HISTORY OF THE JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF:

PREPARATION OF SIOP-63

DECLASSIFIED FEB 13 2007
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HISTORY & RESEARCH DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

JANUARY 1964
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PREFACE

This volume is the second prepared by the SAC History & Research Division covering the activities of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff located at Headquarters SAC, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. The historian has emphasized development of targeting policies and the actions taken in preparing the plan. The main portion of the narrative is concerned with appraisals of SIOP-62 methodology and its relevancy to the next plan, war gaming, the new guidance for SIOP-63, and preparation of the plan. Discussion of the mechanics of the SIOP and what it is intended to do has been kept as general as possible. The SIOP, itself a permanent document, and exhibits accompanying the narrative furnish greater detail should the reader wish it. Appendix I is a short statement on JSTPS organization, included for the sake of continuity, which did not fit conveniently into the main narrative. Appendix II summarizes formal disagreements which arose within the staff during the preparation of the plan and what was done to resolve them. An explanation of some of the more esoteric terminology of nuclear targeting follows the appendices. Documents identified as exhibits (Ex__) are on file in the History & Research Division. In accordance with paragraph 3b, JAI 210-1, this history contains no information categorized as extremely sensitive (ESI).

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Background

One astute observer of the American political scene has characterized the "grand strategy" of the Kennedy Administration as the search for more freedom of action in response to the challenges posed by the Soviet Union: the United States must be free to choose rather than to have the choice foreordained by a rigid policy. "What you need is ... control, flexibility, a choice ...," the President has been quoted as saying.¹ (σ)

The seriousness with which the new administration regarded this search for more freedom of action was nowhere more evident than in its reappraisal of defense policies conducted in early 1961 by the new Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. In general, the administration felt past plans for general war were too rigidly geared to a massive retaliation to surprise attack. It therefore sought means to expand the latitude of possible reactions to fit the wide range of circumstances in which conflict could be initiated. Explaining the germinating strategy of controlled response to a NATO ministerial meeting in 1962, Secretary McNamara said, "We believe that the combination of our nuclear superiority and a strategy of controlled response gives us hope of minimizing damage in the event we have to fulfill our pledge."² (M3)

This was bound to have a direct impact on the preparation of the nation's integrated operational plan for strategic forces. The guidance eventually received for SIOP-63, with its "tasks" and "options,"
represented the administration's attempt to put its philosophy into practice. Interpretation and application of this guidance (markedly changed from instructions for SIOP-62) by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff constitutes the main thread of this narrative.*

Reappraisal of Strategy

The SIOP-62, completed in December 1960 and put into effect in April 1961, was generally recognized as the best plan that could have been prepared within the short time (four months) available. But the first plan was not yet in effect when it came under the scrutiny and criticism of Dr. G. B. Kistiakovsky, President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Science and Technology. Although he believed it to be faithful to directives and similar in outline to earlier SAC plans, certain directives and procedures required review for the future. Specifically questioned was the conservatively estimated damage criteria (which he felt might result in overkill and large force requirements), the essentially counterforce character of the targeting both in preventive and retaliatory situations, some aspects of the computer programming, and the commitment of alert and follow-on forces to the initial strike when damage levels resulting from alert strikes alone seemed so "extensive."
In one of his last memos to the JCS, the outgoing Secretary of Defense of the Eisenhower Administration, Thomas Gates, cautioned that the plan should not be allowed to stagnate. He said: "... further actions should be initiated leading to continued refinement of strategic planning [for the initial retaliatory strike under various conditions of warning."

His successor, Secretary McNamara, also felt a review of procedures was in order, and in March 1961 instructed the JCS to review the organization and planning of JSIPS.\(^5\)\(^\text{[Note 5]}\)

The Joint Chiefs had already begun to solicit comments and recommendations for the future from the CINCs and the services.\(^6\) Most of the replies centered on questions of damage criteria, assurance of delivery, constraints, the target value system, operational factors, war gaming, and flexibility in execution of the plan. The Army, Navy, CINCLANT, and CINCPAC complained of the high level of damage and population casualties provided for in SIOP-62. They believed that a change was required in damage criteria to take into account overall effects, i.e., fire and radiation as well as blast, when assessing damage. If this were done, the weight of effort applied against targets could be reduced. These same four also believed that procedures for achieving a high level of assurance of delivery of weapons to each bomb release line would result in many targets being struck with multiple weapons.*

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\* The National Strategic Target Attack Policy set the minimum assurance of delivery at each bomb release line at to achieve the level of damage required on targets. Actually, the SIOP-62 had a scale averaging assurance.
The three services, CINCPEAC, CINCLANT, and DSTP were in agreement that more research was required on how to compute expected doses of radiation on friendly peoples from bomb bursts. The SIOP-62 had stayed within prescribed radiation levels by air bursting many weapons which otherwise would have been surface burst. Criticized, however, was the use of average seasonal winds instead of an annual average wind; the assumption that for computing constraints one weapon would be delivered at each desired ground zero (DGZ); and the consideration of only SIOP weapons when computing dosages.\footnote{No account was taken of fallout resulting from enemy nuclear explosions.} At the root of this problem was the divergency of opinion among scientists regarding criteria to use in establishing probable fallout intensities and the relative value of shielding materials. Clearly more research was needed in the development of constraints policy for SIOP-63.\footnote{DECLASSIFIED FEB 13 2007} Another recommendation, by the Navy, was that the target point value system used in SIOP-62 be made more receptive to the needs of all commands rather than just to SAC. Certain operational factors -- probability of success of weapon systems and base survivability factors -- were also recommended for reexamination during SIOP-63.\footnote{DECLASSIFIED FEB 13 2007} General Power, as DSTP, agreed with the need for some changes based on experience; he had earlier informed the JCS that planning factors used in preparing the first plan would be reviewed and modified as required when preparing the second.\footnote{DECLASSIFIED FEB 13 2007} He did, however, consider the SIOP-62 guidance sufficient for use in preparing the next plan.\footnote{DECLASSIFIED FEB 13 2007}
But fundamental changes in nuclear targeting policy were gestating within the Department of Defense in early 1961 which would eventually be reflected in the guidance for SIOP-63. The first detailed exposition of the administration's strategic thinking for general war went out from the JCS to the unified and specified commands for comment in May 1962. A message in two parts, it quoted a policy memo prepared for the Chairman of the JCS by Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and an attached draft of a proposed new basic national security policy prepared in the Secretary of Defense's office. The theme followed earlier administration statements calling for greater flexibility in U.S. nuclear strategy. The essence of this lengthy document was that U.S. plans and programs needed a wider range of alternatives or options to meet the various forms a thermonuclear war could take. The CINCs and the DSTD were asked for their opinions on what actions in the near and far term could be taken to widen the latitude of our response. Of particular interest to Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric were options to permit withholding of reserve forces from initial attack; to avoid attacks on urban-industrial, population, and government control centers; to avoid attacks on one or more Sino-Soviet Bloc nations; and to provide adjustments in force readiness.

The CINCs and DSTD commented at length to the JCS, who in turn replied to the Secretary of Defense. Their responses mirrored the attitudes of men who bore heavy responsibilities for direct command of
strategic forces and who were intimate with the vast complexities of operating these forces. They agreed that more work was needed to increase flexibility and options to nuclear war, indeed some steps had already been taken, but they also urged caution lest our strategic plans outstrip our capability to put them into practice. All agreed that force survival must be enhanced by improving weapon systems, but until sufficient invulnerability had been achieved by the deterrent forces to permit a second strike role, all potential enemy targets would have to be judged according to military necessity. The capability simply did not yet exist to permit avoidance of enemy non-military centers and population in an attack. Both the JCS and the DSTP, in their replies, cited the sizable list of options and provisions for flexibility already existing in the SIOP and command war plans:

1. Exemption of one or more specific countries or areas from initial attack. (\red)
2. Redirection of follow-on forces before the order to execute was given. (\red)
3. Recall of manned systems after initial launch. (\red)
4. Alternate launch positions and timing. (\red)
5. Selective launch of positive control force from U.S., forward bases, or both. (\red)
6. Missiles generally had dual targets. (\red)

The JCS assured the Secretary of Defense that better means for controlling nuclear forces were being "pursued vigorously" as better command...
and control procedures were developed. Every effort would be made to incorporate flexibility and selectivity into SIOP-63.\textsuperscript{13}

A period of reappraisal of existing procedures and preparation of JCS directed studies in depth on certain planning factors* began soon after acceptance of the first plan in December 1960 and continued into the spring and summer of 1961. The studies represented proposed improvements in methods to be used in developing the next plan, depending of course on guidance furnished by the JCS.\textsuperscript{14}

In forwarding his study on methodology in late June, General Power assured the Chiefs that additional "improvements and refinements" had been completed and others were being contemplated for SIOP-63.\textsuperscript{15} There was not unanimity within the JSTPS on this point, however. Both the CINCLANT and CINC PAC representatives believed that, in fact, improved methodology had not been developed, and that for all practical purposes the methods for 1963 remained those of 1962. The new plan would contain the defects of the old. They criticized the system used for SIOP-62 because it produced a plan which contemplated attacks on too large a target system, which was too destructive, which underestimated weapons effects, and which gave enemy forces a high probability of success.

* The staff was directed to study methodology for development of SIOP-63, damage criteria, assurance of delivery criteria, improvements in the target point value system, additional flexibility, and several other areas (See SM-390-61, Memo for DERT from JCS, "Actions . . . Directed Toward Improving the Next NSTL/SIOP," 1 Apr 61, B-78744).
while giving SIOP forces a low probability of success. Requirements for SIOP-62 were termed as having been "unrealistic" and "far in excess" of what was required.\[16\]

The CINCLANT's recommendations for change in 1963 methodology featured:\[17\]

1. Establishment of a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) of the minimum size required to meet the NSTAP.\[18\]

2. Economy of force application to this minimum strategic target system.\[19\]

3. More realistic assumptions of own and enemy capabilities.\[20\]

4. Emphasis on neutralization of enemy strengths instead of their complete destruction.\[21\]

5. Fuller consideration of all the effects of nuclear weapons and of overlapping effects of weapons programmed on adjacent DZs.\[22\]

6. Establishment of a reserve force to be ready for operations required immediately after the effects of the initial assault have been evaluated.\[23\]

Similarly, the CINCPAC representative criticized the methodology of SIOP-62 and protested its continued use in SIOP-63. To him, except in minor instances, procedures remained unchanged. The result would be a conservative plan which gave the enemy every advantage, while downgrading U.S. capabilities. If the philosophy of SIOP-62 continued, the next plan would be a capabilities plan which found use for all forces and weapons made available and committed them to [the largest]
General Power held a different opinion of the efficacy of SIOP-62 methodology. He had told the JCS in February 1961 that he considered existing guidance adequate for use in SIOP-63. This, as has been mentioned, was reiterated in the methodology study of 23 June. And in July he told the JCS that should new guidance not be forthcoming by 1 August, planning could proceed using the old directions. Thus, it was clear that the Director saw no need to overhaul the techniques used in producing SIOP-62, although many planning factors would have to be reviewed to determine their continued validity and to modify them based on experience and new information.

Although early in 1961 the JSTIFS was already at work examining its procedures and preparing for the next plan, attention could not be diverted entirely from the previous plan. The SIOP was dynamic in nature. Although when completed it represented the most accurate possible current listing of targets and weapon systems available to attack them, subsequent changes in forces, force posture, intelligence, and extension of the plan beyond the time when the next plan should have become effective required numerous alterations to annexes throughout the life of the plan.
Soon after SIOP-62 was accepted by the JCS, plans began to take shape in the JSTPS for analyzing it by a process of war gaming\* using a wide variety of conditions under which it might be implemented. On 5 December 1960 General Power ordered the war game of SIOP forces, assigning Major General C. W. Eisenhart, SIOP Division Chief, to direct the work. The broad objectives were to evaluate the effectiveness of SIOP-62, to form a basis for modifying future SIOPs, and to educate SIOP planners. A manual or hand game (pitting opposing decision teams against each other under the rule of a control group) and a computer or simulation game (using a mathematical model suited for random play) were to be played. Work within the SIOP Division continued into the spring and summer of 1961: differences of opinion on the numerous assumptions and ground rules to be used in the game were to be resolved by the Policy Committee. In instances where members could not agree, the DSTEP decided.\*

Abruptly in early August, however, with the war game process well along, the picture changed entirely. The JSTPS received from the Chief

\* War game is defined as an operational research technique employing a formalized representation of a military or politico-military operation, conducted according to preset rules of play, using plausible planning factors, for the purpose of determining a range of possible outcomes to the conflict under study. Such games are analytical, as distinguished from field, fleet, or command post exercises. This definition is from JCSM 1261-61, from JCS to DSTEP et al., "Policy on War Gaming of Joint Plans," 22 Nov 61.\*
of Naval Operations results of a war game the Navy had conducted ("Report of Simulation Investigation SIOP-62"). The impact of the study was not so much in its conclusions, although the DMTP believed them invalid because of the unrealistic assumptions used, but in its effect on other games. General Power complained there had been a possible compromise of the general war plan due to the participation in the CNO game of civilian organizations not normally privy to such sensitive information as strengths and weaknesses of U.S. forces, tactics, and penetration aids. He consequently stopped all JSTPS hand games and had the information destroyed. He also asked the JCS to request other commands to cease games involving SAC forces.

The Navy was confident that, in fact, no compromise had taken place, but the affair resulted in the JCS preparing detailed guidance on future policy. Henceforth, no civilian contractors would be permitted to participate in war games of current plans, but the Chiefs would not prohibit commanders from evaluating parts of plans in which they had direct interest. Results of the JCS study arrived in November as detailed guidance on future war gaming activities. Games would henceforth be divided into four categories:

- **Category A** -- Those of joint war plans upon which national security depended.
- **Category B** -- Those of crisis situations which might involve U.S. in limited war or eventually general war.
- **Category C** -- Those of global strategies (political, economic, psychological, scientific, military and...
paramilitary) that affected the power positions in the Free World confrontation with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

Category D -- Those other than the three above.  

The JCS specified that Category A games would be conducted by commanders of unified and specified commands and DSEP. The games would be used to check procedural plans and use of forces, to discover weaknesses in current or subsequent plans, and to assist the JCS in its review of the plan and its capability.  

The results of the completed computer evaluation of SIOP-62 were much more modest than early plans had called for. An analysis of the effects of various levels of damage (destruction before launch or DBL) on SIOP forces was completed late in 1961 and results published in two technical memorandums. Two postures, one-third and one-half alert, were considered. General conclusions indicated destruction by enemy action was the most important factor of all those contributing to vehicle degradation before launch. An increase in forces on alert increased the number of weapons ultimately delivered. It was concluded that DBL factors should be used to achieve more accurate statistics on expected weapon deliveries for a strategic situation in which the force is exposed to attack before launch, although caution was urged in attempting to apply the specific DBL factors for use in future games. Because factors were based on broad assumptions developed in varying degrees, future analysis of DBL should, according to the study, cover a wide range of possible situations.

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It appeared at the time research was completed on this study that analysis of SIOP-63 would be more complete and detailed than that of SIOP-62. In April 1962 JCS directed DSIP to conduct a comprehensive war game of the 63 plan. The JSTPS reported it would. Further attention will be given to this game and its results in the next history of the staff covering preparation of SIOP-64. (16)

**SIOP-63 Guidance**

All members of the Target Staff agreed that they did not want conditions caused by the short period of time available for producing SIOP-62 to be repeated during preparation of the next plan. More time was needed for study and interpretation of guidance. As early as December 1960 the staff had decided that guidance must reach them by 1 August for SIOP-63 to be completed by 1 July 1962. With the 1 August date, force application could begin 15 September, the plan could be submitted for review and approval on 1 February, JCS would transmit the plan to unified and specified commanders and they would begin preparing supporting plans 1 April, and SIOP-63 would become effective 1 July. Later, however, with the 1 August date approaching and having received no guidance, General Power wanted to continue with the old instructions, but the JCS said it was preparing the new guidance and wanted to get it out by that date, although it might be one or two weeks late. This proved to be a highly optimistic estimate -- guidance did not arrive until 30 October. (41)
It was apparent immediately to planners as they studied the new guidance that it was much more detailed than the directions for SIOP-62. This time the JCS specified a capabilities plan, i.e., it would use forces in being at the time the plan was effective, not those programmed for a future date. When implemented, the SIOP-63 was to achieve the following objectives: \(^{(42)}\)

1. To destroy or neutralize the military capabilities of the enemy, while retaining ready, effective and controlled U.S. strategic capabilities adequate to assure, to the maximum extent possible, retention of U.S. military superiority to the enemy, or any potential enemies, at any point during or after the war. \(^{(43)}\)

2. To minimize damage to the U.S. and its Allies, and in all events to limit such damage to a level consistent with national survival and independence. \(^{(44)}\)

3. To bring the war to an end on the most advantageous terms for U.S. and its Allies. \(^{(45)}\)

The attainment of more flexibility in strategic operations was manifested in three tasks to be accomplished by a choice of five attack options. Task I would accomplish the destruction or neutralization of Sino-Soviet nuclear delivery forces. National level military controls were specifically excluded. Every effort would be made in this task to minimize damage to people and industry. It included the capability to withhold attacks on China and any or all communist satellites. Previous SIOP-62 guidance had made no mention of withholds, although the plan did eventually provide for them to a degree. These withhold provisions remained valid under all tasks. In Task II other
Sino-Soviet bloc military forces and resources came under attack, e.g., tactical air bases, military controls, transportation, etc. These targets were outside major urban areas, and care would continue to be taken to minimize the effect on people and industry. Task III executed deliberate attacks on military forces and resources in urban areas, and selected critical elements of industry, technology, and government controls which would most effectively reduce Sino-Soviet capability to continue the war.43

The above three tasks would be accomplished by a choice of one to five attack options,* depending upon what conditions prevailed when hostilities began.**44

I Execute Task I under conditions of U.S. pre-emption, but keeping back for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Tasks II and III. (3)

II Execute Tasks I and II under same U.S. pre-emption condition, but withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Task III.

OSD 3.3(b)(5)

* The term option, as it was used in SIOP-63, had an entirely different meaning in SIOP-62. In the previous plan it was a factor of time, based on the amount of warning available. (Hist of JEPS, Preparation of SIOP-62, p 25, R-82767)

** Although provisions were to be made for withholding attacks against China or any satellite under any attack option, it was made clear in the guidance that should any conflicts in force programming occur, they should be resolved by emphasizing option V. (TS)
III Execute Task I under tactical warning but holding back for subsequent use forces programmed for Tasks II and III.*

IV Execute Tasks I and II under tactical warning but holding forces for Task III.

V Execute all three tasks under tactical warning.

The guidance stated that "Available forces will be used to maximize the achievement of the objectives of the plan." The JCS set neither a maximum nor a minimum on damage to be inflicted; if forces available for the strategic mission could not achieve the prescribed level of damage, it could be lowered. Conversely, if capabilities permitted, higher expectancies of damage against certain targets could be achieved. The guidance prescribed 90 per cent expectation of severe damage to aboveground facilities and aircraft on heavy and medium bomber bases, primary staging bases, and dispersal bases; on known missile sites and missile launching submarine bases; on primary nuclear and chemical storage production facilities; and on local control facilities for nuclear delivery forces known to exist and be active and which were outside major urban areas.\(^5\)

The allocation of forces for the above work would be done so as to permit the assignment of sufficient forces to Task III to inflict

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* It was acknowledged that the chances for using this option were remote, so forces were to be programmed for it as a last priority. General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS, was reported as very critical of this option and doubted it would ever be executed. (Memo for DSTRP, from Brig Gen W. R. Peers, JCSIG, "Questions and Comments by JCS During JCSIG Fourth Status Briefing on SIOP-63," 6 Jun 62.)
"significant damage" to 70 per cent of the floor space in the 100 largest cities in the Soviet Union and Communist China. Floor space was introduced only to define the size of the force to be allocated to Task III, not to define the targeting objectives.\(^4\)\(^6\) \(\text{[redacted]}\)

Although SAC and Polaris submarine forces would be committed to the SIOP as first priority, theater commanders (unified and specified commanders) had the prerogative of deciding what other forces to commit to the plan.* They would be used in the SIOP to increase the damage level or confidence of destruction on Task I and II targets (including suppression of defenses), to destroy low priority targets or targets significant to theater commanders, and to strike nuclear delivery forces as soon as possible after E hour.\(^4\)\(^7\) (\(\text{[redacted]}\))

Preparing the Plan

It was clear to JSTPS planners that to satisfy the requirements of the JCS guidance would mean preparing a more complex plan with greater flexibility and discrimination than was necessary in 1962.\(^4\)\(^8\) Early estimates reckoned that it would take twice as long to prepare as its predecessor.\(^4\)\(^9\) The schedule of preparation was revised. Now force application would begin 15 January 1962 and be completed 2 April. The JCS would be briefed on the plan 15 April, with the remaining time until 1 July, when the plan went into effect, taken up with preparation.

\* In SIOP-62, commitment to the SIOP was first priority for appropriate CINC forces. (\(\text{[redacted]}\))

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and distribution of the plan and its annexes. However, by early January it was realized that 1 July was too optimistic and the effective date was changed to 1 August.\textsuperscript{50}\footnote{\textsuperscript{50}}

The two months following receipt of JCS instructions were occupied with determining the exact meaning of the general statements in the guidance, and based on this interpretation, hammering out within the Policy Committee, and in conferences with planners from the commands concerned, agreements on policies for developing the 1963 plan.\textsuperscript{51}\footnote{\textsuperscript{51}}

With agreements reached and differences resolved, work could begin in earnest on the plan itself. The SIOP-63, like its predecessor, had two basic elements: targets and forces to attack them. The following discussion will trace the steps in preparing the SIOP. It seems appropriate to begin with the target list.*\footnote{\textsuperscript{*}}

In preparing the SIOP, the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) would be the final product of the target selection process; all targets on this list would come under attack in the plan as a function of target priority and force/weapon availability. But first a process of refinement had to be completed. The basic source for selection of targets was the Target Data Inventory (TDI), prepared

\textsuperscript{50} From this procedure it should not be concluded that the list was prepared before any work on force application began. Work on many aspects of these two principal portions of the plan went on simultaneously.\footnote{\textsuperscript{50}}
by the USAF in collaboration with the Army and Navy. Of the [REDACTED] however, less than [REDACTED] were of strategic significance. Next, from these basic materials a target data base (NSTL) was prepared by NSTL Division. Maintained on computer tapes, it was a file of information on targets which had strategic significance and met the criteria set down in the National Target and Attack Policy (JCSM 1162-61, 27 October 1961).

Installations in the Data Base were then submitted to a process of weighing to get their relative worth or value within the three tasks prescribed in the guidance. After using a computer to group contiguous installations into target islands, the installations list was converted into a Desired Ground Zero (DGZ) list, again using computers to locate the minimum number of DGZs required to meet the damage criteria and to identify individual aiming points. From this investigation a group of DGZs emerged. A weapon was tentatively applied to each DGZ and an analysis made of its effects. Of course, many factors had to be considered in this process: restraints, i.e., minimizing damage to cities under certain conditions; constraints, limiting radiation dosage within satellite and friendly nations; vulnerability of the target and size of the target area; and the type of weapons available.\textsuperscript{52} (2)

Each DGZ was assigned to a task (I, II, or III). In January 1962 the total number of DGZs against which forces were to be applied numbered [REDACTED].
Thus, at this point in the preparation of SIOP-63 the target had been identified and a tentative weapon applied. Now the second major phase of SIOP planning began: force application. While NSTL Division had been preparing the DGZ list, planners of SIOP Division had been analyzing the forces committed to the SIOP by unified and specified commands. This evaluation of forces, which must be completed before applying them to targets, was itself an intricate process requiring many decisions by the Policy Committee on what planning factors to use.*

To the force application process the NSTL Division provided DGZ priority lists, by task, preplanned damage expectancy for each DGZ, air target charts, and probable constraint areas. The SIOP Division planners, as mentioned above, supplied data on the capabilities of forces committed to the plan. To facilitate force application, or coordinated with SIOP-63 consisted of the following:**

* These included weapon system reliability, accuracy, weapon reliability, sortie separation criteria, pre-launch survivability, penetration probabilities, and weather/darkness factors. See Appendix I for resolution of conflicts.

Following is a summary of delivery vehicles and weapons committed to the plan.* The August figure shows capability when the plan went into effect, and the December 1962 figure shows expected growth. Commitment figures are broken out by type of delivery system and weapons by command. 56 (56)

### Delivery Vehicle Summary

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<th>August 1962</th>
<th>December 1962</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Alert</td>
<td>Non-Alert</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ballistic Missiles</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cruise Missiles</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>992</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>1033</td>
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### Weapons Delivered by Committed Forces

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<th>August 1962</th>
<th>December 1962</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alert</td>
<td>Non-Alert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Weapons</td>
<td>1661</td>
<td>1217</td>
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<tr>
<td>Semi-Nuclear</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>106</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>155</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>1523</td>
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</table>
Force application began 10 January 1962 with SAC and Polaris missile targeting, followed by the other immediate reaction forces, SAC overseas and ZI alert, and then non-alert missile and other ZI forces. This was the so-called Phase One portion of force application. Phase Two consisted of theater forces applied: (1) to increase damage or confidence of destroying the target; (2) to destroy targets of relatively low priority or those significant to theater commanders; and (3) to enable strikes at enemy nuclear delivery forces soon after conflict began. 57

An example of the targeting process of a single sortie will perhaps give the reader an appreciation for the complexity and magnitude of SIOF force application. A sortie was first chosen and a DZ was selected from the DZ Priority List. Enemy defenses were then analyzed and a preliminary route established. A sortie was tentatively committed when it could meet the requirements of the route, including penetration and delivery tactics. Then degrading factors were applied. If the result was a low probability of the sortie reaching the target, the flight was re-examined to see if any improvements could be made. If the sortie still failed, another one was selected for the DZ, and another DZ was selected for the failed sortie, if possible. 58

During the force application sequence damage expectancy from weapons on each DZ was continually assessed. Also, care was taken to adhere to the policy on constraints as set down in JCS guidance; thus it was sometimes
Constraints, as we shall see later, proved an especially difficult problem in SIOP-63.\textsuperscript{59} (59)

Force application was essentially completed 19 April, although changes to the initial force application continued until late in May because new high priority installations were subsequently added to the target lists. By this time information on each sortie had been placed on machine processed cards (called X and Y cards)* and sent to commands committing forces to the plan. Using these cards, the commands prepared detailed flight plans from takeoff to return to post-strike base. Returned to the JSTPS in late May, the data was checked and then programmed into a computer to resolve time over target (TOT) conflicts. Strike timing sheets for each sortie were then prepared. These sheets were eventually distributed as Annex F to the SIOP-63.\textsuperscript{60} (60)

While force application drew to a close, steps were also being taken to present the finished plan to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense for approval. Throughout the preparation of SIOP-63 the JCS and other interested agencies had been kept informed of progress by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison Group (JCSLG) to the JSTPS. The

\* The X cards contained data on command and execution, vehicle, refueling, routing, weapon type, delivery tactics, and targeting information. The Y cards included routing information, e.g., corridor and time of arrival, entry point, early warning line tactics, major turning points, and post strike base.
liaison group, headed by Brigadier General W. R. Peers (USA),* thus freed JSTPS planners from briefing responsibilities which they had found burdensome during preparation of SIOP-62.61 These status briefings were augmented from time to time by data submitted on tape, and then just before final review of the completed plan, advance copies of SIOP-63 were sent to the JCS for review. By early June the chief of the JCS-LG was confident that the JCS was familiar with the plan and would be "highly receptive" to JSTPS presentations.62 Earlier, he had told the JCS: "To my mind, the JSTPS has made a great effort to insure that they have followed the Guidance [SW-1162-61], and it is the considered opinion of the Liaison Group that SIOP-63 achieves the objectives of the Guidance and is in conformance with..."63

One aspect of JCS guidance which created a problem for planners, however, and one which they were not able to conform to in all cases, was constraints or limiting fallout on friendly, neutral, and satellite areas on the periphery of the Soviet Union and Communist China. There had been an agreement that constraints policy used in SIOP-62, based on the detonation of the single largest weapon on each ICBM, needed revision.64 Guidance for SIOP-63 stipulated constraints would be determined incrementally,65 thus a problem of accumulative fallout

* Brigadier General Peers, formerly Chief of Staff for Army Intelligence, succeeded Brigadier General B. E. Spivy as Chief, JCS-LG, on 5 January 1962. (IASS 313, 22 Dec 61; see also his biography in documents volume.)
was created in some areas. Planners made many changes.

Also, a very real quantity, which was not even taken into account, was detonation of enemy weapons 69 (NS) OSD 3.3(b)(5)

Following the presentation of SIOP-63 the JCS asked that DSTP con-
tinue to try to meet prescribed constraints by seeking alternative pro-
gramming of weapons.

In the meantime, the Joint Staff would examine existing constraints criteria. 70 (NS)

The Joint Chiefs completed two days of briefings at Offutt AFB on 19 June by approving SIOP-63 to become effective 1 August. The plan was also presented in part to Secretary of Defense McNamara on 20
June. The Secretary later praised General Power and his staff for their work.

The completed SIOP-63 was a much more flexible plan than its predecessor, but it was also more complicated in preparation and promised to be more complex in execution. The plan possessed these elements of flexibility:

(1) The capability existed to execute the plan by tasks (I, II, or III) within the five attack options.

(2) Attacks could be withheld by country.

(3) Some limited capability existed for a protected reserve. Under U.S. preemptive conditions, and depending upon the success of attacks on enemy nuclear capability, some alert sorties scheduled for urban-industrial targets would be withheld and in that sense became a protected reserve, as would some early generated non-alert sorties.

(4)  

(5)  

(6)  

(7)  

(8)
The extra time and effort required to complete multiple targeting actions, and thus satisfy the requirement for five attack options, placed a heavy workload on the staff. An aircraft sortie, for example, would be assigned different targets under different attack options. Multiply this one aircraft by the hundreds of sorties which had to be targeted* and the extent of the labor required can be imagined. The plan was prepared in about eight months from receipt of guidance to the briefing of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense on the completed plan. Had more time been available, the process probably would have followed a more orderly and less hectic pace. But since it was not, and since no additional increase in personnel was authorized, that time-honored military expedient of expanding the working day became a necessary and routine procedure. (*}

Summary

The STOP-63 was accepted without revision by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense; thus they affirmed that it fulfilled their wishes as set down in the guidance. The flexibility and provisions for controlled response to general war provided for in the plan represented the Kennedy Administration's most significant contribution to nuclear

* 1712 aircraft were committed to the plan in August 1962, see p 21.
strategy to date. As mentioned earlier, SIOP-62 had certain, if limited, features of flexibility, but essentially the plan was tailored for reaction of the complete force and in retaliation.74 The new plan offered more choice of response. The Secretary of Defense reasoned that our more selective retaliation would give the Soviet Union incentive to discriminate between cities and military forces in their first strike. No one, of course, knew whether or not the Soviets would accept this reasoning and fashion their plans accordingly, but the Secretary believed it was in their interest to do so.75

The SIOP-63 was a plan which offered different courses of action. It was, however, like every military plan ever devised, only as good as the capability of U.S. forces to carry it out. In 1962 this capability in terms of flexible response was still limited. The centralized control so necessary to selective response under nuclear war conditions would, in all probability, be seriously degraded if not completely destroyed because existing communications were vulnerable.76

The former deputy director of the JSTPS, Vice Admiral E. N. Parker,* doubted that they could be relied upon under conditions of nuclear attack, and preferred to put his trust in the operational commander to

* Admiral Parker was succeeded by Vice Admiral Roy Lee Johnson on 10 January 1962. Before his assignment to the JSTPS, Admiral Johnson was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policies (SUPERS Orders 113657, 27 Dec 61; See also biography in document volume). Admiral Parker, upon his transfer, became Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 77

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do his best with what he had. 76 His successor to the deputy directorship acknowledged existing communications to be a weakness, but he emphasized the extensive efforts by the services to correct deficiencies by hardening and redundancy. 77 Clearly, much remained to be done in making the force and its command and control communications more effective under the various conditions in which conflict could be initiated. Progress here would give operational commanders increased confidence in plans for centralized control and flexible application of nuclear strike forces in general war. (TS)
Brought together at Headquarters SAC late in the summer of 1960 under the direction of General Thomas S. Power, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff was an inter-service group of intelligence and operations planning specialists. From its inception, care was taken to keep the staff small, with a nucleus of permanently assigned officers and enlisted men supported by SAC personnel serving in a dual capacity.\(^78\)\(^\text{[b]}\)

Although the staff increased somewhat during the hurried preparation of the first plan (from 269 in September 1960 to 302 in January 1961), when the plan was completed General Power acted to cut the staff to 186, thus tailoring it to the continuing work of keeping the SIOP and NSPL up to date.\(^79\) The JCS agreed with this organizational strength on 14 June 1961.\(^80\)\(^\text{[b]}\)

During the preparation of SIOP-63 there was no change in the staff's Joint Table of Distribution; it remained 186 officers and enlisted men positions with 16 of 34 key positions (all in NSPL Division) identified as no service specified, i.e., they were to be filled by the best qualified officer available regardless of service affiliation.\(^81\) Of the 186 total, 129 were Air Force (including SAC) and 57 were from the other services (Army, Navy, and Marine Corps).\(^82\) Chances that the staff would increase in the future were slim. As pointed out by the
Deputy Director, the successful preparation of the plan tended to work against consideration of increased strength, since any addition would have to be related to a deficiency in the plan.\textsuperscript{82} (\textsuperscript{6})
Appendix II

RESOLUTION OF DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN JSTPS
CONCERNING PLANNING FACTORS

I  Missile Warhead Dud Factors

At the 39th Policy Committee Meeting, 25 August 1961, the Weapon Systems Reliability Committee (a working committee having JSTPS and CINCRep representation) presented a committee position that a missile warhead dud factor...be used in planning...

The CINCSAC representative disagreed, desiring for all missile warheads. At the 40th Policy Committee meeting the DTP decided in favor of the committee resolution, i.e.,...

II  Bomb Reliability

Also presented at the 39th Policy Committee meeting by the Weapon Systems Reliability Committee, this issue involved bomb dud factors. The committee recommended...dud factor. The Policy Committee all agreed with the exception of the CINCSAC, CINCAL, and Air Force representatives who voted for... At the 41st Policy Committee meeting the CINCSAC agreed to the use of the...factor. He reasoned that certain physical and mental actions required by the crew might cause certain errors in procedure. This...factor was the same used in STOP-62.
III Aircraft Bombing Circular Error Probable (CEP)

The Weapon Systems Reliability Committee also presented at the 38th Policy Committee meeting the unresolved issue of what CEP factor to use for certain all-weather aircraft. Positions of the committee members ranged from the CINCSAC representative believed was the minimum which could realistically be applied for aircraft using radar for target identification. The DSEP, in the 41st Policy Committee meeting of 2 November, decided the CEPs proposed by the using commands would be used. (JT-NORWIN)

IV Unknown Defenses Factor

The Penetration Tactics Committee (composed of representatives from JSTPS and the CINCs) could not present a unanimous opinion on what factors to use in planning for destruction of weapon systems by unknown defenses. In SIOP-62 a factor of miles when penetrating an area of unknown defenses was used. The CINCSAC representative advocated its continued use. The CINCLANT and CINCPAC representatives did not believe it should be used at all. A vote during the 39th Policy Committee meeting showed all but CINCSAC and Air Force representatives in agreement not to use it. During the meeting of 2 November the DSEP decided on attrition rate of miles or any portion thereof would be applied when penetrating an area of unknown defenses. A maximum would be applied for any given sortie. (JT-NORWIN)
Also presented in the 38th Policy Committee meeting by the Penetrations Tactics Committee as unresolved within the Committee was whether or not to use a factor called clobber factor. The CINCSAC representative wished to use the SIOP-62 method of 1 per cent attrition per individual sortie for ________ miles of ________ flying. All others believed it should not be used at all. The DSTP, in the 41st Policy Committee meeting, decided that because of the difficulty of determining an accurate factor, it would not be used.

VI Application of Destruction Before Launch (DBL) Factor

In the 45th Policy Committee meeting of 9 December the Deputy Director of Strategic Target Planning, Admiral Parker, presented to General Power the disagreement within the committee regarding the application of destruction before launch factors. Three proposals had been considered:

Proposal 1 That no application of pre-launch survivability factors be used. (CINCSAC and CINCAL representatives)

Proposal 2 That all factors be used including pre-launch survivability. (Army and Air Force representatives)

Proposal 3 That for SIOP-63 forces should be applied in the best manner possible taking into consideration their various capabilities. Any known constants should be applied at this time (reliability, dud factors, etc.). In the assessment phase the effects of varying factors such as weather/darkness, attrition, DBL, etc., should be
integrated in a computer to determine their effects more accurately. (CINCLANT, CINCPAC, Marine Corps, and Navy representatives)

After considerable discussion, in which the wisdom of applying DEL factors derived from an old National Intelligence Estimate was questioned, General Power, noting that he understood that the JCS wanted him to use the DEL factor in the SIOP-63, decided that JSTPS would use all factors supplied, and would review them in light of the new NIE, and modify them accordingly. (TS NOFORN)

VII Use of the Weather/Darkness Factor

Another issue on which it had not been possible to achieve agreement was whether or not SIOP planners should use a weather/darkness factor in the calculation of success of delivery at the bomb release line. [It had been the subject of a formal dissent by CINCLANT at the presentation to the SecDef of SIOP-62, and it remained a source of disagreement during consideration of procedures for use in SIOP-63 planning. Neither the CINCLANT nor CINCPAC representative believed the factor used in SIOP-62 was valid and argued that it should not be used in the next plan. Essentially, the procedure had been to take a mathematical average between the probable assurance of delivery of a visual sortie when conditions were favorable (i.e., daylight and good weather at target) and the probable assurance of delivery when conditions were prohibitive (i.e., at night and with bad weather at the target). CINCLANT's position, supported by CINCPAC, was clearly and amply stated in the policy committee meetings of late summer and early fall, and in several]
memos for the Deputy Director. This disagreement was presented to
the Director in the Policy Committee meeting of 28 August. He recog-
nized the problem as a very difficult one involving judgment factors
that could not be proved one way or the other. He felt that a com-
pletely acceptable factor was impossible because of the many variables
involved, but he also criticized the CINCLANT's position as trying to
improve the "bookkeeping" by eliminating it. He believed it better to
err on the side of being pessimistic about our capability and to plan
accordingly. General Power deferred his decision until JCS guidance
was received in October. It definitely stipulated that this factor
would be used. As to the question of how it would be used, General
Power, in the Policy Committee meeting of 9 December, decided in favor
of using the factor as applied in SIOP-62. (23 WOLFRUM)

VIII Definition of Alert Force

The Policy Committee, in its meeting of 8 December, split on the
definition of alert forces. One proposal, advocated by CINCLANT, CINC-
PAC, CINCEUR, Marine Corps, Navy, and Army representatives, defined it

...The CINOSAC, CINCAL, and Air Force

representatives in their proposal defined alert forces as

"General Power doubted..."
whether a definition was really needed since it had been the staff's policy to accept the number of aircraft on alert from the CINCs without question, but since the committee felt one was needed, in the Policy Committee meeting of 9 December he decided in favor of the first proposal above. (possibly)

IX CINCPAC's Nonconcurrence with DEL Factors and Force Application Sequence

On 3 January 1962 a message from CINCPAC to DSTP listed his objections to the use of DEL factors in force application and the proposed sequence of force application. The CINCPAC said that although JCS guidance (JM 1162-61) said all appropriate operational factors should be taken into consideration, it did not specify methodology or in what phase of planning it should be applied. He wished it to be used to the intended procedure of preferring the sequence followed in SIOP-62, i.e.,

The DSTP replied that the use of pre-launch survivability factors had been thoroughly investigated by the JSTP3 and all had agreed that it was the intent of the JCS that the DEL factor be used. In early January the JCS had been briefed on methodology, including use of this factor and CINCPAC's dissent, but there had been no direction to change
procedures. The DEDP also believed JCS guidance.

He added, however, that CINCPAC forces would be given
### EXPLANATION OF TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alert Force</td>
<td>That portion of a unified and specified commanders committed or coordinated force which in his judgment will be able to launch under conditions of tactical warning. (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Alert Force</td>
<td>That portion of the SIOP force other than the alert force. (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Force</td>
<td>That portion of the committed force not scheduled for the initial launch under any attack option. (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Reserve</td>
<td>Forces not available for assignment to specified alert or non-alert missions, e.g., aircraft in depots or modification, which can be prepared in a relatively short time, plus any missiles not on launchers at time of execution, and possible Polaris submarines and aircraft carriers either in U.S. ports or a significant distance from launch areas. (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Warning</td>
<td>Time to permit positioning and preparation of all forces to accomplish war sorties. (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Warning</td>
<td>The reaction time available under conditions of surprise attack for launch of forces. (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon System</td>
<td>A missile or aircraft (or combination of both) with weapon(s) and all related equipment, including supporting facilities which contribute directly to the readying, launching, and delivery of a weapon to the target. (U)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch Reliability</td>
<td>The probability of a delivery vehicle launching as planned, excluding effects of enemy offensive action. (c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflight Reliability</td>
<td>The probability of a launched delivery vehicle reaching the Bomb Release Line (BRL) or target area, excluding effects of enemy defensive action. (c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon Reliability</td>
<td>The probability of a delivered weapon detonating; includes release, arming, fuzing, duds, and human error. (c)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Alert Readiness Reliability

The probability of a weapon system committed to the SIOP alert reacting to an execution order (applies to missiles only).

Weapon System Reliability

The probability of a delivery vehicle delivering a weapon which detonates as planned, excluding effects of enemy action. (U)

1. Weapon system reliability is the product of alert readiness reliability times launch reliability times inflight reliability times weapon reliability (applies to missiles only). (U)

2. Alert weapon system reliability is the product of alert readiness reliability times launch reliability times inflight reliability times weapon reliability (applies to missiles only). (U)

Aircraft Reliability

The probability of an aircraft delivering a weapon to the ERL, excluding effects of enemy action. It is the product of launch reliability and inflight reliability which includes refueling reliability when applicable. (U)
Damage Expectancy
Probability of achieving a given degree of damage, considering all operational factors (including pre-launch survivability) and weapons effects. It is the average of damage that would be achieved if the attack were run many times.

Force Generation Levels
Sub-plans of each attack option which deal with timing problems inherent in changing numbers of generated and launchable delivery vehicles. Force generation levels provide the JCS with the capability of launching the optimum strike force consistent with the preparation time.

Generation Rate

Positive Control Launch

Pre-emption

Pre-Launch Survivability
The probability that a delivery vehicle will survive an enemy attack under an established condition of warning.

Tanks
Specific undertakings to achieve JCS designated objectives.
FOOTNOTES


2. SecDef's speech to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, 5 May 62, in JCS Memo 2305/859, 11 May 62, B-83265.

3. Annex to Appendix to JCS 2056/20A, 27 Jan 61, "Extract from Memo for President from Special Assistant to President for Science and Technology," 25 Nov 60, B-78559. Commenting at length on the Kistiakowsky report, the DSIP felt its conclusions reflected "... a lack of complete familiarization with procedures employed by JSTPS." The CINCLANT representative to the JSTPS was in essential agreement with the report. (Memo for the JCS, from Gen T. S. Power, DSIP, "Methodology Study," 23 Jun 61, with 1 Atech, B-79481.)


5. Encl A to JCS 2056/258, 13 Mar 61. See also Encl K, "Background of Planning Factors in SIOP," to J-3 Ops 603/1, 8 Mar 61, "Report... on Areas to be Investigated...," B-78558.


7. Encl B to Report by the J-3 to the JCS, "Comments and Recommendations as to Areas to be Investigated for Possible Change in Developing the Next NSTL/SIOP," 8 Mar 61. These comments and recommendations were solicited by JCS 2056/194. Army comments (Encl to JCS 2056/20A), Navy Comments (Enc to JCS 2056/197 and to JCS 2056/221), AF Comments (Enc to JCS 1716/37), Marine Corps comments (Enc to JCS 2056/220), CINCLANT comments see JCS 2056/210, CINCLANT comments (Enc to JCS 2056/206), CINCPAC comments see JCS 2056/211, CINCEM comments see JCS 2056/209, CINCSAC comments see JCS 2056/214, DSIP comments (Enc to JCS 2056/207), B-78558.


10. Msg, JCS 995685, from JCS (Dir of Joint Staff) to Gen Power et al., 9 May 61, B-79155, Ex 2. Originally sent as Note by Secretaries (5 May 61) to JCS on "Policy Guidance on Plans for Central War," referred to J-5 for comment and recommendations as matter of priority, JCS 2101/427, 8 May 61, B-79162.

11. Msg, DSTP B-79315, from DSTP to JCS, n.s., 31 Jun 61, Ex 3; Msg, C B-79347, SAC to JCS, n.s., 5 Jun 61, Ex 4; Msg, CINC PAC to JCS, 2 Jun 61, B-79324; Msg, CINC LANT to JCS, 5 Jun 61, B-79359; JCSM 406-61, 15 Jun 61, B-79491, forwarded with Appendices A-G.

12. JCSM 406-61, 15 Jun 61, B-79491, forwarded with Appendices A-G; Msg, DSTP B-79315, from DSTP to JCS, n.s., 31 Jun 61, Ex 3.

13. JCSM 406-61, 15 Jun 61, B-79491, forwarded with Appendices A-G.

14. The following documents reflecting DSTP's position are enclosed as exhibits: Memo for the JCS, from Gen T. S. Power, DSTP, "Methodology Study," w/1 Atch, 23 Jun 61, B-79481, Ex 5; Staff Study, "Damage Criteria," prepared by NSIL Div, 3 Jun 61, B-79366, and Staff Study, "Assurance Criteria," 3 Jun 61, B-79365, both in Memo for JCS, from Gen T. S. Power, DSTP, "JSTPS Studies, 13 Jun 61, B-79367, Ex 6; Ltr, Gen T. S. Power, DSTP, to JCS, "Improvements of NSIL/STOP," w/1 Atch, 3 May 61, B-79107; Msg, DSTP to JCS, "Expansion of Selected Response to General War," 23 Aug 61, B-79966, Ex 7. These studies were directed by SM-390-61, Memo for DSTP from JCS, "Actions to be Taken . . . Toward Improving the Next NSIL/STOP," 21 Apr 61.

15. Memo for JCS, from Gen T. S. Power, DSTP, "Methodology Study," 23 Jun 61, w/1 Atch, B-79481, Ex 5.


17. Appendix II, "Comments by CINC LANT Representative on Methodology Study," to above Memo.

18. Appendix III, "Comments by CINC PAC Representative on Methodology Study," to above Memo.

19. Msg, DSTP 1168, DSTP to JCS, 14 Feb 61.

20. See above memo for JCS of 23 Jun 61.


24. Briefing, "Status of War Game for SIOP-62," presented by Col E. A. McDonald, SIOP Div and Chief of War Game, 5 Jan 61; Minutes of the 23rd Policy Committee Meeting, 13 Mar 61, 25 Mar 61; Minutes of the 24th Policy Committee Meeting, 20 Mar 61, 31 Mar 61; Minutes of the 25th Policy Committee Meeting, 24 Mar 61, and 27 Mar 61, 5 Apr 61; Minutes of the 26th Policy Committee Meeting, 7 Apr 61, 18 Apr 61; Memo for DDSTP, from Gen T. S. Power, DSTP, "Decision on Policy Committee Disagreement Regarding War Game Red Team Assumptions with Respect to Play of Red versus Polaris Submarines," 7 Apr 61; Minutes of 35th Policy Committee Meeting, 6 Jul 61, 7 Jul 61.


27. Msg, B-79987, DSTP to JCS, "Hand War Games," 12 Aug 61. When in Nov the newly formed Joint War Games Control Group (JWCG) sought material relating to the SIOP-62 war game, for use in an evaluation of post-attack capabilities of the U.S. and the Shino-Soviet Bloc, it was told that all material relating to "Red" (Soviet) and "Blue" (U.S.) SIOPs had been destroyed. (Memo for Chief, JCSLG, from Brig Gen W. R. Calhoun, Dir JWCG, "JWCG Post-Attack Capabilities Study," 6 Nov 61, B-80975; IOM, DSTP to Ch, JCSLG, "JWCG Post-Attack Capabilities Study," 23 Nov 61.)


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29. Msg, JCS 1118, from Gen LeMnitzer (Chairman JCS) to Gen Power, 12 Aug 61, B-79894; Msg, JCS 1317, JCS to CINCSAC, 30 Aug 61, B-80033.

30. Msg, JCS 1318, JCS to CINCSAC, 30 Aug 61, B-80032.

31. Msg, JCS 1317, JCS to CINCSAC, 30 Aug 61, B-80033.


33. Ibid.


37. Briefing, Capt R. F. Fuller, USN, "Considerations Relative to the Planned MSTL Maintenance Procedures," Atch 3 to Minutes of Policy Committee Meeting 22, 6 Mar 61.

38. Proc K to J-3 Ops 603/1, 8 Mar 61, "Report by J-3 to JCS on Areas to be Investigated . . . ," B-78558.


43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

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49. Briefing, "SIOP-63 Status Report," to JCS by JCSLG, 5 Jan 62. This estimate proved correct: 4 months for SIOP-62, 8 months for SIOP-63.

50. Msg, Dstsp 3372, Jstsp to Jcs, "JCS SIOP Development Schedule," 3 Nov 61; Memo for Dstsp, from Capt S. E. French, Dep Ch, SIOP Div, "... Status Report... 5 Jan 62," 8 Jan 62.

51. Msg, 61-60, JcsLG to JCS, "61st Weekly Activity Report," 3 Nov 61; Memo, Ddstp to Dstsp, "... Progress Report... 10 Nov 61," 15 Nov 61; Memo for Ch, NSTL and SIOP Divs, from Vice Admiral E. N. Parker, Ddstp, "Preparation for the Development of SIOP-63," 17 Nov 61; Final Report, "Conference on Procedures for Developing SIOP-63, Offutt AFB, 11-15 Dec 61," prep by Col J. M. Philpott, Ch, NSTL Div, B-82077; See also Appendix II of this history for a discussion of General Power's resolution of disagreements arising in the Policy Committee. A resume of differences was sent to the JCS on 9 Jun 62, see Ex 8.


56. Ibid.


59. Ibid., pp 101-102.

60. Ibid., pp 108, 109, 110, 111; Briefing, "Third Status Briefing," JCSLG to JCS, 2 May 62; Memo for Dstsp, from Ddstp, "... Progress Report... 25 May 62," 31 May 62.


63. Briefing, JCSLG (Brig Gen Peers), to JCS, "Third Status Briefing," 2 May 62.

64. See p 4.


68. Briefing, JCSLG to JCS, "Fourth Status Briefing," 31 May 62.

69. Briefing, "Fallout Constraints," Col C. E. Becker, Ch, Tactics Br, JSTP Div, to JCS, 19 Jun 62, B-83661, Ex 12. An analysis of casualties and fatalities, resulting from implementation of SIOP-63 (blast, thermal, initial nuclear radiation, and fallout effects) is contained as Ex 14.

70. Msg, JCS 5083, to CofS USA et al., 21 Jun 62, B-83629.


72. Memo for Chairman, JCS, from SecDef R. S. McNamara, "SIOP-63," 13 Jul 62, JCS 2056/335, B-83916.

73. Briefing, "Flexibility Achieved," by Col E. A. McDonald, Ch, DSTPFO, 19 Jun 62, B-83666, Ex 10.

74. See p 6; Also, Msg, DSTP B-79315, JSTPS to JCS, 31 May 61, B-79315, Ex 3; Msg, DSTP B-79366, JSTPS to JCS, 23/15302 Aug 61, Ex 8; Memo for Gen Power, from VAdm R. L. Johnson, DSTP, "Visit by General Dean and Party, 2-3 Apr," 6 Apr 62, B-82754, Ex 13.

75. Statement by SecDef Robert McNamara Before the House Armed Services Committee on FY 64-65 Defense Program and 1964 Defense Budget, 30 Jan 63.

76. Interview, Robert Kipp, Historian, with VAdm E. N. Parker, DSTP, 29 Dec 61, on tape.

77. Interview, Robert Kipp, Historian, with VAdm R. L. Johnson, JDD, 4 Apr 63, on tape.

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81. Interview, Robert Kipp, Historian, with Capt J. J. Reichel, Asst Sec, JS, 28 Mar 63; **JSSTPS Joint Table of Distribution, Part Ib, 14 Jun 61, in "JSSTPS Manpower Program FY 64 thru FY 69," n.d., prepared by JS, JSSTPS, Ex 15; See also "Summary of Turnover of Key Individuals With JSSTPS," Ex 16.


86. Msg, JDD 010-8, JSSTPS to CINCPAC, 12 Jan 62.