154. 10/14/62 - SAC flew its first U-2 mission over Cuba. This mission produced the first photographic identification of MRBM launch sites at San Cristobal No. 1. (This area had last been covered by a CIA U-2 flight on August 29.)

From 10/14/62 through 11/8/62 SAC flew 43 U-2 missions over Cuba:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 16</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 17</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 18</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>October 19</td>
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<td>October 20</td>
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<td>October 21</td>
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<td>October 22</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>October 23</td>
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<td>November 1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>November 2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>November 3</td>
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<td>November 4</td>
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<td>November 6</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 43

During the period October 23 through November 8, the Navy flew 54 F6U low-level (Blue Moon) photo flights over Cuba. In the same period the Air Force flew 52 low-level photo missions over Cuba.

*This mission was lost
#Aborted.

155. 10/14-17/62 - During this period SAC U-2 missions identified 9 MRBM and IRBM sites in Cuba. The dates of identification and the dates of the last previous CIA U-2 coverage of these sites follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Identified</th>
<th>Last Coverage Prior to Site Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Cristobal #1</td>
<td>14 Oct</td>
<td>29 Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Cristobal #2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Cristobal #3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Cristobal #4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sagua La Grande #1</td>
<td>17 Oct</td>
<td>05 Sep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sagua La Grande #2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guanajay #1</td>
<td>15 Oct</td>
<td>29 Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guanajay #2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remedios</td>
<td>17 Oct</td>
<td>05 Sep</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

156. 10/15/62 - In the early evening the read-out of SAC's initial U-2 mission over Cuba first became available. It reflected identification of an MRBM site in the San Cristobal area. The Director, DIA, notified a number of key civilian and military officials of the Department of Defense of this fact on the night of October 15, 1962. Similarly, the Deputy Director of Intelligence, CIA, notified Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. Hilsman (who notified the Secretary of State). The following morning the President was notified.

157. 10/15/62 - Following SAC's flight the previous day, a meeting was held at the White House attended by Messrs. Bundy, Gilpatric, Johnson, Mocone, Scoville, Charyk and General Taylor, and by General Komer. SAC's Director of Operations, and General Smith - SAC's Director of Intelligence. Messrs. Mocone and Scoville were
critical of SAC's ability to fly U-2 missions. At the meeting, Mr. Bundy re-
affirmed the decision made on 10/12 and indicated that SAC should continue to
fly these missions. Mr. Scoville was critical of SAC's flight plans for up-
coming missions, and he complained that his office had not received the ELINT
take from the first SAC mission of 10/14. Subsequent inquiry reflected that the
ELINT take had been delivered to CIA immediately following its receipt, but that
it had become bogged down in CIA's message center resulting in delay in its
delivery to Mr. Scoville.

158. 10/15/62 - A U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of crated
IL-28s at San Julian.

158-a. 10/15/62 - General Carter briefed Senator Stennis ("before the
photography of the previous day was available") along the same lines of his
answer to Senator Saltonstall's question, four days earlier, about Senator
Keating's charges of known MRRM sites in Cuba -- i.e., "General Carter said that
there were reports but no hard evidence". (Source: CIA Chronology 11/4/62)

159. 10/17/62 - A U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of un-
crated IL-28s at San Julian.

160. 10/18/62 - Gromyko talked to President Kennedy at the White House,
saying that he was instructed by the Soviet Government to state that Soviet
assistance to Cuba "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense
capabilities of Cuba"

161. 10/18/62 - There was initiated the daily issuance of Joint Evalua-
tional Reports on the Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba -- prepared jointly
by GMAIC, JARIC, and NPIC, based on photographic, ELINT, COMINT, and other
sources. These reports were cumulative beginning 10/18. (See Item 152, above)

162. 10/19/62 - The USSR is making a major military investment in Cuba
with some of their most effective guided missile systems. The planning for
this operation must have started at least one year ago and the operation itself
began last spring. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/19/62)

163. 10/19/62 - [Redacted] from Cuba

164. 10/19/62 - [Redacted] indicating that the USSR has committed its most recent version of the

165. 10/19/62 - "There are several refugee reports indicating the
presence of tactical (FROG) missiles in Cuba, although there is no photographic
confirmation thus far". (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/19/62)

Photography (Mission 5012 of 10/25) confirmed the presence of a FROG
missile launcher in a vehicle park near Remedios... a tactical unguided
rocket of 40,000 to 50,000 yard range, similar to the U. S. Honest John'.
(Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/27/62)
165. 10/21/62 - This was the arrival date in Cuba of a TU 114
crate transport. The unusual circumstance of KRUG flight tracking,
which is normally reserved for especially important flights, suggests that
high ranking Soviet command personnel may be among the 140 passengers
aboard. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/20/62)

166. 10/22/62 - By this date seven Soviet ships identified as
possible ballistic missile carriers (having cargo hatch openings of
at least 75 by 15 feet) had made a total of 13 trips to Cuba since
"late July." These ships were the KASIMOV, KIMOVS, KRSNOGRAD,
OKHOTSK, ONSK, ORENBURG and POTALA.

As of 10/22 the KIMOVS, OKHOTSK and POTALA were en route to
Cuba. Two of these, the KIMOVS (en route from the Baltic) and the
OKHOTSK (from the Black Sea) "are among seven ships which were con-
tacted by individual cipher messages from Moscow six hours after the
President's public statement." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report,
10/24/62)

167. 10/22/62 - The President made his radio-TV address to the
Nation, reporting unmistakable evidence of a series of offensive
missile sites in Cuba and noting that "the first preliminary hard
information of this nature" was received by him at 9:00 A.M., on
10/16/62.

168. 10/23/62 - The President issued a Proclamation asserting
that (1) world peace and U.S. security had been endangered by the
establishment by the Sino-Soviet powers of an offensive military capa-
bility in Cuba, including bases for ballistic missiles (2) in a
Joint Resolution passed by the Congress and approved on 10/3/62, it
was declared that the U.S. was determined to prevent by whatever means
necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in
Cuba from extending its aggressive or subversive activities to any
part of this hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the creation or use
of an externally supported military capability endangering U.S.
security, and (3) that the Organ of Consultation of the American
Republics meeting in Washington on 10/23/62 had recommended that the
Member States, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individ-
ually and collectively, "including armed force, deemed necessary to
ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot receive from the Sino-
Soviet powers military material and related supplies threatening the
peace and security of the Continent, and to prevent the missiles in
Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat
to the peace and security of the Continent.

Therefore, the President proclaimed that the forces under his
command were ordered, beginning at 2:00 P.M., on 10/24/62 to inter-
dict the delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to
Cuba, specifically: surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft;
bombs; air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any
of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support
or operate the above items; and any other classes of material hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense for purposes of effectuating this Proclamation.

The President authorized the Secretary of Defense to employ the land, sea and air forces of the U.S. (in cooperation with any forces made available by other American states) to carry out this Proclamation.

Further, the President authorized the interception of vessels or craft proceeding toward Cuba and the taking into custody of any vessel or craft failing to comply with directions to identify itself and submit to visit and search -- with force to be used only to the extent necessary.

169. 10/23/62 - A message passed within Cuba from Las Villas to Placetas suggested an intent to conceal "equipment" and "fuel station" in a railroad tunnel in an area south of the Remedios IRBM site. The message read: "Today situate equipment in the railroad tunnel of Placetas. Also situate the fuel station in this place." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

170. 10/23/62 - The Director, DIA, initiated the issuance of daily shipping reports and a summary of Soviet ship movements.

171. 10/24/62 - On this date Khrushchev "categorically stated" to American businessman W. E. Knox, in a conversation held in the Kremlin, that "the weapons which the Soviet Union had furnished to Cuba included antiaircraft missiles and ballistic missiles with both conventional and thermonuclear warheads." Khrushchev added that "even the Americans would not trust their NATO allies by turning over thermonuclear devices to them." (Source: N.Y. Times Magazine, 11/18/62)

172. 10/25/62 - The DIA initiated the issuance of a Special Intelligence Summary on Cuba.

173. 10/26/62 - James Reston, writing in the New York Times, stated: "Privately, there are several misgivings. First, many people find it hard to believe that the offensive Soviet missile sites in Cuba suddenly mushroomed over the weekend. Accordingly, there is considerable suspicion either that the official's intelligence was not as good as maintained, or the Administration withheld the facts."

174. 10/28/62 - Communications were established between the USSR and Cuba. "We consider these links as the best candidates identified to date for Soviet in Cuba." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/28/62)
175. 10/28/62 - Until immediately prior to the President's statement of this date welcoming Khrushchev's decision to stop building bases in Cuba, dismantling offensive weapons and returning them to the Soviet Union, it appears that in Cuba the Soviets continued at feverish pace with the construction and camouflaging of their MRM and IRRM bases in Cuba.

176. 10/29/62 - By this date, accumulated evidence showed that the Russians had put first-line modern equipment in Cuba, including such items as FRUITSET radar with C-Band, armored personnel carriers, etc.

177. 10/30/62 - Senator Scott of Pennsylvania, appearing on the CBS radio program "The Leading Question" on the night of 10/30/62, said that he and other Republicans had "very hard information early in September that the Russians were building missile bases in Cuba." Senator Scott said, "We knew it began early in September and any information we had we knew was available to the administration and to the President." Referring to President Kennedy's radio-television broadcast of 10/22 in which the President said that he received the first preliminary hard information of the offensive missile buildup on Tuesday, 10/16, Senator Scott declared, "You don't build a missile site in a week. Those missile bases were there a long, long time before the President spoke." Senator Scott further stated, "On September 13 Secretary of State Dean Rusk in testimony before the Armed Services Committee admitted that a Soviet arms build-up was going on in Cuba." He added, "I think the only conclusion can be that the President himself may not have received the information -- there may have been a failure of intelligence. On the other hand, there may have been a cautious reluctance to move which is understandable but was not shared by the Republican Party or the American people." (Source: Washington Evening Star, 10/31/62)

178. 10/31/62 - Writing in the New York Times under the heading "An Intelligence Gap" Hanson Baldwin stated "The effectiveness of the country's intelligence organization is again in question as a result of the Cuban Crisis.

"Considerable mystery, in the opinion of some members of Congress and military men, still surrounds the Administration's sudden decision to impose a blockade of Cuba after a missile buildup that must have started weeks or months ago. The questions being asked are primarily these: Was the nation's factual information about the Communist military buildup in Cuba adequate in quantity and quality, and was there a long delay after the missiles actually arrived?"

"Were the interpretation and evaluation of this information influenced by policy considerations; in other words, were the estimates tailored to fit top policy beliefs? Or did Administration officials, until action was finally taken, reject the intelligence estimates as erroneous?"

"Has the marked centralization of intelligence activities in the last two years of the Kennedy Administration improved or hampered the production of objective, nonpartisan intelligence analyses?"
179. 11/5/62 - Dr. Charyk, Under Secretary of the Air Force, expressed to Board Member Gordon Gray the opinion that the following lessons were learned from the Cuba situation:

(1) There is a need for a group at the policy level, having access to all pertinent intelligence, which can perform the task of rapidly identifying intelligence requirements and objectives. (Dr. Charyk believed that in this instance USIB did not perform the function he had in mind.)

(2) There is need for a focal point to ensure the availability of intelligence-related resources for use in contingency situations (e.g., film for photographic reconnaissance purposes).

(3) Comparisons of CORONA and U-2 photography of Cuba reveal significant instances where U-2 photography was positive, whereas CORONA photography of the same targets had been interpreted as negative. Dr. Charyk felt that based on this experience it is obvious that satellite photography cannot be wholly relied upon when it provides negative evidence. He observed that this gives one pause when we consider the reliance which has been placed on satellite photography for evidence of missile installations in the USSR. (Dr. Charyk added that recent satellite photography shows a new missile site at Tyura Tam which is not served by rail facilities heretofore noted as an identifying characteristic of this type of missile installation -- suggesting the possibility that our readings of satellite photography have failed to locate other missile sites because of the absence of rail or other characteristics we have assumed for them.)

180. 11/6/62 - The Washington Star of this date records the report of Fernando Garcia Chacon, a Havana lawyer and an agent of the Students Revolutionary Directorate, that Soviet missiles have been placed in seven caves and other underground installations in Cuba. (At Hershey, Victoria, Fenon, Sierra de Cuba, Las Villas Province, Oriente Province and Pinar del Rio Province.) Garcia reported that the underground sites are strongly guarded by Russians and that no Cubans have been allowed to approach them since the sites were completed. Garcia's student group issued a statement in Miami claiming that "The free world is on the verge of being a victim of a new swindle of the Soviet Union. We have in our hands sufficient information that there exist on Cuban territory bases of missiles like the ones that have caused the present crisis and some of even greater range in subterranean installations that cannot be photographed by reconnaissance aircraft.

"The photo planes have localized on Cuban territory nearly 30 launching pads while our information assures us that there are many more missiles in Cuba. The Soviet Union can take out of Cuba and permit the inspection of more than 50 missiles, but there are on Cuban territory sufficient missiles to destroy half the continent."
181. 11/6/62 - (IL-28s) As of this date photographic evidence reflected the following regarding IL-28 medium jet bombers in Cuba:

- 9 already assembled or in the process of assembly at St. Julian
- 20 packaged in crates at St. Julian
- 9 packaged in crates at Holguin
- 4 packaged in crates at a point near Holguin

TOTAL: 42 IL-28s in Cuba.

182. 11/9/62 - When the DCI met with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on this date, he reported that from France he had protested, without success, the conclusions reached by USIN in the SNEI on the Soviet buildup in Cuba, and in commenting upon the lessons to be learned from the recent developments pertaining to Cuba, the DCI: (1) expressed the belief that "we were too timid with respect to the conduct of surveillance operations over Cuba in September;" (2) expressed concern because of the lack of weight given to reports by the intelligence analysts; (3) expressed the view that a state of mind had developed in the intelligence community to the effect that the Soviets just simply would not undertake an offensive ballistic missile buildup in Cuba; (4) reported that CIA has been operating rather ineffective intelligence teams in Cuba and that they have not produced hard intelligence on the subject because they have been occupying themselves mainly with staying alive; (5) advised that there were approximately third-country agents (meaning diplomats) reporting from foreign embassies in Cuba but that CIA "obtained no hard intelligence from them regarding the military buildup;" (6) advised that from the standpoint of reasonable and proper UN verification we do not have satisfactory coverage of Cuba, and that "we have little unoffical on-site information;" and (7) stated that currently CIA "is not getting intelligence on Cuba through conventional means.

183. 11/9/62 - When the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, met with the Board on this date, he expressed the view that there was danger in placing undue reliance on photography in seeking answers to questions that plague us from the standpoint of intelligence. He noted that DIA received no significant information from agent sources concerning the Soviet missile buildup. He suggested that the Army should play an increasing role in terms of clandestine intelligence penetration of Cuba. He also noted that an additional important lesson to be learned was that there must be provided to the Washington area a first class photo processing facility if we are to be prepared adequately for similar Cuban situations in the future.

184. 11/9/62 - When Mr. Thomas Hughes, Acting Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, met with the Board on this date, he identified the following areas as warranting further examination: (1) The need for establishing an improved capability for the evaluation of indicators as distinguished from the process of preparing intelligence estimates; (2) The need for getting across to top level officials the full brunt of such indicators. (Hughes noting that this did not happen in State, and in fact that State received some of the refugee indicator reports as much as two months after they had...
(184. 11/9/62 Continued)

been prepared.); (3) The need for clandestine intelligence collection. (Hughes noting that we do not have espionage agents on the ground in Cuba providing significant data.); (4) The need for a better warning mechanism; (5) The need for registering with USIB views such as those expressed by the DCI from the Riviera. (Hughes noting, as did the Director, DIA, that the DCI's dissent was registered internally within CIA, but was not communicated to USIB until after the Cuban crisis broke.)

185. 11/14/62 - The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, following its preliminary review of the subject on 11/9/62 requested the DCI for "a review on an all-source, all-agency basis of the actions taken and results obtained within the intelligence community in providing intelligence coverage, reporting and estimates on the developing buildup." The Board requested that the report setting forth the results of the intelligence community's review include: (a) an identification of the requirements levied on intelligence collection elements of the Government, (b) a resume of the intelligence information obtained from such sources as foreign diplomatic personnel, Cuban refugees interrogations, in-place agent reports, COMINT, and ELINT, (c) the scope of distribution given such information to higher authority and laterally within the intelligence community, and (d) the extent to which such information was reflected in reports and assessments provided to policy level officials.

186. 11/21/62 - The Minutes of the USIB Meeting of this date reflect the following entry: "Noted a view expressed by General Carter in relation discussion of the Cuban situation that, for intelligence planning for the future, Cuba should be considered as a satellite of the USSR."

187. 11/23/62 - The DIA Summary of this date contains a detailed analysis of Soviet military forces in Cuba as of 11/23. In summary the analysis states "Soviet military forces in Cuba are now believed to number about 16,000, including some 4,000 ground combat troops, 3,000 ICBM and MRBM personnel, 7,800 in air defense and air force elements, and 1,200 naval personnel."

188. 11/24/62 - Broadcasting from Havana on this date Allen Oxley stated (heard on CBS in New York) that "there is now no doubt that not all the Russian missiles have been withdrawn from Cuba. While the Russians have removed 42 missiles it is known that others remain and one type - a rocket with a range of about 25 miles - is believed to be controlled by the Cubans." Information received from Mariel and Bayia Onde, the two main seaports of the Province of Pina Del Rio reveals that at least 88 medium and long range missiles were unloaded there from Russian ships; 30 in the month of September and 22 in October. In addition a large number of short range rockets arrived . . . . There are unconfirmed reports of missiles remaining in Cuba.

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"which have been hidden underground in concrete shelters where American reconnaissance planes cannot detect them. The island is alive with rumors, and it is difficult to sift the facts out of the stories of the big Russian military buildup still going on. Some of these stories tell of big concrete constructions in the wooded countryside and underground rocket bases still being built by the Russians in the mountains."

189. 11/26/62 - At Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, the President commended the Strategic Air Command and the Tactical Air Command for the photographs which they had taken "which first gave us conclusive proof of the build-up of offensive weapons in Cuba." The President noted that "the work of these two units has contributed as much to the security of the United States as any unit in our history, and any group of men in our history."

On the same date at Key West, the President commended the Navy stating: "We express particular thanks to you for your work of the last five weeks. The reconnaissance flights which enabled us to determine with precision the offensive build-up in Cuba contributed directly to the security of the United States in the most important and significant way."

190. 12/4/62 - In a briefing provided to Messrs. Gray and Coyne, the Director, DIA, advised that photographic intelligence identified 33 MREMs in Cuba; that it subsequently identified 42 MREMs on board ship departing Cuba; that the Soviets removed either partially or totally the canvas covers on 36 of the 42 outgoing MREMs (the Soviets refused to exhibit 6 of them) and in all instances the skins of the missiles were in no way removed; that no IREMs were detected entering, in, or exiting Cuba; that the intelligence community estimates that the IREMs had not yet been introduced into Cuba but may have been on some of the ships which turned back at the time the quarantine was declared; that the 9 known MREM-IREM bases in Cuba have been dismantled; that no evidence has been developed reflecting the existence of nuclear warheads in Cuba; that it would be relatively simple to introduce such warheads with little likelihood of detection; that "black boxes" were employed with negative results in an endeavor to detect nuclear emissions from the ships exiting Cuba with the MREM.

The Director, DIA, also reported that photographic evidence reflected that at least 42 IL-28s had been introduced into Cuba; that as of this date three of the IL-28s have been put aboard a Soviet vessel which has exited Cuba; that assembly of other IL-28s has apparently ceased; and there are indications that the remaining IL-28s may be in the process of being readied for shipment out of Cuba.