65. 8/29/62 - SAM sites in Cuba were "first observed" as the result of the U-2 photographic mission flown on this date. On this date 8 SA-2 sites were identified. (Three more were observed on 9/5 -- one on 9/26 -- one on 9/29 -- 1 on 10/5 -- 6 on 10/7 -- 2 on 10/14 -- 1 on 10/15 -- 1 on 10/17 -- Total 24 sites). (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/20/62, Table 3)

66. 8/29/62 - Referring to results of the 8/29 U-2 mission, the CIA Chronology states "Read out of the 29 August coverage showed an SA-2 site near Sagua La Grande which apparently was the basis for the reported activity there" (i.e., the pinpointing of four farms in the Sagua La Grande area as "suspect missile sites," referred to in Item No. 63 above) . . "the target card was changed to show a confirmed SA-2 site. It should be noted that knowledge that this site was in the area could have lead analysts to misinterpret any subsequent reports of MRBM activity as part of the SAM development, but in fact no such reports were received." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

67. 8/29/62 - A DIA study of the 8/29 U-2 photography and a study of refugee reports, suggested some sort of clandestine activity in progress in the San Cristobal area. This prompted the DIA to request additional photographic coverage of this area, but such coverage was not accomplished until 10/14 for a variety of reasons including poor weather and the requirement that the U-2 not overfly SA-2 installations. (Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62)

68. 8/29/62 - The minutes of the USIB meeting on this date show that Mr. Hilsman requested an SNIE on the military buildup in Cuba. The paper requested by Mr. Hilsman and the Board of National Estimates memorandum already requested by the DD/I (on 8/24) were combined.

"... Successive drafts of such a paper, prepared by the one staff, were quickly overtaken by the photography which became available after 29 August. At the USIB meeting of 7 September, further attempts to write such a paper were deferred until 19 September, by which date the new information could be digested. This estimate, SNIE 85-3-62, was in fact passed by USIB on 19 September . . . ."

At the USIB meeting on this date, two other subjects were discussed:
(1) the question raised by General Carter and Mr. Cline of more rapid delivery from Turkey and Denmark of Navy photography of outbound Soviet ships, and
(2) the action which General Carter had taken on 8/27/62 in asking General Lemnitzer about the possibility of low-level photography using F-101 or F8U aircraft -- to which General Lemnitzer had replied that "something could be dug up." (This action by General Carter in calling General Lemnitzer was the result of an instruction telephoned from out of town by the DCI who had left Washington on August 23 for the West Coast, then left the country on August 30 for the Riviera, and returned on September 23. The DCI "was concerned over the long delay of the 29 August mission by weather.".) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
69. 8/29/62 - CIA's President's Checklist contained the report that:

"There is no sign of a let-up in the movement of Soviet equipment and personnel into Cuba.

"By latest count, there have during the past six weeks been some 80 voyages to Cuban ports by Bloc vessels and 20-35 by ships under Communist charter.

"We note that deliveries of industrial equipment, foodstuffs, and other nonmilitary items are being made largely on chartered Western ships, probably because so many Soviet ships are involved in hauling military gear." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

70. 8/30/62 - At a meeting of the Special Group, General Lemnitzer told the Group of his discussion with General Carter who had on 8/27 asked General Lemnitzer about the possibility of low-level photography using F-101 or F-8U aircraft. The Special Group agreed to take cognizance of the matter and "reopen it when specific targets and information needs could be identified." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

71. 8/30/62 - A draft prepared by the JCS on 8/30 in response to NSAM 181 of 8/23/62 presented to the White House "a study of the advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion or other action in the context of aggravated Berlin crisis". The following are selected highlights from the draft:

In NSAM 109 of 10/23/61, the President described the four phases into which he expected progressive U.S. and Allied military action to fall, in meeting and countering Soviet/GDR measures to force the Western powers out of Berlin.

"The JCS are of the opinion that positive action of oppose communist aggression in any geographical area will be evidence of the determination of the United States and will influence the Berlin decision. However, they consider that actions outside of Germany should be complementary to, and not substituted for, actions to be taken in Central Europe to maintain our rights in Berlin and prevent denial of access."

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated repeatedly that the United States cannot tolerate the permanent existence of a communist government in Cuba and that the requirement to remove the communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities."

"Conclusions": (a) a blockade would be an act of war (b) the undertaking of the liberation of Cuba by invasion during a period of aggravated crisis in Berlin is militarily sound -- contingent upon the call of substantial additional forces to active duty and a firm preparedness to execute full mobilization if necessary, and
(71. 8/30/62 Continued)

(c) other actions (such as covert measures to eliminate Cuban nuclear launch installations) would be less effective than full-scale military intervention and would produce only partial or temporary results.

Military Alternatives

The JCS draft also included a section ("Item 7") in response to the provision of Par. 7 of NSAM 181 which called for a Department of Defense study of "the various military alternatives which might be adopted in executing a decision to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching nuclear attack on the U. S. . . . (for example, (a) pinpoint attack; (b) general counter-force attack; (c) outright invasion).

In a preface to this study the JCS pointed out that (1) although the current evaluation of reported SAM sites in Cuba is that they are for defensive purposes and designed for air defense, if these sites are effectively used to derogate U.S. aerial reconnaissance the Cubans will have an opportunity to develop such offensive capabilities as missile launch sites and submarine bases (2) a Cuban offensive capability would fill gaps in the Russian missile coverage of the U.S. and also provide the Cuban Communist government with a means of countering future U.S. actions against Cuba through blackmail, and (3) continued development of Cuban capabilities would increase U.S. defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet the threat.

The JCS analysis of alternative U.S. military actions was then set forth in essence as follows:

a. Pinpoint attack (i.e., a localized attack against a specific facility followed by planned withdrawal . . . This might be done by pinpoint air attack, or by covert commando-type raids (not recommended) on targets adjacent to coastal areas). Advantages: economical in force applied . . . minimizes U.S. and Cuban casualties, and pre-attack publicity. Disadvantages: eliminates nuclear launch capability only on a temporary basis . . . no less belligerent than any other act of war . . . even if covert will brand U.S. as aggressor . . . affords Cuba with outcry before international organizations and a legal justification for retaliatory attacks on the U.S. . . . gives USSR precedent for retaliation against U.S. installations on periphery of Bloc . . . little or no effect on Cuban Communist regime or other Cuban military forces.

b. General counter-force attack (i.e., an attack designed to destroy or neutralize Cuban nuclear capability installations or areas, through air attacks, naval gunfire, or possible overt airborne or amphibious assaults with or without immediate subsequent withdrawal). Advantages: moderately economical in use of U.S. forces if adequate air and naval support . . . fewer U.S. and Cuban casualties than if a full-scale invasion. Disadvantages: same as disadvantages of "Pinpoint attack", above, and also . . . could lead to invasion to extricate U.S. forces . . . gives USSR precedent for retaliation against U.S.

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(71. 8/30/62 Continued)

installations on periphery of Bloc, Formosa, etc. affords USSR with opportunity for stepped-up military material and technical buildup.

c. Outright invasion (i.e., would be accomplished through execution of existing U.S. military contingency plans with full preparation for positive and effective overt U.S. intervention). Advantages: permanent elimination of Cuban facilities having present or potential capability to launch nuclear attack on the U.S. would eliminate Communist government in Cuba and expel direct Soviet influence is equally effective against coastal or inland target areas, whether missile sites, airfields or potential submarine bases would clearly establish that the Monroe Doctrine is effective instrument of U.S. foreign policy would reassert U.S. determination to maintain integrity of Western Hemisphere and reaffirm principle of government by self-determination would restore U.S. prestige, world-wide. Disadvantages: would reduce in some degree U.S. capability to react in other contingency areas during the operation.

JCS conclusion: "... the advantages of a decisive execution of an outright invasion, together with the many disadvantages of any lesser alternative, conclusively indicate that this is the only course of action which should be adopted in order effectively and permanently to accomplish the mission.

"Accordingly, it is recommended that in executing a decision to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching nuclear attack on the U.S., only overt full-scale military action should be considered. Further, noting the increasing complexities attending the delay of U.S. intervention in Cuba, a previous recommendation is reiterated, that a national policy of early military intervention be adopted by the United States."

72. 8/30/62 - The following excerpt from the President's press conference of 8/30/62 was reported in the Congressional Record on 9/5/62:

The President: "We have no evidence of troops. In response to your specific question, we have no information that troops have come into Cuba. The main thrust of course is assistance because of the mismanagement of the Cuban economy. However, we are continuing to watch what happens in Cuba with the closest attention and will respond to -- will be glad to announce any new information if it should come immediately."

Question: "Mr. President, I wonder if a distinction could be made with respect to the troops in Cuba. Some of us were told at the State Department the other day that there is Russian military personnel in Cuba, that these are military technicians, and that they are people who are going to operate missiles, similar to the Nike missiles."

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The President: "I don't know who told you that at the State Department, that they are going to operate Nike missiles, because that information we do not have at this time. There certainly are technicians there and they may be military technicians. We don't have complete information about what's going on in Cuba, but since the word 'troops' has been generally used they had a military advisory commission there for a long period of time, so there may be additional military advisory personnel or technicians. But on the question of troops, as it is generally understood, we do not have evidence that there are Russian troops there. There is an expanded advisory and technical mission. That is correct."

Question: "Are there no antiaircraft missiles shipped to Cuba?"

The President: "We have no information as yet ... that does not mean that there have not been, but all I am saying is that we have no such information as yet."

73. 8/31/62 - CIA's President's Checklist stated that:

"Preliminary information from the 30 (sic) August U-2 mission shows at least seven SA-2 sites on the western half of the island. Manning of this many sites would require some 1500-2000 Bloc troops. We are able to report on the basis of what is known so far that construction of the sites appears to be fairly advanced and that there are canvas-covered missiles in the vicinity of some sites. The existence of additional sites can probably be assumed.

"The same source reveals seven or eight Soviet missile-equipped torpedo boats and an undetermined number of Soviet tanks. The Cubans have had Soviet tanks for some time, but this is our first indication that they now have boats of this type. They appear to be KOMAR-class converted PT-boats, mounting two surface-to-surface missiles with an estimated range of 35 nautical miles." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7)

74. 8/31/62 - Par 5 of NSAM 181 called for an analysis (by the White House, consulting with State, Defense and CIA) of the probable military, political, and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles which could reach the U.S. Accordingly, such an analysis was made and set forth in a memorandum (labelled "Top Secret and Sensitive") signed by Mr. McGeorge Bundy under date of August 31, 1962. There follows a summary of selected highlights from that memorandum, under the topic headings set forth therein:

"1. Soviet missile possibilities in Cuba"

"The most probable present Soviet missile activity would be the introduction of SA-2 missiles." Preliminary photo
interpretation shows 7 SA-2 sites in early stages of construction... a modern first-line AA missile with an engagement range of 30 miles and high reliability from 2500 to 60,000 feet, and limited effectiveness up to 80,000 feet... probably capable of use with a nuclear warhead, but there is no evidence that the Soviet Government has ever provided nuclear warheads to another state, and it seems unlikely that such a move is currently planned... although there is little reason to suppose that the Soviets would refuse to introduce such weapons if the move could be controlled in the Soviet interest.

Other missiles which could be introduced now or later are surface-to-surface missiles with ranges from 150 miles to 2000 miles (the Soviet MREM), which would be of little value without nuclear warheads. Longer range surface-to-surface missiles would require relatively substantial installations -- shorter range missiles of this sort could be introduced very quickly and mounted without elaborate construction... As missile capabilities increase in the remainder of the 1960's, it will be progressively easier for the Soviet Union to install in Cuba lightweight mobile missiles with increasing range and destructive power against aircraft and against targets in the U.S.

"2. Military impact of the introduction of Soviet missiles in Cuba"

"A. Surface-to-air missiles"

Extensive deployment of SA-2s would make reconnaissance overflight and other clandestine air operations difficult and dangerous, and would substantially increase the problem of neutralizing air defense in event of open conflict...

"B. Surface-to-surface missiles"

SSMs with nuclear warheads would be a very significant military threat to the U.S.... It appears probable that on military grounds alone the establishment of such a capability would be unacceptable.

It may well be that the introduction of nuclear warheads into Cuba is a more significant dividing line than introduction of any given class of missiles as such -- but the covert introduction of nuclear warheads would be very hard to detect.

Attention should also be given to the possibility that the Soviets may attempt to set up a submarine missile base in Cuba.
"3. Political and psychological impact of a Soviet missile establishment in Cuba"

In supplying Cuba with missiles of any sort, the Soviet Union is obviously staking a claim to a large-scale military foothold in the Western Hemisphere. . . the delivery of MiGs a year ago did not greatly disturb American or hemisphere opinion, but missiles are something else again. . . and we cannot expect that the public mind will serenely distinguish between aircraft missiles and a direct threat of missile attack on the U. S.

Any missile deployment in Cuba will strengthen critics of the Administration's "softness" on Cuba. This effect can be somewhat mitigated by words and actions being considered in other responses to NSAM 181, but it cannot be prevented while the missiles remain in place.

". . . There will be a distinct difference in impact between missiles for defensive use against aircraft and missiles capable of use against the United States. . . international acceptance of action against defensive installations would be lower than in the case of action against missiles posing a direct nuclear threat to the U. S. . . ."

In Latin America the psychological and political effect of missile installations in Cuba (no matter what kind) will be substantial . . . the missile sites would be seen as proof of strong Soviet support for Cuba. . . in the absence of prompt and effective U. S. counteraction, it would be judged that Castro is here to stay . . . in the Caribbean this would lead to heavy pressure for more U. S. support against Castro's subversion. . . other Latin American states would be more than ever inclined to accommodate to Cuba. . . and all this would accentuate inter-American strains.

"SUMMARY: In sum, the expectation is that any missiles will have a substantial political and psychological impact, while surface-to-surface missiles would create a condition of great alarm, even in the absence of proof that nuclear warheads were arriving with them."

75. 8/31/62 - Senator Kenneth B. Keating included the following in his remarks on the floor of the U. S. Senate:

". . . I am reliably informed—when I say 'reliably informed,' I mean that has been checked out from five different sources, and I am certain I can state it as a fact—that between the dates of 8/4 and 8/15, 10 or 12 Soviet vessels anchored at the Mariel dock area at Mariel. The dock area previously had been surrounded by the construction of a high cinder-block wall. The Soviet ships unloaded 1200 . . ."
"troops. Troops is what I mean, and not technicians. They were wearing Soviet fatigue uniforms.

"On August 13 five Soviet torpedo boats unloaded from Soviet ships, and are now moored at La Base. There is every indication that the naval complement to handle these boats disembarked at the same time.

"Again let me emphasize that these could not reasonably be called technicians.

"On August 13, 1,000 non-Cuban personnel in fatigue uniforms were seen working in the area near Finca La Guatana, in all probability on or near a missile base located in that area.

"On August 3 a large convoy of military vehicles manned by Soviet personnel was observed on the highway in Las Villas Province. The convoy moved in military order and contained the first amphibious vehicles observed in Cuba; also jeeps, 6x6 trucks, and tracked trucks.

"On August 5 there was a movement seen of a 64-vehicle convoy heading west on Carretera Central. The convoy was moving in military order. It included tanks, cannonlike trailers, and flatbed trailers.

"On August 8 there was observed a night movement of a convoy on Carretera Central. Flatbed trucks were observed transporting concave metal structures supported by tubing. The convoy included a number of closed vans. The convoy appeared to be moving toward an installation 4 to 5 kilometers from Canimar in a closely restricted area believed to contain a rocket installation.

"There have been other observations of activities there, which have been confirmed.

"... Since July the Soviet Union has greatly stepped up shipments of men and equipment. More than 20 cargo ships have arrived from Communist ports in the last few weeks. Many have been unloaded under maximum security. Between three and five thousand so-called 'technicians' have arrived in the course of the past year. Soviet statistics reveal that by the end of the year the Soviets will have shipped nearly $1 billion of goods and equipment to Castro. Cuban trade with non-Communist countries will be down to about 30 percent next year and Cuba will be virtually isolated from the free world—a Communist enclave within the free world where the Soviets can operate unchecked and to a large extent unobserved.

"... More ominous reports suggest that the Soviets are constructing missile bases and sending over technicians and experts to man them. In this way the Soviets could expect to discourage determined refugees of other nations of this hemisphere from any kind of concerted attack on the Cuban dictatorship. They could also strengthen Castro to resist increasing internal dissatisfaction against his
"regime. That supposition, which our Government has never openly admitted or discussed, is a source of serious concern to the people of all the Americas. It should be fully aired. The dangers inherent in the situation should be known and appreciated by all the people of this hemisphere, and particularly by those nations which so far have actively blocked measures to combat the menace of Castroism.

"Another very real possibility and, in my judgment, a probability that should be a source of even greater concern to the U.S. and which has so far not been openly discussed at all in this country is that the Soviets are deliberately taking advantage of the proximity between Cuba and Cape Canaveral to conduct other activities. There is no question at all of the possibility of interference with American space flights by sensitive equipment mounted in Cuba and operated by Communist experts. . ." (Source: Congressional Record)

76. 8/31/62 - In retrospect "a thorough review of refugee reports concerning the general areas now containing IRBM and MRBM sites has produced some probable indicators of scheduling. This collateral information indicates that plans to deploy ballistic missiles in Cuba were being implemented by the end of August. Site locations apparently had been selected and the surveys for the initial IRBM installations were probably completed by that time. IRBM site construction was apparently under way in September and preceded the MRBM sites. This sequence is also indicated by the photography."

"Reported activities indicate that probably all of the San Cristobal sites were selected by MRBM deployment in August since an area which includes some of the sites was made a restricted zone during late August-early September."

"Refugees had also reported "about August 22 the owner of a farm, now the location of San Cristobal MRBM Site 3, was evicted and the secondary road to the farm was improved by 24 August . . . (A Soviet survey team was reported in the vicinity of San Diego de los Banos, a village about 4 miles west of Site 1, on 5 September)."

(Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62, Supp. 4)

77. 8/31/62 - CIA distributed a raw intelligence report which was based on information acquired in the U.S. on 8/23/62 (presumably from refugee sources) and which stated in part "A platoon of Soviets who are specialists in rocketry and atomic arms is assigned to the Ministry of the Cuban Armed Forces."

78. 8/31/62 - Information received by an American correspondent in Mexico from a prominent Cuban exile and reported to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City: "... Soviet military presence in Cuba was a fact among the thousands of Soviet technicians who recently arrived on the island, many appeared to be between 18 and 20 years of age, too young to acquire any technical experience to impart to the Cubans . . . these young Russians dress in sports clothes but give the appearance of having only recently completed their military training . . . two sites with antennas, presumably used for monitoring activity at Cape Canaveral, will be converted into missile bases."

(Source: State Department Airmagan from Mexico City No. 737.00/8-3162, dated 8/31/62)
79. 8/31/62 - A column by Henry J. Taylor (date and newspaper not identified) was inserted into the Congressional Record of 8/31/62 page A6569, by Congressman William C. Cramer:

"... we help Cuba mightily by having no policy at all. Admittedly, enemy rocket sites are available there from which to reach Miami, Cape Canaveral, and even Washington (only 1,139 miles), New York (1,317), Boston (1,801), Chicago (1,333), Kansas City (1,497), Denver (1,819), Los Angeles-San Diego (2,299) and easily as far as Seattle (2,843) on a pinpoint basis. Why does the administration consistently pooh-pooh and soften the indications these rocket sites are being built? If you were Khrushchev wouldn't you build them? Disliking the inevitable does not make it less inevitable ..."

80. 9/1/62 - In response to NSAM 181 the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, submitted to the Secretary of State and the White House a paper analyzing the meaning of increased Soviet aid to Cuba including an analysis of Soviet and Cuban motives behind the recent Soviet economic and military shipments to Cuba. This analysis stated in part: "In addition to training and arming Castro's forces, the Soviets may be establishing some kind of overt military presence with Soviet-managed installations in Cuba. But we believe at present such activities are likely to be limited to the setting up of acknowledged intelligence collection and defensive facilities. More risky, and politically less justifiable, would be demonstrably offensive installations, such as bomber bases or pads for missiles capable of reaching adjacent countries. We believe that the Soviets would rule out this type of military presence for the foreseeable future. In sum, we think there is some possibility that intelligence and defensive installations may be set up at least temporarily under purely Soviet control, while offensive installations would not be likely, certainly for a considerable time." The State Department analysis stated at this point "It should be noted in this connection that presently available information makes it extremely difficult to assess Soviet intentions in this field and that a harder estimate must await more clear cut evidence."

81. 9/4/62 - The White House issued the following Presidential Statement: "All Americans, as well as all of our friends in this hemisphere have been concerned over the recent moves of the Soviet Union to bolster the military power of the Castro regime in Cuba. Information has reached the Government in the last 4 days from a variety of sources which establishes without doubt that the Soviets have provided the Cuban Government with a number of anti-aircraft missiles with a short range of 25 miles which are similar to early models of our Nike. Along with these missiles, the Soviets are apparently providing the extensive radar and other electronic equipment which is required for their operation. We can also confirm the presence of several Soviet-made motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-ship guided missiles having a range of 15 miles. The number of Soviet military technicians now known to be in Cuba or enroute -- approximately 3,500 -- is consistent with assistance in setting up and learning to use this equipment. As I stated last week, we shall continue to make - 23 -
81. 9/4/62 Continued

"information available as fast as it is obtained and properly verified.
There is no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba, from any
Soviet bloc country, of military bases provided to (sic) Russia, of
a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo, of the presence
of ground-to-ground missiles, or of other significant offensive capability
either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance. Were it
otherwise, the greatest issues would arise. The Cuban question must be
considered as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats
to peace . . . . It continues to be the policy of the United States that the
Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force
or the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be
necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere . . . ."

82. 9/4-5/62 - "General Carter briefed a number of Congressional
leaders, including the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees".
(CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

83. 9/5/62 - This was the first U-2 mission for September (of the
two which had been authorized "as a routine matter" by the Special Group on
July 19 -- based on the DCI's recommendation that "U-2 flights over Cuba
be continued at their current level of two a month"). This flight (and the
August 29 flight) covered areas which in retrospect are known to have been
the sites of MRM and IRBM installations -- but the September 5 photography
"gave no recognizable evidence that any construction was then under way,
although re-examination showed a few vehicles and some construction material
at Guaniay Site 1 on August 29. In fact there was probably no ballistic
missile equipment in Cuba at that time." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

84. 9/5/62 - On this date photograph of the Remedios IRBM site
was negative, but road improvements began shortly thereafter, and a flow of
construction from the port of Isabela, on the north coast . . . . . . . . . .
"the date at which the site acquired a recognizable photographic signature
is not determinable. The estimated date for the beginning of major
construction is about 1 October". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

85. 9/5/62 - A CIA U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of
MIG-21s in Cuba. (Source: NPIC)

86. 9/5/62 - Senator Keating, speaking on the floor of the Senate
in response to Senator Engle's earlier remarks that day (see Items 60 and 64,
above):

" . . . I have said that the whole story has not been told the
American people. That is still the case . . . . even after the latest
White House announcement yesterday.

" . . . I apologize for the embarrassment I am about to cause the
Senator from California. On the 14th day of August, in an effort to
get some official information, I wrote to the Department of State to
ask them about Cuba and the buildup there. Sixteen days later on

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(86. 9/5/62 Continue)

August 30th, the Department wrote a letter to me which arrived at my office just today (9/5/62). This letter -- an incredible letter in the light of what has happened since August 30, and indeed what had happened before that -- reads in part as follows:

'Several Soviet passenger and cargo ships arrived in Cuba during late July and early August carrying large quantities of technicians of various kinds.

'The Department has established that personnel landed from approximately five of the ships. We have no specific information about the number of persons.

'We have no information that any Soviet-bloc troops have landed in Cuba. Although the full significance of these developments is not clear, there is no evidence that supplies and technicians have arrived in Cuba in such numbers as to provide support for external aggression from Cuba against other countries.' (Source: Congressional Record)

87. 9/6/62 -- "After further analysis" (of the August 29 flight) there appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 6 September the information which had previously been included by the CIA in the President's Checklist of August 31, 1962, regarding photography of the August 29 flight which disclosed SA-2 sites in Western Cuba, plus KOMAR-class PT-boats and tanks. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

88. 9/6/62 -- By this time "more detailed readout of the 29 August mission had . . . led CIA analysts to suspect the presence of another kind of missile site -- possibly surface-to-surface -- at Banes, on the northeast coast. General Carter so informed the President on September 6. (For this reason the information was never included in the Checklist)"

Programs were then set in motion to determine the characteristics and range of the missiles at Banes: On 9/9/62 at the request of the Secretary of State, COMOR reviewed the vehicles available for reconnaissance of Banes. On 9/10 General Carter sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense requesting necessary actions, including Special Group approval, to provide for "tactical-type reconnaissance" of the Banes area, then directed by higher authority. On 9/14 a Special Group meeting was briefed by JCS on capabilities for low-level coverage of "certain targets" in Cuba -- but the Secretary of Defense did not want the operation considered further until there were available the results of further U-2 reconnaissance which had been decided upon at a White House meeting of 9/10.

(On September 18 the CIB reported the results of a further CIA study of the 9/5 U-2 photography, namely, the conclusion that the Banes site was intended for a short-range coastal defense missile.)

"One additional item was picked up by the 5 September mission, the presence of an assembled MIG-21 at Santa Clara airfield along...

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"with several others still in crates. This was not reported by CIA in the Checklist but was reported in the CIB of 5 September. Actually, these MiG-21 crates (readily identifiable from photographs) had arrived in Cuba about 1 September aboard a Soviet ship which had been photographed en route, but the photographs were not received in Washington for several weeks. Upon the arrival of these and photographs of other ships carrying MiG-21 crates, an item was published in the CIB of 27 September -- with DIA withholding concurrence -- that between 22 and 30 MiG-21s had been delivered to Cuba. This information was also reported in the Checklist of 27 September."
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

89. 9/6/62 - "Mexico City, September 4. -- A detailed report on distribution of nearly 20,000 Russian, Chinese, Algerian and African military men, naval and air bases and guided missile launching pads was released here today by a Cuban student exile office. One missile station is being installed near the port of Bahia Honda and another near Varadero Beach in Matanzas Province. ... More than 3000 Russians were landed at Bahia Honda for work on a launching pad. ... the statement said." (Source: Congressional Record)

90. 9/7/62 - On this date the DCI (who was on the Riviera and was being kept informed by CIA cable) sent a cable to General Carter urging frequent repeat reconnaissance missions and stating that "my hunch is we might face a prospect of Soviet short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable types in Cuba which could command important targets in Southeast U.S. and possibly Caribbean areas." (These views were provided to the DD/1 and the Board of National Estimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

91. 9/7 (or 8)/62 - "The first large pieces of equipment for the MREB sites near San Cristobal were probably shipped from the USSR on the ship "Omsk" which arrived at Mariel on 7 or 8 September." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

92. 9/8/62 - The CIB on this date included a report on results of the 9/5 photography which disclosed the presence of one assembled and several crated MiG-21s at Santa Clara airfield. Apparently information on the presence of MiG-21s in Cuba was not reported in the President's Checklist until 9/27/62. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

93. 9/8/62 - DIA reported that the scope of Soviet Bloc assistance to Cuba suggests motives going beyond the lending of support and encouragement of the Castro regime. (Source: DIA report to Board on 11/9/62)

94. 9/9/62 - COMOR, at the request of the Secretary of State, reviewed the vehicles available for reconnaissance of Banes (as the result of U-2 photography of 9/5 indicating the possible presence of an SSM site at Banes). (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)