Sep 3, 91

MEMO FOR Mr. Libby

SUBJECT First Draft of DPG

Scooter:

Work on the Russian revolution still detracts from moving on our schedule on the DPG. The draft attached lays out our general approach even though the sections are uneven. Please indicate any major redirection you desire so we can get it underway.

IR

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

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Doc#33 R-4
Illustrative Outline for DPG FY 1994 - 1999

I. Transmittal Memo/preface signed by SecDef

A. Trends and Prospects in the International Environment
   - Whether the Soviet Union?
   - Increasing Regional Challenges
   - Technology: Comparative Advantages and Diffusion

II. Defense Policy and Strategy

A. Enduring National Objectives

B. Defense Policy
   - Broad Policy (alliances generally; burdensharing; peacetime engagement/LIC; proliferation; arms control)
   - Soviet Union
   - Western Europe and NATO
   - Eastern Europe
   - East Asia and the Pacific
   - Middle East and Southwest Asia
   - Latin American and the Caribbean
   - Africa

C. The New Defense Strategy
   - Strategic Deterrence and Defense
     - Forward Presence
     - Crisis Response
     - Reconstitution

D. Military Strategy (from CJCS NMS)
   - Peacetime
   - Crisis Response
   - Major Hostilities

III. The Base Force
   - Base Case Force Structure (modified if so decided)
   - Quality Personnel and Readiness
   - Sustainability Guidance
   - Mobility (draw on Mobility Requirements Study)
   - Modernization Priorities
   - Active/Reserve Mix
   - Force Reconstitution Capability

Appendices
1. Illustrative Scenarios (Class I or II level)
2. Chairman's National Military Strategy
(C) This Defense Planning Guidance addresses the fundamentally new situation which has been created by the collapse of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and, the scheduled withdrawal, by the end of 1994, from eastern Germany and Poland, as well: the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and influence; and the Soviet Union's internal economic crisis and political collapse. As a result of these events, the United States may be said to be the world's sole superpower, enjoying a predominance on the world political-military stage that is unprecedented in the last century.

(U) Our fundamental strategic position and choices are therefore very different from those we have faced in the past. The policy that we wish to adopt in this new situation will be a matter of continuing debate and adjustment over the next years. Nevertheless, it is possible to state two general objectives that we should pursue:

OSD 1.4 (C)
(S) The other general political-military objective is to address sources of regional conflict and instability in such a way as to promote increasing respect for international law and the spread of democratic forms of government and free and open economic systems. While the US cannot become the world's "policeman" in the sense of making itself responsible for righting any wrong, it will retain the preeminent responsibility for addressing those wrongs which threaten not only its own interests, but those of its allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations. Various types of US interests may be involved in such instances: access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil, may be threatened; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles may pose a threat to the US as well as to others; US citizens or interests may be vulnerable to state-supported terrorism or narcotics trafficking.

(C) In general, the US role will be that of leader or galvanizer of the world community, not of sole actor; in some cases, the leadership role will be properly
taken by others, such as the European community. Nevertheless, the sense that the world order is ultimately back by the US will be an important stabilizing factor.

Shulsky, x52161
I.A.

Wither the Soviet Union?

[This section being drafted by SEE]
(U) As the Soviet threat changes in nature and, generally speaking, decreases in magnitude, other threats become more important to consider in the context of defense planning. In most cases, this is because they appear greater relative to the diminished Soviet threat and thus are more likely to drive actual requirements. In other cases, perhaps, these threats may have become greater in absolute terms because of the end of the Cold War.

(C) For example, some regional powers may feel less inhibited in the use of force to establish local hegemony by virtue of fact that their actions don’t risk setting off a US-Soviet clash. For that same reason, the Soviet Union (and perhaps the US as well) may tend to watch the actions of its clients less closely and put less pressure on them to refrain from provocative actions. In addition, a weakened Soviet Union may simply be less able to pressure its clients or former clients. These factors may help explain the fact that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait occurred in the aftermath of the dramatic events of 1989, which may have weakened the restraining influence the Soviets could have brought to bear.

(S) The Soviet decline may increase the risk of regional crisis in another manner: the collapse of Soviet global ambition has resulted in the increasingly desperate condition of the remaining true-believer Marxist regimes, which no longer enjoy the lavish Soviet economic assistance to which they have become accustomed and, more
importantly, are no longer able to count on Soviet support in extremis. Indeed, in order to maintain their hard-line domestic regimes, the old-style leaders such as Castro have had to distance themselves from Gorbachev and his reforms. In particular, both Cuba and North Korea seem to be entering periods of intense crisis (primarily economic, but also political) which may lead the governments involved to take actions that would otherwise seem irrational.

(6) The waning of Cold War and the increasing irrelevance of the anti-colonial ideology of the post-World War II period may lead some regional states to revert to more traditional views of the world, which in some cases could include a desire to assert some sort of regional hegemony to which, for historical, cultural or other reasons, they feel entitled. For example, India may become more active in asserting its ‘right’ to influence the affairs of its smaller neighbors, and may try to have a bigger say with respect to military use of the Indian Ocean.

(6) An additional source of instability may derive from the break-up of multinational states or empires that have lost their ideological or other raisons d’être. The current turmoil in Yugoslavia is one example of this tendency; the de facto secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia, which may give rise to continuing conflict, is another. The most important effects of this sort are likely to derive, however, from the Soviet Union’s loss of its “external empire” in Eastern Europe and the weakening of its hold over its “internal empire.” Possibilities exist for instability in East/Central Europe, either because of inter-ethnic conflict or because of a Soviet (or Russian) attempt to reestablish its hegemony in the region.

(6) In addition, new conflicts arise from population and environmental pressures. In the Middle East, conflicts over water rights and the diversion or damming of rivers may
lead to conflicts in which the parties feel that their very survival is at stake. Population pressures may lead to large migrations of refugees, either suddenly, such as has occurred from Albania to Italy, or more gradually over a longer period of time, such as the migrations from North Africa to France. These migrations may cause serious domestic problems: receiving states may, under extreme conditions, try to use force to stop them or to force the states from which the refugees are leaving to take stronger measures to control their flow. The US itself may face this problem with respect to large-scale migrations from Cuba or Mexico.

(U) The net result may be that serious regional challenges to US interests, while ultimately less dangerous, may in fact become more likely. For the near term, this tendency may be balanced somewhat by the high degree of political-military credibility the US gained as a result of Desert Storm. Nevertheless, it is clear that DoD may be called upon during the FY1994-1999 period to respond to regional challenges of the sort discussed above. The nature of that response may vary from humanitarian assistance to "presence" or peacekeeping missions to the use of force. In most cases, it is likely that the US will not be acting alone, but will be part of a multinational coalition of some sort, either established for the occasion or under the auspices of an organization such as the UN. Thus, DoD must have the capability to act flexibly in conjunction with coalition partners, some of whom may not be traditional partners or allies. Various ad hoc command, communication and logistics arrangements, such as those created for Desert Shield/Storm will be necessary.

(U) Finally, the continuing diffusion of weaponry, in particular nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic missile technology throughout the Third World (discussed in next section) implies that regional conflicts may have the potential to be much more dangerous than heretofore. We still think of nuclear weapons as "high tech" -- but
they are in fact 1940s technology. The recent example of the Iraqi electro-magnetic isotope separation (EMIS) program is a good example of this point. From our point of view, EMIS is hopelessly 'old-fashioned' and this in part accounts for the fact that we did not discover the Iraqi program. Nevertheless, the technology works and helped the US produce the weapons used in World War II.

(U) The same is true of ballistic missile technology. The Scud missiles, which absorbed such a large amount of coalition airpower during the Desert Storm, are a 1960s-era weapon system in technological terms, but they gave the Persian Gulf war an additional new dimension.

Shulsky, x52161

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New Technologies and the New Defense Strategy

(U) Technological superiority was critical to our success in the Persian Gulf. Maintaining that superiority in the face of reductions to force structure and the defense industrial base, and in a global environment of technology proliferation, is a primary goal of defense programming. Our programs through the end of the FY1994-1999 period must thus be focused on two key objectives:

1. Aggressively pursuing technological innovation; and,
2. Incorporating the results of such innovation into both the base force and our strategy for reconstitution.

(U) US forces must continue to be at least a generation ahead in weapons technology. Future generations of US soldiers, sailors and airmen must have at least the same qualitative advantages over their opponents as our forces did in Desert Storm. To provide such high quality forces for tomorrow, we must in the first instance maintain a robust research and development program. We will not ration defense R&D or military science and technology by arbitrarily fixing their shares of the defense budget. Instead, our investment in innovation must must reach and be sustained at levels necessary to assure the US dominates the military-technological revolution now and for the foreseeable future.

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(U) Robust research and development alone will not maintain our qualitative advantage. The best technology in the world cannot alone win battles. New technologies must be incorporated into weapons systems produced in numbers sufficient for doctrine to be developed. To do this without large-scale production will require innovations in training technologies and the acquisition process. We need to be able to fight future forces before we buy them. We need the ability to experiment with continuous, electronic R&D prototyping on future electronic battlefields, linked to competing, integrated design and manufacturing teams, if we are to reduce the time to get technology from the lab into the field, and if we are to concurrently develop the joint doctrine necessary to employ our combined forces. We must create incentives and eliminate disincentives for the defense industry to invest in new facilities and equipment as well as in R&D. This will be increasingly important as procurement declines. If another country has better technology, we will buy it or beat it.

(U) To make certain the best technology is available to meet the demands of our defense strategy, we must build on our comparative advantages in stealth, space-based systems, sensors, precision weapons and advanced training and C3I technologies. Specifically, should be to create the following before the end of the decade:

1. An integrated, automated contingency planning network to permit military commanders and their staffs to design, assess and visualize the simulated
consequences of execution of their campaign plans, in their wartime command posts, with current or future forces, and at a level of resolution sufficient for requirements and logistics planning.

2. Distributed, joint theater targeting, intelligence fusion, and simulated mission planning systems, supported by global and local surveillance and communication nets, for "anytime, anywhere" strike planning, execution and assessment in near-real time. We can now see targets we cannot destroy and destroy targets we cannot see. We want forces and weapons effects that meet dual criteria -- everything survives except what we target.

4. Embedded training and simulation networks, linking key CONUS military training, education centers and field exercises with each other and their theater counterparts, for a virtual power projection capability to complement US and allied forward-based forces, and assist in assessing the validity of operational requirements.
5. Regional air and naval superiority, including active and passive defenses of US and allied forces in their theaters of operation, against very low observable cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and aircraft. Superiority starts before launch. Fielded forces will enforce a "no second shot" policy - the attackers' first shot will be their last.

6. Disabling countermeasures against weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in order to deal with threats from those with little to lose in using them. We will export no weapons or technologies we cannot counter.

7. Integrated design, prototyping and flexible manufacturing architectures and teams for continuous military innovation in support of force reconstitution.

(U) We must be able to execute these options by the end of the FY1994-1999 program period. We will subsequently direct the preparation of technology roadmaps and investment plans to that end.

Kozemchak, x 44660
II. A.

Enduring Objectives of US Defense Policy

(U) Despite the uncertainties of a rapidly changing environment, our fundamental objectives endure. The central objective of US defense policy is to preserve the freedom of the United States, while avoiding war if possible. Helping other countries preserve or obtain freedom and peace is in part a means to this objective, and in part an end in itself. The extent of our assistance to others is in some cases specified or influenced by our alliance commitments; in the absence of such commitments it is a matter of prudent response to circumstances. To achieve these broad objectives, we seek:

- (U) to deter military attack against the United States, its allies, and other important countries; and to ensure the defeat of such attack should deterrence fail.

- (U) to encourage the political reforms and liberalization taking place in the Soviet Union, and to foster associated commensurate changes in its military posture and other resulting improvements in the security environment.
- (C) to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons and nuclear retaliation by pursuing technologies for strategic defense, by maintaining credible conventional forces and developing new, more effective, conventional weapons systems, and by negotiating and enforcing equitable and verifiable nuclear arms control agreements.

- (C) to maintain stable alliance relationships and to encourage and assist US allies and friends to defend themselves against armed insurgencies, terrorism and coercion.

- (C) to defend the US and its citizens and interests against foreign and international terrorism.

- (U) to increase US influence around the world, to further an atmosphere conducive to democratic progress, and to protect free commerce and ensure US access to world markets, associated critical resources, the oceans, and space.

- (C) to retard the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and of ballistic missiles.

- (C) to preclude the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to the Soviet Union or other potential adversaries.

(U) Since the objectives noted above cannot be achieved once and for all, but require our continuing efforts, our policy must also anticipate change.
attempting to progressively reduce the risks, or prevent increased risks, to our security objectives.

Shulsky, x52161
II.B.

Defense Policy and Regional Objectives

(U) The new defense strategy provides the framework for our overall defense policy and specific regional objectives.
A. Introduction: The echoes of the "Revolution of 1989" continue to resound as the 1990s unfold. Around the world, political, military, economic and sociological change—embodiment of the concept of the "New World Order"—continues to reverberate and resonate in many new and positive ways. A major contributing factor to the ongoing articulation of the New World Order is a strong, engaged American defense posture, which ensures not only our own security, but contributes to that of Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific, among other regions. In both traditional and in new and innovative ways, the future American defense posture sustains international stability in the face of a wide range of threats, yet itself draws strength from its alliance partners and friends around the world, who provide substantial indigenous defense assistance and reinforcement for this smaller US foreign commitment. Thus, security and stability are concurrently ensured by national and mutual defense commitments, albeit at lower levels than in previous decades.

The original precepts of the new US defense strategy—emphasizing regional contingencies, forward military presence, technological innovation, mobility, alliances and force reconstitution—remain largely in tact and continue to provide the basic framework for ensuring the protection of US and allied interests around the world. Reaching beyond the concept of containment, which defined the basic thrust of US security intentions throughout the Cold War era, the new strategy, now operating in a multi-polar global...
environment, places a high premium on flexibility, adaptability and resource management. In many ways, it draws upon the traditional strengths and capabilities of US military establishments of the past, yet has evolved to meet the demands of a New World Order which poses a wide range of unparalleled challenges and opportunities. Thus, while retaining the capability to act on its own if necessary, US policy makers have adapted to the demands of this multi-polar security environment and, whereever and whenever possible, have come to prefer its use generally only in conjunction with the other instruments of national power—economic, political, diplomatic—to achieve threat deterrence, accomplish national objectives and protect vital interests.

From the standpoint of US national security and defense policy at mid-decade, the US continues to be ready to show moral and political leadership; to reassure others of our commitment to protect vital national and mutual interests; and, if necessary, to respond to threats forcefully and resolutely. In support of these ongoing policy requirements, the US defense strategy must accommodate the following elements to ensure its successful implementation in the international security environment of the mid-to-late 1990s.

B. Peacetime Engagement: The precept of peacetime engagement serves as the bedrock policy underpinning all future US international activities. This concept posits that—unlike certain periods in our past, and despite the end of the Cold War era—the
US will remain an active player in global politics and interstate relations. Working by itself, with its regional partners, or through multilateral organizations and processes, the US commitment under peacetime engagement is to ensure that security, order and stability in the international state system are upheld. By these means are peace, prosperity and the solidification of democratic institutions and market mechanisms ensured.

C. Threats: While the USSR will continue to be the focus of most US strategic force planning, regional military threats, spanning the spectrum of conflict, and including specific regional or national contingencies of manmade or natural origin, will be of primary political-military concern to the US on a daily basis. Specific global threats against which US and international efforts will be targeted are proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (so-called weapons of mass destruction), and worldwide dissemination of advanced delivery means, like guided missiles and high-performance aircraft. Arms control, once the centerpiece of US-Soviet Cold War relations, will take on new meaning in this post-Cold War era, as this dialogue becomes more regionally focused. Nations will undertake new initiatives to grapple with the enforcement of treaty obligations under such agreements as the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Innovation in approach and integration of requirements will be the hallmark features of the international dialogue on these issues. There will be a growing realization that the international community has a major stake in the outcome
of this dialogue. A principal milestone will be reached in 1995, when the NPT comes up for renewal. Should this treaty not be re-validated in 1995, there could ensue a potentially radical destabilizing process, as various nations which have withheld or masked development of nuclear weapons move openly or more aggressively to acquire this technology as a future option. The stability of the international system under conditions of radical proliferation is not difficult to predict, and will certainly present challenges which the US and concerned partners must be prepared to address.

D. Alliances, Coalitions and Burdensharing: In direct application of its policy of peacetime engagement worldwide, the US will continue to support its regional alliance commitments in Europe (NATO) and in the Far East, principally with Japan and Korea. Unlike the period of the Cold War, however, the qualitative role that the US plays in these relationships will transform: the US force commitment will be more on a par with that of its regional allies. This new relationship will be demonstrated in many ways, but principally, as these alliance partners acquire more responsibility for their own self-defense, the US will necessarily lessen its air, land and naval force commitment overseas. Because such changes in the regional force balance must be carefully managed, these new roles and relationships will be worked out and implemented under existing treaty arrangements. As such, they will be understood as a new statement of defense responsibility sharing with our regional partners, rather than as a withdrawal of US commitment to regional stability. Even with US force pres-
ence and treaty commitments overseas to ensure stability, crises are bound to develop; this will be especially true of problems which develop in areas outside of existing alliance commitments. Under these circumstances, the US will commit, to the maximum extent, to work through the United Nations and other multilateral coalitions and agencies to resolve problems at the lowest level of confrontation possible. While retaining the right and responsibility to act on its own if the situation warrants, defense planners and military commanders will find that coalition management—for crises or other purposes—will be a new dimension, and a new requirement, of US national security planning and operations.

E. Overseas Presence and Force Posture: The US Base Force, while quantitatively smaller than at any time in the previous decade, will none the less possess the most complete range of high-quality military personnel and capabilities ever fielded by the US, comprehending a wide array of strategic nuclear and conventional force options, and covering sub-surface, surface, land, air and space operational requirements. This smaller but potent military force will be able to uphold the twin responsibilities of ensuring deterrence, and affording defense policy makers a variety of flexible response options across a wide range of contingency situations. Backed by a strong and capable military force, US worldwide alliance and security commitments will be made credible by a selective forward-deployed posture in specific areas around the globe. Should deterrence fail, forward deployed US forces— augmented by manpower and materiel from the CONUS-based contin-
gency and mobilization forces—will be available and have the reach and logistical support necessary to ensure that US and allied security goals and objectives are protected and upheld anywhere around the world.

F. Reconstitution: The future threat situation is fluid and uncertain. Clearly, the US and the world community have a stake in a stable international state system, governed by the precepts embodied in the UN Charter and other foundation documents of international law. Circumstances, for a variety of reasons, could change in several key countries; such changes would be of critical planning importance to the US. One such country which will continue to occupy the attention of US national security and defense planners is the USSR. The transition to a market-oriented economy, with fully-functioning democratic processes and institutions, could go awry; therein lies the potential for a return to confrontation with the US and others, or, alternatively, the plunge into uncontrollable crisis. Should a confrontational government emerge in the USSR, or for that matter, should the threat to US interests and objectives in any other part of the world require a greater and more sustained defense commitment then is available with then-current assets and resources, the US will need a reliable and deliberate means to protect its interests and objectives. A robust national reconstitution program provides this means. Through an integrated, flexible and sensitive planning program, the US will have the capacity to re-establish or build up to a designated level of defense capabilities, consistent with the nature and kind of threat confronting us.
Starting with its basic force resources, augmented by its contingency and mobilization assets, the US will also possess the ability to reconstitute major war-fighting capabilities based on long-range intelligence indicators and warning assessments of threat potential. By increasing our reliance on reconstitution, we accept an increased amount of near-term risk. But, in exchange, we realize long-term savings by not having to field and maintain a large standing force for indefinite periods of time. However, reliance on reconstitution puts a heavy burden on accurate threat assessment, since program provisions will make it necessary for the President to deliberately invoke reconstitution authorities to implement the process. But, as a means to reinforce deterrence by demonstrating US resolve, there would be no ambiguity in the signal we send about our intentions or our assessment of those of our adversaries. We will continue to seek to deter aggression at the lowest level possible, using all available national means, assets and resources. Should these efforts fail, reconstitution provides the authorities the President needs to affect changes in the levels of manpower, production, industrial base, technology and acquisition (among other areas) to deter potential adversaries.

These are the key elements of the US defense strategy, writ large. To appreciate its direct applicability and relevance to specific regional situations requires a more detailed analysis of the linkages and cross-currents which the US will have to forge to ensure its successful fulfillment. To that end, the ensuing sections of this paper will examine how US defense strategy will
accomplish its dual mission of both protecting US national interests and sustaining our concurrent commitment to stability and order in a complex, inter-related world.
II. B. 2.

Soviet Union [Section on Soviet Union being completely revised to reflect this week's changes]
II. B. 3.

**Eastern Europe** [Requires revision to reflect current events in U.S.S.R.]

(b) The end of the Warsaw Pact, unilateral Soviet force reductions, and the CFE agreement go a long way toward increasing stability and reducing the Soviet military threat to U.S. interests in Europe. The emergence of democratic, increasingly Western-oriented states in Eastern Europe is a development of immense strategic significance, and it is critical to U.S. interests in Europe to assist the new democracies in East/Central Europe to consolidate their democratic institutions and national independence. In this regard we must give particular attention to the problems of security and political and economic stability in Eastern Europe, in order to remove the potential for regional instability or Soviet reentry into the region.
6) Should there be a reemergence of the Soviet Union threat toward Germany and
Western Europe in time, we should plan to defend against an attack on Western
Europe through Eastern Europe, or to defend Eastern Europe against attack, should
there be an Alliance decision to do so.

7) The recent changes in the Soviet Union may result in a more benign policy
toward Eastern Europe, as opposed to Soviet policy pre-coup under Gorbachev,
which insisted upon new bilateral relations treaties calling upon Eastern Europeans
to surrender much of their sovereignty in security and defense. But U.S. policy
should keep in mind the long history of friction between Russia and some Eastern
European countries, particularly Poland, and remember that Russia prior to 1917
viewed Eastern Europe as a sphere of influence little less than the Soviet Union
eventually did; Poland was an oppressed province of the Russian Empire for many
years.

8) In the current unsettled condition of Russia and the Soviet Union, which is likely
to persist for a considerable time, there is no guarantee of amity between Moscow
and the Eastern European countries. There is likely to be friction over many issues
with an appreciable risk of conflict in the future, which might not be confined to the
original parties of that conflict alone. There is also the risk of conflict between
countries like Poland and Soviet Republics like the Ukraine if the Soviet Union breaks
up, perhaps with much greater Soviet/Russian military power looming in the
background, and US allies like Germany so strongly affected that involvement in the conflict would be very difficult for them, and perhaps the U.S., to avoid.
Western Europe [Requires update to reflect current events in U.S.S.R.]

(U) The recent changes in the Soviet Union promises a further diminution of the Soviet military threat to Western Europe. Military traditionalists are being replaced by commanders prepared to pursue serious military reform and to consider disengagement from an adversary posture with the West, and the growing political power of the republics in the Soviet Union is likely to impact significantly upon military spending and activities. The current prospect, therefore, is of continued force reductions, a shift to a smaller, more professional Army, and increased emphasis upon defense at the expense of the offense.

(G) Even so, this does not eliminate a residual Soviet/Russia military threat to Western Europe. The latter's force posture is likely to decline further in the years ahead, and the Soviet Union, or Russia alone, will always be able to dominate its European neighbors militarily. The appointment of Marshal Lobov as the new Chief of the General Staff indicates a certain continued adversary theme toward the West in the midst of change and reform. The smaller military forces which are new Soviet/Russian leadership are likely to field in the years ahead will almost certainly have high mobility, lethality, and professionalism as their hallmarks. They will pose a serious threat to Western Europe, even if not the constant threat of short-notice attack which informed NATO policy in the past.

(C) For the foreseeable future only the United States can balance the military power of the Soviet Union, even in its present weakened and perhaps disintegrating condition; therefore,
rev 8/27, 1900

II. B. 5.

East Asia/Pacific
Throughout the FY1994-1999 program period, we will need to maintain sufficient forward deployed forces and power projection capability to reassure our regional allies and friends and to deter threats to our key political and economic interests. We must pay particular attention to Soviet and Chinese strategic nuclear forces. At the same time, the conventional military threat posed by North Korea remains the focus of our most active regional concerns. Our concerns are intensified by North Korea's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. In Southeast Asia, a lasting peace remains elusive in Cambodia, and ambiguities mark Vietnam's future course.

As outlined in the East Asia Strategy Initiative, and consistent with our ongoing assessment of the threat, we will execute our planned three-phase reduction in our Pacific forward military presence. Further, we will take advantage of dual basing of our forces as appropriate.
5) Our forward deployed forces require adequate basing structure and access to host nation facilities. While streamlining our support needs, we must also allow for surge capability in crises. Where necessary, we should seek access arrangements to offset the impact of base closures such as those occurring in the Philippines.

6) We must endeavor to curb proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. Where appropriate, as on the Korean peninsula, we can explore selective conventional arms control and confidence building measures, but we must avoid proposals that would erode U.S. naval strength critical to our forward deployed posture. We need better intelligence yielding improved strategic warning to permit us to benefit from greater economy of force. We should pursue a program of peacetime engagement with friendly regional states, including assistance to combat insurgency, terrorism and drug trafficking.
SUBJECT: Defense Policy Guidance (DPG) Submission for the Middle East and Southwest Asia (U)

We will tailor our security assistance programs to enable our friends to better bear the primary burden of defense and to facilitate standardization and interoperability of recipient country forces with our own. We must focus these programs to enable them to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning, and acquire capabilities such as anti-tank weapons, integrated air defense systems, and improved intelligence and communications systems that will enable them to defend against an aggressor until U.S. forces arrive in the region. We will also place greater emphasis on assistance programs that promote nation-building, civic action projects, and humanitarian aid.
The infusion of new and improved conventional arms and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the past decade have dramatically increased offensive capabilities and the risk of future wars throughout the region. We will continue to work with all regional states to advocate reduced military expenditures for offensive weapons, slow the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles through arms control regimes, and preclude the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to states which might threaten U.S. friends or cause an imbalance in the regional power structure.

The presence of drug production and trafficking in Southwest Asia complicates our relations with regional countries. We will support the efforts of U.S. counternarcotics agencies in the region in their mission to curtail the drug trade.
(U) In Latin America and the Caribbean, the U.S. seeks a stable security environment. As in the past, the focus of U.S. security policy is assisting nations in the region against the threat posed by insurgents and terrorists, while fostering democracy and nation-building. In addition, the U.S. must assist its neighbors in combating the instability engendered by illicit narcotics, as well as continuing efforts to prevent illegal drugs from entering the United States.

(S) The situation in Central America will remain of concern through the FY1994-1999 program period. Though negotiations have begun in El Salvador with the FMLN, the rebels have not given up their goal of overthrowing the Government of El Salvador. Efforts to prevent the guerrillas from receiving outside support must continue. In Nicaragua, despite the election of the Chamorro government, the Sandinistas retain effective control of the armed and security forces, and their links to the Salvadoran insurgents. Stability in Panama is also a U.S. objective, and our programs must also provide the capabilities needed to meet U.S. responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaties. The number of U.S. forces stationed in the region will decrease steadily during the program period. Our programmatic strategy must therefore concentrate on other aspects of peacetime engagement, such as exercises and a robust security assistance program.
(U) Countering drug trafficking remains a national security priority of the Department of Defense. Our programs must be geared toward attacking drug trafficking at the source, in the producing and refining countries, and along the transit routes to the U.S. In particular, we need to help stabilize and bolster the counter-insurgency capabilities of the Government of Peru, which is facing a serious and growing drug-linked insurgency. DoD is the lead federal agency for detection and monitoring of drug traffic destined for the United States. Our programs must therefore provide the capability to detect the flow of drugs from source countries to
the U.S., and for providing that information via secure communications to enforcement agencies.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Draft Strategy Section for the Defense Planning Guidance

The New Defense Strategy

The new US defense strategy officially marks the passing of the Cold War era. Known formally as the Crisis Response/Reconstitution Strategy, the new strategy builds on the enduring nature of our strategic deterrent posture while placing new emphasis on forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution as decisive applications of military power. It is an adaptive strategy that aims to optimize US military potential in a changing security environment, one characterized by regional and local instability; ambiguities over warning; proliferation of advanced weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction; a confluence of friendly though sometimes competing powers; and, importantly, the onset of a new military-technical regime. It is a strategy that will shape the reduction of US military forces by maintaining attention on those core activities necessary to advance US security interests.

Emerging Security Environment

Central to the new defense strategy is clear recognition that, for purposes of planning we no longer will focus on the threat of a short-warning Soviet-led, Europe-wide conflict leading to global war. We continue to recognize Soviet conventional forces as being the most capable in all of Eurasia, but judge this potential to be offset significantly by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, force reductions associated with the CFE accord, and declining Soviet military spending even beyond that directly attributable to CFE reductions. We conclude that these changes have altered the character of the remaining Soviet threat from the capability to wage global war to that of potentially threatening a single region in Europe or elsewhere, and even then with several months of warning. As a result, the new strategy shifts focus to regional or local threats, whether from the Soviets in Europe or from other potential aggressors elsewhere in the world. While the passing of the Cold War reduces the pressure for US military involvement in every potential regional or local conflict, it is necessary that the United States be capable of responding to regional or local aggression that threatens vital interests, if necessary, very rapidly, and often at great distances. This enables us to build down to lower force levels and calls attention to forward presence and crisis response capabilities as the new basis for planning as well as the primary basis for sizing our active and reserve forces.

Ambiguities over warning in the new strategy environment pose a difficult, dual-faceted problem. At one extreme, many regional and local conflicts with potential to challenge US interests will develop with little or no notice, or the circumstances preceding conflict will be sufficiently ambiguous as to limit preparations or effectively prevent initiation of
deterrent measures which might forestall aggression. At the other extreme, a resurgent global threat, in the form of a revitalized Soviet Union or some other unforeseen state or group of states, will not materialize at least for several years or more and would be accompanied by very obvious and highly detectable activities. Regional or local threats certainly could develop more slowly, though planning cannot rest on this expectation; a resurgent global threat could develop somewhat more quickly (for example, is a hard-line regime took control of the Soviet Union), but not so much so that we would be left incapable of undertaking measures to offset the risks that it poses. The challenge of warning, therefore, is to be poised to detect regional and local threats that could develop on very short notice while at the same time remaining attuned to the potential for a resurgent global threat and to define mechanisms that would alert timely responses for either case. The implications for forces are relatively straightforward: short notice regional and local threats require highly ready forces that can provide immediate response with minimal warning; a longer-term resurgent global threat demands a capacity to reconstitute forces, as necessary, but obviates the requirement of retaining unnecessarily large forces in-being.

The spreading proliferation of advanced weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction, poses a different challenge. Proliferation can take many forms and can include state and non-state actors. It can include specific types of technology, including technologies necessary for the production of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons along with their means of delivery; it can also include a full array of ground, sea, and air platforms and supporting systems necessary for the execution of successful combined arms operations. Moreover, proliferation increasingly will include the means of producing advanced weapons, either through original development or licensed production of new systems, or reverse engineering of existing or copied systems. Proliferation cannot be limited in context to major regional powers either; several smaller or lesser powers or even non-state actors are likely to possess advanced weapons and technologies that have potential to disrupt operations or substantially increase the risks of success. Even the presence of relatively old technology, which may in fact characterize the vast majority of cases, can represent a tremendous challenge, as evidenced by the Iraqi use of short-range missiles in the Gulf War.

A confluence of friendly though potentially competing powers holds considerable promise for promoting collective action to regional or local aggression, as was the case in the recent Gulf War, but also requires that the United States be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated or when an immediate response is a necessary presage to a larger or more formal collective response. It will also affect the type and level of presence we maintain in key areas of the world to offset the potentially destabilizing effect that growing powers may have in a region. In many cases it also will require that we establish a new basis for many of our existing relationships. This includes changes in our relations with key allies.

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Europe is experiencing fundamental transformation. In security terms, the challenge from the Warsaw Pact has disintegrated, and the countries of Eastern Europe are seeking to reposition themselves back into the larger political and economic fabric of Europe. A substantial American presence in Europe and continued cohesion within the Western Alliance remain vital. This presence will provide reassurance and stability as the new democracies of Eastern Europe are integrated into a larger and evolving Europe. While its mission may be changed in this new era, the North Atlantic Alliance remains indispensable to peace and stability in Europe.

In East Asia and the Pacific, the peace and prosperity we have helped to secure for our allies have enabled a long-term increase in their own defense capabilities. This has allowed us to initiate a plan for carefully reducing our own level of forces there, and to work successfully with our allies to increase their own role in providing for regional security and stability—provided we avoid a disengagement or abrupt drawdown that would weaken that stability. We must also remain mindful of the potentially destabilizing effects that enhanced roles on the part of our allies might produce. Nevertheless, pressures to reduce our forces and access to bases will constrain our presence options.

Elsewhere, our goal will be to promote stability and facilitate peaceful change. This will require the continued presence of US forces in vital regions, to include specifically the Middle East and Southwest Asia but other regions as well. However, it may also entail that we change our traditional concepts of presence to more closely coincide with basing arrangements and reasonable expectations concerning force availability.

The onset of a new military-technical regime presents continued challenges not only in the realm of technological superiority but also in the way we organize, train, and employ our military forces. The Gulf War made clear the early promise of this new regime, emphasizing the importance of recent breakthroughs in low-observable, information, and other key technologies. The technological edge we showed in Gulf War and the promise of breakthroughs in other areas will greatly affect the calculations of both the Soviet Union and various regional powers. But shortcomings detected in Gulf operations show also the need to be mindful of doctrinal and organizational changes necessary to lead US forces fully into this new regime. Whatever we do, the Soviets and others will be pursuing these advances diligently. Staying ahead of technical and organizational change will help us shape the future security environment and give us capabilities for deterrence or defense against future regional and local aggressors as well as the capacity to reconstitute forces as necessary against a revitalized global threat.

On the broadest level, the new defense strategy recognizes that we cannot ignore our enduring interests or neglect our responsibilities in key regions of the world. To do so will only invite danger, instability, and, ultimately, a greater commitment of resources in the future. We remain committed to maintaining the strength of the NATO alliance, as well as our other alliances and friendships; to deterring and, when necessary, defending
against threats to our security and interests; and to exercising the leadership needed, including the decisive use of military forces when necessary, to maintain a world environment where societies with shared values can flourish.

In defense terms, this strategy requires a robust strategic deterrent capability, including strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces and strategic defenses. It necessitates a robust and capable forward presence of air, ground, and naval forces, although reduced significantly from earlier levels and changed in some instances to reflect basing arrangements and reasonable expectations concerning force availability. Further, the new strategy requires the ability to act quickly and decisively with a range of options against regional or local threats on short notice with modern, highly capable forces. It requires also that we remain mindful of future or emerging threats by providing the wherewithal to reconstitute additional forces, if necessary, to offset the challenge of a revitalized global threat.

Strategic Deterrence

Deterring nuclear attack remains the greatest defense priority of the nation. Accordingly, strategic deterrence is a fundamental constant of the new defense strategy, even as emphases in other areas change. Strategic nuclear forces are essential to deter use of the large and modern nuclear forces that the Soviet Union will retain under a START regime. Our strategic forces also provide an important deterrent hedge against the possibility of a revitalized or unforeseen global threat, while at the same time deterring third party use of weapons of mass destruction.

The United States must continue to maintain a diverse mix of survivable and highly capable nuclear forces, including non-strategic nuclear forces, as well as supporting command and control assets. These forces must be capable of effective response under a broad range of conditions, including ones that would provide minimal or ambiguous warning of attack. Strategic forces comprising missiles, bombers, and submarines will provide important flexibility, resiliency, and reliability, particularly at lower force levels. In addition, bomber forces provide alternative conventional capabilities that potentially are important in the context of regional contingencies, especially as we reduce carrier force levels, tactical fighter wings, and access to overseas bases. Nonstrategic forces will place greater reliance on aircraft armed with modern weapons, deployed forward as a means to enhance deterrence and, in the case of Europe, to provide a defense of last resort.
Notwithstanding continued modernization of Soviet offensive forces and their pursuit of more effective strategic defenses, positive changes in our relationship with the Soviet Union and the fundamental changes in Eastern Europe have reduced markedly the danger of war in Europe that could escalate to a strategic exchange. At the same time, the threat posed by the global proliferation of ballistic missiles and by an accidental or unauthorized missile launch resulting from political turmoil has grown considerably. The result is that the United States, our forces, and our allies and friends face a continued and even growing threat from ballistic missiles. In response, research and development of strategic defenses has been refocused on global protection against limited strikes (GPALS). A phased program, it is intended to better protect deployed forces from ballistic missile attack by the mid-1990s and to protect US territory by the decade's end. GPALS is designed to offer protection against ballistic missile attack originating anywhere in the world.

A complementary effort also is required to offer protection against bombers and cruise missiles. It is particularly important to develop surveillance and warning capabilities against the low-observable threats that could be deployed early next decade.

**Forward Presence**

The new defense strategy emphasizes the criticality of maintaining US presence abroad, albeit at reduced levels. This is another enduring, though newly refined principle of US security policy. In the new strategy forward presence, including associated requirements for a CONUS rotation base, provides a key basis for sizing active and reserve forces.

The historic success of our forward presence strategy—and the critical need to continue it for the future—should carefully be recognized. US forward presence forces send an unmistakable signal to allies and adversaries alike of our enduring commitment to a region. It helps prevent the emergence of dangerous regional "vacuums" that incite historical regional antagonisms or suspicions and which fuel arms races and proliferation or tempt would-be regional and local aggressors—especially in this era of fragile and changing regional balances. Forward presence is critical to maintaining a strong network of relationships, to helping shape the future strategic environment in ways favorable to our interests, and to positioning us favorably to respond to emerging threats. It supports our aim of continuing to play a leadership role in international events.

Forward forces also provide a capability for initial rapid response to regional and local crises or contingencies that may arise with little or no warning. Indeed, our forward forces should increasingly be capable of fulfilling multiple regional roles, and in some cases extra-regional roles, rather than deterring in a more limited sense by being trained and prepared
only for operations in the locale where they are based. These capabilities will require high degrees of readiness and availability, which means generally those capabilities resident in the active forces, for the reduced levels of forward presence that we maintain.

In Europe, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the ongoing withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, and force reductions associated with the CFE accord allow us to scale back our presence to a smaller, but still significant, contribution to NATO’s overall force levels.

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In the Persian Gulf region, as an aftermath of the Gulf War, traditional maritime presence, including carrier battle group presence, likely must be enhanced and supplemented by the forward staging of Air Force tactical fighter squadrons and pre-positioning of Army heavy equipment. Longer-term US presence in the region will depend upon a host of factors, including the evolving regional balance and the prospects for a lasting Middle East accord. The Persian Gulf region will remain vital to US interests for the indefinite future indicating an enduring requirement to maintain long-term presence in the theater.

While East Asia has not undergone the revolutionary change that has swept Europe in the last two years, the growing strength and self-reliance of our allies and friends in the region allow some adjustments and reductions in our presence. As articulated in the East Asia Strategy Initiative, a phased approach, responding to global and regional events, holds greatest promise for success. Force levels in the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Japan will be reduced. Various regional facilities, including Clark Air Force Base, will close. This is designed to thin our existing forward presence and supporting force structure and reshape our security relationships. Korea remains a significant danger spot, but the growing strength of South Korean forces allows them to assume a greater leading role. Over time, our presence will become increasingly more maritime in nature as a reflection of our long-standing maritime interests in the region and the greater capacity of our key friends and allies, specifically Japan and Korea.
Finally, as we reduce our forward presence, we must remain mindful that there exists no reliable mechanism for evaluating precisely the exact levels of forward presence necessary to promote our objectives. Reductions in forward presence involve risks, and precipitous actions may produce unanticipated and highly costly results from which it is very difficult to recover. The potential for increased risks can take several forms, not all necessarily related to decreases in our presence, but they certainly can be exacerbated by lack of attention in this area. Planned reductions should be undertaken slowly and deliberately, with careful attention to making in-course adjustments as necessary.

Crisis Response

The ability to respond to regional or local crises is a key element of our new strategy and also a principal determinant of how we size our active and reserve forces. Under the former policy of containment, safety demanded that we assume a major regional conflict involving superpower interests might not stay limited to the region in which it began or effectively exclude the superpowers as major combatants; indeed it demanded recognition that regional conflicts could well escalate to global war. In contrast, we now recognize the potential for an array of possible regional and local conflicts that will remain limited geographically or involve only a single major power or even tacit cooperation among the major powers.

The regional and local contingencies we might face are many and varied, both in size and intensity, potentially involving a broad range of military forces of varying capabilities and technological sophistication under an equally broad range of geopolitical circumstances. One trait most share, however, is that they have potential to develop on very short notice because of ambiguities in warning. These conditions require highly responsive military forces available with little or no notice, a role best suited to the active component. Over time we must have the capability to respond initially to any regional contingency with combat most support forces drawn wholly from the active component, except for a limited number of support and mobility assets. Reserve forces will be responsible primarily for supporting and sustaining active combat forces and for providing combat forces in especially large or protracted contingencies. In addition, mobilizing Reserve combat forces can provide the force expansion needed to enhance the US capability to respond to another sizeable regional or local contingency.

As we learned from the Gulf War, a regional crisis can also mean mounting a very large military operation against a well armed, highly capable adversary. Proliferating unconventional threats of ballistic missiles and chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons raise further the specter of risk. Highly ready and rapidly deployable power projection forces, including effective forcible entry capabilities, remain key elements of protecting our interests from unexpected or sudden challenges. We must be ready to deploy a
broad array of capabilities, including heavy and light ground forces; tactical aviation forces, naval and amphibious forces, and special operations forces.
Reconstitution

Historic changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union allow us to plan on dramatic increases in the time available to meet any renewed threat of a massive, theater-wide attack on Europe that could lead to global war. Such long warning of a renewed global threat is what enables us to reduce our active and reserve forces to levels sufficient to meet the regional threats which are now our focus--so long as we are prepared to build, as the President has said, "wholly new forces" should the need to counter a global threat reemerge. The new strategy therefore accepts risk in this lower probability threat and refocuses resources both on the more likely near-term threats and on high priority investments in future capabilities.

(U) Reconstitution draws on and expands upon established concepts and capabilities, such as full and total mobilization and graduated mobilization response. For example, it capitalizes on the fortuitous opportunity we now have to reduce our active and reserve units in ways that take advantage of our past investments by retaining access to needed long-lead elements of that unit structure -- that is, to build down in ways that preserve our capacity to build back up.
(U) Reconstitution includes activities in time frames analogous to those identified as the three "phases" of graduated mobilization response activity: peacetime planning and preparations; measured responses to a crisis; and large scale force expansion.
Our emphasis among these capabilities should reflect continuous assessment of the relative likelihood of near-term, identifiable reconstitution threats on the one hand and long-term, undefinable threats on the other.

In the near term, the Soviets' large military industrial base and recently demobilized forces will provide a relatively robust capability for rebuilding their own forces if they so decided. (And in the particularly near term, the treaty-limited equipment stocks they now hold could provide the largest extent of their total post-reconstitution force.) It appears that through at least 1994 the Soviets' preoccupation with their internal political and economic crisis, the massive tasks of reestablishing their forces' unit integrity and infrastructure after withdrawals from Eastern Europe and the ATTU zone; and the absence of other prospective global threats; will together make a reconstitution scenario especially unlikely. Therefore for that period, and quite likely thereafter, this is a prudent area in which to accept some risk, in order to focus resources on more likely current threats and on the long-term technological and doctrinal innovation that would likely be decisive against a more distant future threat.

In the near term, the potential for a Soviet threat requiring a threat-paced response can be met primarily by focusing our reconstitution efforts on retaining access to "regeneration"-type assets -- those elements of force structure now exiting our active and reserve units that would take relatively long to produce, such as large weapons platforms with long production or recommissioning times, and highly trained personnel, like unit commanders and specialized technicians. We can benefit from our defense investments over the last decade by retaining some equipment of disestablished units in laid-up or cadre-type status, and tapping the pool of trained personnel exiting units but still accessible in reserve manpower categories.

If, as we expect by mid- to late 1990s, the Soviets fulfill their pledges not to retain TLE as useable equipment stocks, and those stocks and their defense industrial base deteriorate, obsolesce, and shrink, then our own reconstitution timelines can lengthen accordingly, and in place of threat-paced response with regeneration-type assets we can focus more on measured but high-leverage deliberate rearmament capabilities from our industrial and technology base and mobilizable manpower assets (assuming that no other, new foreseeable threat-paced reconstitution requirement emerges in the international environment). Given this prospect, efforts to encourage the Soviets' rapid, unambiguous and irreversible elimination of equipment stocks and conversion of defense industry will have high priority in our policy and diplomacy.

In any case, for both the near-term and the long-term all of the categories of reconstitution capability will require that we take care to preserve in adequate measure the longest-lead elements of our overall security posture. This includes particularly our alliance structures, forward deployments and access; the advantages in both military technology and
doctrine that come from vigorous innovation and development, and the high quality and morale of our military personnel pool.

Intelligence assessments, and the associated warning and decision process, have pivotal roles in the reconstitution area. For the near term, warning efforts should focus continuously on specific indications of a Soviet national reconstitution effort (and the major political indicators of a change in strategy which would certainly precede it). In support of decision making in response, intelligence should continuously monitor and regularly report on such indicators. For the near and long term, intelligence efforts should more generally stay abreast of possibilities of other emerging threats that could require reconstitution capability -- most likely, longer-term and more ambiguous possible threats.

Measures planned for response to early indicators of a specific reconstitution threat must strike a careful balance between, on the one hand, the needs to demonstrate resolve, strengthen deterrence, and begin enhancing military capabilities to respond, and on the other hand the imperative to avoid provocative, escalatory steps and to maintain the ability to arrest or reverse mobilization steps without creating military vulnerabilities.

Wargaming and net assessment activity should focus on assessing whether prospective reconstitution assets against the prospective threat provide capabilities for robust conventional defense to defeat attacking forces, or rather provide lesser capabilities that primarily strengthen or lengthen the period over which a defend and delay strategy can be sustained conventionally. If the resources for reconstitution investments are insufficient to provide an increment of capability that significantly enhances the prospects for sustained conventional defense, then those resource investments may be of marginal warfighting value -- though perhaps of some real deterrent benefit.

In this context, however, reconstitution planning must reflect the comparative strengths of the United States and its allies against a revitalized global threat. Longer-term reconstitution represents a collective security challenge; the effect of our allies' and friends' contributions on deterring and countering a reconstitution threat will be considerable. This requires substantial emphasis on role specialization as a means of coordinating a collective response.
III. Programming Guidance and Priorities

A. Introduction

1. (U) Purpose. The guidance set forth in this section establishes minimum capabilities to be provided within available resources to support national military objectives and strategy. The overriding objective must be to provide U.S. military forces capable of deterring and, if necessary defeating, the array of threats foreseen in the strategic environment projected for the planning period. Fiscal constraints will make this exceedingly difficult and require many difficult decisions. In making these decisions, the Department will ensure that we maintain effective offensive and defensive strategic deterrence; continue adequate, although reduced, levels of forward presence in key locations; provide robust capabilities for regional crisis response as contingencies may require; and ensure capabilities to reconstitute additional forces if required commensurate with a renewed global threat. This section constitutes the most definitive guidance from the Secretary of Defense for formulation of the Military Departments’ and Defense Agencies’ FY 94-99 Program Objective Memoranda.

2. (G) Fiscal Outlook. The current Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) reduces defense resources to the lowest level of GNP since before World War II—pressing the bounds of adequacy for the nation’s defense needs. This FY 92-97 FYDP reflects projections of total resources available for all but the last two years of the FY 94-99 defense program. Continuing changes in the international security environment, coupled with strong pressures for reduction of the federal deficit, will likely produce strong pressures for further reductions in defense resources. Furthermore, newly emerging funding imperatives, and previously projected economies that do not emerge, are likely to create increasing fiscal straitjackets. In this context, and pending more formal fiscal guidance, planning and programming for this period should anticipate no real growth in overall resources following the FY 1997 baseline in the current FYDP, and should be prepared to deal with reductions in the current program if they indeed emerge.

3. (G) Overall Program Priorities. In this strategic and fiscal context, difficult decisions will have to be made to reflect carefully considered broad priorities. Our currently planned force structure reductions approach minimum acceptable "base force" levels, as defined in the formulation of the current FYDP, in or around FY 1995. For our overall force levels and for levels of forward presence alike, additional reductions we make at or near these minimal levels must be very carefully planned and deliberately paced.

Our priority must be to retain adequate levels of force structure for our military requirements and our global leadership role, but under no circumstances will we maintain larger forces than we can support with adequate levels of readiness. Training, manning, and equipping our forces appropriate to the real threats we still face is imperative. Sustainability for the reduced forces we will retain is also a critical part of avoiding a return to the days of the "hollow force."

In the area of modernization, this will remain more a decade of research and development than of procurement. Robust R&D will remain important to maintain our technical edge in military hardware and doctrine alike, not only against currently evident threats, but increasingly against unforeseeable threats that may emerge in the longer-term future. Where increasing
sophistication of threatening forces requires, or where technological leaps offer very high-leverage capabilities, new advanced systems will be fielded, at least for some portion of our forces. Designing an overall modernization program in an era of increasingly severe resource constraints will warrant close consideration of the implications for our strategic shift to focus on regional threats; of the changing nature and relative sophistication of those threats; and of the relative importance, in light of these changes, of various defense mission areas and various means of executing them.

In summary, our priorities among these "pillars" must be to retain needed force structure, but only at adequate levels of readiness; to provide the sustainability those forces would need in combat; to maintain our technical edge, first in potential military technology and doctrine, and then in fielded capabilities; and then to broadly modernize our force structure.

B. Strategic Forces

1. Offensive.

2. Defensive.

Maintain rigorous pursuit of missile defenses focused on developing defensive systems able to provide the U.S., our forces overseas, and our friends and allies global protection against limited ballistic missile strikes -- whatever their source. Actively pursue complimentary capability against bombers and cruise missiles. Ensure that strategic and theater defense systems, as well as offensive and defensive systems, are properly integrated.

C. Conventional Forces and Forward Presence

This guidance is intended to reflect adjustments in security policies and military posture that take advantage of real change in the strategic environment. Because these adjustments must be accomplished within the constraints of prudent risk, fiscal austerity and great uncertainty, we must be flexible in our approach. We will not preserve force structure at the cost of creating a hollow force. Forces must retain the ability to respond immediately to regional crises worldwide and to satisfy requirements for forward presence.
(U) Required forces will be maintained in that component of the Total Force — active, reserve, or civilian — in which they can effectively accomplish required missions at the least cost. The various components will operate cohesively in peacetime and in wartime in their respective roles as an integrated and effective Total Force.

1. Army.

- Move into reconstitutable status (cadre-like reduced-readiness or reduced operating status) those forces not needed for forward presence and peacetime operations or for crisis response against regional threats (including a single-region Soviet threat).

- Retain one corps consisting of two divisions in Europe with combat support capabilities and reception and onward movement base.

- Retain at least one heavy brigade capability in Korea.

2. Navy/Marine Corps.

- Program for 12 carrier battlegroups based on a force of 12 total aircraft carriers (plus one training carrier), 13 airwings (11 AC/2 RC), and about 150 major surface combatants.

- Move into reconstitutable status (cadre-like reduced-readiness or reduced operating status) those forces not needed for forward presence and peacetime operations or for crisis response against regional threats (including a single-region Soviet threat).

- Program for no less than 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces including 6 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (5 AC/1 RC). Program amphibious lift for 2.5 MEBs.

- Retain the capability to support full-time Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) presence in the Mediterranean Sea and Western Pacific; and [insert appropriate requirement for Marine forces stationed in Okinawa].

3. Air Force.
4. Special Operations Forces.

D. Readiness

(U) Given changes abroad that allow a shift to focus on regional threats, our active and reserve forces' readiness, as well as their size, can in general be based on the forward presence and crisis response requirements of the new defense strategy. This tenet of the new strategy allows substantial savings in terms of reduced force structure for these smaller threats, but it precludes any comparably wide-ranging reductions in readiness, given that the long-standing short warning times for these threats have not increased. Under no circumstances will we maintain larger forces than we can support with adequate levels of readiness, or otherwise risk a return to the days of the "hollow force."

(U) Priorities among units for providing resources to maintain manning, training and equipment readiness will be commensurate with units' peacetime role and wartime deployment sequence, regardless of component.

1. (S) Readiness Levels. Program resources expected to maintain unit readiness levels as follows:
Other reserve component combat forces and associated support forces will be maintained at readiness levels commensurate with their assigned wartime missions.

2. (U) Personnel Quality. Maintaining the high quality of U.S. military personnel is a strategic imperative, but will be more difficult than ever during the reduction in the size of the force. Therefore, structure and resource robust recruitment and retention programs accordingly to maintain a high quality force.

3. (U) Training. Place increased emphasis on joint and combined exercises that stress interoperability and joint warfighting doctrine. Increase emphasis on use of simulators in training to most efficiently provide a well-trained force.

E. Sustainability

1. War Reserve Inventories

- Our goal is to have US and allied stockpiles and production capability to accomplish the following:

   a. [Blank]

   b. [Blank]

   c. Program a combination of preferred and reasonable substitute munitions and all other suitable items to reach the war reserve inventory goal by the end of the FY 1997 funded delivery period, using a level funding profile.

2. Industrial Surge

- Program for Industrial Preparedness Measures that would permit surge production of munitions and critical spares where this is a cost-effective means of meeting a portion of the above guidance and short-notice need is a real possibility (e.g., airlift spares). Calculated US war reserve requirements shall be reduced by the assets projected to be available from surging the production base and those assets that can be expected to be made available by host nations and allies.

F. Mobility and Prepositioning [Will draw from Mobility Requirements Study]

1. Airlift

2. Sealift

3. Prepositioning
G. Modernization

1. General Policies

a. (U) High-Low Mix -- emphasis will be placed on fielding high-low mixes of systems capable of meeting the postulated threat in terms of its quantity and technological sophistication. In this regard, increased emphasis must be placed on system life extensions and product improvements of current systems.

b. (U) New Starts -- new system starts will be limited to those that are deemed absolutely essential to projected national security needs, that offer order-of-magnitude improvements, and that can be fully resourced over the life of the program given projected resource constraints.

c. Research and Development -- each Military Department and DARPA shall program for not less than 0 percent real growth in the technology base (6.1, 6.2, and 6.3a)

d. Facilities -- Investments in infrastructure to include test ranges and facilities, laboratories, and logistical complexes shall be sufficient to preclude unacceptable levels of backlog and repair.

e. Industrial Base and Technology Base [TBP?]

2. Force Modernization Programs

a. Strategic Deterrence

(P) Program resources to maintain the adequacy of strategic deterrent forces consistent with postulated threats and arms control constraints and to develop the capability to defeat against accidental launches and third world ballistic missile threats

(1) Offensive Forces.
b. General Purpose Conventional Forces.

(1) Close Combat/Direct Support (Fire Support and CAS)

(2) "FOFA" ranged-fire/Interdiction/Deep strikes

(3) Air Defense/Air Superiority

(4) Maritime Power Projection

(5) ASW

[Seek to develop the above mission categories as organizing construct -- ?]

(9) Assessment of programmed contingency capabilities and evaluation of Persian Gulf War experience indicate the following critical modernization needs:

- rapidly deployable tactical air anti-armor capabilities with moderate support requirements (e.g., 30-mm gun pods aboard carrier-based tactical fighter/attack aircraft).

- air-deployable ground force mobility and anti-armor capabilities for enhanced immediate tactical flexibility (e.g. motorizing some initially-deploying light forces).

- better and more survivable reconnaissance capabilities (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles).
enhanced Army/Air Force tactical intelligence interoperability (e.g., Air Force acquisition of JSTARS data line ground stations).

- improved detection capability against the full range of unconventional weapons (chemical, biological and radiological) in both field and support forces (e.g., German Fuchs vehicle acquisition).

- enhanced air/land battle Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems and procedures (e.g., increased Army/Air Force joint exercises to refine interoperability).

- improved ground forces tactical mobility for enhanced operational flexibility (e.g. procurement of more HETs).

- improved Air Force/Navy tactical air operations integration and joint planning systems and procedures.

- improved mid-term air defense suppression capabilities against advanced (including long-range) surface-to-air missile threats (e.g. successor capability to the recently-cancelled Tacit Rainbow emitter attack missile).

- improved airbase attack weapons for reduced delivery aircraft attrition and increased expected lethality (e.g., replacement for Durandal).

- good conventional tactical missile defense capabilities against both land and sea targets (e.g., Patriot upgrades, Phalanx follow-on).

- good naval mine clearance capability (including rapid minefield location systems and improved killing mechanisms). [NOTE need improved land mine clearance capability too??]

H. Force Reconstitution Capability

(5) The Reconstitution aim is to continuously maintain, in sufficient measure, capabilities to create additional forces and capabilities (beyond those in extant active and reserve units) to: deter either a Soviet reversion to a force posture for global war, or a general remilitarization of the international environment, that would require additional U.S. forces; or, if such reversion or remilitarization occurred, to respond by creating additional forces sufficient to maintain deterrence against the larger threat; or, if then deterrence failed and general war ensued, to provide forces for a strong defensive effort with conventional forces that would present an aggressor with the prospect of costs and losses outweighing any expected gains.

(5) Extant active and reserve units would be available to respond to any threat requiring reconstitution. Additional forces beyond these could be created from three types of reconstitution assets: force regeneration assets, mobilizable manpower assets, and industrial and technology base assets.
(c) Develop planning to lay-up other ships in recallable status (e.g., carriers and SSNs) and identify the costs and times to reach deployable status for each option.

The Military Departments and Defense Agencies should explicitly address options for regeneratable status for all major equipment being decommissioned through FY 95.

2. (a) Mobilizable Personnel Assets: To provide needed manpower beyond the Selected Reserve and Ready Reserve, plan for the following: [more detail/data to be provided as needed]

- Consider new legislative authority as needed to enable access early in an apparent reconstitution situation to the limited numbers of personnel needed to begin preparations for cadre-type units (e.g., cadre divisions and INRC).

- For threat-paced response, plan for use of Individual Ready Reserve and, in more stressing circumstances, Retired Reserve personnel. Make optimum use of annual IRR screening. Consider programmatic measures to increase the size of the IRR if/as necessary. [IRR is shrinking in FYDP -- why?]

- (c) Plan and prepare to regain personnel assets for deliberate rearmament timelines primarily through increased recruiting and measures to retain increased numbers of personnel in recallable personnel categories.
3. Industrial Base / Technology Base Assets: [Flesh out the following]

Industrial Preparedness Measures (IPMs)

Manufacturing Technology

Deliberate efforts to reduce military specifications in procurement assets.

Explore broadening of dual-use platforms (refittable with military hardware if needed), including Civil Reserve models for reconstitution-required assets.

Reconstitution will not be a predominant factor in any decision to maintain production of a major platform, but in many such decisions the time required to restore production for reconstitution will be among the considerations.