exist, resulting in duplication of effort (para. 5, page 68) and division of control as to both agents and in the maritime field as well as high phone bills and unnecessary cables. The duplication of effort undoubtedly existed to some
extent, particularly in the summer and fall of 1960 as the organization
was being set up, but the Survey does not give enough specifics to enable
direct answer, and undue or serious duplication is not remembered. As
to confusion of channels, there was surely some confusion in the early days
on Washington-Miami calls, but in the fall of 1960, rules were established
which, it is believed, adequately clarified this problem. The division of
control on maritime assets was intended, namely, the small boats were
considered tactical and were under Miami control, the big boats strategic
and were, therefore, kept under Headquarters control in order to keep them
available for and ready to support the main landing. As far as is known,
this division of control, which is considered to have been sound, caused no
real difficulty.

2.1 Miami allegedly received almost no intelligence support (paras.
15-18, pages 79-80). The general nature of these allegations plus a failure
to indicate what the alleged consequences of the errors were once more
make it difficult to answer directly. Obviously, there was no intention to
deprive Miami of needed support and no Miami operation is known to have
failed because of lack of operational intelligence. Beach areas and the in-
ternal Cuban situation were as well known to Miami as to Washington.
(See para. 17, page 80). U-2 photography did not go to Miami, but it was
not needed for any of the Miami decisions. Also, it was available in

TS #18/1884
Copy #1
Washington to Miami officers. As to Special Intelligence (para. 16, page 79),
the Miami Base was supported by a whole Staff D unit at another location.

Miami did not, it is true, have a Staff D officer in Base Headquarters. An
FI officer, however, was given the responsibility of digesting all Special
Intelligence material in order to pass it to operations officers if important.
In addition, he briefed the operations officers on this material twice a week.

3.) Security is attacked (pars. 1 et seq., page 135). Obviously
many aspects of the Cuban project were public knowledge. With the required
relations with many Cubans, politicians, military, and otherwise; recruit-
ment efforts; press, magazines, radio and other propaganda programs, a
substantial amount of undesired publicity along with the desired was unavoid-
able. Otherwise, it is believed that the security record of the project was
not too bad. For example, it is now known that any case officer was ever
"blown" by true name. The Uraguay Island operation was never disclosed.

U. S. training sites were mentioned in the press but not located specifically
and were not, it is believed, identified. The movement of the brigade from
Guatemala to Nicaragua and from Nicaragua to Zapata was not discovered.
In view of the efforts to find out everything by the Cubans and the U. S.
press, these were significant accomplishments. Sending agents to Cuba who
had known each other in training is criticized and blame is registered for one
radio operator who knew "almost every paramilitary operation in Cuba from

TS #181384
Copy # /
the beginning of the project. In reply, it can be said that every effort was made to send agents trained together to different parts of Cuba. Admittedly, there were cases where they may have moved together after arrival (e. g., working their way into the city of Havana). No case is known, however, where two agents trained together were despatched together to the same place. As to the knowledgeable radio operator, it is quite true that there was a man with exclusive knowledge of operations. He served under three resistance chiefs, the first two having been killed. Each of these chiefs chose him as their command communications channel, thereby evidencing the utmost confidence in him. He managed to escape and is now an instructor for the Agency. No reason is known as to why the belief in him was not justified. The disregard of security rules by trained agents (para. 4, page 136) was regrettable but Cuban, or indeed human, discipline is fallible. No instance is reported or known where such indiscipline was too serious or could have been avoided. As to American lack of discipline the Survey cites only one case, i. e., that of a case officer in a Miami motel (para. 6, page 136). The Survey might also have said that this case was thoroughly investigated immediately and reported on long before the project was completed. Had the Survey mentioned this, it might also have indicated that unfortunate as the incident was, the DCI on the recommendation of the DD/P, decided that in view of
all the circumstances the officer had made a mistake but an understandable one and not one requiring action other than a warning to increase future safeguards. As to screening recruits, it was impossible to use the same precautions regarding recruits to the camps, particularly toward the end when the recruiting rate was high (para. 7, page 137), as was used with individual agents. In camp, however, they were members of a group making individual activity difficult and even if they had known something, they had no means of communication. The pre-landing movements and the landing, it must be remembered, remained unknown. Also, the brigade members discharged their duties well. Bad consequences, therefore, of the looser procedures were not too evident.
MEMORANDUM FOR: A/DDP/A
C/WH Division
C/WH/4
AG/DDP Division

The following procedures shall apply to all Cuban overflights undertaken under the Cuban Project, with the exception of any U-2 reconnaissance missions. Approval for the latter shall be obtained and instructions issued in accordance with standard U-2 procedures.

1. Prior to sending any notification to the field, the DD/P and A/DDP/A (or one of them if either is unavailable) shall be briefed on the operational plan. If possible DDP/EBM shall be included in the briefing in order to be informed when the matter is presented to the Special Group.

2. WH/4 should be responsible for arranging this briefing. As a rule it should cover at least the following aspects of the proposed operation:

   a. Status and means of communication with reception party.
   b. Detailed flight plan,
   c. Communications plan.

   A representative of DPD should always be included to cover the second aspect.

3. The DD/P, or A/DDP/A on his behalf, shall make arrangements for an appropriate briefing of the D/DCI on each such flight. Normally such briefing will occur after a DD/P plan has been decided upon following the briefing referred to in paragraph 1 above. In case of urgency, however, the DD/P, or A/DDP/A on his behalf, may decide to combine these briefings into a single briefing in order to save time. /N.B.: All briefings of either the DCI or the D/DCI on Cuban Project matters including the above shall be arranged through the Office of the DD/P./
4. Following the above briefings an appropriate message, or messages, will be sent to the field. Since an approval of the operation and of specific operational plans will have been obtained in the briefings, messages may be released by C/WH/4 (and AC/DPD as appropriate), provided they communicate plans reviewed at the briefings. If, however, any message includes important instructions the substance of which has not already been reviewed then it should be released by the DD/P or D/DCI as appropriate.

5. No flight shall be dispatched until the Special Group has been advised of the plan or the DCI has specifically waived this requirement.

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH-4

SUBJECT: Organization and Command Relationships—WH-4 and Development Projects Division


1. Comment on Reference: The referenced study I find penetrating and well expressed. The facts set forth in paragraph 2 are accurately presented and the considerations elaborated in paragraph 3 have great force. On the other hand, certain additional considerations bearing on the problem appear to have been ignored. When these are taken into account, the conclusions as stated in paragraph 4 require slight modification and the recommendations set forth in paragraph 5 must be substantially modified in order to be acceptable.

2. Additional Considerations Bearing on the Problem:

a. As stated in the reference, present command relationships do not give the Cuban Task Force Commander (C/WH-4) control over all the major assets committed or proposed to be committed to this operation. In particular, air capabilities are under the control of AC/DPD, a separate component subject to no common command below the level of the DD/P. Although the referenced paper does not specifically refer to other resources required for the CTF which are not under the command of C/WH-4, it is important to emphasize that this project will require extensive support from other organizational components and that no contemplated arrangements will give C/WH-4 command authority over all the resources and supporting activities upon which the success of the project depends. Accordingly, the issue raised by the paper is whether with respect to air assets the dividing line between assets under the command of the C/WH-4 and other assets remaining under separate command but used in support of the Cuban Project should be drawn as at present or should be redrawn in such a way as to place part of D/P under command of C/WH-4.
b. The reference argues that the proper place to draw the line is between the Air Support Section of DPD, which should be transferred to the control of C/WH-4, and the other elements of that component. It is believed that this judgment is erroneous. In actual fact, the Cuban Project will require at one time or another the performance of operational and supporting activities by most of the branches of DPD. The reason is that DPD has been developed as a largely self-sufficient, integrated organization which includes staff sections for not only operations, but logistics, personnel, finance, security, and administration—all of which may have some part to play in the Cuban Project. Specifically, it will probably be desirable for logistic support of air operations to be managed by DPD. As for operational planning and Headquarters monitoring of operations, it may well be desirable to use the DPD control room and communications facility. The DPD Cover Officer certainly has important contributions to make as does the Security Section. Even the Air Proprietary Branch will be concerned with the Cuban Project because of the need for some of its resources. In order, therefore, to place under the command of C/WH-4 all of the air assets he may require it would be necessary to transfer a substantial part of DPD.

c. The foregoing suggests that the proper dividing line between the authority of C/WH-4 and that of AC/DPD should be redrawn in such a way that perhaps half of the latter component would be under the command of the Cuban Task Force Commander. In fact, however, it would be inefficient and probably wholly infeasible to draw a dividing line in this fashion. All of the branches of DPD which have responsibilities for the Cuban Project, and most of the personnel who will discharge these responsibilities, also have concurrent duties which fall outside of the responsibility of C/WH-4. If DPD were a large headquarters it would at least be feasible to split each Branch into two pieces but such is not the case. Moreover, the burden of the Cuban Project activities and of other business will vary from day to day and week to week. Efficient utilization of personnel requires that in many cases the same individuals perform both sets of duties.
3. **Supplementary Conclusions:** It is concluded that DPD as an organizational unit cannot be split into two parts, one of which would have full and exclusive responsibility for Cuban Project activities and be placed under the command of C/WH-4. Taking this conclusion in conjunction with those stated in paragraph 4 of the reference it would appear that a solution must be sought not by splitting DPD, but by placing the whole of that Division under the control of the CTF Commander with respect to air activities which are in fact Cuban project operations. This solution will have the added and vital advantage of making available to C/WH-4 as a senior staff officer, AC/DPD who is the senior air commander in the Agency.

4. **Physical Separation:** The considerations set forth in paragraph 2 above suggest that no modification of command relationships will overcome the major difficulties that grow out of the physical separation of WH-4 and DPD. It is manifestly infeasible to house the whole of DPD in the Cuban Project headquarters. The physical location of the DPD Air Support Section with WH-4 may be desirable but obviously will leave the DPD Operations Control Room and its Logistics and Administrative Branches in a remote location. Accordingly, such matters as the devising of cover stories, the working out of budgets and funding arrangements, certain security business, and the clearance of many cables will still have to be done between officers who are housed some distance apart. It should be emphasized that this is inherent in any arrangement whereby the full resources of DPD are employed in support of the Cuban Project. Perhaps the most serious problem is that presented by the remoteness of AC/DPD's office from that of C/WH-4. This can only be overcome by reasonably frequent meetings between these two individuals. The inconvenience which is the cost of this solution is the price that must be paid for the employment in the Cuban Project of the best technical talent available to the Agency under circumstances that will permit that talent to be used parttime for the performance of other essential tasks.

5. **Task Force Concept:** A solution along the lines outlined in paragraph 3 above is in the main consistent with comments
on the military task force concept contained in paragraph 3.b. of the reference. In particular, the proposed solution will permit unity of command. It must be recognized, however, that this solution will in effect provide C/WH-4 with a large air section and with the services of a senior staff officer for air activities. It is the size and competence of the air section thus provided that precludes physical integration as explained in paragraph 4 preceding. Moreover, if such an air section is to be used efficiently and to make its full contribution, C/WH-4 must practice substantial delegation to his air section and should recognize that it is competent to handle details in the implementation of broad instructions issued by him. It is especially desirable that full use be made of DPD in its capacity as the air section of the Cuban Project, along with other staff sections of WH-4 as appropriate, in the development of military plans. It will be necessary, if high professional standards are to be maintained, for several military specialists, of which air represents one, to be made use of in planning as well as in operations.

6. Approved Action:

a. Operational control of all air forces and facilities required and employed in the Cuban Project will be assigned to Chief, CTF.

b. Chief, CTF will exercise this control through a newly created staff section for air operations in the CTF.

c. AC/DPD will serve as the Chief of the CTF Air Section. The staff of the Air Section will include any and all DPD personnel when actually employed on Cuban Project business.

d. For DPD business unrelated to the Cuban Project, AC/DPD will continue to report in the usual manner to the DD/P. When and if questions arise concerning the allocation of DPD resources as between the Cuban Project and other requirements and activities, such questions will be resolved by the DD/P.
e. The Cuban Task Force as presently constituted has a unified force with a single Headquarters. If and when it should seem desirable to establish a forward Headquarters or a Field Command having responsibility for military operations in which air and other forces will be employed, the constitution of any such Field Command and its command channels to CTF Headquarters will require careful consideration. The desirability of such a combined Field Command and relationship between the CTF Air Section (DPD) and air assets committed in Field operations will be considered when military plans are more nearly complete.

(signed)
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)
VII. PERSONNEL

The Survey is critical of the Project's personnel management in two major respects:

1) The Project was not staffed throughout with top-quality people; and

2) A number of people were not used to the best advantage.

(Page 144, para. 7).

There are three basic difficulties common to the entire Survey which are equally and perhaps especially applicable to the sections on personnel and which make specific responsive answers almost impossible. They are the existence of:

1) Unsupported allegations of fact as in paragraph 5 on page 42, which will be discussed further below.

2) Conclusions unsupported by facts as in paragraph 13 on page 45 where a number of "obstacles" are stated in such general terms as to make their understanding difficult or in paragraph 3 on page 42 where it is stated that as a result of a number of factors "none of the most experienced, senior operating officers of the Agency participated full time in the project." (Underlining supplied).

3) An admixture of allegations some of which apply to the DD/P generally (e.g., lack of Spanish linguists, para. 9, page 44; defective nature of entire CS staffing system, para. 11, page 44);
some of which apply to the government or the Department of Defense (e.g., problems with Armed Forces, para. 13, page 49); and some relate to the Project.

An effort, however, will be made to be specific in reply and where this is impossible to indicate the difficulty. Regarding inadequate competence in staffing, it should be stated that the Survey mentions no names. A somewhat general response is, therefore, unavoidable, but to be reasonably specific, it has been felt that the names and the backgrounds of a number of the senior officers in the project, excluding the DD/P, A/DDP/A, and C/WH, would be helpful in determining the managerial judgments in this selection. (See Annex A). Support personnel, including communications, have not been included since the Survey is rightly complimentary of their performance. (Page 43, para. 12; page 145, lines 5-7).

A major criticism by the Survey in connection with personnel assignments was an alleged failure to carry out a statement made by the DGI in April 1960 that he would do anything necessary to provide the personnel needed for success. In fact, this was given substantial recognition. On 15 April 1960, the practice was established that if the Project wished to secure the services of a particular
individual about whose release there was some question, C/WH would advise the A/DDP/A who would examine the case with the DD/P.

Obviously carte blanche could not be given but a rapid procedure was established for resolution of difficult cases. In this connection, it is not clear if the Survey in paragraph 1 on page 41 is criticizing a failure to give carte blanche, but, if so, the conclusions suggest an organizational concept with which we disagree.

The Chief of the Clandestine Service Personnel Office (CSPO) also had meetings with the A/DDP/A in which the DCI's views were discussed (at least one of which is recorded in a Memorandum for the Record, dated 22 April 1960) and the CSPO arranged a procedure with WH-4 whereby personnel requests were brought to him either by name or by skill requirement, then by him to the appropriate Panel and finally to the element in question. The understanding was, as indicated above, that difficult cases would be brought to the DD/P via the A/DDP/A. The purpose of this procedure was to avoid the need for WH-4 negotiating directly with other elements regarding personnel thereby eliminating any potential divisional conflicts.

On 16 May 1960, COFS sent an EYES ONLY memorandum to Staff and Division Chiefs and Chief, Operational Services indicating the need of WH for clerical assistance as well as imposing
Certain requirements on the addressees for help in this request.

A copy is attached as Annex D.

Again on 25 August 1960 at the DD/P weekly staff meeting attended by Division and Staff Chiefs of the CS, COPS, in order to re-emphasize the above, announced that the DD/P wanted to be sure that WH-4 was receiving "enough first class people to assure success in their efforts." The solution announced was:

"We have staffed WH-4 thus far without seriously interfering with other operations and activities. The seriousness of the situation demands your most sympathetic consideration of requests for temporary assistance to them. They now have about a dozen critical officer vacancies. We have agreed to having WH-4 suggest the names of those officers whom they would prefer to have particular jobs. The CS Personnel Office will be in touch with you on the names produced by WH-4 and on others identified as being qualified. If you can possibly spare them for the next few months, I urge you to do so. If you feel you cannot spare them, please tell the CSPO your reasons. Mr. Barnes, Mr. Blissell or I will then attempt to judge the relative priorities and make a decision respecting such assignments."

In view of the foregoing, there can be little doubt that senior CS officers knew of the CIA policy to support WH-4 in its personnel requirements. The success or failure of the application of the policy is, of course, a matter of judgment. Obviously no personnel roster..."
is ever wholly satisfactory. Conversely, no project can take any officer regardless of other commitments. The attached roster, it is believed, establishes that on an impartial judgment the project was served with officers of experience and competence.

Obviously the requirements of the Project were unusual and urgent, but a review of the pace at which officers (i.e., staff not contract) were assigned and detailed has revealed no more than the usual problems, e.g., a requesting officer wanting help more rapidly than provided and some junior officers being less qualified than desired. On the whole, however, assignments and details were kept pretty well up-to-date and the caliber adequate. In a number of cases the performance of many officers responded to the challenge of the project, and, consequently, was better than might have been anticipated. In this connection, it might be noted that despite the enormous time demands, inconveniences, family separations, and other difficulties imposed on personnel the project's record for sick leave or absenteeism was so good as to be spectacular.

It might be noted that the CSPO, one of the few senior officers with whom the I.G. or his representatives had any discussions on this matter, asked the chief investigating officer what officers
were considered poor. Our PM officer was named. The CSPO then demonstrated that, although this officer was disliked by some people, he had been specifically requested by WH-4, had performed extremely well and in fact was continued in WH-4 after the misfortunes of April 1961 because of his performance in the project. No more was then said about this individual but no other examples were offered despite a specific request for names.

In view of the foregoing, it is suggested that the Survey allegations be at the very least set aside until specific evidence be introduced to which an answer can be addressed.

The few minor points listed by the Survey regarding personnel are discussed below:

1. A basic mistake was made by filling key spots early without realizing how much the project would grow with the result that officers often ended up supervising three to four times as many people as originally anticipated.

The inference of supervisors beyond their depth is clear. It can only be said that supervision during the project in no place seemed to require change due to inability. Moreover, it must be
recognized that in a fast moving situation an informed junior officer, who has lived with the project often is more effective than an uninformed senior officer. At any rate, further factual support of the criticism must be produced before any more thorough answer can be provided.

2. None of the three GS-16 officers assigned to the project was given top-level managerial responsibilities (Page 42, para. 3).

Actually, there were four GS-16 officers with the project. One, however, was detailed for a special assignment. One of the other three was Chief of Station, Havana until the Embassy was closed in January 1951 when he returned and became the senior man dealing with the Cuban political elements. Another GS-16 was Deputy Chief of Station in Miami. The Chief in Miami was junior to him in grade but he had been with the project from the start (having initially been the project deputy); he was an old hand in the WII area and was performing well. All, including the GS-16, agreed that the Deputy Chief of Station, Miami was appropriate for the GS-16 since it was a high enough post to permit him to be effective and still did not upset a situation by changing purely for reasons of grade an officer, performing well, in favor of a late-
comer who was not an area expert. The third GS-16 was a DD/I officer, not a DD/P officer, who performed well in a responsible overt post. To have made him a manager would have created problems since he did not have operational experience.

3. Of the 42 officers "holding the principal operational jobs in WH-4 in Grade GS-12 through GS-15" a large percentage were rated in a low position in the initial "Relative Retention Lists". (Paras. 4-5, page 42).

Without analyzing specific cases, it is submitted that these statements are completely deceptive as possible evidence of poor quality of personnel. The reasons are:

a. The ranking of individuals under the above procedure in many cases had nothing to do with competence or ability in given assignments. Rather the criteria were the needs of the service over the years to come. A high grade specialist in a little needed field, therefore, might be rated very low. A specific example is a paramilitary officer assigned to WH-4 from another division who served in the project with distinction. Nevertheless, since his parent division had no foreseeable need for such officers, he was ranked low in the initial list. More generally a similar result might well be true of paramilitary officers since the feeling is that the Agency, particularly
post-Cuba, will in all likelihood have few similar projects in the future. Surely this view would be reflected in initial lists prepared by Divisions and would tend to be corrected as necessary during the elaborate policy level review of the lists.

b. Ranking is competitive, and since many of the project officers were not WH officers, they were ranked in the retention lists initially by WH officers in competition with WH officers for long term WH assignments. On this scale, they might well come out badly regardless of their competence for the Cuban Project. In the first place, if paramilitary officers, their speciality is not in future demand; and if not WH area specialists, they would be poor competitors with area specialists looking to a long term future. They might, however, have been excellent officers in many Cuban Project assignments without area knowledge.

c. The initial lists were substantially revised for the above and other reasons in subsequent reviews. Consequently, by themselves they are of little validity.

Again, therefore, it is recommended that at the very least the Survey's allegations in this respect be set aside until a more detailed examination is possible covering the specific individuals in question; why they were rated low on initial lists; did their ratings change on
later lists and, more specifically, what relation the rating for retention purposes had to the performance on the Cuban Project. Obviously, the reverse might also be true, i.e., an officer could receive a top rating for retention purposes but still have poor qualities for the type of urgent rather peculiar requirements existing in the Cuban Project.

4. "A very few project personnel spoke Spanish or had Latin-American background knowledge." (Para. 9, page 44).

Obviously, it would be desirable for most officers in a project of this sort to have both language and area knowledge. Admittedly, the Agency has not achieved this capability to the extent desired, and probably never will. It must also be recognized that in special projects like Cuba the personnel demands must be met in substantial part by assignments based on functional experience even though the individual assigned lacks area or language qualifications.

As to the Project itself, the need for Spanish should also be analyzed. Obviously it was necessary primarily for those dealing with Cubans. Not all such officers, however, needed Spanish, since, for example, FM instructors were quite able to perform effectively without the language since they taught by showing and example. Actually, there were Spanish-speaking trainers in Guatemala so this point is made only for purposes of analysis. Moreover, the training job both on the ground and in the air was never an issue as it was generally conceded to have been excellent.
As to others dealing with the Cubans, the officers working with the Cuban politicians were all fluent in Spanish with one exception, a senior officer who had no difficulty dealing with the Cubans in English and who was relied on very heavily by many of the senior Cubans. His lack of Spanish, therefore, did not prevent his achieving a position of personal confidence.

The officers in propaganda had native Spanish and in addition the publications, the newspapers and the radio scripts were written and produced by Cubans who, in the case of most of the newspapers and publications, had run and produced the same items in Cuba immediately prior to defecting.

The senior FI and CI officers had fluent Spanish. In Miami, an officer with native Spanish organized a corps of 35 to 40 Cubans into a CI organization of considerable competence. Even the Survey called this a "responsive and useful instrument". (Para. 55, page 19; paras. 57-58, page 20).

C/WH-4 and his Paramilitary Chief had fluent Spanish, as did the Chief in Miami. To generalize, of the sixteen senior managerial officers listed in Annex A, eleven had fluent Spanish. During the last four months, the Project operated its own Signal Center and its own Cable Secretariat providing 24-hour coverage. Two of the three post-duty Duty Officers had fluent Spanish. Also, a Translation
Unit of seven people was developed to provide 24-hour coverage of direct communications.

It can be asserted that Spanish speakers were available for all needed uses. Some inconvenience may have been caused on occasion due to not having even more Spanish speakers, but a lack of adequate Spanish speakers cannot honestly be alleged as a ground for any major failure in the project.

5. "Some of the people who served the project on contract were incompetent." (Para. 10, page 44).

Undoubtedly, this statement has some basis in fact, but since no more is said and the consequences to the Project not explained, a reply is not possible in any manageable context.

6. Regarding the improper use of skilled personnel, the Survey has little to say. Inadequate use of GS-16's is discussed above. The only other comments in the Survey are:

a. "In a number of instances, those senior operating personnel in the field stations that did speak Spanish had to be interrupted in their regular duties merely in order to act as interpreters." (Para. 9, page 44). This is answered above.

b. "In many instances, case officers were used as 'handholders' for agents and technical specialists as stevedores."

Surely any case officer does some handholding. Whether this was particularly serious in the project is not known nor indicated by the Survey.
The "stevedore" reference is elsewhere expanded by the Survey to the effect that the "technical and training abilities" of several Navy Chief Petty Officers who were borrowed in connection with work in certain of the Project's ships were "grossly misused" as "much of their time was spent at stevedore or deckhand labor." (Paras 33-34, pages 120-121). It is quite true that some Navy personnel on duty with the Agency were made available by their components to represent the Agency interests and keep an eye on maritime repairs and modifications. Unquestionably, they were not fully employed though their presence at moments was very important. In all likelihood, therefore, this was a situation where some inefficiency of employment resulted. One Chief Petty Officer was upset by the assignment and asked to be returned to his regular duties. Others, however, accepted the situation as special and largely unavoidable, and served without complaint as long as their experience was needed.

c. The Navy Captain assigned at Agency request to the Project to handle maritime activity was "reported to have been not entirely happy with his brief Agency tour. In any event, he was another example of poor handling of people in this project, and he was not given a chance to solve the problems of maritime operations." (Para. 40, Page 123). It is not known who "reported" the Navy Captain (Captain Scapa) as "not entirely happy", but we are surprised at the statement since Agency
officers close to him thought that he left in a pretty good frame of mind.
Of course, it must be remembered that his experiences might well have
caused some discouragement. He was flown on short notice from his
shipboard Navy assignment to detail with another Agency with which he
had no previous experience. He arrived in February 1961 so that the
project was well along and he had to fit himself to it in a great hurry
and under pressure. He was, however, able to provide substantial help
and his assignment was distinctly worthwhile. He examined each ship
as the project had; went to Vieques and inspected the Cuban crew train-
ing; spent a substantial amount of time at Project Headquarters working
on the maritime aspects of the Trinidad and Zapata plans and finally
accompanied the Paramilitary Chief to Puerto Cabezas to participate
in the final briefing of the Brigade and the ships’ crews. Thereafter,
he returned to Project Headquarters and spent night and day in the war
and operations rooms working on all maritime aspects of the final days
of the effort. Such employment of Capata Scapa, it is submitted,
was sensible and constructive.
TOP SECRET

VII - ANNEX A

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY OF CERTAIN SENIOR OFFICIALS

Jacob D. Esterline  E.O.D. February 1951  Chief, Cuban Task Force

Mr. Esterline's prior Agency experience included an assignment as a senior official on the anti-Arbens project in Guatemala and ... Mr. Esterline had fluent Spanish. He has since been assigned as Chief of Operations, WH Division.

During World War II he had 20 months with OSS including two tours behind the lines in Burma. He was a Captain and commanded guerrilla units up to battalion strength.

1951-52, Chief Instructor at Guerrilla Warfare School at Fort Benning
1953, Chief Instructor in Guerrilla Warfare

Edward A. Stanulis  E.O.D. September 1952  Deputy Chief, Cuban Task Force

Mr. Stanulis served in succession as Chief, Plans and Programs, Chief of Operations, and ultimately as Deputy Chief of the Cuban Task Force.

His military service was with the U.S. Army from 1942 to 1950 wherein he progressed in rank from 2nd Lt. to Major.

He is now permanently retired for combat incurred disability (loss of leg). His assignments prior to combat duty included:

Asst. Reg. Intelligence Officer, Eastern Defense Command
Regimental Adjutant, Instructor, Intel. School
Asst. Plans and Ops Officer
Training Officer, Infantry Tactics

In combat (ETO), with the rank of Captain and Major, he served as Commanding Officer of an Infantry Co. (Rifles) with tactical control of battalion attacking elements. Having been wounded, he was a POW for six months.

On return to active duty in Washington he served as a Major in Public Information Divisions of the Army and the Department of Defense until his discharge in 1950.

TOP SECRET

TS #181884

Copy #
He has also had broad experience in public affairs, writing, editing, and publishing. His prior Agency experience included assignments to OPC/PW, F&P Staff, and PP Staff. Assigned as an instructor and ultimately Chief of Headquarters Training, Ops School/CTR. Mr. Stanulis instructed in and assisted in the revision of PP, FI, and FM courses.

Richard D. Drain  E.O.D. March 1951  Chief of Operations, Cuban Task Force

Mr. Drain reported to the Project from an overseas assignment in where he was Chief of Internal Operations and on occasion

His military record includes service as an officer with the U. S. Army, Field Artillery (Armored). His active duty extended from April, 1943 to May, 1946. His training included the Ground Forces Intelligence Course #1, with special emphasis on O. B. and the Armored Command posture, Combat Intelligence Course.

Among other assignments he conducted Basic Training, served as Assistant and Acting Battalion S-3; was an instructor at the Armored School, and was Battery Officer in Advanced Training.

In combat (ETO) he was Forward Observer with a Combat Team and a Platoon Commander.

His decorations include the Silver Star and Bronze Star.

He is a lawyer and practiced in D. C. prior to Agency EOD. His Government experience also included Agency assignments as Executive Asst. to the DD/I, Staff Officer for O/IC (Office of Intelligence Coordination), Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee; and he was detached from the Agency for two extra-Agency assignments. In the first he served on the White House Staff of the Planning Coordination Group under Mr. Nelson Rockefeller. In the second he served with the Department of State as a Special Asst., Multilateral Affairs.

John F. Mallard, Col., USMC  E.O.D. August 1957  SA Military, Cuban Task Force

Prior to his assignment with this Agency, Col. Mallard had served with the Office of the CNO, Assistant Head Naval War Plans Section. His performance was outstanding with comments indicating an excellent background of staff experience and professional capabilities. Noted as diligent, thorough and possessing mature judgment. He had earlier served as Assistant Plans Officer on the
staff of the Commander, 7th Fleet, where he also received an outstanding rating and was looked upon as a source of strength on the staff. Had earlier been a Battalion Commander and was rated an outstanding Artillery Battalion Commander. Col. Mailard carried the brunt of liaison with the military services and heavy responsibility with the State Department on military matters.

E.O.D. June 1951 Chief/Intel/PM Section/Cuban Task Force

reported to the Project from the FI Staff. His earlier assignments included that of senior FI Case Officer in D.C., Chief/I, and Chief Instructor, Resistance Ops Course/OTR. He has received numerous commendations for his performances in Headquarters, in the field, and in Agency liaison activities.

His military service was with the USMC where he served overseas as Bomb Disposal Officer from 1943 to 1945 at New Caledonia, Guadalcanal, and Northern Solomons. He is a Major in the USMC.

Albert G. Davies, Lt. Col., USA E.O.D. March 1960 DC/Int/PM Section/ Cuban Task Force

At the time of his assignment to the Project Col. Davies (a regular infantry officer) had been serving as Army G-2, USACARIB from 1956. He is rated by his service as an Infantry Staff Officer. Served in the European theatre during World War II and in Korea. He holds the Silver Star and the Bronze Medal with two oak leaf clusters. Prior to his assignment to USACARIB he had been an infantry instructor at Fort Leavenworth, Battalion Executive Officer, and Battalion Commander in the Far East, and had been a student at the Army Command and General Staff Officers Course in Oklahoma. Col. Davies' assignment with the Cuban Task Force included that of Post Command at Et. E809 and later Deputy Chief, Intel Unit-PM Section. He has broad area familiarity with Latin America and has some fluency in the Spanish language. He is currently serving as Chief/Intelligence, Research, and Reports/WH/4.

E.O.D. February 1952 C/FI Section/Cuban Task Force

Later DC/WK/4

experience included ten years with the Department of State with whom he served in Tegucigalpa, Madrid, and Santiago, Chile, the

TS #181884

Copy 1
latter two as Second Secretary. He has fluent Spanish, Portuguese, and French, and has wide experience in Latin American affairs with a thorough knowledge of economic matters.

His WH Division assignments include the following.

He is now preparing to assume duties of

Ralph G. Sechafer E.O.D. August 1952 DC/FI Section/Cuban Task Force

Mr. Sechafer entered on duty with the Agency in August of 1952 and has served exclusively with WH Division. His overseas tours of duty included an assignment as . His possessing fluent Spanish and also speaks Portuguese and German. Mr. Sechafer took his undergraduate degree in Hispanic studies. He is noted for his deliberate and unyielding efforts and was a source of strength to the several senior officers who served as Chief of the FI Section.

David A. Phillips E.O.D. April 1955 C/PP Section/Cuban Task Force

Originally a contract agent and covert associate in , Mr. Phillips became a staff employee with the Agency on assignment to P&F Staff and P/F/Operations. He then had assignments to the Havana Station and . Noted as an outstanding propagandist with excellent supervisory qualities, Mr. Phillips has fluent Spanish with excellent area knowledge as evidenced by the fact that he often speaks publicly on the area, including having been on the "Town Hall of the Air".

Philip A. Toomey E.O.D. December 1951 DC/Propaganda Section/Cuban Task Force

Entered on duty with the Agency in December 1951 and has had prior assignment with OPC/WE/Plans and Ops, served abroad as a PP Ops Officer, returned to the PP Staff in Headquarters and was serving

TOP SECRET

TS #1181094
Copy # /
TOP SECRET

with WH/3 at the time of his assignment to the Project. He has native
Spanish and possesses ability to handle a tremendous amount of work.
Mature judgment and skill in the propaganda field are only a couple of his
attributes.


Col. Hawkins was serving on the staff of Marine Corps School,
Quantico, Virginia at the time of his appointment by Commandant, USMC to
the Cuban Task Force. He is a Naval Academy graduate and saw service in
the Philippines at Bataan and Corregidor until taken prisoner. Having escaped
from his prison camp, he joined guerrilla forces and led raiding parties in
attacks against the enemy for which action he was awarded the DSC. He was
later awarded a Bronze Medal for the Okinawa campaign. Following World
War II he served as a member of the Naval Mission to Venezuela and later as
Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines in combat in Korea. He was
there awarded the Silver Star. Served as an instructor in Quantico for three
years and then as G-3 at Camp LeJ une where he was promoted to his present
rank of Colonel. Col. Hawkins possesses native fluency in Spanish. He was
personally selected for the assignment by General Shoup, C.G., USMC.

Frank J. Egan, Lt. Col., USA  E.O.D. June 1956  C/SPU/PM/WH/4

Col. Egan reported to the Cuban Task Force with a background of ex-
perience in Special Forces, U. S. Army. He had on earlier occasion worked
in a liaison capacity with this Agency and always showed a true apprecia-
tion of the peculiar requirements of covert action. Serving originally as Chief of
the Strikes and Plans Unit/PM Section, Col. Egan later proceeded to Guatema-
la where he assumed command of all indigenous Brigade training. He held this
position with the help of a few staff and contract employees until the arrival
of the group of Special Forces Trainers. His capacity for work was outstanding
and the rating he received by his senior officer, Col. Hawkins, reflects
Col. Hawkins' respect for his abilities. Comments particularly pertinent
refer to his ability to influence and inspire the confidence and respect of
troops.

Ernest Sparks  E.O.D. August 1954  Sr. Cuban Task Force Rep/Guatemala

Entering on duty as Ops Instructor in 1952, Mr. Sparks departed for
Korea with the USMC and remained there as an IO/PM and Maritime Officer

TOP SECRET

TS #181884

Copy # /
until 1958. He then served at C/Maritime Ops until 1958 first as an instructor, then Chief of the Maritime Branch, later as Instructor, and ultimately, Chief of the Ops Course. He was commended as an outstanding instructor and capable administrator. Prior to his assignment to the Cuban Task Force he served as Chief/cover Training (C/CT) where he set up and administered a highly competent tutorial facility. His performance was noted as being outstanding.

Jacob Scapa, Capt., USN  E.O.D. February 1951  C/Maritime Ops/Cuban Task Force

Assigned to the Cuban Task Force as a Special Assistant for Military Matters by the CNO, Capt. Scapa appeared on the scene in the late stages of Project development. He was at the time of his assignment on the Staff of the Commander, Amphibious Training Command, Atlantic Fleet. He had earlier served as Commanding Officer of the USS Walke and served aboard the USS Wisconsin, and had been on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic. Capt. Scapa quickly reviewed and made himself familiar with all maritime operational plans. He participated in pre-invasion briefings and added a significant touch of professionalism to maritime matters.

TOD visit to Miami Base/100 to review problem of Maintenance Facility for LCI's and Small Boats. On return recommended and assisted in acquisition of Navy CPO's [Machinists].

Then assigned to Plans and Strike Operations Unit where he assisted greatly in liaison with Navy components and in preparation of sailing instructions, etc. He participated in final briefings of Brigade and maritime personnel. Active during actual strike in War Room, Headquarters, Cuban Task Force. Currently Chief of Naval Mission, Ecuador.

E.O.D. September 1951  C/CI Section/Cuban Task Force

Entered on duty with the Agency as an instructor in the Ops Course in 1951. Remained with OTR until his assignment to C/CI Training. He served there as a Training and Intel Officer and Director of FI Operations. Returning to OTR in 1956 as an instructor in the CE/CI Training Course, he was responsible for the training of two CE services. He became Chief Instructor in the Agency Orientation, CI Familiarization and Security Officer Courses. All reports indicate he was a superb instructor, a good executive and supervisor. He has been noted as being the outstanding instructor on the Headquarters Operations School faculty.
Gerard Dreller  E.O.D. September 1949  C/PA/Cuban Task Force

Extremely capable PP Officer, original, enthusiastic, aggressive. Requires challenge. Outstanding PA man. Long time BE Officer. Entered on duty with the Agency in 1949 in OPC tour in 52-54 excellent reports. Respectively C/Ops, DC.

Bernard E. Reichhardt  E.O.D. November 1947  P&F Officer/Cuban Task Force (Later C/PI Section)

Mr. Reichhardt's earlier Agency assignments included that of Finance Officer, later Chief/Cover Division. He served SE Division in and as Chief/Branch 1/Headquarters. Later assignments were to the PP Staff and with Branch 3 WI Division. His assignments with the Project included a stint at Miami Base before returning to Headquarters as DC/PA Section/Cuban Task Force. He was then moved up as Plans and Policy Officer and ultimately served as Chief/PI Section. Mr. Reichhardt has native fluency in Spanish. He is currently .

E.O.D. September 1947  Special Aeat/WR/4/Cuban Task Fo:

Prior assignments included and Department of State (Mexico) 1931-41. has fluent Spanish. Was commended for extraordinary performance by C/WHD. Characterized as dependable and resourceful, and having the ability to get the most out of employees.

E. Howard Hunt  E.O.D. November 1949  PP/PM/Cuban Task Force

Mr. Hunt's background prior to his service with the Agency was working as a writer and as a correspondent for Time, Inc. He was assigned to OPC and served in for three (3) years, was then reassigned to SE/P & PW Staff. He was later assigned as a PP Officer to before being selected as . He was rated, before his assignment to the Cuban Task Force, as having outstanding ability in the covert action field. He is exceptionally talented and imaginative in the PP field. His assignment in drew outstanding reports. He has fluent Spanish.
Mr. Vandervoort's outstanding military background is well known to all in the Clandestine Services. He possesses area knowledge in WE, FE and WH Divisions and he has good Spanish. He is a competent reporter. Earlier personal reports note his exceptional qualifications for participation in contingency task force operations. He had also earlier been recommended as a Senior War Planner.

U. S. Army service from 1939 to 1946 and was discharged with the rank of Lt. Col. He gave outstanding service in the ETO and was decorated by Generals Gavin and Ridgway as "Outstanding WW II Battalion Co., 82nd Airborne". Decorations: two DSC's, two Bronze Stars, three Purple Hearts, plus French, Dutch, Belgian Decorations.

Mr. Reynolds' career has been spent largely with WH Division beginning with his assignments in OSO. He served in ________, and later as ________. Mr. Reynolds had returned to WH/3 at the time of his assignment to the Project and was one of the first senior officers so assigned. Serving first as DC/Cuban Task Force he was later transferred to Miami Base as Chief of Base. Mr. Reynolds possesses fluent Spanish ability.
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of All Special Staffs and Operating Divisions

SUBJECT: Clerical Assistance for WH Division

1. Certain activities of the WH Division require experienced clerical personnel. It is desired that all CS components contribute to this effort to the maximum extent possible.

2. Requirements now exist for first-class stenographers and typists, grade immaterial, who have had general experience in the Clandestine Services for temporary detail to WH Division for an indefinite period. It is requested that you provide at least one such person from your component. Please notify the Clandestine Services Personnel Office (Ext. 4541) of your selection so that the necessary arrangements may be made. The CSPO will notify you several days in advance of the date when your nominee should report to WH for duty.

Richard Helms
Chief of Operations, DD/P
VIII. THE POLITICAL FRONT AND RELATIONS WITH THE CUBANS.

One of the conclusions of the Survey (as stated in para. 3 on page 143) was "as the project grew, the Agency reduced the exile leaders to the status of puppets, thereby losing the advantages of their active participation". This summarizes the Survey's general criticism of the handling of the Cuban leaders. Two more specific criticisms are made at least by inference in the discussion of this matter in the body of the Survey. The first was that the decision in November 1956 to consider requests for paramilitary aid from groups other than the FRD "complicated relations between Project case officers and the FRD leaders," and "appears to have resulted in some diffusion of effort". It also "seriously hampered progress toward FRD unity, sharpened internal FRD antagonisms, and contributed to the decline in strike force recruiting efforts". The second criticism is that the Agency prevented close contact between the political leaders, first of the FRD and later of the CRC, and the military forces in training in Guatemala. The Survey states (para. 36, page 92) that "this was probably a mistake and an unreasonable interference in the Cubans' management of their own affairs. Controlled contact between the FRD and the troops would have done much to improve morale and motivation of the troops and make the training job easier".

TOP SECRET

TS #181834
Copy /
As will be shown in the following paragraphs, the generalized criticism that the exile leaders were treated as puppets has little if any basis in fact. As to the two more specific criticisms, the facts are correctly stated, but as explained below there were plausible reasons for both decisions and even with the benefit of hindsight these decisions appear to have been wise. This does not mean that no disadvantages attached to them. The Survey is correct in pointing out that relations with the FRD were strained by the decision to support certain non-FRD groups and that the lack of contact between the political leaders and the Brigade gave rise to difficulties on both sides. What is omitted from the Survey's discussion, however, is any explanation of the considerations that made these two decisions seem necessary, let alone any attempt to balance the risks and costs of different courses of action against the disadvantages of those actually pursued.

The press has carried many stories especially after the events of April 1961 citing the sentiments of Cuban exiles to the effect that they were disenchanted with their role in the affair. It is understandable that after the defeat these Cubans would look for scapegoats and allege that they had been used as puppets. It is, on the other hand, disturbing that
these Cuban utterances in the press are accepted as fact in the Survey, particularly when considerable documentary evidence to the contrary was available to the Survey team.

Before analyzing the Survey’s above conclusions, it is important to examine various aspects and complexities of what the Survey calls "exile leaders". First, one must differentiate between the political and military leaders. Second, one must recognize the pressures which existed within each of these two groups. Third, one should understand what the term "leadership" meant within the Miami Cuban exile community.

From the very beginning of the Project it was evident that there were considerable differences of opinion—on almost all important questions—among Cuban exiles of varying political shades and leadership capabilities. Clearly, there was unanimity on the desirability and need to overthrow Castro; but during the great debate on how to accomplish this, two main trends became discernible: the activists, principally the military element in this category, wanted to fight. Political considerations meant little to this segment of exiles who believed political solutions would evolve automatically after Castro’s demise. As a matter of fact, they had the greatest contempt for "the politicians". On the other hand, the
politically-minded exiles realized that the overthrow of Castro without specific plans and preparations to fill the vacuum created by his departure would be an immense error. They agreed with the activists that the overthrow could only be accomplished by violent action but they feared that during the fighting one or more of the military leaders would emerge whose politico/economic postures were unknown quantities and who—in the exuberance of victory—might be accepted by the population as the new political chief of Cuba. Consequently, the political and military exile elements grew apart despite the existence of bonds of friendship and loyalty between individuals in one element and people in the other. Thus, when speaking of "exile leaders" a distinction must be made between political and military leadership.

Also within the political and military groups a high degree of competition existed. Personal ambitions were rampant. Each individual claimed larger followings inside and outside Cuba than the next man; each tried to belittle the potential and capabilities of the other; each proselyted the other's assets. In the early autumn of 1963, over sixty different anti-Castro political groups were active and vocal, almost all of them in the Miami area. They ranged in size from an individual exile with three or four personal henchmen to sizeable bodies with
substantial organizations still active within Cuba itself. The Agency representatives were in contact with many of these and its constant effort was to induce as many groups and individuals as possible to support a broadly based unified movement which would exclude only the supporters of Castro on the left and the Batistianos on the right. The Agency exerted pressure on the Cubans throughout the whole period from mid-1960 up to the invasion in only two ways: to promote the greatest and most inclusive unity of effort and to promote the greatest feasible effectiveness. Decisions, however, as to who should be the dominant leader and what the political platform of the opposition should be were studiously left to the Cubans themselves.

Despite the pressure for unity, it remained true up to the election (by the Cubans) of Jose Miro Cardona as president of the CRC in March 1967 that exile Cuban leadership— if taken in the broadest meaning of the term— consisted of the spokesmen of a great number of anti-Castro groups whose prominence, importance and capabilities for active participation in the operation varied greatly and whose claim for leadership remained highly controversial. If the term is to connotate the FRD Executive Committee then it is highly pertinent to keep in mind the barrier between the "Politicians" and the "Militarists" mentioned above and the very
remarkable checks the FRD Executive Committee members imposed on each other. For rather obvious reasons they attempted to make the FRD an "Exclusive Club" by restricting, if not closing, membership in it and they insisted on a system of parity throughout all FRD working elements, that is to say that each Executive Committee member placed the same number of his followers, as did any one of his fellow members, on any working group. This concept of leadership—not surprising in exile politics and somewhat reminiscent of past Cuban history and practices—had, of course, its effect on dynamic action and puts the term leadership in a somewhat different context. Moreover, the U.S. and the Agency did not feel that a different concept could be forced on the Cubans.

As the pace of the build-up and of current operations accelerated in the autumn of 1960, it became increasingly apparent that any approach to the effectiveness which was the second of the two objectives of Agency pressure would require a higher degree of control over and direction of the anti-Castro movement by the Agency than had originally been hoped. The Cubans never did succeed in creating a Cuban organization sufficiently free of internal divisions and competently enough staffed to perform the rapidly expanding operational tasks. Radio broadcasts had to be organized, publications arranged, and propaganda material
prepared. Paramilitary personnel had to be recruited, screened, and trained. Boats had to be procured, crewed, and maintained. Air crews had likewise to be selected and trained and air operations mounted. Two bases had to be built in Guatemala. There was the large and continuing task of logistic support. All of these tasks would have had to be performed in one form or another even if the major emphasis had continued to be on the internal resistance rather than on the preparation of a strike force. The FRD never came close to achieving the capability to take the major initiative in planning, directing, or conducting these activities. The hope entertained in the summer of 1960 that the FRD would soon evolve into an organization which could take increasing responsibility for the direction of the efforts, relying on the Agency mainly for financial and logistic support and for some help in training, proved completely illusory. It is fair to say that by mid-autumn of 1960, the choice was between a degree of initiative and control by the Agency recognized at the time to be undesirable and, as the only feasible alternative, the abandonment of any serious effort to accomplish the end in view.

Against this background one can examine whether the FRD’s political and military elements were reduced to the status of puppets and whether the advantages of their active participation was lost by this.
1. The FRD political element.

   a) From the outset, the basic principle was established to respect the independence of the Project's Cuban collaborators and, for all intents and purposes, to treat and deal with them as equals; no orders were to be issued, results were to be accomplished by persuasion and by the application of normal, generally accepted practices of political intercourse.

   The 11-12 May 1960 New York meeting which resulted in the formation of the FRD is but one example of the application of this Agency's posture. Agency representatives served as hosts for the assembled Cubans, stated unequivocally the view that formation of a unified opposition to Castro was strictly a Cuban affair and then withdrew leaving it to the delegates to establish their organization in terms upon which they could agree.

   b) The staffing of the FRD working elements and the initiation of activities via these elements was in the hands of the Cubans who were not obliged to check their moves with their U.S. contacts. In fact, the inclusion of Aurelano Sanchez Arango in the Executive Committee on 10 June 1960, which took place without Agency consultation and was at that time at least considered an undesirable development, is another example of the freedom of action the Cubans enjoyed. It might also be said that Sanchez Arango never had any assets of any kind to offer.
He had a longstanding friendship with "Pepe" Figueres of Costa Rica and President Betancourt of Venezuela which enabled him to muster some pressure in the early days for a high position. In view, however, of his lack of following, his resignation was of no significance whatsoever contrary to the statement of the Survey (Para. 16, page 85).

c) From the moment the FRD was formed in May 1960 in New York, the Cubans were aware of the importance attributed in the early stages of the Project by their U.S. contacts to having FRD Headquarters moved to Mexico. The Cubans opposed this move for a variety of reasons—mostly personal and some, from their viewpoint, political. Had the Agency treated its counterparts as puppets, this move could have been accomplished within a matter of weeks. However, in spite of considerable pressures on the Agency, the principle of tactful persuasion was relied upon and it was not until August 1960 that the FRD got to Mexico and then it was only for a short time.

d) The establishment of FRD branch offices in numerous Latin American countries was accomplished by the FRD Executive Committee, with U.S. contacts merely playing an advisory role.

e) The aforementioned self-imposed system of parity and co-running the FRD by Committee resulted in less dynamic action than was
desirable. A partnership with divergent views among the partners is not the best mechanism for decisive action. Thus, U.S. contacts suggested in September 1960, the creation of the position of an FRD General Coordinator, a suggestion accepted in principle by all Cubans concerned. The Cubans, however, wanted their U.S. colleagues to declare their preferences for a particular person. Again this was not done because of the principle of non-U.S. interference in strictly unilateral exile Cuban affairs. The exile internal warfare on this leadership issue assumed rather remarkable proportions but finally the FRD Executive Committee selected Antonio de Varona as General Coordinator on 27 September 1960.

1) The concept of permitting the FRD Cubans to run their own show as much as possible coupled with their own preoccupation on mending their political fences and creating their own political machines, caused many tactical difficulties to those Agency elements charged with day-to-day propaganda activities whose successful implementation hinged on immediate action without protracted negotiations on each detail. Thus, of necessity unilateral Agency operations had to be created in substantially all the action fields (e.g., propaganda, intelligence collection, pararmilitary) which were impossible to conceal from the FRD. The FRD leadership resented what they considered competition and demanded
exclusive control of these activities; they also demanded that the FRD be the only channel for U.S. dealings with any segment of the internal Cuban opposition or the Cuban exile community. On the latter point the Department of State did not agree; on the former, the Agency could not acquiesce because of operational considerations. Moreover, on the former point there was a strong feeling throughout the U.S. Government that it would be wrong to permit the FRD to be in a position to rule out any Cuban elements which might have usable internal Cuban assets. It was clear at least by December 1960 that the effort to broaden the membership of the FRD to the point where it included all political acceptable elements of the opposition had failed and that the effort of its members to use it to advance their own political fortunes within the exile community was resisted. All elements of the U.S. Government were agreed that it could not be an exclusive chosen instrument with a monopoly of governmental support. These problems were certainly not the product of coercion.

gl The inability of the FRD Cubans again--because of their incessant preoccupation with political advantage--to establish an effective paramilitary recruiting mechanism within the Project deadlines called for the utilization of Cuban officers and men outside the FRD channel.
This action was in line with the realities of the situation, i.e., the inability of the political elements to tackle the military tasks as speedily and effectively as necessary and the aforementioned unwillingness of the military (or activists) to accept the political leadership. (Only after the election of Miro Cardona as CEC President did the Liberation Army support and accept the political structure.) Thus, political personalities retained their independence in their specialty and the military (and activists) worked—with the guidance of U.S. military specialists—in theirs. If closer coordination had been possible between the political and the military it would clearly have been desirable. Only the political urgencies of an actual attack were sufficient to achieve any real unity and this was in many ways a mirage and a "sometime thing".

It is true as stated in the Survey that the Agency intervened actively to prevent visits by the political leaders to the training camps in December and January, and that this was deeply resented by the political leaders. It is also true that this lack of contact with the political leadership left the Cuban military personnel unsure of what and for whom they were going to fight, even though being activists not political scientists they were generally satisfied with a mere "Down with Castro" slogan. There were, however, the most specific and urgent reasons for following
this policy. During these months, as the crucial role of the strike force was recognized by all concerned, the competition between the political leaders to secure control of it was at its maximum. Varona used the FRD recruiting machinery to try to secure a preponderance of loyal personnel that would be acceptable to and have some loyalty to him.

Other members of the CRC were equally anxious to insure the inclusion of recruits loyal to them. Most (but not all) of the FRD leaders resented the inclusion of men who had not been supplied through their own recruitment machinery. The FRD leadership, and later some members of the CRC, were determined to try to displace the senior military officers of the Brigade with political appointees acceptable to them.

During the four months before the invasion, no one of the political leaders could have been allowed to visit the camps alone without accusations of favoritism. Meanwhile, the Cuban military leaders in training and the American training officers who were endeavoring to fashion the Brigade into a cohesive and powerful force, feared above all any encouragement of factionalism in the ranks. Moreover, although the troops needed indoctrination in the ideology for which they were going to risk their lives, it was known that some members of the FRD and later of the CRC were unpopular in the camps. There was a real possibility that if there
were many visits of the political leadership, and if these visits were not
carefully controlled when they were permitted, a real cleavage would
have opened up between the military force and the political committee, with
the possible disruption of the Brigade, the one essential asset at the time.
The decision to isolate the Brigade from the political leadership for a
considerable period was obviously a difficult one and no one can state
with certainty that the course of action actually followed was the wisest.
It did, however, produce a situation on D-Day in which the Brigade was
unified and the political leadership had, at least superficially, accepted
their relationship to it.

b) As the deadline for the Project approached the need
to broaden by democratic means and strictly by Cuban action the FRD
base and to evolve a provisional government became pressing. Continuous
negotiations were conducted during February 1961 and March 1961, and on
22 March 1961 the CRC was created. Every Agency position paper
prepared on this matter stressed the need for letting the Cubans have
their own say. Indeed it was felt that only Cuban selection could have
any real value. This policy had the approval of the Department of State
and was carried out to the letter. The following excerpts from an
address by an Agency representative to the Cuban Revolutionary Assembly
on 18 March 1961 just prior to the start of the selection of the CRC exemplified this: "Naturally, the procedures employed in the election of your leader or Provisional President must remain entirely in your hands... Obviously we are not trying to tell you whom you should elect--that is your responsibility and yours alone... The decision is up to you. I am confident you will make the right one." Thus, acting independently the Cuban exiles elected Miro Cardona as their provisional President.

i) It is quite true that CRC members went into isolation during the 17 April invasion; it is also true that statements on the invasion were issued in their names. On the former, CRC members were briefed and counseled by two high ranking Agency officials and the Cuban agreement was given voluntarily and without coercion and in recognition of the demands of the hour. In fact Miro Cardona was told that he might stay in New York City over the fateful weekend of 14-17 April. He, however, asked to be isolated with the other members of the CRC.

j) In summary, the facts prove that FRD (and later CRC) members were not reduced to the status of puppets--regardless of their feeling in the ice cold reality of defeat--and that their action capabilities
were exploited to the fullest (an outstanding example is the great number of laws and plans which were ready for promulgation and implementation upon the assumption of power in Cuba by the Provisional Government).

Such limitations as existed on active participation by Cubans in post-Castro plans for Cuba were created by their own preoccupation with matters relating to personal ambitions, long-standing personal biases and exile politics Caribbean style. Indeed as pointed out above, politicians had little to do with the military aspects of the operation since they lacked by their own admission technical competence. Just before the landing, however, the politico-military understanding was at its best. The Brigade and its leadership recognized the political leadership of the CRC and Marcel Artiaga, a leading member of the CRC, stayed and landed with the Brigade as a representative of the CRC.

2. The FRD Military Element.

a) The military element similarly enjoyed freedom of action consonant with traditionally accepted rules of military discipline and order. Although American advisors, of necessity, directed the planning of the troop training from the basic stage through advanced large unit exercises and maneuvers, the Cuban military leadership participated in this planning and was solely responsible for the conduct of the training and for the control of the troops. In this latter connection, the Cuban
military leaders were responsible for the maintenance of law, order and discipline and in the discharge of these responsibilities meted out disciplinary punishment ranging from "company punishment" to incarceration.

b) Without coercion on our part, the Liberation Troops pledged their loyalty to the Cuban political leadership as represented by the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

c) The traditional cleavages of military versus political leadership naturally were evident in this operation as they are in almost any organized state in the world. There is no evidence, however, to support any contention that the gap between their respective objectives and methods to be employed to achieve these objectives was any wider than would be expected given the circumstances that existed. Merely because those like Manuel Ray who never favored an invasion said after the defeat "I told you so" to all available newspapers did not mean that the D-Day unity was not sufficiently strong to have provided a platform on which to build.

Failure, quite naturally, provided the most potent fuel to the flames of dissension which lay only just below the surface.

3. Miscellaneous. Other than the main conclusion mentioned above, there are some minor criticisms in the Survey. Project officers are criticised for not speaking Spanish. This point is discussed elsewhere but it might again be noted that of the six senior
officers dealing with the Cuban leaders, five had fluent Spanish and the one officer who did not succeeded nevertheless in achieving a close relationship with a number of the top Cubans including Miro Cardona.

Paragraphs 42-50 on pages 54 to 57 of the Survey contain a series of criticisms and preachment which are so general, unsupported or unconnected to some specific consequence that we can only comment that they have been noted with dismay and that we regret that until more detail is furnished, an answer is not possible.

The remainder of the Survey's section on the political front and the relations to the Cubans starting on page 81 is mainly factual. It is only unfortunate that it treats so complex a problem so superficially and fails to include any of the extensive Agency relationships with the State Department and the White House with respect to the proper line to take with the Cuban leaders and the correct interpretation of the political views of these leaders. Also, what political attitudes were the most desirable from the point of view of the U.S.? In addition, the Agency did considerable work on the preparation of political documents. Moreover, some non-Agency experts were obtained to work with the Cuban leaders at their request in the development of the planks for their political platform. The absence of this whole story and the problems faced as it unfolded makes it difficult to have any real understanding of what was involved on the political side.
IX. AIR MARITIME OPERATIONS

The Survey only has a one sentence conclusion regarding the carrying out of paramilitary operations (as distinguished from the basic military concept), namely, "Air and boat operations showed up poorly." (Para. 4., page 143). The body of the Survey, however, has three chapters on this point dealing with "Air", "Maritime", and "Training Underground Leaders". (Page 93-134). The major points in these chapters will be considered below.

/ NB: Three maps have been kept and are available, if desired, which show all air and maritime deliveries into Cuba plus all FM assets on Cuban soil as of 17 April 1961. These can be examined at any time. They are believed relevant to these paramilitary points. /

A. AIR

1. Before discussing the many specific criticisms of the Survey, a few background points should be presented.

a. For reasons already discussed, U.S. bases could not be used. Consequently, drop missions had to be flown the longer distance from Guatemala, the only foreign soil within range for which permission from the local government was possible. Conceivably, President Somoza might have approved Nicaragua, but for many reasons Guatemala was preferable for these missions, e.g., a usable base in Nicaragua was not ready until late in the project; Nicaragua
was farther from the U.S. and during this period supplies had to come from the U.S.; the trainees were in Guatemala, so that by using the same country the logistic support was simplified; and a separate country for the strike base was desired. Moreover, it was advisable to keep pre-strike activities out of the country providing the strike base.

b. U.S. airmen could not be used. The Cubans recruited had extensive experience and were given a lot of training. Their air background, however, was commercial flying which, as it turned out, did not provide them with the kind of night flying navigational precision desired. Moreover, being Cuban and emotionally involved, their discipline was not good. For example, they often violated orders by remaining over targets too long in an effort to find the DZ and help their countrymen.

c. Reception committees were either untrained or performed under difficult conditions. Even a trained individual, other than perhaps a surveyor, can make a slight error in figuring the coordinates of a DZ, particularly in rough terrain. A small mistake is enough to destroy the effectiveness of an air drop.

d. The recent and productive experience of making drops in difficult areas, such as [redacted], has convinced us that communications with the receiving group, including ground to air communications from the DZ to the dropping aircraft (whether by radio, W/T or
beacon), is essential to any assurance of success. In the Cuban situation, communications at best were difficult. For example, although contact was established with groups in the Escambray by courier, efforts to infiltrate a trained radio operator with equipment were never successful. In other cases it was advisable, if not necessary, to keep the radio operator away from the DZ in order to avoid risking so scarce a commodity. This meant an unavoidable delay with respect to last minute messages between the senders and the actual receivers. In no case were the desired communications mentioned above ever possible.

e. The Cuban land mass is not easy for drops. Either the terrain is rough and DZs are few as in the Escambray or the area is relatively crowded making an isolated spot difficult to find. In addition, Castro, as a former guerrilla leader, had surveyed possible DZs and was thoroughly familiar with their location.

f. Drop operations without all aids are inherently difficult. As already stated even toward the end of WW II skilled crews dropping to skilled and experienced reception committees were accorded, as a rule of thumb on the basis of lessons learned, only a 50% chance of success. The technical facilities in Cuba were less good than those in France in 1944-45 and the human capabilities much less good.

Having made the foregoing comments, it should then be admitted that the drop record in Cuba was poor. Efforts to improve it, however, were
not successful, nor is it clear that any permissible action would have done any good. Some 27,800 lbs. of material were actually delivered (somewhat more than stated by the Survey). (See para. 9, page 101). The major deliveries, however, as already explained, were by boat. Only one body drop was made. The reason for this was that drops were obviously going badly and individuals could be infiltrated more successfully by boat.

2. Specific allegations of the Survey follow:

a. The first drop was close but missed by 7 miles as stated by the Survey (para. 1, page 98). A contributing factor was an unknown dam construction marked by lights. No U-2 flights had been approved at this stage of the project and knowledge of the construction was not available. On return the plane hit the proper coast-in point in Guatemala, and the crew captain then turned the plane over to the co-pilot. The latter took a short-cut, climbed above some cloud cover, was lost when he came down and landed on the first field he found, i.e., in Mexico, even though he still had sufficient fuel to return to Guatemala. Obviously, this was bad procedure and poor crew discipline.

b. The rice and beans drop (para. 4., et seq., page 99) is an exaggerated case. In order to fill out the load, the DDCI decided to drop some food, as food shortages were clearly a problem with the
resistance. Probably too much food was dropped and the agent was disturbed and angry. He continued, however, to work for the resistance and with the Agency, coming to Miami at a later date and returning again to Cuba thereafter.

c. Reception procedures (para. 11-12, pages 101-102) were the best that could be devised in each instance, given the circumstances, i.e., the DZ, the local situation, the communications and the material available or that which could be used, (e.g., bonfires often were impossible, thereby making flashlights necessary). As to differences of view, there is no doubt that before a final flight plan was decided upon in particular cases there were often varying suggestions as to what should or should not be done. The clearance procedures already described were fully understood, however, and, it is believed, worked. In view of all the circumstances, they were not "cumbersome", as alleged by the Survey. The Special Group gave the overall clearance, the Task Force made the request for a drop and recommended the time, the place and the load; DPD handled the preparation of the flight plan and suggested any changes prompted by air safety considerations; and the DDCI gave the specific flight plan and final operational clearance. The crews were briefed in Guatemala. Their air discipline, as already indicated, was poor but how to correct it was difficult. Pilots and crews were hard to find so that they could not be fired. Navigation also was
faulty though usually mistakes occurred in the difficult area after hitting the Cuban coast-in point.

d. Pilots were often told, as indicated by the Survey, to drop if they had any reason to believe that they were close to their targets. Often the need was so urgent that any effort to deliver supplies was justifiable. Moreover, capture of materiel by Castro’s forces was a matter of no consequence as the Cubans had more equipment than they could use. Also, there were cases where recovery was by non-resistance Cubans who then passed the materiel to the resistance. Consequently, this chance was always present. If the blind drop theory was wrong, at least it was consciously adopted by all concerned at the time.

e. The so-called "lardy corrective action" (para. 31, page 108) was misunderstood by the Survey. In late February or early March a review of drops was made to try to see what, if anything, could be done to improve results. The findings merely confirmed the problems but really provided no solutions. Some suggestions were made which, in effect, were merely a restatement of existing procedures. Blind drops, as already indicated, were continued as a matter of policy when conditions were urgent, even though the review recommended their elimination. The other study made in January 1961 (para. 31, page 107) was stopped by the Paramilitary Chief as he knew that a solution by use
of American pilots was politically unacceptable no matter how desirable operationally.

In conclusion it might be said that the DPD overall air drop record is a good one and will stand close examination. The failures in Cuba were not the result of lack of competence nor of poor organization. They were rather the result of many complex factors, some beyond Agency control, some undoubtedly within Agency control. During the project, the only real solutions were believed to be in the area of political feasibility, although an improved record might have otherwise been achieved. Surely if better communications could have been provided with the resistance elements at the time of drops, there would have been greater success. It must be remembered in this connection that during the early months in 1961 the communications picture improved materially. Moreover, during the last two or three weeks before the invasion some 15 drop requests were received which could not for other reasons be fulfilled. The groups making these requests were, however, well equipped and capable.

B. MARITIME

In the maritime field, it should be noted that the Survey makes no mention of the operational atmosphere or difficulties. This, of course, is true throughout the Survey, but, because of the particular difficulties encountered in connection with ships and crews and the amounts
of money involved, the omission of realities seems perhaps more
conspicuous in the maritime field.

One major omission, for example, is the effort made by the
Agency to find boats in the Navy and the Coast Guard. Although
such effort was made and both Services were thoroughly cooperative,
no usable boats could be found. Consequently, although the Agency
fleet was not what might have been desired, it was, of necessity,
obtained out of what could be found.

Another omission is any review of performance in relation
to difficulties. For example, under the circumstances, it is
suggested that the infiltration of 88,000 lbs. of materiel plus 79
bodies and the exfiltration of 51 bodies is a perfectly reasonable
performance. Moreover, the transportation of the Brigade to the
beachhead without hitch was surely a commendable operation.

As to supplies, the Survey criticizes the limited distribution
achieved geographically in Cuba, but the fact is that the distribution was
fairly good. This has been explained in an earlier section along with the
reasons why the central south coast was not covered.

As to the condition of ships and the money required for their
purchase and repair, no detailed discussion seems justified, although
the Survey devotes considerable space to these items. The only signi-
ficance of these allegations, it is felt, would be if, in the light of the
existing requirements, urgencies and availabilities (i.e., of both 
equipment and people), the judgments exercised were reprehensible.
Admittedly, the Agency fleet cost a substantial amount of money.
Moreover, as stated, the craft were not ideal. The issue, however,
is what else was possible. It is doubted that anything could have 
been done at the time which would have materially altered the 
situation.

Admittedly, as indicated [in the Survey (para. 41, pages 123-124),
the Agency capability in the maritime field at the start of the Cuban 
project was not very substantial. This, however, is no great 
surprise in view of the unlikelihood pre-Cuba that the Agency would 
become involved in a project requiring this type of maritime capability.
It should be noted that for two years prior to Cuba DD/P officers 
examined all aspects of PM requirements, including maritime, to 
determine what preparatory steps, if any, could be constructively 
taken in advance of an actual project requirement. Although a number 
of actions were taken, the Cuban maritime needs were not anticipated.

In this connection, in retrospect it would probably have been wise 
to have requested Captain Scapa or some other senior Navy officer 
earlier in the project. A Marine Colonel was, of course, the Paramilitary 
Chief and had charge of maritime operations. Also, continuous liaison
with the Navy and Navy officers in Defense was taking place. Nevertheless, a full time Navy Captain in the project could have resulted in the adoption of more imaginative methods which might possibly have produced greater performance. Even in retrospect, however, it is not known what these would have been.

1. The main specific criticisms of the Survey are:
   a. Difficulties with crews particularly the "Barbara J".

   There is no question that trouble was experienced with the Cuban crews. One problem was that the Cubans, when recruited, thought that they were going to control the ships. This impression could have been given by Agency officers in good faith. At any rate, it soon became apparent that such control was impossible, particularly for the landing operation. Clearance was, therefore, requested by the Agency and obtained to hire American masters plus a few American officers for special posts (e.g., chief engineer, communications) on the main landing ships. The heads of MSTS went to extensive pains and trouble to help the Agency find such officers. When hired, however, they were resented by the Cuban seamen, who felt that they had been deprived of their own command and control, and time and circumstances did not permit shake-down cruises. The consequence, particularly when the crews were first put on board ship, was trouble, partly for the reason given and partly
because of differences between the Cubans themselves. These latter conflicts were unfortunate, but it is unknown how they could have been discovered or anticipated during the recruitment unless more time had been available. These problems, moreover, were ironed out before the landing movement in which these particular ships were involved. In addition, the crews were effectively given good training at Vieques as evidenced both by Captain Scapa's examination and the later performance of the crews.

b. The Survey makes a great deal of the case of one of the Masters of the "Barbara J" who was discharged and subsequently had his name included in a letter of commendation. (Paras. 24-25-26, pages 117-118). This case had a long history known to the inspectors which unfortunately the Survey does not choose to mention. Briefly, the Master was considered by MSTS as one of their best men. In fact he was one of the youngest of their men (about 35) to be made a Master. A strong personality difference arose between him and one of the senior Agency contract employees who was to be a central figure in the landing. This employee made charges against the Master including a charge that the Master had been drinking on an operational trip. He, therefore, 'demanded that the Master be discharged.' The case was such that under the circumstances the Agency
employees had to be backed or lost. Due to the employee's importance to the mission, the fact that he was a very good officer, and the shortness of time, he was backed and the Master discharged. On further investigation, it was found that the Master not only denied all the allegations against him but claimed that he could find men to substantiate his story and asked in writing to vindicate himself. In view of his superior MST3 record and faced with serious issues of fact plus obvious security problems and with no time or opportunity to hold hearings to resolve these issues, it was decided to give the Master his contract pay and to explain the facts to the Industrial Relations Officer of MST3. This was done. Thereafter, at the last moment it became essential to obtain a Master for one of the reserve supply ships. Due to the urgency of the situation, the Master's background and the very good impression that the Master had made following the other incident he was asked to take the job. Knowing of the problems at the beachhead including the dangers from enemy air attack and despite his strong disagreement with the decision resulting in his discharge, the Master still immediately accepted, took command of the ship and put to sea. Due to subsequent events beyond his control, he was recalled. In view of all these facts, his name was later included in the general letter to MST3 commending the performance of the more than 20 officers provided by MST3. On this record, the action taken still seems correct.
c. As to infiltration of teams (para. 11, page 128), there were some difficulties but again the situation must be examined in regard to all the existing facts. In the first place through the summer, fall and early winter of 1960, the Havana Station was in existence (the Embassy and thus the Station was closed in early January). Consequently, internal Cuban contacts and communications were excellent. Moreover, legal travel was relatively easy and as pointed out by the Survey, some 8 radio operators were put into Cuba legally. In addition, defectors, as indicated in an earlier section, were exfiltrating in large numbers. Many of these held responsible positions in the Castro Government or in the community and were in close touch with resistance groups. Moreover, the Miami exile community, many of whom were U.S. representatives of internal resistance groups, had their own communications through couriers or otherwise. Consequently, the six maritime operations mentioned by the Survey in September, October, and November must be assessed in relation to this background. Also, in addition, in the summer and fall of 1960 (ending in December) the RIO ESCONDIDO was used to infiltrate and exfiltrate as many as 16 people. The ship had a smuggling compartment in the boiler room which could take two individuals, preferably one. The Survey does not mention these movements, probably because they were not considered maritime operations, rather arrangements with the ship's captain. Five of the 16 people infiltrated during this period were key resistance leaders and their W/T operators. Another factor during this period was that...
legal movement was relatively easy for individuals legally in Cuba so that the desirability of putting in individuals who had to live and leave black was reduced. In view of all these factors, it was decided to keep out many of the teams originally planned for infiltration. The reaction of trained teams to such inactivity was, what might have been expected, anger, discouragement and lowered morale. On top of this the ill-fated trip of the "Barbara J" was unfortunate since 3 teams were aboard who were not put ashore in Cuba. Consequently, the attitude of this group of Cuban trainees was at times bad. After the Havana Station was closed, however, the infiltration efforts picked up despite being thwarted by bad weather through January. By the end of March or early April, the paramilitary agent infiltration had achieved an adequate total. Moreover, thirteen communicators was a satisfactory number although it is probably fair to say that there is no such thing as too many communicators.

d. The Survey alleges that small boat operations were not planned (para. 17, page 114). Probably under the press of events the paper work was not as tidy as might be found in normal charter parties. Planning, however, was, it is believed, what was possible. Maritime operations can only be planned in relation to known facts such as an available reception, an available boat and a moment timely for a mission. Overall plans are obviously possible and it is believed that
it can be shown that such plans existed. In the same way what was
desired in the way of boats was known but actual purchases were only
feasible as particular craft materialised on the market.

C. TRAINING UNDERGROUND LEADERS

The major criticisms of the training were that the sites
were inadequate and in some cases too remote; training on foreign
soil would have been better accomplished in the U.S.; some of the U.S.
training was with haphazard facilities and trainers; and the training
was piecemeal without plan.

Before responding to the particular allegations, it must be
noted that, with all due respect, the Survey's criticism suggests the
attitudes of a dweller in a secure and well-ordered academic "Never-
ever Land" who assumes that all training must be similarly con-
ducted or it is poorly managed. It is the Harvard Law School trying
to comment on the advantages of sandlot training for baseball players.
The only difference being that the HLS would be judiciously analytic
which is a point of view never achieved by the Survey.

The facts are that none of the project's training sites
were ideal or picked solely for the accomplishment of the training in-
volved. Security considerations, or, in other words, political con-
cerns, played a vital role.
Moreover, if results are any criteria, the training sites were adequate. As far as the Brigade and its air arm are concerned, the conclusions of impartial experts (i.e., the JCS team) regarding the competence achieved are recorded in writing. The performance of the trainees on the beachhead is further proof. The training of the landing ships' crews at Vieques was good and effective in operation. The training in Panama was excellent on all reports as was the screening and handling of personnel to be trained at Useppa Island. The Nino Diaz group at New Orleans was, according to all observers, well trained and ready to fight. Its failure to land was due to poor leadership and not the fault of the troops.

The communications training has always been reported as excellent and the Survey itself commends the communications effort. Practice also established that the trained agent communicators in Cuba had far fewer garbles in their messages than normally found in such transmissions.

The agents, who were trained (and all those who were infiltrated as agents were given training), received courses in how to live black; some weapons and demolitions training; some CE; air reception and how to handle drops; resistance organisation and how to contact underground groups. The teams who were to be infiltrated received,
as stated by the Survey (para. 12, page 129) and mentioned earlier, training in "security, basic clandestine tradecraft, intelligence collection and reporting, propaganda and agitation, subversive activities, resistance organization, reception operations, explosives and demolitions, guerrilla action and similar action."

There was, therefore, no lack of training doctrine or planning. Incidentally, since it has been raised by the Survey (para. 11 et seq., page 101), the air reception procedures taught to all agents were those taught in the Agency School on this subject.

Regarding sites, it should be pointed out that, whether good or bad, the Guatemala sites were the only ones available. The U.S. was politically unacceptable and the Guatemala government was the deciding element as to the sites in Guatemala that could be used. The Survey says that the ground training base in Guatemala "obviously... could not " accommodate 500 individuals. (Para. 10, page 127). The fact was that it did plus many more and worked.

Similarly the initial situation at New Orleans was difficult. (Para. 23, page 133). Again, however, the problems were adequately corrected to provide adequate training. It took work and some help from the Armed Services to get the base functioning but both occurred and prevailed.
The Survey, as indicated, also alleges that training could have been more effective and secure if done in the United States (Paras. 11-12, page 138). The Survey points to tank and communications training which did take place in the U.S. to support its conclusion. What is not said is that the tank training only involved 25 men and was done at a U.S. base accustomed to training foreign groups and quite able to assimilate a small group of this size. Similarly, communications could be and were taught in small classes. Political clearances, therefore, were granted specifically for these classes, i.e., a U.S. base for tankers and U.S. safehouses for communicators, but as a recognized exception to the basic rule of generally denying the use of the U.S. for any kind of training. The Nino Diaz group at New Orleans was obviously another exception and one which was somewhat inconsistent with the general rule, but the clearance was given nevertheless because time was short (the invasion was imminent) and an attempted diversionary operation was considered important. Moreover, no other site was available that was either better or usable, taking all factors into account.

The question of haphazard facilities and trainers has been discussed earlier. Obviously, there is a good deal of adjusting to the needs of the moment in a project of this sort. It is believed, however, that the record will show that the training plans were reasonably detailed and complete. Moreover, that wherever a training course of any length was involved, there was a specific training plan.
19 January 1962

Dr. James R. Killian, Jr.
Chairman, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
29th Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Dr. Killian:

Attached is copy of the CIA Inspector General’s “Survey Of Cuban Operations” together with comments therein by General C. F. Cobell, Deputy Director of CIA and Analysis Of The Cuban Operation” by Deputy Director (Plans). This latter report is intended as a comment on the Inspector General’s report.

As you readily understand, I am not in a position to render a personal opinion concerning the validity of the IO’s report or the statements by the DDCI and the HPF because I was not in CIA at the time. However it is my personal opinion as a result of examinations I have made of this operation after the fact that both the report and the rebuttals are extreme. I believe an accurate appraisal of the Cuban effort needs some place in between the two points of view expressed in the reports.

I believe it is safe to say the failure of the Cuban operation was government-wide and in this respect the Agency must bear its full share (though not the entire) responsibility.

For this reason I would recommend that your board, in reviewing the Inspector General’s Survey also review the comments and analysis of the DDCI and the IO/P.

Yours very truly,

/s/ John A. McCone

John A. McCone
Director

Attachments
As stated
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Survey of Cuban Operation

1. My work in support of your "Analysis of the Cuban Operation" gave me an unusual opportunity to study with care the document which caused the analysis to be written, namely, the "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation, October 1961".

2. My consideration of the survey has forced me to reach certain conclusions which I feel that I must record. I do so in writing because these conclusions are, in my opinion, of sufficient significance to demand the discipline of a written expression. Moreover, I feel that those who disagree with me should have the opportunity to direct any replies that they may choose to make to specific identifiable comments.

3. I may say that my decision to write this memorandum was reached with considerable reluctance and only after long deliberation. The deciding factor was my belief that the suggestions for action in paragraph 6 below are worthwhile and should be submitted. They would have been meaningless without the reasons set forth in the earlier paragraphs. The views expressed are, needless to say, exclusively mine.

4. In my opinion the I.G. Survey is most unfortunate for three reasons:

   a. It is an incompetent job. The authors never understood the problems with which they were dealing and failed to express their views with any precision or proper use of relevant facts.

   b. It is biased. Basically relevant evidence on vital issues was not only left out but never even mentioned. The Survey undertook only to present those items which suggested failures or inadequacies. These items, however, were not fully depicted so that a false picture was given. Admittedly, an I.G. must expose fault but it is also his job to do so accurately.
c. It is malicious, or, to put it alternatively, it is intentionally biased. Admittedly, this is a serious charge and is, at best, merely a statement of opinion. I can only say that I hold such opinion firmly. In my view it could be supported solely on the basis of the Survey's total omission in many places of significantly relevant evidence. Such omissions are so excessive and one-sided as to substantiate the conclusion that they must have been intentional. In addition, however, I would like to mention four other points:

1) The fact that the inspectors, in making their investigation, omitted any discussions of their findings with the senior officers responsible for the project. Although technically, the I.G. can accurately state that he talked to the ID/P and the then A/DIP/A about the Survey, the fact is that these discussions were exceedingly brief and covered none of the real issues in the Survey. The A0/DIP was not spoken to at all. The Security Officer of WR/4 was not spoken to at all. Other senior officers, such as C/WR and C/WR/4, were never given an opportunity to express their views in relation to statements in the Survey.

2) Some officers with whom the inspectors had discussions felt after they had a chance to see the Survey, that it did not impartially express the information which they had provided and left out much of the relevant information given. Moreover, some officers have reported that the attitude of the inspectors and their line of questioning indicated a desire to obtain facts or views to support judgments already formed. Opinions contrary to these judgments were not only disregarded but resisted.

3) The distribution of the final Survey was so peculiar and contrary to normal practice that it raises an inference of intended partiality. The method of distribution is known and will not be repeated here. It might be added that there
were other facts with respect to the distribution of the Survey worthy of mention. C/Wh/4 was called one day and asked if he wanted to read the Survey. He said that he would like to do so but since both C/Wh and IC/WH were away he could not leave since he was Acting Chief of the Division. Particularly, he could not meet the requirements of the offer which were that he would only have an hour from the time of the telephone call to see the Survey (including travel time) since it then had to be sent to the printer. Why the urgency was so great is not clear. As far as is known, only one individual outside of the I.G. Staff saw the Survey in final or substantially final form before it was distributed, namely, an officer who was the Chief of Operations for WH/4 during the project. Why he was selected instead of one of his superiors who was connected with the project is not known.

4) Since this particular operation, without question, involved more political interest and dynamite than any in which the Agency has ever participated, there was every reason for following regular procedures meticulously. In addition to the distribution point mentioned above, it seems relevant to wonder how Dr. Killian and the Attorney General knew of the Survey’s existence so as to request a copy.

5. I should say that, whatever the appearance of the foregoing, I have not been trying to I.G. the I.G. The information reported came to me unsolicited and in the normal course of my work with you and your Analysis. Maybe there is additional evidence of importance, but I have not looked for it and do not plan to do so.

6. The significance of the foregoing is to provide the reasons for the main purpose of this memorandum, i.e., the submission of the following recommendations for action.
b. The DDI should resolve to his own satisfaction the conflicts on major issues between the I.G.'s Survey and your analysis. Since both these documents are internal to the Agency, there is no Agency position on the Cuban operation unless the conflicts are resolved. In view of the importance of and the continuing interest in the operation at high levels of the Government, an Agency position seems essential. Such a position is also important for the future. The operation is bound to be studied for various reasons and there should be an Agency position at least as to what happened, what were the mistakes and what were the lessons. Moreover, the DDI, having assumed office after the operation was thoroughly finished, has every reason for wanting to have some definitive findings and conclusions.

b. If the DDI agrees with a. above each recipient of the Survey and Analysis (and it is understood that they will only be distributed together) should be advised of the fact that such an Agency position is being sought. This might help to avoid independent conclusions outside of the Agency being reached first.

c. The following requirements should be imposed on all future I.G. surveys at least on any aspects of the DD/P area of responsibility.

1) No survey shall be undertaken without specific written terms of reference approved by the DDI.

2) The DD/P shall be satisfied that in each future survey covering any portion of his area of responsibility the I.G. or his staff will interview at least all officers having had responsibility for any part of the activity inspected by the I.G., and prior to the distribution of the survey the DD/P and each such officer will be given an opportunity to express his views on points included in the Survey. Obviously the I.G. need not accept these views. Such procedure, however, will save an enormous amount of time required to answer
surveys such as the Cuban one which fail to present a full factual picture regardless of the conclusions reached.

7. I am addressing this memorandum to you as my immediate superior. I hope, however, that you will agree with my request that the memorandum be passed to the DII for his consideration. I do not, of course, ask that you associate yourself with it or any part of it merely because you transmit it.

/s/C.T.B.

C. TRACY BARRIES

Original & 1 - DB/?
22 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. C. Tracy Barnes

Dear Tracy:

Thank you for your courtesy in sending me a copy of your memorandum of 18 January concerning the Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation. I do hope that Dick forwards it to the DCI, and I am enclosing a copy of this note to you in case you wish to send a copy to Dick.

I have not had time to study your memorandum, or even in fact do more than glance at the DB/P analysis in view of the meeting with the President’s Board all day Friday and the fact that I am going to be away all this week. However, I will make the following comments. Needless to say, I completely disagree with your statement that it is an incompetent job. I feel that it is competent and I believe that the more than one file cabinet drawer full of background documents will prove its competence. I do not believe that it is biased. We made it very clear at the start of the report that it would only deal with inadequacies and failures and would not purport to be a thorough analysis of the operation.

Most of all I object most strongly to your third observation, namely that it is malicious and intentionally biased. I have asked the men who did this survey to review your memorandum and comment on the reasons you believe that it is biased. I should perhaps acknowledge that more time should have been spent with you or Blissell, but I do not think this is involved here. If there is a fault, it is mine personally. But to imply that for some reason, unknown to me, that we would slant this report is an unfair comment. You apparently feel there was something unusual in the distribution of the final report. The only thing unusual in it was that we had two Directors at the time, and Mr. McCona having asked for it received it as he was leaving for the West Coast on the day before Thanksgiving and everybody else got their copies on the day after Thanksgiving. Your concern as to how the President’s Board and the Attorney General knew of the survey’s existence can be answered very simply. In 1956 the President’s Board in writing advised all agencies that all
Inspector general reports should be forwarded to them automatically. I don't believe it was a week after the Cuban operation that the direct question came from that Board as to whether an inspection was going to be done to which an affirmative reply was given. The Attorney General's source I do not know.

Finally, as far as to what should be done next, you and Dick should know that at the conclusion of my discussion with the President's Board I urged that a group, or individual, who had not in any way been associated with the operation be charged with taking the Taylor Report, our report and your comments and all background material and writing a truly national and detailed report. I believe that would be a far better solution than trying to develop a CIA position, which really is not very practical inasmuch as there were so many outside factors affecting this operation.

/s/ Kirk
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Mr. Barnes' Memorandum on the IG Survey of the Cuban Operation

1. As you are aware, Mr. Tracy Barnes did a major part of the work in preparing our comments on Mr. Kirkpatrick's Survey of the Cuban Operation. At the conclusion of the task, Mr. Barnes wrote me the attached memorandum which I hereby pass on to you.

2. I may say that I am in agreement with Mr. Barnes that the Survey, largely by reason of the omission of material relevant to its conclusions, constitutes a highly biased document and that the bias is of such a character that it must have been intentional.

3. I will be glad to discuss this with you if you so desire.

/s/ Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plase)

Attachments
1. Barnes' Memo
2. IG Memo to Mr. Barnes
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kirpatrick

SUBJECT: The IG's Cuban Survey and the DB/P's Analysis of the Cuban Operation

1. The scope of the IG Survey is briefly and clearly stated in the Introduction. The Survey's intent was to identify and describe weaknesses within the Agency which contributed to the final result and to make recommendations for their future avoidance. The IG had no authority to conduct a survey of the machinery for making decisions and policy at other levels of government. This field was covered by the group headed by Gen. Taylor. The Survey expressly avoided detailed analysis of the purely military phase of the operation.

2. Much of the DB/P's Analysis is devoted, however, to a discussion of governmental decision-making and to a rehash of the military operation. It criticizes the Survey for insufficient attention to these matters, putting the major blame for the operation's failure on factors beyond the control of the Agency.

3. The Analysis attempts to refute most of the weaknesses described by the Survey. The few which it admits were, it contends, not significant to the final result. It rejects the Survey's statements that intelligence was inadequate and misused and that staffing was inadequate. It blames the failure of the air drops on the Cuban reception areas and air areas. It states that small boat operations could not well have been handled in any other way. And it states that other weaknesses were not important because they were not the decisive reason for failure.

4. There is a fundamental difference of approach between the two documents. While the Analysis is preoccupied with interdepartmental policy-making and military strategy, the Survey is mainly concerned with the failure to build up internal resistance in Cuba through clandestine operations. The Analysis fails to shed any further significant light on this fundamental issue.
5. The Analysis shows a poorer grasp of what was going on at the case-officer level than of events in policy-making circles. This is apparent in a number of inaccuracies in the Analysis. For example, the discussion of activities in Miami is inaccurate and misleading. Conduct of training in Miami is defended although it was not criticized by the Survey. The 178 trainees alluded to in the Analysis as trained in Miami were in fact trained in Guatemala. The HM section in Miami was being built up beginning in November 1960, rather than being de-emphasized. These and other inaccuracies suggest that the Analysis should be read with caution where it deals with events on the working level of the project.

6. The IO investigators centered their inquiry on certain phases which are significant to the success or failure of the operation and of the Agency's over-all mission itself. They cannot be ignored or argued away just because of policy decisions made outside the Agency.
15 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John McCone
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation

1. Upon receipt of the Inspector General's report of October 1961, on the Cuban Operation, which reached my desk prior to my resignation as Director of Central Intelligence, I immediately transmitted a copy to the Deputy Director (Plans) for his comment. This was in line with the practice I had consistently followed in dealing with the reports of the Inspector General: namely, the Office which is the subject of the inspection is given an opportunity to comment on the I.G. report before the Director determines the action to be taken thereon. The reply of the Deputy Director (Plans), dated 18 January 1962, of which I have received a copy, was submitted to you following my resignation.

2. Meanwhile, I have also received and considered the comments of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cabell.

3. I remain at your disposal for any comments you may wish to submit on any phases of this matter relating to C.I.A. responsibilities. Hence I will not submit detailed written comment on the Inspector General's report.

4. At this time, however, I wish to make certain general comments:

a. As a member of the Taylor Committee appointed by the President, I participated fully in the work of his Committee and joined in his Memorandum and oral reports to the President on this subject. While I do not now have a copy of those documents, I made only one or two reservations to the general conclusions and recommendations of these reports. I consider them to be sound and believe they should be accepted as the best available Survey of this particular operation.

]TO SIGN[
b. The Inspector General's report suffers from the fact that his investigation was limited to the activities of one segment of one agency, namely, the C.I.A. Opinions based on such a partial review fail to give the true story or to provide a sound basis for the sweeping conclusions reached by him.

c. Judgments could not properly be rendered in this matter without a full analysis, as was made by the Taylor Committee, of actions of all of the participating elements in the operation and the influences brought to bear outside of the Agency which affected the operation. This applies particularly to the participation of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to certain elements of the Executive Department of the Government.

d. At no time during the preparation of his report did the Inspector General request any information from me and he makes certain serious errors in areas where my direct responsibility was clearly involved.

5. Two major areas of criticism in the I.G. report cover (1) the operational arrangements for the organization, training, transportation and deployment of the Brigade and, (2) the relations of Agency personnel to the Cuban emigration and their political organization. As to these points, I submit the following:

a. First, while certain organizational matters, in the light of developments, may be open to some criticism, the Brigade with its entire complement of men and equipment reached the landing area on schedule and under circumstances which achieved complete surprise. The situation in the landing area was substantially as predicted. The enemy battle order intelligence was essentially correct. The failure to get the ammunition and supplies ashore was due to circumstances beyond the control of the Brigade commander or its personnel.

b. Second, with respect to the organization of a Cuban enigre political committee in support of the operations, I would point out that prior to engaging in the operation a broad coalition of Cuban leaders, and one acceptable to our State Department, was realized.

These two important achievements covered major areas of C.I.A. responsibility.
6. As Director, I deemed it desirable and necessary in view of my other duties to delegate certain responsibilities within the Agency for the day-by-day management of the operation, and on military matters and judgments I relied heavily on military personnel assigned to C.I.A. and on Department of Defense personnel and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, I assumed throughout full responsibility for the Agency's participation and actions and kept currently advised of all important developments. During the concluding days of the operation, I was particularly influenced by the judgments in Col. Hawkins dispatch, dated April 13, 1961, relating to the high state of readiness of the Brigade (Annex I to Chapter IV of DDI report).

7. Whether or not the operation would have succeeded if the Brigade had landed with its entire personnel and equipment is a matter which can be debated and on which even today military experts differ. Certainly, the responsibility for failure does not lie primarily in the main areas of criticism stressed in the Inspector General's report.

8. Of course, there are lessons to be learned as pointed out in the Taylor Reports. These Reports, I believe, should be taken as the main basis for any review of the Agency's actions in support of the operation.

/s/ Allen W. Dulles

Allen W. Dulles
19 February 1962

The Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen:

I have received your memorandum of 15 February 1962
containing your comments on the Inspector General's Survey
of the Cuban Operation. Copies of this memorandum, together
with the DE/F analysis of the survey, the comments made by
General Cabell, Mr. Kirkpatrick, and the personal views
expressed by Mr. Tracy Barnes, will be bound in the report --
and therefore will be known to anyone who might have occasion
to read it.

Sincerely,

signed

John A. McCone
Director