II. Chronology of Specific Events Relating to the Military Buildup in Cuba

Presented below is a summary of information on the subject which has been assembled by the staff in a chronological arrangement of selected excerpts of data received from intelligence community sources and from public sources. The chronology is somewhat incomplete because it does not include: (a) the all source, all community review which the DCI is making at the request (11/14/62) of the Board, (b) significant information in the files of the NSC Special 5412/2 Group on intelligence and covert actions relating to Cuba, and (c) all of the information believed to have been submitted to the White House during the period of the military buildup in Cuba.

1. 1/2/59 - Castro proclaims provisional Government headed by Urrutia as President.

2. 1/7/59 - U.S. recognizes the Castro Government . . . expresses the sincere good will of the Government and people of the U.S.

3. 12/31/59 - Cuba and Communist China sign trade agreement under which Cuba is to sell Peking 50,000 tons of sugar.

4. 2/4/60 - Mikoyan arrives to open a Soviet exhibition. On 2/13/60, Fidel Castro and Mikoyan sign a joint Soviet-Cuban communiqué describing their conversations as "carried out in an atmosphere of frank cordiality."

5. 2/13/60 - Cuba and the USSR sign trade and economic aid agreement.

6. 2/20/60 - Cuba signs trade and payments agreement with East Germany.

7. 3/31/60 - Cuba signs trade and payments agreement with Poland; with Czechoslovakia on 6/10/60; with Communist China on 7/23/60; with Hungary on 9/15/60; with Bulgaria on 10/7/60; and with Romania on 10/26/60. During this period Cuba established diplomatic relations with these countries and with North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania and Outer Mongolia.

8. 7/9/60 - Khrushchev stated that the USSR is "raising its voice and extending a helpful hand to the people of Cuba . . . speaking figuratively, in case of necessity, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with rocket fire."

9. 7/10/60 - Guevara stated that Cuba is defended by the Soviet Union, "the greatest military power in history."

10. 7/21/60 - The Cuban press reported Raul Castro's statement in Moscow that Cuba is grateful for political and moral support from the USSR.
11. 8/24/60 - Castro charged the U.S. with supporting counter-
revolutionaries, and stated that Cuba would be friends with the
Soviets and Chinese Peoples Republic.

12. 11/18/60 - U.S. stated that at least 12 Soviet ships have
delivered arms and ammunition to Cuba since July 1960, and that Soviet
bloc arms provided to Cuba amount to at least 28,000 tons.

13. 12/19/60 - Cuba and the USSR sign joint communique through
which Cuba openly allies itself with the domestic and foreign poli-
cies of the Soviet Union and indicates its solidarity with the Sino-
Soviet bloc.

14. 1/2/61 - Cuba holds military parade displaying bloc arms,
including tanks, assault guns and field guns. Castro said this
represents only a "small part" of the arms which Cuba had received
from the bloc.

15. 1/3/61 - The United States severed diplomatic relations
with Cuba.

16. 2/23/61 - Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro declared that
the Chinese People's Republic has sent Cuba hundreds of machine guns.

17. 3/24/61 - In a letter to the New York Times, Mr. Juan Bosch
of New York City (former Minister of Finance of Cuba prior to the
Batista Administration) stated that: "Just recently I have received
confidential information that in the western part of the island of
Cuba, specifically in the vicinity of the town of Soroa, Province of
Pinar del Rio, an installation is being finished that has required
hundreds of tons of portland cement, and has led observers to conclude
that a rocket-launching pad is being prepared for use by the Soviet
Union. Many reports of other secret military installations are being
received continuously in my office. Do the American people not realize
that these installations may be used to pinpoint atomic destruction to
any part of the United States, and that a military base in Cuba would
be invaluable to the Soviet Union, not only because of its military
value as a base at the very back door of the U.S., but also because
of the prestige that this would give the Russians?"

18. 4/3/61 - The U.S. Department of State stated that since mid-
1960 over 30,000 tons of arms valued at $50 million had arrived in
Cuba from the bloc; the Cuban armed forces are dependent on the
Soviet bloc for their armed power; Soviet and Czech military advisers
and technicians had accompanied the flow of arms; Cubans had gone to
Czechoslovakia and the USSR for training as jet pilots, ground main-
tenance crews, and artillerymen; and that, except for the U.S., Cuba had
the largest ground forces in the hemisphere -- at least 10 times as
large as those maintained by Batista's and other previous Cuban
Governments.
19. 4/17-19/61 - The CIA-directed effort against Castro met with disaster at the Bay of Pigs.

20. 4/20/61 - President Kennedy stated that any unilateral American intervention would have been contrary to our traditions and to our international obligations, but that we do not intend to abandon Cuba.

21. 4/20-12/1/61 - CIA relaxed its intelligence collection and covert action efforts against Cuba, according to the oral report made to the Board on 6/26/62 by CIA Deputy Director Helms.

22. 6/15/61 - A CIA U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of MIG-15s and MIG-17s in Cuba.

23. 7/15/61 - A CIA U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of MIG-19s in Cuba.

24. 12/2/61 - Castro declares himself a bona fide Communist, "I believe absolutely in Marxism ... I am a Marxist-Leninist and will be a Marxist-Leninist until the last day of my life." He admits that he hid his true political ideology during his revolutionary struggle because he felt that "if we, when we began to have strength, had been known as people of very radical ideas, unquestionably all the social classes that are making war on us would have been doing so from that time on."

25. 1/31/62 - The Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, meeting at Punta del Este, declared that because of its public alignment with international communism, the present Marxist-Leninist government of Cuba is excluded from participating in the Inter-American system.

26. 2/3/62 - In a Proclamation by the President an embargo was placed on trade with Cuba.

27. 3/7/62 - Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/3, entitled "Priority National Intelligence Objectives," provided guidance to the intelligence community on its intelligence collection effort. This guidance included the following:

"First Category: Objectives of such vital importance as to require a maximum intelligence effort ... E. Prospective Soviet and Chinese Communist nuclear attack on the U.S. ..."

"Second Category: Objectives of such critical importance as to require an intensive intelligence effort ... F. Present and prospective Soviet, Chinese Communist, Satellite, and Cuban capabilities and intentions to initiate, conduct, and support ..."
"Internal warfare in countries on the periphery of the Sino Soviet Bloc, and in Africa and Latin America."

"Third Category: Objectives of such great importance as to warrant a major intelligence effort. . . . 2. The stability, internal policy, and international relations of the Castro regime in Cuba; the locus of power within the regime; the progress of its reorganization of the economy, the political structure, and the military establishment; its capabilities to control the population and to defend itself against internal and external attack; the extent and nature of popular disaffection and of organized internal resistance; the regime's economic, political, and military relations with the Soviet Bloc and with Communist China; its subversive capabilities and activities in Latin America."

28. 3/15/62 - According to a CIA memorandum of 11/16/62, the intelligence community established on 3/15/62 an interagency refugee interrogation center (Caribbean Admission Center) at Opa-Locka, Florida, manned by 40 personnel representing CIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, USIA and VOA. Cuban refugees were arriving at Miami at the rate of 1,400 per week. On arrival, male refugees were screened at the Center for intelligence and counter-intelligence potential. From 3/15 to 10/23/62 (the date on which civil air travel was suspended), 10,000 refugees were interviewed at the Center, and 5608 intelligence reports were disseminated to the community.

According to the 11/14/62 CIA Chronology: "On 15 February, 1962 an interagency interrogation center was established by CIA at Opa Locka, near Miami, to handle Cuban refugees and improve the quality of intelligence collected from them . . . . The establishment of Opa Locka coincided with a sharp drop in reports of missile activity received in Washington. When the defensive phase of the Soviet buildup began, the volume of Opa Locka reporting rose very rapidly, and provided good information on the types of equipment coming in, on the use of Soviet personnel and on the security precautions imposed by the Soviets on this operation -- such reports were the basis for the Checklist item cited . . . " (See Items Nos. 54 and 59, infra).

(NOTE: As reflected in Item No. 13b, infra, a somewhat different CIA assessment of the reports appears elsewhere in the CIA Chronology of 11/14/62 wherein it is stated that CIA's files contain 211 intelligence reports on missile and missile-associated activity in Cuba before January 1, 1962, all of which were either totally false or misrepresentations by the observer of other kinds of activity. The CIA Chronology adds that CIA analysts had come to view such reports with suspicion.)
29. 3/21/62 - The DCI circulated NIE 85-62 on "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba". It stated that Cuban military capabilities are "essentially defensive" and that "we believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with strategic weapon systems or with air and naval capabilities suitable for major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate (the next two years). This attitude would

(CONTINUED ON PAGE 5)
"not preclude the liberal provision of Bloc advisers, instructors, and service personnel, the provision of such defensive weapons and equipment as surface-to-air missiles and radars, and such improvement of Cuban naval and air facilities as would enable them to service Soviet units." A foreword to the above estimate states that "Our information on internal developments is not as complete or as reliable as we could wish. On some matters, it is seriously inadequate ... In general, the information available is sufficient to support the estimate."

30. 3/27/62 - The U.S. stated that the Sino-Soviet bloc has furnished $100 million worth of military equipment and technical services to Cuba, and that several hundred Cuban military personnel have received training, including pilot training, in the bloc. "Arms include 5 to 75 MiG jet fighters; 150 to 250 tanks; 50 to 100 assault guns; 500 to 1000 field artillery; 500 to 1000 antiaircraft artillery; 500 mortars; 200,000 small arms, and some patrol vessels and torpedo boats. No evidence of missiles, missile bases or bombers."
(Source: Chronology prepared by the State Department at the request of Senator Morse.)

31. 4/11/62 - DIA initiated meetings with JCS and CIA personnel to discuss refugee interrogation guides for use at the Opa-locka center and to review intelligence requirements on Cuba.
(Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62)

32. Spring of 1962 - "The USSR's decision to develop Cuba as a military base must have been made by the spring of 1962 and preparations within the USSR must have been under way from that time on. There also must have been planning activities in Cuba, in particular, reconnaissance and survey work. The only indication of these operations which can be found is a single intercepted personal message (4/11/62) addressed to a Russian in Cuba who had previously been at the Kapustin Yar missile test range. This fragment was not judged important enough to warrant inclusion in current intelligence publications".
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

33. May 1962 - A Cuban "Indications Center" was established at CINCLANT on the recommendations of DIA and NORAD.
(Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62)

34. 5/31/62 - On this date the NPIC began publishing a series of formal reports dealing with NPIC's evaluation, from a photographic standpoint, of refugee and agent reports on Cuba. Between 5/31 and 10/5, NPIC examined 138 refugee and agent reports. The CIA Chronology of 11/7/62 stated that only three of these reports cited missile activity which could not be linked to the SAM and cruise missile deployments, and "NPIC's evidence negated these three." Elsewhere in the CIA Chronology it is stated "CIA current intelligence was ordered on 14 August not to publish any information on the construction of..."
(34. 5/31/62 Continued)

"Missile bases in Cuba until they had been checked out with NPI.
Between 14 August and mid-October one CIA office sent NPI 13
memoranda "asking for a check on 25 separate reports containing
information which was thought to raise the possibility of Soviet
offensive weapons in Cuba. A great many more such reports were
checked with NPI informally by telephone. In all cases, NPI
either lacked the necessary coverage or made a negative finding."

35. 6/1/62 - DIA issued intelligence requirements regarding
the missile buildup in Cuba including missiles of intermediate range.
These requirements were described by General Carroll as detailed and
comprehensive and as including suggested clandestine intelligence
requirements for CIA.
(Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62)

36. 6/26/62 - At the PFIAB Meeting on this date, Mr. Richard
Helms, Deputy Director of Plans, CIA, reported that CIA relaxed its
intelligence and covert action efforts against Cuba following the
abortive invasion in April, 1961; that since December 1961 CIA has
mounted a major intelligence effort against Cuba; that there have
been weekly U-2 overflights of Cuba; that an interrogation center
has been set up at Opa-locka, with Defense participation, where
1600 Cuban refugees a week are interrogated with 250 weekly intel-
ligence reports resulting therefrom; that such intelligence reports
are coordinated with U-2 photography as the basis for disseminating
intelligence data on the status of the military situation in Cuba;
that CIA is operating intelligence agents in Cuba; that some intelli-
gence is also received from [Redacted] and other govern-
ments still maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba; that the
Cubans are credited with being stronger militarily than any other
Latin American country, but that the Cuban ground forces do not
represent an offensive capability; that they have no guided missiles;
and that no nuclear weapons are known to have been supplied to Cuba
by the USSR.

37. July 1962 - According to the CIA Chronology of 11/7/62,
"intelligence officers dealing with Cuba were focusing during July
on the direction Soviet-Cuban relations would take following Soviet
acquiescence in Castro's assertion of his leadership of Cuban
Communism in the Escalante affair."

38. 7/4/62 - The President's Intelligence Checklist, prepared
by CIA, referring to Raul Castro's visit to Moscow, noted that Raul
was probably seeking more Soviet military aid such as MiG-21s and
surface-to-air missiles which the USSR was already providing to
Indonesia, Egypt and Iraq.

39. 7/19/62 - CIA's President's Checklist noted that the fact
that Raul left Moscow without publicity indicated that this was a
"pretty good sign that the visit was unproductive". (Source: CIA
Chronology, 11/7/62)
40. 7/19/62 - The NSC Special 5412/2 Group (and later the President) approved a proposal that U-2 flights over Cuba "be continued at their current level of two a month". This recommendation was based on a memo from the D/D1 to the DCI following a request made of the DCI on 7/10 by General Taylor who had asked for a comprehensive review of all aerial photography activities. The justification advanced for the DCI's proposal that U-2 flights over Cuba be "continued at their current level" was (1) that earlier missions over Cuba had provided "conclusive evidence that recurring reports of submarines and missile bases in Cuba have been false"; and (2) that "our most important need is for any evidence of the deployment of SA-2 missiles and/or MIG-21s in Cuba". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

41. 7/26-29/62 - Soviet ships carrying equipment and personnel for the Soviet buildup in Cuba first began arriving at Cuban ports. ... evidence gradually accumulated that the behavior pattern of these ships was similar to that of Soviet ships carrying arms to other countries, that even greater security measures than usual were in effect, that a number of the ships were coming from the Baltic rather than Black Sea ports, that some of these were passenger ships, and finally that there was a general movement of Bloc shipping toward Cuba on an unprecedented scale. Apparently, the first recognition of unusual activity in any intelligence publication was a note in a daily review of economic intelligence for CIA internal use ... this paper stated on August 1, that 'at least some if not all of the ships involved probably are carrying additional military equipment to Cuba'. This statement was in direct contradiction to NSA's comment on the same information, i.e., that it tended to corroborate a report received in Havana (earlier intercepted by NSA) that Kaul Castro had asked the USSR to take back excess war material. ..." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

42. August 1962 - "... It should be noted for the record that CIA was in disagreement with DIA over interpretation of intelligence on the movement of shipping to Cuba throughout the month of August. The resulting difficulties in coordination of items for the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), held up publication from 3 August to 9 August of the first item on this subject in that publication. As late as 29 August, DIA in its own daily Intelligence Summary said that 'the high volume of shipping probably reflects planned increases in trade between the USSR and Cuba ...'. There were further difficulties resulting from CIA-DIA differences in the interpretation of photography of aircraft crates deck-loaded on Soviet ships; the record shows that CIA was right. Finally, it should be noted that there is a long history of CIA efforts to obtain better photography on deck cargoes and faster service in returning these pictures to Washington." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
43. 8/1/62 - The DCI circulated NIE 85-2-62 on "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba", which stated that the capabilities of the Cuban armed forces "have been and are being greatly enhanced by the Soviet Bloc's provision of military equipment and instruction. Cuban military capabilities however are essentially defensive. We believe it unlikely that the bloc will provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the bloc will station in Cuba bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate." (The estimate was "over the next year or so"). With respect to this estimate CIA reported that "The Intelligence Community view of the Cuban problem in this period was crystallized in NIE 85-2-62 . . . as the intelligence foundation for MONGOOSE". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

44. 8/4/62 - CIA's President's Checklist ("not being under a requirement for USD coordination was able to report the accumulating information fully to the President") stated that "Eleven Soviet ships are on their way to Havana and we strongly suspect they are carrying arms. Such a delivery would not be far short of the total amount of arms delivered in the first half of 1962". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

45. 8/5/62 - "The first of the two Cuban U-2 missions authorized for August was flown on August 5, probably too soon to detect significant reflections of the Soviet equipment entering the island at that time." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

46. 8/8/62 - "Observations (in reports later reviewed) at the port of Mariel suggest that preparations for construction of the Guanayj MPRBM sites were being made in early August. Prefabricated concrete slabs up to 12x4x2 feet in size and more than thirty dark colored cylindrical tanks about 30 feet long and 10 feet in diameter were off-loaded about 8 August. Tubular and semicircular shaped concrete forms arrived in Mariel during the same period. Similar items have been photographed at the IRBM sites in the Guanayj-Bauta area. One source reported that this material was designed for use in building missile bases, and that some of the cargo was delivered to the Bauta area. . . ."

"Concrete forms similar to those observed at Mariel were off-loaded at the port of La Isabela (in the Remedios IRBM site area) during August . . ." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

47. 8/8/62 - "The DCI briefed the Republican Policy Committee, emphasizing the arrival of Soviet military equipment and technicians." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
48. 8/9/62 - CIA's President's Checklist for this date said "Soviet ships have been arriving on an unprecedented scale since mid-July. Some 32 vessels are involved; at least half of these we believe to be carrying arms. Five passenger ships with a total capacity of about 3,000 persons have already arrived. Some of the personnel are said to be Soviet technicians, and we have no reason to doubt this. We do not believe that there are any combat troops among them." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

49. 8/10/62 - At a Mongoose meeting, the DCI stressed the importance of intelligence received on the arrival of Soviet military equipment and technicians in Cuba. The DCI "raised questions as to what purpose was behind the sudden movement of men and matériel, and said that the United States must face the possibility of the USSR locating MIRVs in Cuba as a step that it could justify because of U.S. missile bases in places like Italy and Turkey." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

50. 8/14/62 - There arrived in Havana the first shipment of Komar class patrol craft in Cuba -- each carrying two homing missiles with a range of 10 or 15 nm and carrying 2000 pound HE warheads. The Komars were transported to Cuba as deck cargo on Soviet ships, two and four per shipload. By 10/20 there were a total of 12 Komar craft in Cuba. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/20/62)

51. 8/14/62 - "CIA's current intelligence was ordered orally by the DDI's office on about 14 August not to publish any information on the construction of missile bases until they had been checked out with NPTC -- this instruction was in the field of intelligence technique rather than of policy; it had no relation to later restrictions (see Item No. 152, infra)..... Between 14 August and mid-October this office sent NPTC 13 memoranda asking for a check on 25 separate reports containing information which was thought to raise the possibility of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. A great many more such reports were checked with NPTC informally by telephone. In all cases, NPTC either lacked the necessary coverage or made a negative finding." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

52. 8/15/62 - On this date, in an effort to supply guidance and requirements for photographic reconnaissance, the DIA asked NPTC to conduct a study and review of photographic intelligence which had previously been obtained with respect to three particularly suspect areas in Cuba. On 8/17 photographic evidence indicated that SA-2 equipment was located in two of these three suspect areas, although there was no evidence of their deployment. (Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, on 11/9/62)

53. 8/15/62 - "Construction material for the Guanajay fixed IRBM sites began to arrive at Mariel about mid-August ....... minor activity of an indefinite type was noted there in the 29 August photo- graphy, and major construction had probably begun by 15 September. (The fact that shipments to Guanajay started before those to San Cristobal reflects the longer lead-time required for construction
(53. 8/15/62 Continued)

"of a fixed site.) It is not possible to say how soon after 15 September the activity might have been recognizable from the air as an IRBM site." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

54. 8/18/62 - CIA's President's Checklist reported that "There are grounds for thinking that the large influx of Soviet military equipment and technicians into Cuba lately could be connected with the beginning of construction of surface-to-air missile sites. What we know so far is that the shipments have included quantities of electronic, transportation and construction equipment, some of it similar to Soviet equipment which showed up in Indonesia for the building of SAM installations, and that many of the arriving Soviets are construction personnel ..." (The CIA Chronology at this point states that "Soviet operations in August involved primarily the establishment of surface-to-air missile and coast defense missile positions. By the middle of August CIA was receiving a large volume of agent and refugee reporting which, while understandably garbled and fragmentary, enabled its (CIA's) analysts to pinpoint areas of construction and identify some of the equipment coming in.") (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

55. 8/20/62 - "The COMOR Targeting Working Group (chaired and staffed largely by CIA) set up the first comprehensive card file system for Cuban targets." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

56. 8/21/62 - At a meeting in Secretary Rusk's office (attended also by Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Johnson, the Attorney General, General Taylor, General Lemnitzer and Mr. McGeorge Bundy) the DCI said that "information available since 10 August indicated the extent of Soviet aid was much greater than previously thought, and that this probably included highly-sophisticated electronic installations or missile sites, probably ground-to- air." "The possibility of Soviet ICBMs in Cuba was again raised by the DCI, which developed a discussion of possible U.S. courses of action ... It was agreed that the DCI would fully brief the President the next day (which he did) and that Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and the DCI would discuss the situation with the President on 23 August." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

57. 8/23/62 - A meeting was held with the President with Messrs. Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and McConie in attendance. This meeting resulted in the issuance of NSAM (National Security Action Memorandum) #181 dated 8/23/62, reflecting that "The President has directed that the following actions and studies be undertaken in the light of evidence of new bloc activity in Cuba ... "2. What information should be made available in the United States and abroad with respect to these new bloc activities in Cuba?"
(57. 8/23/62 Continued)

"4. The line of activity projected for operation MONGOOSE PLAN B PLUS should be developed with all possible speed."

"5. An analysis should be prepared of the probable military, political and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles which could reach the United States."

"6. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvantages of making a statement that the United States would not tolerate the establishment of military forces (missile or air, or both?) which might launch a nuclear attack from Cuba against the United States."

"7. A study should be made of the various military alternatives which might be adopted in executing a decision to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching a nuclear attack on the United States. What would be the pros and cons, for example, of pinpoint attack, general counterforce attack, and outright invasion?"

"8. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion or other action beyond the MONGOOSE B PLUS, in the context of an aggravated Berlin Crisis."

NSAM No. 181 indicated there would be a further meeting with the President about 9/1 to review progress on the above items and that in the event of important new information an earlier meeting would be called. The NSAM concluded with the statement "The President emphasizes again the sensitive character of these instructions."

58. 8/23/62 - The CIA Chronology of 11/7/62 referring to the meeting with the President, which resulted in the issuance of NSAM #181, states: "... Thus, by 23 August CIA had alerted the highest levels of the government to a rapidly unfolding Soviet military development in Cuba, including the probable establishment of surface-to-air missile sites, and the danger of surface-to-surface missiles. Furthermore, the President had taken action on the intelligence received. There was at this time no evidence of any sort that surface-to-surface weapons were being installed -- in fact, the MRBM units had scarcely started en route from the USSR -- but the possibility had been discussed by the President and his advisers."

59. 8/23/62 - CIA's President's Checklist stated that:

"Most of our information from within Cuba on the influx of Soviet equipment and technicians has come from Cuban sources. We now have several reports from [redacted] whose people have been out looking."
"They have spotted at least one camp southwest of Havana, where the number of vehicles suggested the presence of 'many' more than the 200 presumed young Russians they did see, and where a radio antenna field had already been erected. This they think could be connected with radio monitoring."

"Their information on the equipment coming in--some hard, some not--leads them to suggest that an expert might consider the possibility of antiaircraft rockets and radar."

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

60. 8/24/62 - On the floor of the Senate on 9/5/62 Senator Engle stated that "On August 24 the Department of State gave a background press and radio news briefing" on the subject of Soviet activities in Cuba. The Senator then quoted a number of articles from various U.S. newspapers dated from 8/24 to 8/26/62, which Senator Engle summarized as follows: "All these stories contain the same set of facts. All of them mention 3000 to 5000 Soviet technicians. All of them mention the strengthening of coastal and air defenses... All of these articles relate that the information came from U.S. officials." (Source: Congressional Record)

61. 8/27/62 - In a memorandum of this date, General Carter reported to Mr. Bundy on actions taken in response to NSAM 181: (a) Task Force "W" would look into the possibility of removing the restrictions on the mounting of clandestine operations out of Guantanamo, (b) the Board of National Estimates would "establish a procedure to ensure continuing analysis" of the numbers and types of Communist Bloc personnel and equipment entering Cuba and its probable use, and of all construction, particularly missile sites, (c) the Board of National Estimates would assess the physical and psychological dangers to the U.S. and Latin America of missile installations in Cuba, (d) a daily CIA "Cuban Highlights" memorandum would be published for distribution to the President and others, (e) CIA would arrange intelligence collection overflights "as frequently as the situation demands," and (f) Task Force "W" would prepare a plan of operations for "Mongoose B Plus." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

62. 8/27/62 - On this date, pursuant to NSAM 181, OCG of CIA began publishing a daily paper, "Cuban Highlights," using a "philosophy and format similar to the (President's) Checklist." It was to include current intelligence estimative assessments and press coverage -- for distribution to the President, Bundy, McNamara, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, Rusk, Taylor, and the Attorney General. (A few officials were later added to the distribution.) "It was discontinued on 19 September, because General Carter and the DD/I concluded that sufficient emphasis was by then being given to Cuban reporting in regular intelligence publications." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

63. 8/27/62 - "Based on refugee reporting the COMOR Targeting Working Group pinpointed four farms in (the Sagua La Grande) area as suspect missile sites." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
64. 8/29/62 - The State Department briefed a bipartisan group in the House of Representatives, according to Senator Engle's statement on the floor of the Senate on 9/5/62. He said that the statement which had been supplied to the House of Representatives by the Department of State on 8/29 read as follows: "Soviet Military Aid to Cuba. After a lull since early 1962 the Soviet Union resumed large-scale military deliveries to Cuba in the last week in July. Since then, Soviet ship movements to Cuba have totaled at least 25, including at least 5 passenger ships. This is in addition to normal tanker and cargo movements. The shipments contained both military and economic goods and personnel. Although full details are not yet available on the contents of the ships, nor of the breakdown "between military and nonmilitary, information to date indicates the following:

"Cargo: Military cargo, perhaps as much as half of the total, included large quantities of transportation, electronic, and construction equipment, such as communications vans, radar vans, trucks, and mobile generator units. Much of the equipment is likely to go into the improvement of coastal and air defenses. The size and shape of some of the boxes delivered suggests that it is possible they could contain ground-to-air missiles for antiaircraft use, but we have no information on that as yet. These missiles are not adaptable for nuclear use.

"Nonmilitary cargo, roughly half of the total, consists of deliveries, already behind schedule, of industrial and agricultural equipment under aid and trade agreements.

"Personnel: A large number of additional Soviet specialists arrived in Cuba in the same period. With the recent arrivals, the total number in Cuba or on the way, both military and nonmilitary may be as high as 5000. The breakdown between military and technical personnel is not known, but the additional numbers of military specialists are incompatible with the training and setting up of the complex military equipment which has arrived. There is no evidence of the arrival of Soviet combat troops from other Soviet bloc countries.

"The shipments consist of both economic goods and defensive military goods. They appear designed to enhance the Cuban regime's defense capabilities against an internal threat, and to increase the effectiveness of the Cuban military establishment for possible internal use. Information to date indicates that the shipments will not improve significantly the very limited offensive capabilities of the Cuban armed forces.

"The recent shipments indicate a significant increase in Soviet involvement in Cuba. The increased amount of military assistance accompanies stepped-up Soviet economic aid to try to relieve Cuban shortages. The shipments must have been planned several months ago to have arrived when they did. The Cuban regime, facing economic deterioration and rising popular discontent, probably hopes to strengthen its internal position through new demonstrations of Soviet support." (Source: Congressional Record)