95. 9/10/62 - Senator Thomas J. Dodd stated in the Senate:

"I have reason to believe, on the basis of information from reliable sources, that the situation in Cuba is even more grave than has yet been indicated to the American public . . .

"The fantastic buildup of Soviet planes and tanks and missiles and advisory personnel that has gone on in Cuba over the past year cannot be dismissed as purely defensive." (Source: Washington Evening Star - 10/24/62)

96. 9/10/62 - Upon instruction of the President, General Carter briefed General Eisenhower "on the Cuban situation". (The DDI briefed General Eisenhower again on 10/3.)
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

97. 9/10/62 - On this date the DCI sent a second cable to General Carter from the Riviera stating: "Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defenses being established in Cuba . . . appears to me quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBM's to be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from overflights. Suggest Board of National Estimates study motives . . ." (These views were provided to the DDI and the Board of National Estimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

98. 9/10/62 - In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, General Carter requested "necessary actions (including Special Group approval) to provide for the employment, when directed by higher authority, of tactical-type reconnaissance" against the cruise missile site at Banas. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

99. 9/10/62 - CIA reports that on this date a meeting took place at the White House attended by Secretary Rusk, Messrs. Robert Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy, and Generals Carter and Lansdale. The purpose of this meeting was to make "a full review of the overflight program for Cuba," and it was prompted by "the results of the 29 August and the 5 September missions, in particular the confirmation of SA-2 sites,"

CIA reports that the factors involved and the decision reached at this White House meeting were as follows:

(1) Because of the Soviet protest of the August 30 U-2 overflight of Sakhalin Island, and because of the September 8 shootdown of a U-2 over Communist China, the participants at the meeting "were naturally reluctant to authorize any flights over areas where SA-2s might be operational."

(2) The hard intelligence thus far received on the presence of SA-2s and other advanced defensive systems had been foreseen in NIE 85-2-62 of August 1 and had subsequently been fully reported. Therefore, the hard intelligence was not such as to "produce a sense
"of alarm or a feeling that urgent action was required . . . . confirmation came not as a shock but as a problem to be dealt with deliberately . . . . it may have even served to relax the sense of urgency generated by the President's decision of 23 August, the known usually being less alarming than the unknown . . . . The participants therefore felt that the next step was to provide systematic coverage of the areas covered by the two previous missions (of August 29 and September 5)."

(3) "Finally, the participants (at the meeting) were operating in the atmosphere of the time . . . . The Soviet diplomatic and propaganda apparatus was attempting to focus attention on Berlin . . . . throwing up a diplomatic smokescreen . . . . Furthermore, they (the participants at the White House meeting) must all have been acutely aware that Cuba was potentially the campaign issue that could most seriously damage the Administration in the election campaign then beginning."

(4) The CIA proposed two extended overflights covering the remainder of the island not covered in the August 29 and September 5 missions. "The Secretary of State objected" and insisted that "coverage of the rest of Cuba should be designed so that peripheral flights over international waters would not be combined with overflights of Cuban territory."

(5) "To meet (the Secretary of State's) wishes, the program was divided into four flights, two overflights and two peripheral. The overflights were to be: (a) over the Isle of Pines, and (b) over the east of Cuba to cover Guantanamo and Baracoa. The peripheral flights were to be: (a) over the north coast of eastern Cuba, and (b) the south coast. All four flights were to be designed for maximum safety, and the overflights were to be quick "in-and-out" operations. In obtaining approval for the tracks it was necessary to provide assurance that there would not be flights over known SA-2 sites.

"The President approved this program" for four flights in September. "Thus the record shows that the President authorized everything the Special Group requested." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

100. 9/11/62 - Senator Tower, speaking in the U. S. Senate: "Russian tanks, rockets, military planes and high velocity artillery have been brought into Cuba. They threaten the entire U. S. east of the Mississippi. Pads for light rockets have already been built in Cuba by Russians and Chinese. . . . . I am reliably informed that launching pads for medium rockets with a 1500-mile-plus range can be built in under 4 days."

(Source: Congressional Record)
101. 9/11/62 - Senator Humphrey, speaking on the floor of the Senate said: "... I think it is ridiculous and insulting to the American people for grown men to wring their hands publicly about Cuba's being a military threat to the United States... I do not underestimate the fact that there are missiles, intermediate and short range. But I do know... that we have it within our capacity without even so much as violently flexing a muscle, to destroy every single military installation in one day. So I do not want the people of my state to lose a single night's sleep worrying about the might of Cuba..." (Source: Congressional Record)

102. 9/12/62 - General Carter briefed the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees "on the Cuban situation". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

103. 9/12/62 - A Cuban National being processed at the Refugee Center at Opa-locka, Florida, reported that on this date he observed 20 Soviet-driven trucks pulling 4-wheel double axle trailers from 65 to 70 feet in length; that these trucks were observed driving from Havana to Camp Libertad; that the beds of the trucks were loaded with black crates; that the trailers were loaded with what the source believed to be large canvas-covered missiles; that there were 4 fins at the trailing edge of each missile. The source of the information drew sketches of the missiles and these missiles resembled surface-to-surface MREMs. CIA disseminated this information to the intelligence community on 9/21/62.

104. 9/13/62 - "On 13 September a source was informed by a resident of the general area that a rocket base was being constructed by the Soviets at a location now identified from photography as Remedios (MREB) Site 1. A second base was also reported, but a missile site has not yet been found in photography although new road construction exists in that area." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

105. 9/13/62 - On this date the DCI sent a third cable to General Carter from the Riviera "repeating these pronouncements" which he had set forth in cables to CIA on 9/1 and 9/10 regarding the possibility of Soviet introduction of MREMs into Cuba. (These views were provided to the DDI and the Board of National Estimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

106. 9/14/62 - At the Special Group meeting, a JCS representative briefed on capabilities for low-level coverage of "certain targets" in Cuba. However, "the Secretary of Defense was recorded as not wanting to have the operation considered further until results of further U-2 reconnaissance of these targets were available, i.e., General Carter's proposal had been overtaken by the decision on U-2 coverage taken on 10 September (at the White House meeting on that date)." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
107. 9/14/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that "The number of confirmed SAM sites remains at 12, but the likelihood that others are under construction grows, with the latest evidence pointing to the Isle of Pines as one of the additional locations". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

108. 9/15/62 - Major construction at the Guanajay fixed IRBM sites "had probably begun by 15 September" (the construction equipment and material having arrived at Mariel beginning "about mid-August").

"It is not possible to say how soon after 15 September the activity might have been recognizable from the air as an IRBM site." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

109. 9/15/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that "A message [redacted] an alert on a net serving [redacted] called for 'volunteers for the protection of Cuba'. We are not sure of the weight to be placed on this and another [redacted] referring to the isolation of 'volunteers'. If valid, they would suggest that the influx of Soviet military personnel to Cuba is not finished. We are investigating further." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

110. Mid-September, 1962 - At this time there was first noted a high frequency circuit in operation between Moscow and Havana relayed through [redacted]. The fact that manual operations and [redacted] are used argue against [redacted]. For this link, it is believed that this link was established to meet a requirement for additional back-up communications. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/19/62)

111. 9/16/62 - On this date, the DCI sent a fourth cable to General Carter regarding the possibility of a ballistic missile buildup in Cuba, stating: "Do not wish to be overly alarming this matter, but believe CIA and community must keep Government informed of danger of a surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps possibly beyond our capability once Cuba defense system operative. (These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

112. 9/17/62 - The second shipment of equipment for the MRBM sites at San Cristobal arrived at Mariel on 9/17/62 on the ship "Poltava" (the first shipment had arrived on September 7 or 9). "This equipment was moved to San Cristobal by truck at night with the first convoys probably arriving at the sites about 17 September. That is, 17 September is the earliest date at which photography might have detected the first MRBM equipment at San Cristobal". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

113. 9/18/62 - There appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin on September 18 a report on the September 5 photography which reflected the presence of a surface-to-surface, short-range, coastal defense missile site. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
114. 9/18/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that "We have spotted two more Soviet passenger vessels en route to Cuba. Their arrival will raise our estimate of technicians on the scene to about 4,200. We are beginning to see some tenuous evidence foreshadowing the appearance of SAM sites in Camaguey Province." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

115. 9/19/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that:

"The interception on 15 September of a signal from a missile-associated radar, probably coming from the surface-to-air missile site at Mariel, suggests that the site is or soon will be operational."

"The message asking for volunteers for service in Cuba, which we reported Saturday, has now dropped up on enough Soviet military radio nets to reveal that a fairly general recruiting campaign is going on. There is no indication yet of the numbers involved."
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

116. 9/19/62 - (USIB Meeting) - "As a result of the DOI's pressure (presumably his cables to General Carter from the Riviera from 9/7 to 9/20/62) there was a renewed examination of other methods of reconnaissance of Cuba. (It should be noted here that this discussion was in terms of what might be necessary after the establishment of a complete SA-2 defense had made use of the U-2 impossible, with the implicit thought that only at this point would the Soviets risk the introduction of such weapons as MRBM's). On September 19 at USIB, General Carter stated his desire to see RF-101's over Cuba. He also said he thought use of the FIREFLY drone over Cuba could be justified to the Special Group, adding that 'we cannot put a stop to collection in Cuba; otherwise the President would never know when the point of decision was reached.'" (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

117. 9/19/62 - USIB issued SNIE 85-3-62 on "The Military Buildup in Cuba". Among the key findings of the SNIE were the following: (1) We believe that . . . the main purpose of the military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and Soviets conceive to be a danger that the U.S. may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke U.S. military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose; (2) the Soviets are well aware that the question of offensive as opposed to defensive weapons in Cuba has become a major political issue; (3) the establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear striking forces which would be used against the U.S. would be incompatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far . . .

However, Soviet military planners have almost certainly considered the contribution which Cuban bases might make to the Soviet strategic posture, and, in that connection, the feasibility and utility of dislaying nuclear delivery systems to Cuba. Therefore, this contingency
(117. 9/19/62 Continued)

"must be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy; (4) Soviet planners might see some utility in deploying MRMNs and ICBMs to Cuba in order to supplement the limited number of ICBMs now believed to be operational in the USSR and to reach targets beyond the range of submarine-launched missiles; (5) the establishment on Cuban soil of a significant strike capability with such weapons would represent a sharp departure from Soviet practice, since such weapons have so far not been installed even in Satellite territory . . . the Soviets might think (it) would be worth a good deal if they could get away with it, however, they would almost certainly estimate that this could not be done without provoking a dangerous U. S. reaction; and (6) although the Soviets may see some military advantages in Cuba, as a strategic strike base, the risks would be great and the political implications would run counter to the kind of policy they are actually pursuing in Latin America. They do not propose to win the region for communism by military conquest. They count instead on a process of political action . . .

* * * * * * * * *

CIA's retrospective comments on NIKE 85-3-62: (1) the judgment on the degree of risk which the USSR was willing to accept was gravely in error and the community was virtually unanimous in support of this judgment (2) the deployment of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons outside the USSR was unprecedented (3) while the first ballistic missiles had probably arrived in Cuba between 9/7-15/62, the first reports by ground observers who had seen them had not arrived in Washington by 9/19/62, and there was no evidence that MRMNs were on the way (4) the estimate failed to give adequate weight to the pace at which Soviet operations were moving and to the great probability that the new installations were manned by Soviet personnel (5) the community was still thinking in terms of rather deliberately-paced Soviet military aid programs for the UAR, Iraq and Indonesia, and for Cuba in the 1960-1962 period, but there was already good evidence that the Cuban program had departed from this pattern (6) also the Indonesian situation had broken the Soviet pattern only a month before when the USSR showed itself willing to accept a substantially increased degree of risk "for the sake of a political gain something less than vital to Soviet interests" (7) the USSR had shown in the Indonesian affair that it was "willing to take some risk of military engagement with an ally of the United States, albeit the degree or risk involved was far less than in the Cuban venture, and (8) . . . For the record, there is no evidence that the existence of NIKE 85-3-62 had any inhibiting influence on later decisions: It was not, for instance, cited to support an argument against continuing overflights. Nor did it affect current intelligence reporting; this is conducted independently of the estimate process and provides a check on the continuing validity of standing estimates"
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

118. 9/20/62 - CIA disseminated an agent report quoting Castro's personal pilot, Claudio Marinas, who said on 9/9/62: "We have 40-mile range guided missiles, both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air . . . There are also many mobile ramps for intermediate range rockets . . . " This report was considered "too general to be used in the process" (in which CIA analysts made up target cards). (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
119. 9/20/62  Intercepted messages (COMINT) indicated the presence in Cuba on this date of Lieutenant General Pavel B. Dankovich. Dankovich is believed to have held a command in Vinnista probably as late as November, 1961. Vinnista is the location of a probable Soviet MRBM command and the headquarters of a Long Range Air Army. It is not known how long Dankovich may have been in Cuba prior to September 20, 1962. The intelligence publications available to the Board fail to reflect that any particular significance was attached to Dankovich's presence in Cuba until after the President made his public address relative to MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba. On October 27 CIA distributed a memorandum stating that Dankovich's presence in Cuba "indicates the high priority assigned by Moscow to the missile bases in Cuba." (Source: CIA memorandum of 10/27/62; DIA Intelligence Summary 10/27/62; Joint Evaluation Report, 10/27/62)

120. 9/20/62 - On this date the DII sent a final cable to CIA from the Riviera, commenting to General Carter on the conclusions of SNIE 85-3 of 9/19 which had been cabled to the DCI. The DCI's cable expressed reservations on the conclusions and stated "As an alternative I can see that an offensive Soviet base in Cuba will provide Soviets with most important trading position in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might take unexpected risks in order to establish such a position." These views were provided to the DD/1 and the Board of National Estimates. (We have no evidence that the intelligence community was informed of the views expressed by the DCI in his several cables from the Riviera. The State and DIA members of USIB advised the Board on 11/9/62 that they had not been informed of the DCI's views.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

121. 9/20/62 - The Defense Intelligence Agency on this date attempted to obtain broad area coverage of Cuba through CORONA. On that date the DIA member of COMOR addressed a memorandum to the Chairman of COMOR with the request that COMOR recommend the programming of an engineering pass of the CORONA vehicle over Cuba "where the western end of the island is, temporarily at least, off limits and where we need to know if any other SA-2 sites have been constructed ..."

122. 9/21/62 - An article in the Washington News by Virginia Prewett under date of 10/31/62 entitled "Why Didn't JFK Act Earlier?" stated that a report made by Miami's Cuban Student Directorate on 9/21/62, stated that: "One of the European Ambassadors in Havana recently reported to his respective country 'that if the countries of this hemisphere do not take military action against Castro immediately, or at least before the next six months, Cuba will possess Russian missile bases armed with atomic and nuclear weapons capable of destroying in a few minutes the most strategic zones in the United States. Besides, it is known that the construction will be carried out secretly, with this end in view—that while the work continues, the American government will go on believing that the military installations are purely defensive measures.'"
123. 9/21/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that: "Evidence is still coming in on Moscow's canvas of its military forces for volunteers to serve in Cuba. This activity is puzzling; we have never seen anything like it before. The move may be purely administrative: to replace personnel who had been suddenly ordered there with others prepared to stay for some time. On the other hand, it could mean another sizable increment to Soviet personnel in Cuba or a belief in Moscow that its people are likely to be engaged in combat. We are trying to get a better answer." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

124. 9/22/62 - "The most likely ship to have carried the large items (of equipment for the Segre La Grande MRRM site) is the Kimovsk which docked (at Casilda, on the south coast) on 22 September. This equipment must have moved to the site during the last week of September, and was probably detectable from photography after 1 October." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

125. 9/27/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that:

"Photography snapped earlier this month show at least two Soviet ships delivering 22, perhaps more, MIG-21s. "We now estimate there are 25-30 aircraft of this type in Cuba." (This paragraph was quoted in the CIA Chronology of 11/7/62 but not in the revised Chronology of 11/14/62.)

"Our running account of the number of Soviet dry-cargo vessels making the voyage to Cuba since mid-July is now over 100. About 85 of these probably were carrying military hardware."

"The Cuban Foreign Office on Tuesday ordered Western correspondents to put in for new credentials by today, telling them that all of Cuba beyond Havana's city limits is out of bounds except by special permission." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

126. 9/27/62 - On this date CIA received a report of an observation made on 9/17/62 of a convoy moving toward San Cristobal. This report dovetailed with the earlier report of the 9/12/62 sighting of MRRMs near Havana (Item 103; above). "The arrival of the second report led CIA analysts to a tentative conclusion that the two observers had in fact seen the same convoy, and that there was a possibility of the SS-4 identification being genuine. A day or so earlier, a target card on San Cristobal had been prepared on the basis of a vague report of "Russians building a rocket base." Now this card was removed and, with the two reports cited above and other less specific information on activity in this area which was beginning to trickle in, a new card was prepared between 1 and 3 October which was in effect a priority requirement for photographic coverage. This card was used in the targeting of the 14 October flight. It read as follows: 'Collateral reports indicate the existence of a restricted area in Pinar del Rio Province which is suspected of including an SSM site under construction, particularly SS-4 Skybird. The area is bounded by a line connecting the following four towns: Consolacion del Norte (632N/224W); San Diego del Los Banos (632N/223N); San Cristobal (5301N/2243W); and Las Pozas (6317N/2250W). Requirement: Search the area delineated for possible surface missile construction, with particular attention to SS-4 Skybird.'" (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)
127. 9/27/62 - "... At some point, probably just after 27 September, an item on the subject of possible strategic weapons in Cuba might have been written for CIA current intelligence publications. It could not be written because there was an injunction not to do so (see Item No. 51, above). ... It should also be noted that the order not to publish anything on missile sites without NSC corroboration had never been rescinded. The effect this would have had on reporting in late September and October if the ban had not been in effect (i.e., the USDE restriction -- see Item 152, infra) is difficult to determining. These restrictions did not apply to the Checklist but the Checklist writers drew ... largely on the Cuban Daily Summary published by CIA. Since the Summary was affected by the restrictions, this practice, imposed by the sheer volume of raw material coming in on Cuba, had the effect of cutting the Checklist off from information on offensive weapons. Moreover, neither the Checklist group, nor any other current intelligence officers, knew that the possibility that a Soviet strategic missile base might be established in Cuba had been raised by the DDI and seriously discussed by the President and his advisors more than a month earlier (see Item No. 57, above). In other words, the thrust of NSAM 181 had been so watered down by time and bureaucratic processes that it reached the working level only in the form of SNIE 85-3 which held that establishment of such a base was most improbable (see Item No. 117, above).

"It is difficult to say whether information from ground sources would have been published had there not been a blanket injunction against it. The analysts too were sensitive to the political impact of the reports they were receiving ... . In addition, rigid compartmentation was maintained between the COMOR -- Special Group organization for collection and the intelligence components responsible for analysis. Few, if any, CIA analysts working on the Cuban problem even had clearance. As a result, they did not know that no overflights of Pinar del Rio and Las Villas were included in the September program, or that this program was seriously delayed. They had no way of knowing that the photographic verification they had requested would not soon be forthcoming, and they might well have delayed publication from day to day in hopes of receiving it.

"Nevertheless, it can be established that if the injunction against publication had not existed there would have been some reflection of the refugee reports in the Cuban Daily Summary, which is not highly selective. In retrospect, it seems quite possible -- but by no means certain -- that they would have been picked up in the Checklist, but it is extremely doubtful if they would have survived the coordination process for the Central Intelligence Bulletin. Thus, at the most the President might have learned that there was suspicious activity around San Cristobal slightly more than a week before he apparently did.

"In sum, the CIA analysts believed they had done their duty by targeting the San Cristobal area for photographic coverage, but no word of their concern over activity in this area had appeared in an intelligence publication. It appears highly probable that the Special Group first heard of this concern at its meeting on 9 October (see Item No. 143, infra) when it ordered a U-2 mission which covered the area.

"The gap of 7-10 days between the key analytic correlation of reports and the Special Group Meeting can probably be attributed to the cumbersome processes of the administrative structure supporting the Special Group. This machinery was
designed to provide elaborate justifications and back-up paper work before each decision was made, procedures reaching back into the early history of the U-2 operations over the USSR. They were intended for the control of deliberate strategic reconnaissance of the USSR, and not for a fast-moving situation such as that in Cuba, which was rapidly becoming tactical. In fact, after readout of the 14th October mission they were jettisoned." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)
128. 9/26/62 - At the Board's 9/26/62 meeting the DCI indicated he did not believe that offensive, strategic missiles had been installed in Cuba, but he considered this a possibility at some future time, but only after Cuba's defensive capability was such as to deny Cuban airspace to U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. The DCI reported that "our intelligence collection on Cuba has improved since the first of the year" and that "CIA now has 45 third-country agents (meaning diplomats) reporting throughout Cuba."

129. September 1962 - "Offensive missiles identified: Western Cuba. Two launch sites consisting of 8 field-type launchers and 16 1020-nm MRBMs (SS-4). . . these missiles are probably those reported moving into this area during September." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report of 10/18/62, prepared by GMAIC/JAEIC/NEIC)

130. 9/29-10/2/62 - Pursuant to the 9/20/62 request of DIA, a pass over Cuba was made by the Corona vehicle launched on 9/29/62. The resulting photography was good by Corona standards but not of sufficient quality to reflect significant photographic intelligence on MRBM or IRBM developments on the island. When this CORONA photography was checked against the photography obtained from the SAC-operated U-2s it was possible to relate some of the earth scratchings appearing in the CORONA photography to the construction at some of the long range missile sites which were detected beginning October 14. Without the U-2 photography however, these scratchings could not possibly be identified as being associated in any way with MRBM or IRBM construction. The photographic interpreters at the Strategic Air Command believe that if all nine sites had been completed at the time of the CORONA pass, the CORONA photography might have resulted in the identification of the IRBM sites but not of the MRBM sites.

Dr. Charyk, in commenting on this subject to Board Member Gray, noted that this experience makes it obvious that satellite photography cannot be wholly relied upon when it provides negative evidence; and that this gives one pause when we consider the reliance which has been placed on satellite photography seeking evidence of missile installations in the USSR.

131. 10/1/62 - A memorandum prepared on this date in DIA by a DIA analyst, on the subject "Analysis of SAM Sites," dealt with the 15 confirmed SA-2 sites in Cuba and the discernible pattern which was developing from their location:

(1) In Oriente Province, the 3 SA-2 sites form a triangular pattern around the new military airfield at Holguin which will probably soon be operational . . . no MiGs there now but the MiGs believed to be stationed at Camaguey airfield will probably be moved to Holguin when Holguin becomes operational. (No SA-2 sites identified at Camaguey.)

(2) 4 SA-2 sites form a rectangular pattern around the military airfield near Santa Clara in the Central Army area -- where MiGs have been for several months, and also the field on which the first MiG-21 was identified.
(131. 10/1/62 Continued)

(3) In the Western Army area, the 3 (possibly 4) SA-2 sites form a linear pattern for the defense of the military airfield at San Antonio de los Banos and the Havana-Mariel complex (San Antonio is headquarters for the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force and the assembly point for all MIGs except MIG-21s).

(4) Further west, in Pinar del Rio Province, a triangular pattern of SA-2 sites cannot be connected with any significant military installation. There are 2 underground facilities within this triangle whose use and purpose are unknown. One of these 3 SA-2 sites is located very near to the Cien Julian military air base, but this is a most unlikely spot to place SA-2s for the defense of this air base. "Therefore, curiosity is immediately aroused as to the purpose of this triangular pattern on the far western tip of Cuba."

(5) In the north central portion of Pinar del Rio Province is a trapazoid-shaped restricted area (15-20 miles on a side) controlled by Soviet military personnel recently introduced into Cuba . . . no known military installations in this rough and sparsely populated area . . . Cuban refugees arriving in Miami say all Cubans have been evacuated from the area. Purpose of this restricted area is unknown.

(6) Information on the deployment of Soviet military personnel and "technicians" in Cuba is derived from unevaluated refugee sources. A plotting of all reported locations indicates that there is a definite correlation between the location of Soviet personnel and missiles or missile activity. Significantly, the greatest concentration of Soviet personnel, activity and camps is in the western end of Cuba indicating a greater interest by the Soviets in Pinar del Rio than in other Provinces.

(7) The source of an unevaluated report says that on September 12 he saw some 20 SS-4 (or possibly SS-3) missiles in the vicinity of Campo Libertad (a small airfield on the western edge of Havana). This report is unconfirmed and there are no other reports of such missiles. However, it is significant to note that by taking the approximate center of the trapazoid-shaped restricted area previously referred to, as the point of origin for a radius of 1100 nm (range of an SS-4 missile) the arc includes Philadelphia, St. Louis, Oklahoma City, San Antonio, Mexico City, all Central American capitals, the Panama Canal, and Venezuelan oil fields. "The presence of operational SS-4 missiles in this location would give the Soviets a great military asset."

Based on the foregoing, DIA on 10/2/62 proposed to the CMOR Working Group that the Pinar del Rio search area be included in CMOR's reconnaissance objectives for Cuba. (This was done at the October 4 COMOR meeting and the objective was incorporated in the reconnaissance objectives list.) (Source: Letter to Coyne from Director, DIA, 11/13/62)
132. 10/1/62 - According to reports subsequently reviewed, "On October 1 explosions were reportedly occurring at a highly secure construction project at a location now identified from photography as Site 1 (Sagua La Grande area). Material delivered to the project included lumber and prefabricated concrete forms. This suggests that site construction was underway at that time." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

133. 10/1/62 - This is the estimated date for the beginning of major construction on the Remedios IRBM site. "... the date at which the site acquired a recognizable photographic signature is not determinable." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

134. 10/1-3/62 - CIA reports that during this period CIA prepared a new target card which was in effect a requirement for photographic coverage of the San Cristobal area (see Item No. 126, above), and that in spite of time lags involved in receiving reports of refugees and CIA agents, ..... "Nevertheless, by about 1 October, the San Cristobal area was pinpointed as a suspect IRBM site and photographic confirmation had been requested. This represents a considerable technical achievement. ... the Intelligence Community had been flooded with reports of Soviet weapons shipments and missile installations in Cuba ... CIA's files contain 211 intelligence reports ... on missile and missile-associated activity in Cuba before 1 January 1962. All of these were either totally false or misinterpretations by the observer of other kinds of activity. CIA analysts had naturally come to view all such reports with a high degree of suspicion ... By September, the volume of agent and refugee reporting had become very large indeed. During the month 882 reports on internal activities in Cuba were disseminated, exclusive of telegraphic dissemination. (The CIA clandestine collectors report that their output represented only a small publishable fraction of the raw material collected.) A substantial proportion of these dealt with the deployment of defensive missiles and related activities. Knowledge on the part of the analysts that such a deployment was in fact going on, plus the normal difficulties encountered by untrained observers in telling an offensive missile from a defensive one, tended to throw a sort of smoke-screen around the Soviet offensive deployment when it finally began. The CIA analytic apparatus, however, recognized and correlated the first authentic reports of IRBM equipment ever to be received in Washington, and took action upon them. It targeted the San Cristobal area, not as another location where alleged missile activity should be negated by photography, but as a suspect SS-4 site. This process took about three weeks, from the date when the first observation was made on the ground in Cuba to the preparation of the target card ..." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

NOTE: The fact that CIA considered San Cristobal as a suspect IRBM site was not included in any of CIA's current intelligence publications until after photographic confirmation was obtained in mid-October.

135. 10/2/62 - CIA distributed to the White House and other recipients a raw intelligence report, based on information acquired in Cuba on 10/1/62 which stated in part that on 9/19/62 large intercontinental rockets more than 67 feet long were unloaded in Mariel, Pinar del Rio Province and that the rockets were on long trailers when unloaded from the ship. In distributing this report CIA Headquarters appended the comment "It is more likely that source observed SA-2 missiles being off-loaded".

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136. 10/2-3/62 - The Final Communiqué of the Informal Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics held in Washington, 10/2-3/62 stated in part that "The Soviet Union's intervention in Cuba threatens the unity of the Americas and its democratic institutions" and it called for "the adoption of special measures, both individual and collective". The communiqué observed that "it is desirable

(CONTINUED ON PAGE 39)
(136. 10/2-3/62 Continued)

"to intensify surveillance of the delivery of arms and implements of war and all other items of strategic importance to the communist regime of Cuba, in order to prevent the secret accumulation in the island of arms that can be used for offensive purposes against the Hemisphere."

137. 10/3/62 - The President signed Senate Joint Resolution 230 which had been adopted in the Senate and House of Representatives during September. The Joint Resolution expressed the determination of the United States to (1) prevent by necessary means, including use of force, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending by force or threat of force its aggressive or subversive activities in this Hemisphere; (2) prevent in Cuba the creation or use of externally supported military capability endangering U.S. security; and (3) work with the OAS and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.

138. 10/3/62 - The DCI briefed General Eisenhower "on the Cuban situation" (the General had previously been briefed by CIA on 9/10). (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

139. 10/3/62 - On this date the DIA member of COMOR submitted to the Chairman of COMOR a memorandum which (1) noted the concerns of the Sec/Def and JCS about the (insufficient) amount of intelligence on Cuba that was being made available to responsible decision makers in Government; (2) noted that certain portions of the island, notably the western end, had not been seen since August 29; (3) expressed the view of DIA and J-2 that the best way of collecting intelligence on Cuba under the present circumstances was by resuming frequent and regular U-2 overflights and that coverage on the order of once a week was essential; and (4) proposed that COMOR send to the USIB a draft "intelligence justification" which had been prepared by the DIA as the basis for authorizing frequent and regular U-2 flights over Cuba.

The DIA "intelligence justification" pointed to the buildup of SAM sites, and "SSM" sites which had been observed in eastern and western Cuba - and on the Isle of Pines. The DIA proposed called for U-2 coverage to meet requirements for up-to-date intelligence on (a) the location of SA-2 sites; (b) confirmation or negation of reports from reliable sources concerning the sightings of SS-4 missiles in Cuba; (c) the number of KOMAR class PGMGs in service; and (d) the number of MIG-21s in Cuba.

The intelligence justification drafted by DIA gave recognition to the increased risk to U-2 aircraft in the light of SA-2 and MIG-21s present in Cuba. Nevertheless, this recognition of risk was followed by the statement: "But it must be stated that the current need is extremely urgent, and the risk involved should be very thoroughly weighed before this coverage is denied."

The DIA memorandum to COMOR also included a proposed list of target objectives in Cuba to meet the intelligence requirements which DIA had outlined.
(139. 10/3/62 Continued)

With few changes or omissions, the DIA's 10/3 draft of the intelligence justification for revised overflights of Cuba was forwarded by COMOR on 10/5 to the USIB for consideration and approval. Similarly, on 10/6 COMOR sent to the Director of NRO, at his verbal request, the intelligence justification and statement of target requirements for overhead reconnaissance of Cuba (with copies also being sent to COMOR to the USIB for information and any comments prior to the Special Group meeting on 10/9/62.)

In summary, the intelligence justification, and the listing of requirements and specific objectives, which went forward to NRO from COMOR on 10/6 included the following:

(1) A statement of the pressing need for photographic coverage of the Soviet arms buildup in Cuba, particularly with regard to (a) SA-2 sites, (b) possible MRBMs, (c) MIG-21 aircraft, and (d) tanks, artillery, and other conventional weapons and equipment "which are arriving in large quantities."

(2) SIGINT coverage to obtain up-to-date intelligence on the Soviet-furnished air defense buildup in Cuba which is known to include (a) radar -- EW, GCI, HF, MO, AQ and FC; (b) missile systems consisting of 3 confirmed and 1 probable cruise-type coastal defense short range missile sites, 15 SA-2 sites, and missile storage and support facilities; (c) MIGs -- 60 MIG-15/17/19 and 36 MIG-21s estimated; and (d) a general dispersal throughout Cuba of 30mm, 37mm and 57mm AAA to defend airfields, ports and military installations. ("... a two-fold collection program is necessary: first, a continued coverage of the communications networks which is now adequately covered by peripheral air, shipborne and ground efforts; second, overflight missions by a vehicle capable of the readiness and effectiveness of weapons can be determined.")

(3) Conclusions: "Some of these requirements are currently being met by peripheral means. However, only overflights will permit the accomplishment of all objectives. COMOR will provide a continual review and up-dating of requirements."

(4) Recommendation: "It is recommended that reconnaissance programs be initiated to satisfy these requirements."
(Source: DIA letter to Coyle, 11/13/62)

140. 10/4/62 - The Director, DIA, established a Cuban "Situation Room" operated on a 24-hour basis.

141. 10/4/62 - On this date at a meeting of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, the DOI noted that U-2 flights were now restricted by the presence of SAM sites to the southeastern quadrant of Cuba. The DOI questioned whether this was a reasonable restriction at this time particularly since the SAMs were almost certainly not operational. The
(141. 10/4/62 Continued)

Special Group then directed the NRO to prepare an over-all program for reconnais-sance of Cuba for presentation at the Special Group meeting of 10/9/62.

142. 10/9/62 - NSA units in [redacted] and on the USS Oxford detected for the first time the Cuban [redacted] 1962; this not shifted from an experimental to an operational status.

The Russians are employing the [redacted] in Cuba. (The first time it has ever been detected outside of the Bloc except on Soviet ships in certain instances.) NSA has reason to believe that the Russians are possibly employing

(Source: Deputy Director, NSA, 11/7/62)

143. 10/9/62 - NRO (Dr. Charyk) made a presentation to the Special Group of an over-all program for reconnaissance of Cuba. This presentation was based on the DIA-recommended, COMOR-proposed submission of a paper on "Intelligence Justification and Requirements for Overflights of Cuba."

"At the Special Group meeting on 9 October, NRO's first recommendation was 'A U-2 probe over the suspect MRBM site as soon as weather permits.' This referred to the area targeted by COMOR near San Cristobal. . . . The operation, which was to be supported by ELINT collection aircraft off the coast, also was designed to pass over one of the SA-2 sites which was thought to be most nearly operational. Thus the secondary objective was to determine the status of SA-2 defenses in order to measure the risk involved in getting complete U-2 coverage of Cuba as rapidly as possible. NRO's second recommendation was therefore conditional: 'If there is no SA-2 reaction to the initial U-2 sortie, maximum coverage of the western end of the island by multiple U-2s simultaneously, as soon as weather permits.' (There were also certain other recommendations for low level, oblique, and FIREFLY missions.)

"The Group gave first priority to the San Cristobal mission and recommended the President that he approve it. The President gave his approval -- presumably learning of the San Cristobal reports at this time -- and the mission was immediately mounted. It was delayed by weather, however, from 10 through 12 October. On that date operational control was transferred to SAC by direction of the President in a meeting with the Deputy SecDef and the DNI. There is no reason to believe that the transfer in any way delayed launching the mission, which SAC flew on 14 October. The pilot did not fly the prescribed track, but took a course at an angle to it. Fortunately the planned and actual paths crossed over San Cristobal, and the primary mission was accomplished." (Source: CIA Chronology 11/14/62)

NOTE: This is in error. See Item 143-a, next page.
143-a. (See Item 143, above.) On 12/7/62 SAC representatives exhibited to a Panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board the plan for and actual flight track of the 10/14/62 U-2 mission over Cuba, as laid out by SAC. The material shown to the Board Panel reflects that the pilot flew the mission precisely as prescribed.
Prior to this decision, CIA had operated 21 U-2 missions over or peripheral to Cuba during 1962. The dates of these 21 missions are listed below:

1/19/62 5/2/62 6/19/62 9/5/62
2/21/62 6/6/62 7/12/62 9/26/62

(Source: NPIC)

144. 10/9/62 - The DCI briefed Congressman Cannon "on the Cuban situation." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

145. 10/9/62 - Senator Kenneth B. Keating, speaking on the floor of the U.S. Senate:

"Mr. President, the President of Cuba, like a two-bit Khrushchev, has disgraced the name of the United Nations . . .

"Cuba represents a new and menacing shift in the world balance of power . . . I trust that all of us, regardless of party, are united in the hope that this Nation, through its chosen leaders and in cooperation with its allies, will progress resolutely toward the stern decisions which may be necessary to deal with the Soviet cloud now darkening our national horizon . . .

"Late in August I called attention to the Russian arsenal in Cuba . . .

"My first suggestion, made August 31, called upon the Administration to tell the American people all of the facts about the island buildup. Reliable information had reached me concerning the number of ships, types of armament, and Soviet troops arriving in Cuba . . .

"On August 29, just 2 days earlier, the President told a reporter that he had no information that Russians were sending Nike-type missiles to Cuba, after the reporter cited a State Department source to that effect. Following my revelations on the Senate floor, on August 31, the Administration first declared, through a Senator on the other side of the aisle, that Senator Keating was "misinformed". Nevertheless, there followed from other quarters an effort to make it appear that the information I had reported had been released earlier by the State Department.

"On September 4, however, the President conceded that Nike-type missiles had been delivered to Castro and confirmed in almost every detail the facts I had stated 11 days earlier. The President characterized the buildup as "defensive". This, in my view was a tremendous error and a serious concession to the Soviets. That was their line. It should not be ours."
... Under Secretary of State Ball now admits that 85 ships have delivered troops and war goods to the island. He admits that 15 missile sites have been established, and it is estimated that the total will eventually reach 25. This knowledge has been possessed for a long time by many of us. Under Secretary Ball said ... that four missile sites of different types have been identified. He said that these sites are similar to known Soviet defense missile sites which are believed to contain anti-shipping missiles having a range of 20 to 25 miles. The significant sentence, rather buried away, is that several more such sites will be installed.

"Many other facts have been stated which have been known to some of us but which have not been publicly stated before. The statement was made that 4,500 troops are stationed in Cuba. It will be remembered that the first figure given was 3,000. I stated that there were at least 5,000. The first figure given by the President was 3,000. That was advanced to 4,200. It has now been advanced to 4,500. I stand on my statement that more than 5,000 troops are stationed in Cuba. Five thousand is a modest figure. But I commend the Under Secretary of State for revealing these additional facts." (Source: Congressional Record)

146. 10/10/52 - USIB discussed the COMOR submission on "Intelligence Justifications and Requirements for Overflight of Cuba", in response to the Special Group's request of 10/9 for USIB opinion regarding the COMOR-approved paper, especially as regards frequency of coverage for the various groups of objectives and targets proposed by COMOR. After discussion USIB agreed that the DCI should express to the Special Group USIB's view that (a) the targets in Groups II and III should be surveyed as promptly as possible and that the results of such initial surveillance should determine the subsequent frequency of coverage to be recommended, (b) COMOR submit for USIB consideration at its 10/17 meeting a specific list of those priority targets in Group IV which should be covered.

Group II and Group III listed "those targets for which surveillance is desired primarily to provide order of battle and operational status information. Ground resolution of 2-5 feet or better will suffice for this purpose. Group II includes targets for monthly coverage; Group III includes targets for weekly coverage."

Because the records of the NSC Special 5412/2 Group have been unavailable thus far to the Board's staff we are not clear as to what action was taken by the DCI on the basis of the USIB discussion of 10/10/52. (It may be that by this time, or shortly thereafter, action on the USIB decision was overtaken by decisions at higher levels in Government including the decision of the President to transfer from CIA to SAC responsibility for operation of U-2 missions over Cuba.)
147. 10/10/62 - On this date CIA received Navy photographs taken of the Soviet ship Kasimov off Cuba, showing clearly identifiable IL-28 crates which later showed up in U-2 photography of 10/17 at San Julian airfield - "along with a number of others which must have come in on unphotographed ships."
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

148. 10/10/62 - The DCI briefed the CIA Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on the buildup, including the IL-28s. He also commented on MREMs essentially along the lines of his cables from Nice, adding that there were many experts who did not believe the Soviets would make such a move, but that he differed with them. He told the Subcommittee that he had authority for an overflight in the next day or so. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

149. 10/10/62 - On the floor of the U.S. Senate, Senator Keating declared that:

"Construction has begun on at least a half dozen launching sites for intermediate range tactical missiles. Intelligence authorities must have advised the President and top Government officials of this fact, and they must now have been told that ground-to-ground missiles can be operational from the island of Cuba within 6 months."

"My own sources on the Cuban situation, which have been 100 percent reliable, have substantiated this report completely."

(Source: Congressional Record)

150. 10/11/62 - On this date CIA reported in the President's Checklist the information from Navy photography of 10/10 showing IL-28 crates on the Soviet ship Kasimov off Cuba.
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

151. 10/11/62 - On this date General Carter said to Senator Saltonstall "much the same thing" that the DCI had said on the preceding day to the CIA Appropriations Subcommittee of the House, i.e., that he differed with experts who were of the view that the Soviets would not place MREMs in Cuba.
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

152. 10/11/62 - The CIA Chronology of 11/14/62 indicates that the "USIB principals ... aware that they were dealing with an explosive political issue and aware also that "leakage of intelligence on offensive weapons, true or false, would seriously limit the President's freedom of action in dealing with what might become a major international crisis, they had evolved a system for limiting dissemination of such information." Analysis would continue and senior policy ...
"officials would be briefed, but no material would appear in formal intelligence publications without the approval of the USIB principals. These instructions were first issued orally, (CIA does not say when) and later on October 11, 1962 formalized by USIB in the [redacted] system. The key passages in USIB's order were 'such information or intelligence will be disseminated outside each USIB intelligence component only to specific individuals on an EYES ONLY basis who by virtue of their responsibilities as advisers to the President have a need to know', and 'there is no intent, hereby, however, to inhibit the essential analytic process'."

(Despite the advisory role to the President which is supposed to be performed by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the latter Board was not included as one of the approved recipients for [redacted] reports. Accordingly, the Board received its first official notification of offensive missiles in Cuba when the President made his address on 10/22. The Board thereafter requested the restricted [redacted] intelligence reports which were made available to the Board by CIA on 10/29/62.)

153. 10/13/62 - General Carter of CIA addressed a letter to Mr. McGeorge Bundy requesting reconsideration of the Presidential decision to transfer from CIA to SAC operational responsibility for U-2 missions over Cuba. Mr. Bundy acknowledged General Carter's letter, stating in essence that the decision had been made and that it would stand. During the period immediately preceding and following the Presidential decision, CIA personnel expressed considerable concern relative to the transfer on the ground that SAC did not have capability or experience to effectively operate such U-2 photographic missions.

(The following resume of SAC U-2 operations is pertinent to the question raised by CIA as to SAC's competence to conduct overflights of Cuba: SAC established the 4080th Wing in May 1956, and U-2 aircraft began to arrive in June 1957. Thereafter, the 4080th operated from a variety of locations in the United States. The 4080th flew peripheral photographic reconnaissance against the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Russian land mass in the East Siberian Sea, and the Laptev Sea area of Russia, obtaining thereby the first photographs of these areas available to Air Force planners. The 4080th has flown under every conceivable weather condition including snow, ice, fog and desert. In addition to photographic missions, it has flown U-2 ELINT missions during 1961 and 1962 in the Far North and Far East areas. Further, it has flown about 3500 sampling sorties since 1957 in support of the national effort. The 4080th's crews average 3500 hours of which 600 hours is in U-2 aircraft. The 4080th has flown about 1500 overseas sorties. Since its establishment six years ago, eight crews have been lost by accidents (one RAF, seven USAF). During the period from October 14 through November 9, 1962, the 4080th had flown 36 U-2 sorties over Cuba, with the loss of one aircraft which was shot down on October 27, 1962.)
(Source: SAC, as provided to O'neal by Generals Power and Smith)