Final Draft

- Scenario for Airstrike against offensive missile bases and bombers in Cuba.

ADVANTAGES

1. Carries out President's pledge to eliminate offensive threat to U.S. and Hemisphere from Cuba and avoids any erosion of U.S. momentum and position. The pledge carried out shows that U.S. has will to fight and to protect vital interests (of great importance vis-a-vis Berlin).

2. Since directed at offensive weapons, keeps issue focused on Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba in defiance of OAS and majority of Security Council.

3. Sharp, possible one time action, may carry smaller-risks of further escalation than a series of confrontations over a period of time. Soviet decision to risk major war unlikely to be decisively affected by this action in an area non-vital to the Soviets.

4. Prompt action will avoid danger of a growth of hands-off Cuba movement throughout Latin America which might make it increasingly difficult to strike at offensive weapons. Present willingness of Latin Americans to support strong action probably cannot be maintained indefinitely.

5. Signals clearly that U.S. not prepared to bargain bases in Cuba for positions in Berlin, NATO and elsewhere.

6. It could demonstrate to Cubans, Castro and others, the weakness of Soviet position in Cuba. In the absence of a strong Soviet reaction in defense of Cuba, we would start the process of disenchchantment and disaffection requisite to undermining Castro and Cuban reliance on the Soviet Union. We would also weaken any tendencies to rely on Soviets elsewhere in world.

7. Removes a military threat to U.S. from Cuban territory.

8. Denies Khrushchev a possible cheap victory through successful maintenance of offensive weapons in Cuba.
DISADVANTAGES

1. This action may force Khrushchev to react strongly and could result in some type of war. Khrushchev will not order launch of a missile from Cuba unless he is ready for war essentially on other grounds. There is greater likelihood of a riposte in kind. However, it is unlikely that the risks of major war are greater than through escalation of blockade.

2. There is remote possibility that some local Soviet commander in Cuba may order firing of a missile.

3. Adverse effect on U.S. image of initiation of use of force against a small country. This can be minimized by making attack selective and focused on Soviet offensive weapons. At same time there would be positive increments to our image from demonstration of clear willingness to take on the Soviets in protection of our vital interests.

4. Unless carefully handled could damage long-range U.S.-Cuban relations.

5. May not totally eliminate offensive weapons thus calling for follow up attacks and/or invasion, unless full and unlimited international inspection is agreed to.
PREREQUISITES FOR DECISION


2. Evidence that Soviets have continued build-up of existing offensive capability in Cuba in defiance of Presidential warning and OAS resolution.

ACTIONS PRIOR OR SIMULTANEOUS TO STRIKE

1. White House statement that offensive build-up is continuing, a dangerous and provocative act, which increases gravity of situation. Repeats warning for those engaged in this work.

2. Delivery of copy of White House statement to Cuban representative at UN.

3. Evacuation warning (as long as militarily feasible) to personnel in strike areas by leaflet drop. A strike plan designed to accomplish mission with minimum damage to non-military targets.

4. Inform OAS (Chairman) shortly in advance of strike.

5. Arrange for Ambassadors to notify Latin American heads of state at zero hour.

6. Inform NATO Allies and others at appropriate time.

7. Letter to K delivered at zero hour, describing action and indicating regret that continuation of work at offensive sites had forced action, limited nature of operation, our effort to limit personnel losses, and calling for immediate consultations to reduce world-wide tensions.
FOLLOW UP ACTIONS

1. Continuation of close air surveillance.

2. Be prepared to hit SAM sites and airfields if reconnaissance planes attacked.

3. Immediate report to Organ of Consultation (OAS) and adoption of resolution requesting Soviets to evacuate offensive forces from Cuba under international inspection.

4. Report to UN Security Council explaining limited nature of operation and requesting immediate despatch of UN observer team to Cuba.

5. Maintenance of blockade extended to include POL until clear evidence is available that offensive bases have been eliminated.

6. Major Presidential address including special message to Cuban people.

7. Appropriate leaflet drops over Cuba.
ANNOTATED COPY FOLLOWS
Scenario for Airstrike against offensive missile bases and bombers in Cuba.

ADVANTAGES

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PREREQUISITES FOR DECISION


2. Evidence that Soviets have continued build-up of existing offensive capability in Cuba in defiance of Presidential warning and OAS resolution.

3. Repeat of warning

4. End of embargo

ACTIONS PRIOR OR SIMULTANEOUS TO STRIKE

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Complete information to accompany

by such an event further ahead

to all concerns
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**ADVANTAGES**

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Final Draft

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

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SECRET
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Final Draft

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3. SECRET
OADR

Final Draft

TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE

PREREQUISITES FOR DECISION:


2. Evidence that Soviets have continued build-up of existing offensive capability in Cuba in defiance of Presidential warning and OAS resolution.

3. Lack of progress in U-2 incident

4. Cuban rejection of U.S. nuclear free zone

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