Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994-1999 (U)

This Defense Planning Guidance addresses the fundamentally new situation which has been created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the internal as well as the external Soviet empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and influence. The new international environment has also been shaped by the victory of the United States and its Coalition allies over Iraqi aggression—the first post-Cold War conflict and a defining event in US global leadership. In addition to these two victories, there has been a less visible one, the integration of Germany and Japan into a US-led system of collective security and the creation of a prosperous and democratic "zone of peace."

(U) Our fundamental strategic position and choices are therefore very different from those we have faced in the past. We are in a position to provide for our security with far fewer forces and considerably less resources than required in the past. The challenge is to adapt and reduce our forces consistent with this much more favorable security environment and, further, to continue shaping the developing environment in a way that we need not return to the more costly, albeit necessary, policies of the past. The choices we make in this new situation will set the nation's direction into the next century.

I. Objectives and Goals (U)

Enduring National Objectives (U)

(U) Despite current uncertainties, our fundamental objectives endure. The central objective of US defense policy is to preserve the freedom of the United States, while avoiding war if possible. Helping other countries preserve or obtain freedom and peace is in part a means to this objective, and in part an end in itself. The extent of our assistance to others is partly specified by our alliance commitments, and partly a matter of prudent response to circumstances; but neither our principles nor our abilities permit us to defend our interests alone. To achieve these broad objectives, we seek:

* (U) to deter military attack against the United States, its allies, and other important countries; and to ensure the defeat of such attack should deterrence fail.
(U) to increase US influence around the world, to further an atmosphere conducive to democratic progress, and to protect free commerce and ensure US access to world markets, associated critical resources, the oceans, and space.

(U) to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.

(U) to retard the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

B. Defense Strategy Goals (U)

(U) These objectives can be translated into two broad strategy goals that lend further clarity to our overall defense requirements.

(U) Our first goal is to avoid the reemergence of a new rival posing a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This dominant consideration underlies the new regional defense strategy and requires us to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources could, under consolidated control, generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, Northeast Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia. We focus attention on these regions because they represent the principal sources of global power which could challenge US interests and security, but we remain aware that there are other regions where US military power could be required.

(U) The second goal is to address sources of regional instability in ways that promote international law, limit international violence, and encourage the spread of democratic government and open economic systems. These objectives are especially important in deterring conflict in regions important to US security because of their proximity (such as Latin America), or where we have treaty obligations or security commitments to other nations. While we cannot assume responsibility for righting every wrong, we must be able to address selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies.
II. The Regional Defense Strategy (U)

A. Defense Strategy Aims (U)

(1) Shaping the Future Security Environment (U)

(U) The new regional defense strategy is designed not simply to react to reductions in the Soviet threat, but to help shape the future security environment. With the passing of the traditional Cold War threat -- a global war beginning on short notice in Europe -- we have identified some missions and forces no longer needed. But shaping our future security environment means more than simply accounting for such changes in anticipated threats. World events repeatedly defy even near term predictions; our ability to predict events over longer periods is even less precise. History is replete with instances of major, unanticipated strategic shifts over multi-year time frames, while sophisticated modern forces take many years to build. A proper appreciation for uncertainty is critical for a strategy that builds forces today for crises 5, 10, or 20 years away. We can help shape our future environment, and hedge against both anticipated threats and uncertainty, safely, and relatively cheaply compared to the past.

(U) The regional defense strategy seeks to help shape the future. The containment strategy we pursued for the past 40 years successfully shaped the world we see today. Our willingness to match the build-up in Soviet military power during the Cold War and our deployment of forces forward in Europe and the Pacific that allowed democracy to develop and flourish in those areas contributed to the very substantial peaceful changes that we see occurring today in the world.

(U) Future peace and stability will continue to depend in large measure upon our willingness to maintain forward presence and to retain high-quality forces that enable response to crises that threaten our interests. The future may also come to depend on others' perceptions of our will and capability to reconstitute forces and to deter or defend against strategic attack, should that prove necessary. Maintaining that posture will be absolutely crucial in heading off future crises and dissuading future aggressors from challenging our vital interests. The regional strategy has already shaped our future for the better. Our success in organizing an international coalition in the Persian Gulf kept a critical region from hostile control, strengthened our ties with moderate states, and preserved world access to a critical region.

(2) Strategic Depth (U)

(U) Our successes have pushed back in several ways the threats we may face. The threats have become remote, so remote they are difficult to discern. The regional defense strategy seeks to maintain that situation.
During the Cold War, our position was lacking strategic depth. With only a week or two of warning, we faced the prospect of a Warsaw Pact offensive that could in short order subjugate Europe and push us to the brink of nuclear war. Now the democratic liberation of Eastern Europe, the passing of the Soviet Union, the creation of independent states in Russia and Ukraine, and the ascendency of democratic forces in the Commonwealth have both reversed the basis of a massive offensive threat to the West, and opened the way to a whole new strategic relationship in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

Today we have no global challenger, except with respect to strategic nuclear forces. No country is our match in conventional military technology or the ability to apply it. There are no significant alliances hostile to our interests. To the contrary, the strongest and most capable countries in the world are our friends. No region of the world critical to our interests is under hostile non-democratic domination. Near-term threats in these regions are small relative to our capabilities and those of our allies. We have great depth for our strategic position. The threats to our security have become more distant, not only physically but in time as well. A challenger to our security would have to overcome our formidable alliances and their qualitative advantages. The events of the last three years have provided America with strategic depth in which to defend our national interests that we have lacked for decades.

The regional defense strategy is designed to take advantage of this position and preserve capabilities necessary to keep threats small. Our tools include political and economic steps, as well as security efforts to prevent the emergence of a non-democratic aggressor in critical regions. On the security side, through forward presence, sustained crisis response capabilities, and a continued technological edge, we can help to preclude potential aggressors from beginning regional arms races, raising regional tensions, or gaining a dangerous foothold toward hostile, regional domination. We can maintain the alliances and military capabilities necessary to our regional strategy. We can provide more security at a reduced cost. If a hostile power sought to capitalize on a vacuum and presented a regional challenge again, or if a new antagonistic superpower or alliance emerged in the future, we would have the ability to counter it. But the investments required to maintain the strategic depth that we have won through 40 years of the Cold War are much smaller than those it took to secure it or those that would be required if we lost it.

Maintaining Alliances and Coalitions (U)

Maintaining our alliances will continue to be an essential part of the regional defense strategy. The US will maintain and nurture its alliance commitments in Europe, the Far East, and Latin America. Unlike the Cold War, however, the US will play a
qualitatively new role—that of leader and galvanizer of the world community, but not always greatest contributor of manpower, materiel, or financial resources. As alliance partners acquire more responsibility for their own defense, the US will be able to reduce its military commitments overseas without incurring significant risks. These changes, however, must be managed carefully to ensure that they are not mistakenly perceived as a withdrawal of US commitment.

(C) Coalitions hold considerable promise for promoting collective action to regional or local aggression, as in the Gulf War. Like that coalition, we should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies in many cases carrying only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished. Nevertheless, the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the US will be an important factor in assembling coalitions and stabilizing crisis situations. American leadership in security issues will be a key element in fostering a democratic and peaceful international security system. 

(C) We should recognize that leadership, in some cases, will be taken by others, such as international or regional organizations, and we must accept and encourage this. Nevertheless, the United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated or when an immediate response is a necessary prelude to a larger or more formal collective response. This requirement will affect the type and level of presence we maintain in key areas of the world.

\[\text{(C)}\] Defense Strategy Foundations (U)

3. Technological Superiority (U)

(U) Technological superiority was critical to our success in the Gulf War. A primary goal of our strategy is to maintain that superiority in key areas in the face of reductions in force structure and the current defense industrial base, and in a global environment of technological proliferation.

(U) US forces must continue to be at least a generation ahead in those technologies which will be decisive on future battlefields. Future generations must have at least the same qualitative advantages over their opponents as our forces did in Desert Storm. To provide such high-quality forces for tomorrow, we must, in the first instance, maintain a robust research and development program. Our investment in innovation must reach and be sustained at levels necessary to assure that US-fielded forces dominate the military-technological revolution.

(U) Robust research and development alone will not maintain our qualitative advantage. The best technology in the world cannot alone win battles. New technologies must be incorporated into weapons systems produced in numbers sufficient for doctrine and tactics to be developed. To do this without large-scale production will require innovations in training technologies and the acquisition process. We need to be able to fight future forces
through simulation before we buy them. We need the ability to experiment with continuous, virtual and real R&D prototyping on future electronic battlefields, linked to key training ranges and competing, integrated design and manufacturing teams, if we are to reduce the time to get technology from the lab into the field, and if we are to concurrently develop the joint doctrine necessary to employ our combined forces. We must create incentives and eliminate disincetives for the defense industry to invest in new processes, facilities and equipment as well as in R&D. This will be increasingly important as procurement declines.

(U) To make certain the best technology is available to meet the demands of our defense strategy, we must build on our comparative advantages in stealth, space-based systems, sensors, precision weapons and advanced training and C3I technologies.

1. Quality Personnel (U)

(U) The Gulf War demonstrated that the quality of our military personnel is the key factor in success in war. The success of the Base Force concept will depend on our ability to attract and retain the best qualified personnel through an appropriate incentive structure as we transition to lower force levels. The US military will attain the Base Force force structure by FY 1995. In the subsequent years, we will seek to preserve the quality of our force at a level 25 percent lower than in FY 1990 in what may be an austere budgetary environment. Continued efforts will be required to terminate unneeded programs; close, coordinate or realign military bases; streamline our defense infrastructure and procedures; and maintain a proper balance between active and reserve forces.

2. Core Competencies (U)

(U) Core competencies are the leadership, doctrine, and skills needed to retain mastery of critical warfare capabilities. Retaining the lead in core military competencies will be a high defense priority for the FY 1994-1999 period.

3. Robust Alliances (U)

(U) The Cold War and the Gulf War illustrate the array of security challenges that can best be met with the help of an extensive system of security arrangements. In many respects, our alliance structure is perhaps our nation's most significant achievement since the Second World War. We have built longstanding alliances and friendships with nations that constitute a prosperous, largely democratic, market-oriented "zone of peace" encompassing more than two-thirds of the world's economy. The continued vitality of NATO and our alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, and others will remain a foundation of our security. The creation of an ad hoc coalition in Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield illustrates the use of our unique ability to unite others in response to aggression. This will be critical to future
responses. In the long run, preserving and expanding on these security arrangements will be just as important as either the successful containment of the Soviet Union or our defeat of Iraq. Alliances and security arrangements take many years to establish and, if lost, could take a generation or more to recover.

B. Defense Strategy Elements (U)

(U) The regional defense strategy requires an effective strategic deterrent capability, including strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces and strategic defenses. It necessitates a capable forward presence of air, ground, and naval forces, although reduced significantly from earlier levels and changed in many instances to reflect basing arrangements and reasonable expectations concerning force availability. Further, the strategy requires the ability to act quickly and decisively with a range of options against regional or local threats on short notice with modern, highly capable forces. It requires also that we remain mindful of future or emerging threats by providing the wherewithal to reconstitute additional forces, if necessary.

1. Strategic Deterrence and Defense (U)

(U) Deterring nuclear attack remains the highest defense priority of the nation, even though the threat of strategic attack has decreased significantly with the rise of democratic forces and the political collapse of the Soviet Union. Strategic nuclear forces are essential to deter use of the large and modern nuclear forces that Russia will retain even under a modified START regime and implementation of the nuclear initiatives announced by then President Gorbachev in the fall of 1991 and President Yeltsin in January 1992. Our nuclear forces also provide an important deterrent hedge against the possibility of a revitalized or unforeseen global threat, while at the same time helping to deter third party use of weapons of mass destruction through the threat of retaliation.

(U) Positive changes in our relationship with the Commonwealth states and the fundamental changes in Eastern Europe have all but eliminated the danger of large-scale war in Europe that could escalate to a strategic exchange. At the same time, the threat posed by the global proliferation of ballistic missiles and by an accidental or unauthorized missile launch resulting from political turmoil has grown considerably. The result is that the United States, our forces, and our allies and friends face a continued and even growing threat from ballistic missiles.

(U) The Gulf War raised the specter of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons proliferation and their delivery by missiles from hostile and irresponsible states like Iraq. A secure retaliatory capability should deter their use by a rational enemy but does not protect against accidental, miscalculated or irrational use. The President called upon Russian leaders in his September speech to join in taking "immediate concrete steps to
permit the limited deployment of non-nuclear defenses to protect against limited missile strikes -- whatever their source."

(U) Defensive forces will provide active defense of population centers and military targets against ballistic missile strikes. A global missile defense capability will help to ensure that neither the United States nor any future coalition partners is deterred by missile threats if it is necessary to employ military force in support of US interests. Limited deployment of defenses will also be an integral element of our efforts to curtail ballistic missile proliferation. Defenses would undermine the military utility of such systems and should serve to dampen the incentive to acquire ballistic missiles. In addition, defenses offer an alternative means of responding to ballistic missile attacks.

(U) In the decade ahead, we must adopt the right combination of offensive forces while creating the proper balance between offense and defense to mitigate risk from weapons of mass destruction from any source. For now this requires retaining the readiness of our remaining nuclear deterrent forces. In addition, we must complete the offensive modernization and upgrades for the forces we have retained. These offensive forces need to be complemented with early introduction of an appropriately sized GPALS system.

2. Forward Presence (U)

(U) The regional defense strategy emphasizes the criticality of maintaining US presence abroad, albeit at reduced levels. This is another enduring, though newly refined principle of US security policy. In the new strategy forward presence provides a key basis for sizing active forces.

(U) US forward presence forces send an unmistakable signal to allies and adversaries alike of our enduring commitment to a region. They help prevent the emergence of dangerous vacuums that have potential to incite historical regional antagonisms or suspicions and which fuel arms races and proliferation or tempt would-be regional and local aggressors to seek gains through the use of force--especially in this era of fragile and changing regional balances. Forward presence is critical to maintaining a
strong network of security relationships, to helping shape the future strategic environment in ways favorable to our interests, and to positioning us favorably to respond to emerging threats. It supports our aim of continuing to play a leadership role in international events.

(U) Forward forces also provide a capability for initial rapid response to regional and local crises or contingencies that may arise with little or no warning. Indeed, our forward forces should increasingly be capable of fulfilling multiple regional roles, and in some cases extra-regional roles, rather than deterring in a more limited sense by being trained and prepared only for operations in the locale where they are based. Special operations forces can help resolve conflict peacefully or deal effectively with selected low-intensity and terrorist threats. They are invaluable economy of force instruments of forward presence.

(F) Forward basing, of necessity, must become more flexible to accommodate changing regional configurations and to allow for a more dynamic character in our alliance relationships. This is true for our withdrawal from the Philippines, but it will be true elsewhere as well, including Panama. Basing and access arrangements will evolve along with our regional commitments, but must remain oriented on providing visible, though unobtrusive, presence and a forward staging area for responding to crises, large and small.

(F) Europe is experiencing fundamental transformation. In security terms, the changes there allow us to scale back our presence significantly to a smaller, but still militarily meaningful contribution to NATO's overall force levels, while at the same time retaining an effective theater nuclear component. In this new environment, a substantial American presence in Europe will provide reassurance and stability as the new democracies of Eastern Europe and possibly some states of the former Soviet Union seek to be integrated into a larger and evolving security architecture. It provides options for selected action should future leaders decide it to be in our interest. American presence will also allay Western European concerns as those countries seek a new identity through integration and possibly the emergence of a common foreign and security policy.

(FO retroactive to 16 FEB 93) In East Asia and the Pacific, the peace we have helped to secure for our allies has facilitated long-term economic growth
and now enables our allies to undertake a greater share of the regional security burden.

(U) In the Persian Gulf region, as an aftermath of the Gulf War, our traditional maritime presence is enhanced through arrangements for quicker return of land-based air and ground forces. We will focus on more prepositioning of munitions and materiel in-theater through additional maritime prepositioned forces or POMCUS provided by friendly states; increased ABM defenses; and improved in-theater command, control, and communications. Longer-term US presence in the region will depend upon a host of factors, including the evolving regional balance and the prospects for a lasting Middle East accord.

(U) In other regions, as the need for our military presence continues or as we see that some new or additional form of presence might further stability, we will increasingly rely on periodic visits of air, ground, naval, and SOF forces, training missions, access agreements, prepositioned equipment, exercises, combined planning, and security and humanitarian assistance. These more subtle forward presence operations most tangibly reflect the type of commitment we can expect in a dynamic global environment. This implies a more mobile and focused role for our presence forces rather than an appreciable increase in the overall level of activity.

(U) Reductions in forward presence involve risks, and precipitous actions may produce unanticipated and highly costly results from which it is very difficult to recover. The potential for increased risks can take several forms, not all necessarily related to decreases in our presence, but they can be exacerbated by lack of attention in this area. Planned reductions should be undertaken slowly and deliberately, with careful attention to making in-course adjustments as necessary.

3. Crisis Response (U)

The ability to respond to regional or local crises is a key element of our regional defense strategy and also a principal determinant of how we size our active and reserve forces. The regional and local contingencies we might face are many and varied, both in size and intensity, potentially involving...
a broad range of military forces of varying capabilities and technological sophistication under an equally broad range of geopolitical circumstances. We must be ready to deploy a broad array of capabilities. Highly ready and rapidly deployable power projection forces, including effective forcible entry capabilities, remain key elements of protecting our interests from unexpected or sudden challenges.

One trait most crises share is that they have potential to develop on very short notice. These conditions require highly responsive military forces available with little or no notice, a role best suited to the Active Component. Over time we must have the capability to respond initially to any regional contingency with combat and most support forces drawn wholly from the Active Component, except for a limited number of support and mobility assets. Reserve Component forces will be responsible primarily for supporting and sustaining active combat forces and for providing combat forces in especially large or protracted contingencies. In addition, mobilizing Reserve Component combat forces can provide the force expansion needed to enhance the US capability to respond to another contingency.

forces must be capable of accomplishing a major force deployment within current planning parameters.

4. Reconstitution (U)

(U) With the demise of the Cold War global threat, we have gained sufficient strategic depth that potential global-scale threats to our security are now very distant—so much so that they are hard to identify or define with precision.

Because we no longer face either a global threat or a hostile, non-democratic power dominating a region critical to our interests, we have the opportunity to meet threats at lower levels and lower costs—as long as we are prepared to reconstitute additional forces should the need arise. The new strategy
therefore prudently accepts risk in this lower probability area of threat, in order to refocus resources both on the more likely near-term threats and on high priority investments in the long-term foundations of our strategic posture.

Nevertheless, we could still face in the more distant future a new antagonistic superpower or some emergent alliance of hostile regional hegemons. For the longer term, then, our reconstitution strategy must refocus on supporting our national security policy to preclude the development of any potentially hostile entity that could pursue regional or global domination in competition with the US and our allies.
D. Challenges and Opportunities (U)

(U) With the demise of the Soviet global military challenge, military threats in regions critical to US security will be our primary concern. These regions include Europe, Northeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and the territory of the former Soviet Union. We also have important interests at stake in the Middle East, Latin America, Oceania, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

(U) To appreciate the applicability and relevance of our strategy to specific regional situations requires a more detailed analysis of the linkages and cross-currents within and among various regions. This also requires a more complete discussion of how the regional defense strategy will accomplish its dual mission of both protecting US national interests and concurrently sustaining our commitment to stability and order.
1. Former Soviet Union (U)

The breakup of the former Soviet Union presents an historic opportunity to transform the adversarial relationship of the Cold War into a relationship characterized by significantly greater cooperation. It already has reduced significantly our defense requirements. The best means of assuring that no hostile power is able to consolidate control over the resources within the former Soviet Union is to support the efforts of its successor states (especially Russia and Ukraine) to become peaceful democracies with market-based economies. A democratic partnership with Russia and the other republics would be the best possible outcome. At the same time, we must hedge against the possibility that democracy could fail. Our challenge is to construct the security hedges against democratic failure in such a way that we do not preclude future cooperation with a democratic Russia or increase the likelihood of failure.

For the immediate future, key US concerns will be the ability of Russia and the other republics to demilitarize their societies, convert their military industries to civilian production, eliminate or, in the case of Russia, radically reduce their nuclear weapons inventory, maintain firm command and control over nuclear weapons, and prevent leakage of advanced military technology and expertise to other countries.

Our goal is to ensure the completion of Soviet/Russian troop withdrawals from Germany and Poland. We should also encourage Moscow to undertake significant unilateral force reductions beyond those already negotiated.

Outside Europe, the former Soviet threat in Southwest and Southeast Asia has been significantly reduced by the Soviet/Russian withdrawals from these areas and the impending end of military and economic assistance to former clients. The announced withdrawal of Soviet military elements from Cuba is another important step.

Over the long term, the most effective guarantee that the Soviet Union's successor state does not threaten US and Western interests is democratization and economic reform.

2. East/Central Europe (U)

The end of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have eliminated the large-scale military threat to Europe. The ascendancy of democratic reformers in Russia is creating a more benign policy toward Eastern Europe. However, the US must keep in mind the long history of conflict in Eastern
European, as well as the potential for conflict between the states of Eastern Europe and those of the former Soviet Union.

The emergence of democratic, increasingly Western-oriented states in Eastern Europe is a development of immense strategic significance. The liberation of Eastern Europe—the gateway to Western Europe—provides strategic depth to Western Europe and significantly reduces our most urgent defense requirements in this region.

3. Western Europe (U)
4. East Asia/Pacific (U)
We must endeavor to curb proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. Where appropriate, as on the Korean peninsula, we can explore selective conventional arms control and confidence building measures, but we must avoid proposals that would erode US naval strength critical to our forward deployed posture.

5. Middle East and Southwest Asia (U)

We will tailor our security assistance programs to enable our friends to bear better the burden of defense and to facilitate standardization and interoperability of recipient country forces with our own. We must focus these programs to enable them to modernize their forces, upgrade their defense doctrines and planning, and acquire essential defensive capabilities.

The infusion of new and improved conventional arms and the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction during the past decade have dramatically increased offensive capabilities and the risk of future wars throughout the
region. We will continue to work with all regional states to reduce military expenditures for offensive weapons; slow the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles, and prevent the transfer of militarily significant technology and resources to states which might threaten US friends or upset the regional balance of power.

(S) The presence of drug production and trafficking in Southwest Asia complicates our relations with regional countries. We will support the efforts of US counter-narcotics agencies in the region in their mission to curtail the drug trade.

6. Latin America and the Caribbean (U)

(U) In Latin America and the Caribbean, the US seeks a stable security environment. As in the past, the focus of US security policy is assisting nations in the region against the threat posed by insurgents and terrorists, while fostering the development of democratic institutions. In addition, the US must assist its neighbors in combating the instability engendered by illicit narcotics, as well as continuing efforts to prevent illegal drugs from entering the United States.

(S) The situation in Central America will remain a concern. In El Salvador, we seek the successful implementation of the agreement reached by the Salvadoran government and the FMLN. We also seek peaceful resolution of the conflict in Guatemala. In Panama, we seek to foster stability. Our programs there must also provide the capabilities to meet US responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaties, including defense of the Canal after 1999.
(U) Countering drug trafficking remains a national security priority of the Department of Defense. Our programs must be geared toward attacking drug trafficking at the source, in the producing and refining countries, and along the transit routes to the US. In particular, we should assist Peru in its efforts to overcome a serious and growing drug-linked insurgency. Our programs must provide the capability to detect the flow of drugs from source countries to the US, and for providing that information via secure communications to enforcement agencies.

7. Sub-Saharan Africa (U)

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III. Programming for the Base Force

A. Introduction

1. (U) Purpose. This section constitutes definitive guidance from the Secretary of Defense for formulation of the FY 94-99 Program Objectives Memoranda, to be used in conjunction with the Fiscal Guidance published by the Secretary on 14 February 1992.

2. (A) Overall Program Priorities. To support national objectives and strategy while making the profound programmatic adjustments appropriate to the current strategic and fiscal environment, the Department must maintain effective strategic deterrence; continue adequate though reduced levels of forward presence; provide robust capabilities for regional crisis response; and provide reconstitution capabilities to forestall or counter any future global challenger. Under current plans, force structure reaches minimum acceptable "base force" levels (for strategic forces, crisis response forces, and forward presence levels alike) by around FY 1995 for most areas of the force, so we must give priority to retaining adequate levels of force structure. It is imperative, however, that we maintain this force at levels of readiness (training, manning, and equipping) adequate for deterrence and timely crisis response. Sustainability sufficient for the intensity and duration of crisis response operations is also of great importance. For modernization, a profound slowing in the Soviet modernization that long drove programs enables a new acquisition strategy, focused on selected research and advanced development to keep our qualitative edge in systems and doctrine, with greatly reduced emphasis on procurement.

B. Strategic Forces

1. (A) Offensive Forces. Program for base force levels as follows. This force will provide sufficient capability to support U.S. deterrent strategy, assuming CIS forces are reduced to START levels, the strategic environment continues to improve, and our modernization goals are attained. With partial downloading of the Minuteman ICBMs, this force will conform with the START treaty. (Bomber figures are total aircraft inventory.)

2. (A) Defenses. Within a refocussed SDI program, develop for deployment defensive systems able to provide the U.S., our forces overseas, and our friends and allies global protection against