Defeating An Insurgency Seminar Wargame
“Changing the Environment”
February 20-23, 2007
McLean, VA

Panel 3:
Frame the Problem, Set Initial Conditions and Develop the Approach, Issues and Insights

Frame the Problem

Current Conditions:
- The KRG move for an independent Iraqi Kurdistan is a potential problem throughout the moderate Arab world and for the coalition
- Increased Sunni Arab émigrés attempting to enter the Kurdistan area
- KRG is maneuvering into a position to control the Kirkuk oilfields
- Coalition forces remain in Iraq
- Early stage of insurgency with goal to overthrow the government
  - Al Qaeda (Sunni Arabs) and Ansar al Islam (Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds)
  - Expansion of insurgency (Sunni Rebels) is a symptom of Kurdish / Arab tensions
- There is the potential for neighboring states (Turkey & Iran) to intervene against PKK and PJAK
- Rising level of violence within the KRG
- Turkey and Iran have a keen interest in maintaining status quo
- Peshmerga provides an indigenous security force
- Decreasing public support for the KRG
Current Conditions (cont):

- What does the KRG gain from remaining part of a federated Iraq?
  - Keeps the neighboring countries at bay
  - Routes available for oil distribution (percentage of oil revenue)
  - Trade in general
  - International recognition
  - Coalition support

- What are the Kurdish perceptions of an independent KRG?
  - 100% of oil revenue from the Kirkuk oilfields
  - Ethnic pride, re-address historic wrongs
  - Nation state status
  - Less support from Coalition
  - Possible Turkish/Iranian intervention

Current Conditions (cont):

- What is the spill over from an independent Kurdistan?
  - Danger of being surrounded by hostile neighbors
  - Current friends could be enemies
  - Border disputes with ICG and Sunni Arabs
  - Tension generated by other independence movements
  - Potential resistance from the ICG over Oil revenues
  - KRG loses U.S. support
  - Economic problems due to closed borders and temporary loss of oil export
  - Situation in Kurdistan is influenced by larger situation in Iraq
  - Sunni Arab refugee / IDPs

- Turkey
  - PKK terrorism/insurgency in Anatolia
  - Turkey desire EU membership
  - Large well connected Kurdish Diaspora in EU
  - Chances of Islamic radicalization of Turkish government
Frame the Problem

Describe the Insurgency: (1/2)

- Insurgency nascent but growing:
  - Ansar al Islam (Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds) Endstate:
    - Proponents of a Sunni radical interpretation of Islam and Holy War
    - Want Coalition forces out of Iraq
    - Creation of an Islamic state in northern Iraq
  - Al Qaeda (Sunni Arabs) Endstate:
    - Force the withdrawal of US led forces from Iraq
    - Maintain Sunni Arab control of Kirkuk, adjacent oil fields, prevent Kurdish de-Arabization efforts and to strike at Coalition forces and infrastructure
    - Establish a Sunni Islamic state
  - Sunni Arab clashes focused on Kirkuk and Mosul
  - Influx of Sunni émigrés into region
  - Attempts to force Sunni Arabs out of Kirkuk and Mosul
    - Expansion of insurgency (Sunni Rebels) is a symptom of Kurdish / Arab tensions

Frame the Problem

Describe the Insurgency: (2/2)

- Insurgency nascent but growing (Cont):
  - PJAK and PKK activities against Iran and Turkey respectively
    - Kurdistan is the sanctuary for both insurgents
  - PJAK Endstate: An independent secular Kurdistan in Iran. Eventually becoming a Greater Kurdistan
  - PKK Endstate: Want to create an independent Kurdish state in Eastern Turkey (where 50+% of the Kurdish population resides)
To Achieve:

Stable, economically viable, multi-ethnic, and semi-autonomous region that is mindful of the rule of law and cooperates with the ICG: capable of minimizing Kurdish-based regional threats

- Security forces capable of defending the region from internal and external threats without posing a threat to neighbors
- Insurgent elements isolated & neutralized (maintained for and by the population)
- Sunni immigration no longer causing instability
- An agreed upon process to resolve border issues
- A negotiated resolution of Kirkuk oilfield revenues achieved
- Ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil
- Kurdistan remains part of a federated Iraqi state
- Ensure PKK and PJAK activities below threshold of foreign intervention
- Minimal populist support for radical Islamic movement
- Maintain minimal U.S. presence and visibility

Assumptions:

- Disaffected Sunnis are the primary source of insurgent manpower for al Qaeda and Ansar al Islam
- This is a coalition operation
- Kurdish population will support the decision of the Kurdish Government to back off of independence movement
- Neighboring states do not want Kurdistan to gain independence
- ICG remains stable
- Necessary SOFA are in place
Kurdistan Logical Lines of Operation

Diplomatic Efforts

Security

Information Operations

Essential Services

Governance

Endstate: Stable, economically viable, multi-ethnic, and semi-autonomous region that is mindful of the rule of law and cooperates with the ICG: capable of minimizing Kurdish-based regional threats

Coalition Lead ➔ ICG/KRG Lead ➔ Coalition Transition to Termination Begins

Campaign Design
Logical Lines of Operations

Required Actions:

Diplomatic Efforts

- Build international legitimacy
- Establish regional stability with bordering states
- Determine the interests of border states (Turkey, Syria and Iran) and identify which of our objectives they will support and what they may attempt to subvert
- Coalition and regional support to reverse actions to establish an independent Kurdistan
- Coalition and regional support for the KRG as part of a federated Iraqi state
- Establish a unified coalition effort (civil and military)
Campaign Design
Logical Lines of Operations

Required Actions:

Governance:

- Resolve Sunni Arab immigration problem
- Address the Arab and Kurd property disputes in Mosul and Kirkuk
- Facilitate and reward good governance programs
  - Rule of Law
  - Fair elections
  - Culturally acceptable business practices
  - Minority rights
  - Freedom of the Press
- With the ICG and KRG develop process to define regional / provincial boundaries and the roles & responsibilities of the respective governments (jurisdictional implications)

Required Actions:

Security

- Training and employing Kurdish Security Forces
- Educate U.S. advisors to understand the relevant laws and customs
- Establish regional stability with bordering states (focus on PJAK and PKK)
- Enable the security forces to handle the local threats
  - Intelligence resources
- Assess the performance of all forces
- Assist in the interdiction of external support to internal insurgents.
- Assist in the protection of key Iraqi / Kurdish infrastructure
Campaign Design
Logical Lines of Operations

Required Actions:

Essential Services / Economic Development
- Maintain oil flow
- Maintain trade with neighboring states
- Monitor the economic growth in the area (all ethnic groups)
- Continue to promote equal employment
- Monitor and improve essential services

Required Actions:

Information Operations
- Participate in a viable public information program to encourage popular support of the Federated Iraq
- Build international support for the Coalition efforts in Iraq
- Internal I/O campaign focused on unique Kurdish issues
- Target insurgent infrastructure/support
- Attempt to influence, ICW with the Kurdish education ministry, an educational curriculum and supporting texts that teach tolerance
- Information operations message reinforces tolerance and acceptance of others
- Ensure mutual support of actions vs. message
Approach to Setting Initial Conditions

Conditions:
- Set diplomatic conditions for coalition assistance
  - ICG and KRG commitment to resolve the problems
    - Commitment from U.S. government.
    - Interagency support
  - KRG has tabled independence movement
  - Determine interests of border states
- Coalition understands the complex dynamics along the "green line"
- ICG supports efforts against insurgents

Objectives:
- Ensure unity of command
- Train security forces capable of suppressing insurgents
- Minimize Coalition "footprint" in KRG
- Enable ICG to resolve the problems in Kurdistan

Required Actions:
- Diplomatic actions ICW the ICG to ensure KRG tables their independence movement
- Establish a unified coalition effort (civil and military)
- Assess:
  - ICG assessment of regional problems
  - KRG security forces
  - Governance / Rule of Law
  - Economy and Infrastructure
  - Social Services
  - Cultural intelligence (especially along the "green line")
    - Provincial boundaries
    - Property disputes
    - Tribes
    - Militias
    - Insurgent threats (internal & external)
- Develop the organization & the Campaign Plan ICW the ICG / KRG
- Develop a strategic communications plan
Approach to Setting Initial Conditions

Capabilities:

- Multi-agency / multi-national expertise empowered to leverage the capabilities of their department or agency
- Security assistance
- Liaison with ICG and KRG
- Public information expertise
- Build governing and security capacity
- Obtain regional/international support
- Persuade KRG leadership to back-off from independence movement
- Population and regionally oriented intelligence network
- Political / economic / cultural / energy expertise
- Regional diplomacy
- Leadership expertise
- Appropriate funding for flexible and rapid interagency activity
- Use of contractors

Capability Gaps

Capability Gaps:

- Unity of command
- Funding for flexible and rapid interagency activity
- Communication gap with Sunni Arab / Tribal leaders
- Assistance to law enforcement / legal system
- Regional diplomacy
- Political / economic / demographic / cultural / energy expertise
- Integrated population and regionally oriented intelligence analysis
  - Integrate indigenous HUMINT and U.S. technical capabilities
- Obtain regional / international support
- Capability to build governing and security capacity
- Population control measures
  - National ID cards
  - National Census
- Government advisors working with ICG / KRG / provincial / local governments
- Development / production of education materials for the educational system
Conditions:

- Internal insurgent groups no longer threaten the stability of the KRG
  - Al Qaeda and Ansar al Islam
- Iraqi infrastructure secure in northern Iraq
- Stability of the “Green Line”
- An agreed upon process to resolve border issues
- KRG satisfied with the ICG plan for sharing of oil revenues
- Volume of Sunni Arab émigrés is at a manageable level
- Inter-ethnic tensions managed by rule of law
- External insurgent groups no longer incite the intervention of the neighboring states
  - PKK & PJAK
- Kurdish autonomy is a diminished concern for the ICG

Objectives:

- KRG backed-away from independence
- The KRG is stable and secure:
  - Violence and security return to pre-crisis levels
  - All internal insurgencies reduced to a level that can be handle by KRG security forces
  - External insurgents being contained by KRG security forces
  - Ethnic tensions reduced
  - KRG cooperating with the ICG
- Oil revenue sharing being mediated between KRG and ICG
- Physical control of the Kirkuk oilfields resolved to the satisfaction of both the KRG and ICG (remained controlled by the ICG)
- With the ICG and KRG develop process to define regional / provincial boundaries and the roles & responsibilities of the respective governments (jurisdictional implications)
Required Actions

Apply diplomatic pressure on the ICG and KRG to resolve issue related to ownership and oil revenue sharing of the Kirkuk oilfields

Advise / support Kurdish security force operations against the insurgents

Assist in the Interdiction of external support to internal insurgents

Assist in the protection of key Iraqi / Kurdish infrastructure

Ensure ICG and KRG effort to prevent ethnic cleansing

Control emigration of Sunni Arabs
  - Displaced person system monitored (PRC)
  - Resettlement plan for émigrés

International level program / arbitration board to resolve property disputes between Kurds and Sunni Arabs with a appropriate compensation / resettlement program
  - Work with moderate Sunni Arab nations (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, etc.) to help resource relocation of losers of arbitration

Facilitate and reward good governance programs

Monitor trade with neighboring states

Monitor the economic growth in the area (all ethnic groups)

Promote equal employment

Monitor and improve essential services

Attempt to influence, ICW with the Kurdish education ministry, an educational curriculum and supporting texts that teach tolerance

Information operations message reinforces tolerance and acceptance of others

Information operations to isolate the insurgents from the population
COIN / SSTRO to Transition

Capabilities:
- Provide CA and PSYOP support to assist Kurdish security forces
  - Tips and rewards programs
  - Civilian non-interference program
  - Safety program
  - Support of counter-propaganda
  - Advise legal system and governance
- Competent Kurdish security forces operating within the Rule of Law
- Population control measures
- Government advisors working with ICG / KRG / provincial / local governments
- Development / production of education materials for the educational system
- Coalition capabilities to provide training and education to the Kurdish forces conducting COIN operations

COIN / SSTRO to Transition

Capability Gaps:
- Population control measures
  - National ID cards
  - National Census
- Government advisors working with ICG / KRG / provincial / local governments
- Development / production of education materials for the educational system
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Panel 3:
Insights, Implications and Actionable Recommendations

Ideal Vision of Transition

Time

Effort

U.S. Military w/allies
U.S. Civilian Organizations, IOs
Indigenous Organizations
Realistic Vision of Transition

U.S. Military, w/allies

↓

U.S. Civilian Organizations, IOs

Indigenous Organizations (very slow rise)

Time

Building Capacity – Options

DoD

HQDA

IN | SF | MP | CA | AR
MOS | Units | Organizations

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Panel 3

Insight 1

What are the DOTMLPF implications for the military to increases or build partner capacity without interagency support in these areas?

- Governance
- Policing / Judicial
- Education / training
- Agriculture
- Economic Development

There are significant DOTMLPF implications for all of these categories

Panel 3

Insight 1

Key DOTMLPF Implications

- Governance Teams / Doctrine / Training already exist – but too little
- Ensure current doctrine for governance is not CA specific
- Develop career tracks for building capacity
  - New MOS and new ASIs
  - Ability to code, track active, NG, RC, prior service and retired individuals
- DOD ability to call-up and deploy expertise to areas of conflict
  - Ability to code individuals based on civilian skills
- Provide education/training: just tools and / or content?
- Holistic agriculture program vs. local farming
  - Distribution
  - Marketing
  - Storage
- Flexible, available and responsive funding
- Legislative changes required
Insight 1: The military needs to capable of building partner capacity without interagency support

- Governance:
  - (O,P,F) CA BN – AC Per Div
    - Governance Teams / Doctrine / Training already exist – but too little & in RC
  - (O,P) RC "governance unit" = akin to RC medical units
  - (D,O,T,P) Knowledge broker (ethnicity based)– Recruit to build network
    - Cultural consultant
    - AC / RC / Contractor
    - Adam Smith serves to help the QC
    - NGOs are regional experts

- (O, L, P) Establish contingency contractor relationship with NGO and contractors who specialize in governance type work (Brown & Root analogy)
- (D) Recognition of differences between "governance advice" vs "Martial Law"
- (D, T) Training and doctrine for execution of martial law
- (D) Ensure current doctrine for governance is not CA specific
Insight 1: The military needs to capable of building partner capacity without interagency support

- Policing and Judicial
  - (D) MP / CA / JAG decision
  - (O) active / NG - RC split, MP / JAG capacity expansion
  - (T) New doctrine/new mission requires training
  - (M) More study required but example; Civilian clothes with force protection
  - (L) Change mind set
  - (P) New MOS, new ASI and ability to code and track active / NG – RC and retired individuals
  - (F) Create CTC-like facility for this mission

- Legislative changes required

Panel 3

Insight 1: The military needs to capable of building partner capacity without interagency support

Education / Training
- Intent: U.S. help build system
  - Provide tools and/or content?
  - Organization / structures / supplies
  - (D) Need to establish a doctrine (infrastructure, funding, materials, teachers), unknown CA capabilities, needs expansion,
  - (O) Develop and expand units (CA) active duty vice reserve, multi-functioning elements capable of handing all nation building functions, CA MTTs to train deploying units
  - (T) CA training, Pre-deployment unit training, General Nation building training for leadership at various levels
  - (M,F) Facilities, classroom materials / supplies / needs funding
  - (L) Educate leaders at various levels, cultural sensitivity
  - (P) Develop career tracks for nation building
Insight 1: The military needs to capable of building partner capacity without interagency support

Agriculture
- Goals: increase productivity, increase self-sufficiency, and increase employment
- (D,O,T,L,P) Techniques
  - University partnering
  - Contract farming trainers
  - "Dual track" reservist, especially IRR, under CA control
  - Liaison with NGOs
  - Develop host nation department of Agriculture
  - Liaison with U.S. Department of Agriculture (Irrigation engineering, water conservation)
- Issues:
  - Holistic agriculture program vs. local farming
  - Closely tie agriculture to economic program
- Gap:
  - DOD ability to recall and deploy agriculture experts to areas of conflict

Economic development
- Expectation (D, O, T, L, P)
  - Long term Programs
    - Structured, centralized
    - USAID, etc
  - Short term projects / jobs
    - Unstructured, decentralized
    - Flexible funds, scope
- Team Composition
  - Additional skill set
    - Economics, finance, project management
    - Engineering, health services, social services
  - PRT model
- Skills / Attributes (T, P)
  - Initial entry language and culture
  - Mid-career economics, finance and project management
Insight 1: The military needs to be capable of building partner capacity without interagency support.

**Economic Development**

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<tr>
<th>Expected Environment</th>
<th>Who / What</th>
<th>Skills / Attributes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Long Term</td>
<td>• Interim team</td>
<td>• Modular</td>
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<td>• Structured</td>
<td>• GP Force</td>
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<td>• USAID</td>
<td>Background</td>
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<td>• Short Notice</td>
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<td>• Unstructured</td>
<td>• Projects / Jobs</td>
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<td>• Decentralized</td>
<td>• Eng Svcs</td>
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<td>• &quot;Bag of $$$&quot;</td>
<td>• Health Svcs</td>
<td>• Finance</td>
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<td>• &quot;PRT&quot; Model</td>
<td>• Project Mgt</td>
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* Legislative Change Required

Insight 2: Ability to identify and utilize SMEs for non-traditional topics.

Insight 3: No institutional responsibility for non-traditional topics.

Insight 4: Inadequate USG civilian and military command and support relationships.

Insight 5: No U.S. Government unified narrative (message) plan.

Insight 6: No USG capacity to conduct timely coordinated / integrated / synchronized regional diplomacy.
Panel 3 - Insights

Insight 7: Funding for flexible and rapid capacity building

Insight 8: Lack of cultural and language skill sets within DOD

Insight 9: Dilemma of changing standards in “war amongst the people”

Insight 10: Cultural acuity

Panel 3 - Insight 3

Insight 3: Unclear institutional responsibility for non-traditional topics
  - Governance
  - Policing & judicial
  - Civilian education and training
  - Agriculture
  - Economic development

Why is it important?
  - Insufficient expertise with no interagency support
  - Need to clarify responsibility for force-wide DOTMLPF for the non-traditional topics
  - JFCOM, TRADOC, MCCDC, CAC, AWC, USAJFKSWC all have pieces of this problem

Way forward?
  - Collaborative development
  - TRADOC lead
Panel 3 - Insight 4

Insight 4:
Inadequate USG civilian and military command and support relationships

Why is it Important?
- There is no unity of command or effort between civilian and military authorities
- There is no integration of DIME
- Strategic, operational and tactical disconnects

Way forward?
- Collaborative development within the entire USG
- CJCS lead with strong SECDEF support

Panel 3 - Insight 9

Insight 9:
Dilemma of alternating standards in “war amongst the people”
- Warfighting and policing are dynamically linked in COIN / SSTR
- Conducting combat operations to establish the rule of law

Why is this Important?
- During COIN / SSTR operations, US military are tasked to conduct operations to achieve stability and development
- Evidentiary collection, transfer and repository practices are not embedded in our institutional training programs but are essential tasks

Way forward?
- Immediate implementation: Plan and execute within 1 year
- TRADOC (MANSCEM) lead, with MCCDC
Insight 10:
Cultural acuity

Why is this Important?
- Current operations in SSTRO are based on trust and influence
- Cultural transgressions at the tactical level can have strategic consequences
- Interactions between all actors

Way forward?
- Immediate implementation: Institutionalize cultural respect and understanding IOT effectively work within other societies
- JFCOM lead