TOP SECRET  JCS 995685

From JCS. Director Joint Staff sends. Personal for General Power, General Armstrong, Admiral Dennison, General Norstad, Admiral Felt, and Admiral Smith.

1. Following message is in two parts relating to requirement for an assessment of capabilities for employment of nuclear delivery forces. Part I is a quotation of a memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Policy Guidance on Plans for Central War, prepared by Deputy Secretary of Defense. Part II is quote
of a draft section of proposed new Basic National Security Policy prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This Policy has not been approved. Request replies in response to requirements outlined in Part I be submitted to Joint Chiefs of Staff not later than 6 June. Reproduction of Parts I and II authorized only in sufficient quantity to comply with requirements.

PART I

2. Our plans and programs should provide a significant range of alternative response options appropriate to the various foreseeable forms of a thermonuclear war emergency. The ability of the President to select a response suited to the specific circumstances prevailing at the time of hostilities should enhance deterrence and could permit the United States and its Allies, if central war occurred, to secure military, civil and political outcomes markedly more advantageous than might otherwise be expected.

3. The attached draft of a section of the proposed new Basic National Security Policy reflects current thinking on the goals, criteria, and the nature of required capabilities for a posture permitting controlled, discriminating response. To the degree made feasible by progress toward the requisite capabilities, it should be possible
concurrently to reflect in basic policies and war plans provisions for increased latitude in response options to thermonuclear war emergency. Such recent or currently programmed innovations as integrated operational planning for strategic offensive forces, mobile alternate command posts at national level and below, the extension of the bomb alarm system and the introduction of the Polaris system all lend themselves to immediate exploitation in the interests of greater strategic flexibility. We should be interested, therefore, not only the long-run improvements of posture in this direction, but in pursuing opportunities for partial and progressive development on a continuous basis, beginning as soon as possible.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to cause the Director of Strategic Target Planning to scrutinize the current SIOP-62 and forces committed to its execution and that appropriate unified and specified commanders similarly scrutinize their current war plans covering atomic capable offensive forces not committed to the SIOP. Recognizing that these plans already permit a variety of options keyed to duration of warning, geographic discretion, constraints, and specifics of weather and visibility, the objective of this scrutiny will be to provide answers to the following questions:

JCS 995685 (May 61) PAGE NR 3
a. In light of considerations in the attached paper and of such new capabilities as those mentioned above, to what specific extent might it be feasible in the near term to provide a wider latitude of options for response to thermonuclear war emergency, assuming that any impediments to this action embodied in the current National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy were removed?

b. What would be a realistic time schedule for the earliest integration of such feasible additions to current response options into operational plans?

c. If further desirable options would depend on capabilities not currently programmed, would changes in our capabilities be feasible at reasonable cost and effort in the near term, and what specific actions would be necessary?

d. What capabilities not presently programmed would be the principal requirements for a future posture permitting a still wider variety of response options calculated to derive maximum advantage from any of the foreseeable circumstances under which central war might occur?

e. Are any other major problems or difficulties foreseen, in light of the recognized necessity to avoid
any disruption or reduction of current capabilities?

5. Mr. McNamara and I are particularly interested in
assessment of the possibilities for early development of
options relieving selected elements of ready forces from
initial attack assignments to permit their retention as
uncommitted ready reserves; options permitting avoidance
of attacks against enemy urban-industrial, population and
governmental control centers as such in initial attacks;
options permitting exclusion from initial attack, to the
extent feasible, of one or more member nations of the
Sino-Soviet Bloc without the necessity for replanning the
balance of the attack; options providing varying degrees
of adjustment in force posture, beyond those currently
planned, during periods of critical tension; options
permitting attacks against ready military strengths while
minimizing "bonus" damage to non-military population and
resources.

6. If possible, the Director of Strategic Target
Planning should respond to this inquiry by 15 June 1961.

PART II

7. Major National Security Objectives

The security interests of the United States deter-
mine, at all times, multiple national security objectives.
Each provides a distinct criterion by which to judge the
adequacy of an overall military posture and the strategy for its use. The most urgent objectives are:

a. To deter any deliberate major nuclear assault upon the United States or its Allies.

b. To deter and counter attempts by the Sino-Soviet Bloc to extend its political, military and ideological influence by direct or indirect, overt or covert threat or use of force.

c. To reduce the likelihood of uncalculated, unpremeditated or inadvertent nuclear attacks. To reduce the likelihood of accidents, misinterpretation of incidents or intentions, false alarms, or unauthorized actions within any nation (including the United States and its Allies); and to reduce the possibility that such events may trigger major nuclear war.

d. To inhibit and, if possible, to reverse the diffusion of nuclear weapons; to reduce the likelihood of nuclear attacks by minor nuclear powers, against the interests of the U.S.; and to reduce the possibility that such attacks may trigger major nuclear war.

e. To protect US security interests in any armed conflict involving US forces which might occur. In particular:
(1) In local war: (Central War is defined as a war between the US and the USSR in which either nation deliberately attacks the homeland of the other. Local War is defined as any other armed conflict in which significant elements of military forces are engaged.) To bring the conflict to a conclusion satisfactory to the US, in a manner which protects US Allies and preserves US alliances, which deters further attempts by hostile nations to enhance their influence and strength by armed forces, and which minimizes the risk of escalation to major nuclear war.

(2) In central war:

(a) To preclude, under all circumstances, US military inferiority to an opponent or any potential enemies during or after the war.

(b) To this end to reduce the military capabilities of the opponent and to retain major strategic capabilities, ready, effective and controlled.

(c) To limit damage to the US and its Allies, at a minimum to a level consistent with national survival and independence.

(d) Consistent with above objectives, to achieve decisive military superiority to the opponent.

(e) To bring the war to a conclusion on the most advantageous terms possible.
POLICY FOR CENTRAL WAR POSTURE AND STRATEGY

8. Goals

a. The primary objectives of US policy with respect to central war must be to deter deliberate attack and prevent unintended outbreak. The US rejects armed aggression as a means of enhancing its security; nor can a major thermonuclear war be its preferred instrument in meeting armed aggression by others. It is an object of US policy that there be adequate alternatives to the initiation by the US of central war. Yet if central war is forced upon the United States, US military strength must still serve multiple national objectives.

b. Central war can result from a variety of causes other than the calculated and objective view of enemy leaders that they can achieve decisive superiority over the US by deliberate surprise attack. National planning cannot safely be based on the assumption that deterrence will certainly succeed, that unpremeditated nuclear attacks cannot occur, or that major aggression, undeterred, will never challenge the US to fulfill its commitments to Allies and to protect its security by risking or waging central war. Neither can it regard all possible outcomes of a central war as indistinguishable. In some circumstances, even the best outcome attainable in
central war may represent unprecedented catastrophe; yet outcomes very significantly worse than the best, both in civil and military aspects, may also be possible, and it will remain an urgent goal of US security policy to forestall them.

c. Thus, central war posture and strategy must continuously be tested not only for ability to prevent deliberative or undeliberated attack but for ability to secure basic national objectives in wartime. Solutions to these separate problems can and should be chosen to reinforce each other.

d. The most urgent military goal in central war is to preclude the prospect of an unarmed US confronting armed opponents. It is essential that no enemy be able to disarm the US by surprise attack on forces or controls; it is equally important that the US not disarm itself, by expending all ready forces in initial attacks that cannot guarantee to disarm the opponent. Although the Soviet Union must be left in no doubt that its military strength would be drastically reduced in any central war, there may be future circumstances in which US countermilitary action alone could not disarm it totally in initial attack; the Soviets might be able to retain sizeable forces that were initially untargetable or that could be destroyed
only at a highly unfavorable rate of exchange in terms of residual capability. To the extent that conservative planning must allow for the survival of such Soviet forces, US posture and strategy must permit the retention of ready uncommitted forces in reserve, at least comparable to estimated Soviet residual forces in ability to inflict further damage or to influence further the military balance. These forces must remain, under all circumstances of enemy attack, under effective control by authorized political leadership.

e. A visible and indisputable capability to achieve this basic military requirement is vital to deter deliberate attack on the US. It denies such attack any incentive. It guarantees that even a well-designed surprise attack would be futile and costly; an assault could neither win military superiority nor reduce to acceptable proportions the nuclear retaliation that could be launched by US forces.

f. At the same time, the capabilities required for this fundamental task serve the other wartime goals of minimizing damage to the US and its Allies and forcing a conclusion to the war on advantageous terms. US countermilitary action reduces enemy capability to inflict further damage or to continue the war; the
survival of sizeable US ready residual forces, threatening, by their very existence, enemy targets surviving or deliberately left unhit in initial attacks, can destroy the will of surviving enemy leaders to pursue unrestricted attacks or to continue the war.

The latter ability to influence enemy will might be particularly vital in circumstances when attacks upon enemy capabilities alone could not deprive enemy forces of a residual ability to inflict grave damage. Under those same circumstances, it might appear probable that attacks against high governmental and military command centers, or indiscriminate initial attacks on all major urban-industrial centers would fail to inhibit punitive retaliation by surviving enemy units, but would instead eliminate the possibility that enemy response could be controlled or terminated to US advantage.

The ability of US ready forces held in reserve to extend deterrence, in some degree, into the wartime period, can have important effect not only upon the later stages of hostilities but upon the damage deliberately inflicted by the enemy in his initial assault. Whether the enemy attack were premeditated, irrational, or based on false alarm, initial enemy tactics will reflect his preattack planning, which in turn reflects his image of
US capabilities and options. The prospect of confronting sizeable, protected and controlled US reserve forces after any attack should deter him from planning unrestricted attacks on US or Allied society under any circumstances; it should further induce him to undertake preparations for post-attack flexibility, control, and information. It thus lays the groundwork, if war should occur, for deterring unrestricted enemy attacks and for deterring continuance of hostilities.

1. Not all objectives can be achieved with equal confidence. But a capability to preclude, with high confidence, enemy residual military superiority at any stage of the conflict offers best hope not only of deterring deliberate attack but, if war occurs, of minimizing damage to the US and its Allies and of stopping the war on the most advantageous terms possible.

J. At the same time, the posture and strategy for deterring or waging central war must be consistent with efforts to minimize the likelihood of accidents, unauthorized actions or unintended nuclear exchanges, to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons, to deter or defeat local aggression, and to enhance US security by safeguarded arms control agreements and by non-military means.
10. Requirements
   a. To satisfy these demands, military posture for central war should acquire, as soon as possible and to the utmost extent practicable, the following general characteristics:

   (1) Survival and endurance. Strategic offensive forces, in major strength, should be capable of surviving an enemy surprise attack without essential reliance upon quick reaction to warning. A sizeable fraction of such forces should be capable of enduring in a wartime environment under prolonged reattack, as a ready reserve force responsive to flexible, centralized control.

   (2) Strict positive control. Control over the initiation and overall conduct of nuclear war should be exercised at all times by highest national authority. The President will determine and review procedures for such control, including any delegation of basic decisions under any circumstances of Presidential inability to control. There should be reliable physical safeguards against accident or unauthorized action involving nuclear weapons, including weapons under dual control with an Ally; in particular, weapons on high alert status, in mobile launchers, and in planes launched under positive control. Authorized procedures and protected control
(6) Contingency planning. To permit rapid selective responses on the basis of information available at the outset of hostilities and after, contingency plans should be provided corresponding to gross differences in the circumstances and course of central war. In particular, alternative options should include counterforce operations carefully avoiding major enemy cities while retaining US ready residual forces to threaten these targets; the option to exclude major control centers from counterforce attacks should also be available under all circumstances. Alternative plans covering central war with the USSR will provide both for the inclusion and exclusion of Communist China and other individual members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in initial attacks, the choice to be designated by the President or highest surviving national authority at the time of hostilities. So far as consistent with military objectives: (a) all plans for military action against Bloc members other than the USSR and Communist China should minimize fallout and non-military damage and casualties; (b) all planned attacks against designated enemy nations should be designed to minimize resulting damage and casualties in all other nations, in particular neutrals and Allies of the U.S. Management, decision and planning aids should be provided.
9. Contingencies

a. Posture and strategy for central war must be designed to achieve these various US security objectives under a spectrum of contingencies. It must be intended to deter not only a conservative decision-maker in the absence of national or international tension, but a wishful or frightened opponent in a time of crisis, when his alternatives to attack upon the US might also seem dangerous. Its ability to deter must be able to withstand sizeable enemy miscalculation of US intentions or capabilities, and should offer hope of withstanding unforeseen technological shifts. Its ability to prevent or to contain the political and military consequences of accidents, unauthorized actions, false alarms or "third party" actions must be considered for varied situations of international tension and local war, when such incidents are both more likely and more dangerous than in periods of relative calm.

b. If central war should occur, despite US efforts to reduce its likelihood, there could be wide variance in the circumstances of initiation, enemy posture and readiness, enemy tactics, the results of initial attacks, the attitudes and actions of Allies on both sides, and enemy wartime objectives. Ability to achieve US wartime
objectives would depend upon ability to adapt US strategic response to these various circumstances, which might be unforeseen, ambiguous, or both. A single detonation or several might presage a major assault, or come by accident, unauthorized action or attack by a minor power. A surprise attack might be calculated and well-designed or a hasty response to false tactical warning or miscalculation of US intentions. It might be well or poorly executed, providing much warning or none; retaining sizeable, protected enemy reserves or few; destroying all but the most protected US forces or failing to do so. It might direct heavy initial assault against US and Allied civil society and major command centers or it might carefully avoid such targets. Central war might culminate an escalating local war, preceded by mobilization, deployment and heightened alert on both sides; or an attack might follow a period of normal alert. Enemy posture and readiness might lack major vulnerabilities, assuring the survival under counterforce attack of major mobile, concealed or hardened enemy forces; or the enemy may have failed to protect parts of his system effectively.

- This list of possibilities is not exhaustive. Intermediate situations between the extremes cited may
offer special problems; and "surprises" in the form of wholly unforeseen circumstances are likely.

d. Among all these contingencies, it is not exclusively the "worst" cases or even the most likely ones that deserve attention; the design of posture and strategy should provide insurance against a broad range of uncertain possibilities. It is necessary to be able to exploit even improbably favorable wartime possibilities, such as windfalls of intelligence or warning, badly executed enemy attack, or urgent desire of leaders of one or more enemy nations to surrender after early operation. A capability for flexible response under high-level, informed and experienced political leadership may be most critical, and most rewarding, in such favorable cases, or in the ambiguous and urgent circumstances presented by accident, unauthorized action; "third party" attack, enemy false alarm or escalation of local war. It is in these situations that the need for a range of options alternative to an all-out, undiscriminating strategic response may be most urgent; important capabilities would include a series of well-designed alerting actions and defensive measures, communication with Allies and potential enemies, augmentation of intelligence and warning systems, and implementation of threats and discriminating counterforce attacks.
capabilities should assure an opponent of an effective, properly authorized response under all circumstances of attack, without any reliance upon the possibility of unauthorized initiative.

(3) Information. Reliable, unequivocal bomb alarm detectors and bomb alarm signals at key warning, communications and command points and all major offensive force bases, and detectors at all major cities, should be provided to assure any opponent that dependable notification of any surprise attack cannot be eliminated. Such a system should be protected under attack to a degree which will enable it to provide at least gross indications of the size and nature of enemy attack, the status of US bases and the level of damage to US society. So far as practicable, reliable information, status-reporting, intelligence, sensor, and reconnaissance systems, including protected post-attack capabilities, should be provided to furnish more discriminating knowledge of the source and nature of attack, US and enemy residual capability, and damage to US, Allied, and enemy societies. Means should be provided for prompt, reliable and unequivocal indication of the status of higher command centers to all units, permitting orderly devolution of command in accordance with authorized procedures.
(4) Force flexibility. Strategic offensive forces, both missiles and aircraft, should be capable of... 

(5) Countermilitary capability. Offensive counterforce capabilities, active defenses and passive defenses, supported by warning and reconnaissance systems, should be able to reduce enemy residual military capability at least to levels that will ensure the strategic advantage of US residual forces; they should be equipped to exploit possible vulnerabilities in Soviet posture or gross inefficiencies in Soviet planning or execution of attacks. These measures should be complemented by (a) geographic separation of US strategic forces from population centers to the fullest extent consistent with other military objectives; (b) such active anti-bomber and anti-missile defenses of cities as are judged to be effective; (c) civil defense which, at a minimum, provides adequate fallout protection and recovery capability from nuclear attack directed at important US military strengths.
to permit rapid re-planning prior to, and, as practicable, during hostilities. While avoiding premature decisions or commitments, plans should be formulated and kept under review specifying acceptable terms for ending hostilities, suitable to the several circumstances under which central war might commence and proceed; these terms should provide for the satisfaction of US security objectives in such circumstances, without a predetermined requirement for unconditional enemy surrender. The President and the Secretary of Defense will review all strategic plans.

(7) Protected command. The protected command, communications and information systems should permit coordinated, informed and selective overall direction of US forces by the highest surviving, authorized civilian and military leaders; to the utmost extent feasible, direction should be by highest constituted political authorities at all times. In particular, these systems should be designed and protected to minimize the loss of command capability and political leadership that could result from a small number of detonations, stemming from accident, unauthorized action, attack by a minor power, badly executed attack or attack intended to avoid US command capabilities. By means of mobility, hardening,
active defense, dispersal, internetting, or concealment, the protection of primary command facilities and communications serving highest national leadership should aim to raise the cost to the enemy of destroying primary centers to a level which would deter him from planning to attack them, given his inability - which must be assured with the highest confidence - to paralyze US response by doing so. Plans for protection of primary command capabilities and leadership should not rely upon warning, but should be prepared to utilize available warning, either strategic or tactical.

(8) Wartime control. The protected command and communications system should enable highest surviving national leaders to exploit, in pursuit of national objectives, the full capability for selective, deliberate, response provided by force flexibility and endurance, information, and countermilitary capability. It should enable them to use surviving forces efficiently, to make significant choices as to overall target objectives, scope and timing of attacks, and to modify these choices during hostilities on the basis of new information. It should allow commanders not only to select preplanned responses but to modify them or, within limits, to improvise new ones. It should support their efforts to
end hostilities on the most advantageous possible terms. It must provide highly reliable means for transmitting authenticated "Stop" or "Recall" orders to offensive forces in addition to initial "Go" orders. National leaders should have swift, reliable means of communications with Allied and enemy leaders prior to and during hostilities. Plans and preparations should be made to enable US national leaders effectively to threaten use of US reserve forces against civil or military targets as yet unhit; to carry out demonstrations; to provide evidence of remaining capabilities or to mislead the enemy by cover and deception activities; to propose terms acceptable to the US for ending hostilities, safeguarding US security interests in the light of circumstances of war initiation, the conduct of the war and the results of initial operations; and to monitor and enforce conformity to agreed terms.

b. A US military posture with these broad capabilities permits a wide variety of strategic responses under varying conditions of central war. Its major post-attack capabilities should effectively deter deliberate attack; yet if central war occurs, they give highest national authority maximum opportunity to preserve US military advantages, to limit damage to the US and its Allies and
to stop the war on the most advantageous possible terms. They will allow US commanders to exploit any opportunity in wartime to disarm the opponent or to achieve decisive military superiority in support of US postwar aims, if circumstances offer hope of doing so without grave jeopardy to other national goals. If an aggressor should initiate central war, these capabilities will assure him of a decisive degradation in his relative military power position and of unprecedented damage to his society (even with a counter-military US response); they will assure him of still greater damage and further worsening of his military position if he should continue the conflict. They would warn him that direct attack upon US and Allied civil society would be, under any circumstances, the worst of all possible actions.

c. Moreover, this posture will reduce the likelihood of unpremeditated nuclear exchanges. The protected command system, safeguarded positive control, and ability to achieve essential goals by deliberate response, without reliance upon hasty reaction under ambiguous circumstances, should reduce both the chance and enemy fear of US accident, unauthorized action or false alarm. At the same time, the US posture reduces the tendency of any opponent to attack hastily under similarly ambiguous
circumstances, since the prospect of US post-attack capabilities deprives him of incentive to do so.

d. In comparison to current posture, the most urgent changes demanded involve principally qualitative characteristics of force capabilities rather than major increases in force size. These characteristics complement each other, but they are important individually. Progress toward achieving major security objectives does not demand that they all be attained simultaneously. In particular, all opportunities to improve the ability of constituted leaders to control the forces in a deliberate, discriminating fashion, and to enlarge the range of alternative options available to them, should be exploited on an immediate and continuing basis.