FIFTH AIR FORCE

IN

THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS OF 1958 (U)

31 December 1958

Prepared by
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Director of Historical Services
Office of Information Services

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

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FIFTH AIR FORCE

PACIFIC AIR FORCES

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FOREWORD

Recognizing the defense of Taiwan as a continuing problem in which the diplomatic and military services of the United States have become increasingly deeply involved, Fifth Air Force has perceived the need of keeping a thorough record of its role in the international developments in that area.

From the establishment of its own provisional task force headquarters in the Taiwan theater in early 1955, until the renewal of hostilities by the Communist Chinese over the Taiwan Straits late in August 1958, this command has maintained a posture of readiness to assist in defense of the Island bastion. It has thus exemplified the spirit of the alliance long existing between the Government of the United States and that of Nationalist China.

The early circumstances of this alliance have been preserved in studies prepared while facts were still recent. The study at hand presents a sequel to the earlier record, providing a permanent narrative of subsequent events for the archives of this command.

In composing the report, the historian has been given fullest assistance of the staff. Its members have made all pertinent communications available to him, and he has been permitted to visit the zones of which he writes. A single limitation has been placed upon his efforts, the instruction to treat only those aspects of the Taiwan situation with which Fifth Air Force was directly concerned.

W. L. HELMANTOBER
Colonel, USAF
Chief, Information Services
Acknowledgement

In preparation of this study, valuable assistance was received from Lt Colonel Frank A. Sanders, Director of Fifth Air Force Tactical Operations Center, who made essential documents available.

Acknowledgement is also made of help obtained from Lt Colonel James B. Sweeney of this headquarters, who as Air Force Representative in the Information Services Office of the Taiwan Defense Center during the active phase of operations there, facilitated access to important sources.

A. G. O'N
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Taiwan Crisis 1958</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth's Earlier Taiwan Mission</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Current Picture</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of Forces</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASF</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Forces</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question of Control</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Command Element</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summit Conference</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Coverage</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidewinder Accounts for Self</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three-Mile Limit</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manning</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-Day Extension of Tour</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Deployment</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-104</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-100 to NCAF</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAR-3</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roll-Up</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A number of copies of this study, containing the full appendix, have been given only limited distribution because of the high classification of the documents to which the footnotes refer.
On the morning of 23 August 1958, the Communist forces on the mainland of China reopened artillery attacks of unacquainted intensity upon some of the off-shore islands held by the Government of the Republic of China. These attacks, intermittent and of slight effect during most of the intervening months since the beginning of hostile action by the Chinese Communists in the early 1950's, were believed to presage an invasion upon Taiwan itself.*

To Fifth Air Force, released only one week earlier from the alert in which it had been placed on 15 July 1958 because of disturbances in Iraq and Lebanon, the sudden developments in the Taiwan Straits carried a serious meaning. In the first place they were reminiscent of an earlier crisis which sent elements of Fifth Air Force to Taiwan to form a provisional tactical headquarters. In the second place, and with greater

* Taiwan, historically known as Formosa, as it was named by Portuguese settlers, lies in this geographic position: 21°17'52.5"-25°37'53" North Latitude and 119°18'13"-122°6'2" East Longitude.
immediacy, they pertended the implementation of the command's operations plan designed for just such an emergency as now existed.

And the instructions for this implementation were not long in coming. On 26 August 1958, Pacific Air Forces Headquarters, Fifth's superior command, reimposed the alert status upon this command and directed implementation of OPlan 25-58. Later the same day Pacific Air Forces Headquarters (PACAF) directed Fifth to place under Condition 4 those units committed by OPlan 25-58.

The Operations Office of this headquarters prepared a special presentation on 28 August for Lt. General Robert W. Burns, Fifth's new commander; familiarizing him with OPlan 25-58. Lt. Gen. Burns was keen and vital in his role as the new commander.

Fifth's plan was written in support of the one PACAF evolved for the same purpose, and it was given the same numerical designation as that of the superior command.

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Lt General Burns assumed comd of 5AF '4 Aug '58, per SAF GO 70, 4 Aug 58, vice Lt General Frederic H. Smith, Jr. /
Msg, PACAF to 5AF (S) PFOC-451, 26 Aug 58. /
Msg, PACAF to 5AF (S) PFOC-459, 26 Aug 58. /
5AF OPlan 25-58 (15), 26 Aug 58. (Cyt-dtd to USAF Hist Div). /
PACAF OPlan 25-58 (15), 7 Aug 58.
Fifth's Deputy for Operations, Colonel Horace A. Hanes, had transmitted the plan by wire to component organizations on 8 August, and two weeks later had distributed the printed publication to all units concerned.

In a statement at its beginning, the plan set forth the general circumstances under which it would be carried out, noting that it committed certain Fifth Air Force components to the operational control of the Commander of the Philippines-based 13th Air Force* for conduct of tactical air operations in support of the Government of Republican China (GRC) forces defending Taiwan and the Penghuis.

The general statement further explained that operations under the plan would be carried out in two and possibly three phases: Phase I, patrol and reconnaissance (actually underway at time of publication); Phase II, Defeat of the attacking forces; and Phase III, expanded air operations against Communist China. The third phase, if implemented, would be conducted primarily by forces of the Strategic Air Command supported by Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) and component commands.

Fifth's mission under the plan, as has been indicated, would be to provide and deploy certain combat-ready forces.

* Maj Gen Thomas S. Moorman.

to the operational control of the Commander, 13th Air Force
to assist in defending Taiwan and the Penghu against at-
tack, and in conducting such combat air operations as might
be necessary.

To accomplish this mission, the plan designated the fol-
lowing organizations as task forces:

11th Air Division
313th Air Division
3rd Bomb Wing (TAC)
16th Tactical Fighter Wing
67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing
6000th Support Wing
10th Weather Group
5th Communications Group
1st Communications Squadron
7th Tactical Depot Squadron

Fifth's Earlier Taiwan Mission

Indeed, it was in anticipation of just such an eventuality
that Fifth Air Force had set up in Taipei early in 1955 a pro-
visional task force headquarters under Brigadier General Harold
W. Grant, formerly of this command. The establishing of that
headquarters followed the outspoken threats of Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai against Taiwan and the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Although Fifth was relieved of the provisional headquarters a few months later when responsibility for conducting the establishment was transferred to the 13th Air Force, this command continued to hold considerable official interest in Taiwan because of its continuing mission of sending flights of tactical aircraft on mobility exercises to the Chinese Nationalist stronghold. /

Fifth's experience in Taiwan in 1955 and earlier have been recorded in the command's histories of the periods and in two special studies published at the time the command's activities were current. /

The Current Picture

Now, in mid-summer of 1956, new portents of trouble for Nationalist China appeared. The western world viewed a four-day conference between Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Red China's

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/ 5AF Special study "Fifth Air Force in Formosa" by R. D. Burns, 25 Jul 55; 5AF Special Study "Fifth Air Force in Taiwan (second phase)" by R. D. Burns, 15 Mar 56.
Mao Tse-tung ending on 3 August in Peiping as a possible preliminary to the flare-up beginning on 23 August. At the close of this conference the two leaders issued a joint communique denouncing British and American aggression in the Near East and demanding an immediate meeting of leaders of governments of the "Big Powers."

In Taipei, Tao Hsi-sheng, an advisor to President Chiang Kai-shek, saw the international meeting of the Communist leaders as boding ill for the Taiwan area as well as elsewhere in Asia, and his fears seemed well grounded when the long-smouldering Communist attack on Quemoy and adjacent islands reopened scarcely three weeks later with increased intensity. This coincidence was mentioned by President Eisenhower soon afterward in an answer to one of Khrushchev's letters in which he noted the remarkable sequence of events, observing that:

"The present state of tension in the Taiwan area was created directly by Chinese Communist action, not by that of the Republic of China or by the United States. The fact is that following a long period of relative calm in that area, the Chinese Communists, without provocation, suddenly initiated heavy artillery bombardment of Quemoy and began harassing the regular supply of civilian and military populace of the Quemoy's. This intense military activity was begun on August 23rd, some three weeks after your visit to Peiping. The Official Peiping Radio has repeatedly been announcing that the purpose of these military operations is to take Taiwan (Formosa) as well as Quemoy and Matsu, by armed force."

President Eisenhower's statement harked back to one made by Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai on 8 December 1954, offi-
"The Chinese people wish to announce to the whole world that Taiwan is a territory of China and the Chinese people are determined to liberate it. Only by liberating Taiwan from the tyranny of the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique can the Chinese people accomplish complete unification of the fatherland and further safeguard peace in Asia and the world."
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

The Taiwan Straits crisis came just at the time the US military structure in the island bastion was being re-organized, the sudden eruption of hostilities upsetting the plan and dictating the rapid realignment of command. The eventual adoption of a new scheme of organization followed, closely resembling the arrangement which had previously existed.

As has been told in an earlier study of the Taiwan situation, Fifth Air Force, upon direction of the JCS, had ceded control of its task force at Taipei to 13th Air Force in June of 1955 after the Tachens evacuation in the spring of that year. /1/

In the three-year interval between that date and 23 August 1958, a gradual alteration in status of Taiwan-based forces developed with which Fifth Air Force was not involved. The recording of that evolution is left to the historians of the 13th Air Force and the 13th Air Task

/1/ Interview with Dr. H. Kelley, Historian, 13th ATF (P) at Taipei, 11 Oct 58.
/1/ 5th AF Study, "Fifth Air Force in Taiwan, (Second Phase)" by R. D. Burns, 15 Apr 56.
Force, upon whose field this study does not intrude. It is considered relevant, however, in order to provide a grasp of the set up at the beginning of the 1958 action, to briefly sketch the scheme of integration of US military elements current at that time, and it is done with the permission and assistance of the officers of the responsible commands. / 

In March of 1958 the United States-Taiwan Defense Command and the command element of the US Navy in Taiwan were combined under Vice Admiral Roland N. Smoot as supreme commander. / At the same time, Brigadier General Fred M. Dean was given the dual role of Chief of the Air Force Section of MAAG-Taiwan and Commander of Air Task Force 13 (Provisional). Later, the Taiwan Air Base Group (Provisional) was redesignated the 6211th Air Base Group, while Detachment 1 of the Taiwan ABG was deactivated on the same date. * At the same time the Tainan ABG, which had been Detachment 2 of the 6200th Air Base Wing, ** became the 6209th Air Base Squadron under the 6214th Air Base Group.

Under the setup thus outlined, the 6211th ABG became the logistic and administrative headquarters in Taiwan, while

** 6200ABW, Spprt Organ of 13AF at Clark AB, FI.
/ Dr. H. Kelley, Historian, 13ATF (P).
ATF 13 (P) became the Air Force operational headquarters solely of service of forces of S.E. Asia.

Hardly had this plan been placed in effect when the augmentation of US troops began as a result of the 23 August outbreak and the reorganization was thrown overboard. It was at this juncture that Fifth re-entered the picture on a scale that justified the recording of its part in the new Taiwan operations, for it was in response to the directives initiating the augmentation of troops that this command transferred a considerable number of its own personnel to Taiwan, to Okinawa and to the Philippines, as is told under the subject of Manning in this volume. And it was in compliance with related directives that Fifth sent elements of its own tactical forces and supporting and control units with considerable quantities of equipment and supplies to the same locations. These facts are also recorded in detail later in the narrative.

The deployment of forces in Taiwan and the physical disposition of command elements prevailing on 29 September 1958,

* On 1 September Lt Col DeLair A. Clark of the Defense Plans Division in Fifth's Ops Office arrived at Taipei to individually observe the status of tactical units and to learn the immediate requirements. In the course of a ten-day visit, he initiated from Taipei many of the communications with this headquarters which form the substance of an appreciable part of this account.

/ Ibid.
only a month after the fateful 23 August date, are shown in following pages. They attest the rapidity of action on the part of those bearing Air Force responsibilities in the Far East theater and of Fifth Air Force in particular.

These deployments and dispositions preceded the arrival of Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) elements from the ZI and elsewhere, summoned to the theater by the Commander of 13th Air Force on 27 August.\(^1\) With these forces, Fifth Air Force was concerned only insofar as their arrival and assumption of missions in the Taiwan area affected its own activities or relieved it of responsibilities.

**CASF**

Commitment of TAC's Composite Air Strike Force to the Taiwan area had been directed by USAF Headquarters at 1525Z on 29 August 1958. The force consisted of one squadron of F-100D's, one C-130 squadron, ten tanker aircraft and a communications and control element, plus six RF-101's which were already in-place by the time this headquarters received information about their position from USAF through PACAF.\(^2\)

To Fifth Air Force this deployment presaged a release of its own units from commitments in the Taiwan area. As will

\(^1\) Msg, 13AF to PACAF (TS), 130PP-58-1395, 27 Aug 58.
\(^2\) Msg, PACAF to 5AF (TS), PFOOG 0374, 30 Aug 58.
be seen; this prospect was realized soon afterward. The listing below illustrates the disposition of USAF and USMC units and strength as of the close of September. /

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Armament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>83rd Fighter-Interceptor Sq</td>
<td>Tao Yuen (Gen Tacon)</td>
<td>F-104A</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Fighter-Interceptor Sq</td>
<td>Tainan</td>
<td>F-86D</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2.75 Rocket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Fighter-Interceptor Sq</td>
<td>Hsin Chu</td>
<td>F-86D</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.75 Rocket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>388th Tactical Fighter Sq</td>
<td>Chiao Yi</td>
<td>F-100D</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMF 451</td>
<td>Pingtung</td>
<td>FJ-4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20mm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMF 115</td>
<td>Pingtung</td>
<td>FJ-4D</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>GAR 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMF 314</td>
<td>Pingtung</td>
<td>FJ-4D</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>GAR 8 or 19.2.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So rapid was the execution by the 16th Squadron of the movement order that it evoked from General Kuter the following commendation: /

The departure of the first F-86D aircraft from Naha in 4 hours and 15 minutes after transmission of movement order from PACAF and completion of deployment 3 hours and 20 minutes later must be considered an outstanding performance.

Details of this movement are given in this study under Aircraft Deployment.

/ DE, ATF 13 (P) TOFDG to Comdr TDA, Subj: Strengths ATV 13 (P) TOFDG, 29 Sep 58.
/ Msg, PACAF to SAF (S), PFGNC 13011, Personal for Burns from Kuter, 30 Aug 58, App 1 & 2.
Present Strength  
29 Sep 58

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Taipei</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Airmen</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Det 1, 13 AF</td>
<td>Assigned 61</td>
<td></td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TDY 77</td>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>621st Comm. Sq</td>
<td>Assigned 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TDY 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6209th AB Sq</td>
<td>Assigned 12</td>
<td></td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TDY 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6987th RSM</td>
<td>Assigned 10</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|               | Tao Yuan       |          |        |
| Det 2, 6214th | Assigned 11    |          | 196    |

|               | Other Assigned |          |        |
|               | CASF 83rd F Intcp Sq | 33 | 213 |

|               | Hainanu        |          |        |
|               | 621st AB Group | 15       | 115    |

|               | Taichung       |          |        |
|               | 507th CC OP    | 16       | 158    |

|               | Chia Yi        |          |        |
|               | 621st AB Group | Assigned 2 | 10    |
|               |                | Attached 6 | 130   |

More is said about the disposition of forces in this study under the subject of "Question of Control" wherein later disposition of CASF units is shown.
Other Forces

Lest the impression be given that USAF units were the only armed forces of the US on Taiwan, the fact is emphasized that the US Army and Navy were well represented on the island and that even among the Nationalist forces sizeable contingents of their naval aircraft were strategically distributed.

Nor were tactical elements of the USAF its only representatives. There were stationed at Tainan in southern Taiwan the 868th Tactical Missile Squadron with its TM 61-C missile, the Matador "pilotless bomber." At the hands of the 868th, this formidable weapon could be electronically guided deep into the Communist mainland.

The Matador unit under command of Lt Colonel Frank P. Dannelly, had arrived in Taiwan in February 1958, and had since that date been on 24-hour alert.

Additionally, and more recently, the US Army had introduced its Nike missile batteries in Taiwan, and they, like the Matador units, were held in constant readiness for action.

Thus, Fifth Air Force was not by any means the only American military resource to bulwark the Nationalist defenses, nor

// 13 ATF (P) release by H/Sgt S. E. Wickam, 4 Sep 58.
// Intvw, 13 ATF (P) Historian, Dr. H. Kelley, 11 Oct 58.
was it the only USAF organization to deploy units to Taiwan, a fact which is stressed at this point and brought out in detail in this study under the caption of Aircraft. In that chapter the early presence in Taiwan of F-101's and F-104's of other USAF commands is acknowledged.

The services of a mobile training team were needed by the Nationalist Chinese Air Force (NCAF) pilots of the F-100F aircraft they acquired on 1 September, and an eleven-man unit arrived from the ZI on 16 September to provide that requirement. They were the Mobile Training Team 59-11-1, a part of the 3499th Field Training Wing, Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois. The mobile team provided complete F-100F instruction to both NCAF pilots and maintenance technicians, and ten Chinese pilots soloed on 3 October in the two-seated Super-Sabre.

So rapid was the progress of this training unit that it anticipated readying a full complement of trained personnel for the NCAF F-100 unit by 1 December, and this was done.

The F-100 training program was inaugurated under the auspices of Air Force Section of MAAG-Taiwan.*

* See page 82.

/\ 13 ATF (P) release by Sgt S. E. Wickam, 8 Oct 58.
/\ Intrvw with Capt F. P. Robison, Jr., DCS/Ops TOC.
Congestion at Bases

Saturation of facilities at Kadena soon made itself strikingly apparent, and efforts to effect more suitable deployment of forces were aggressively pursued as could be seen in a PACAF advice to 13th Air Force that if continued presence of the F-100 CASF squadron at Kadena could not be supported, then the B-57 CASF squadron should be moved to Naha AB./

Fifth had decided immediately after the outbreak of the Taiwan crisis that its aircraft engaged in striking pre-planned targets and targets of opportunity would utilize Kadena AB for launch and recovery, though it foresaw the possibility that deployment of some tactical fighter units to Taiwan bases for non-nuclear offensive operations might later be required by an expected supplement to 13th Air Force’s OPlan 25-58. One of these units was the 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron about which more is said elsewhere.

A few days later General Burns advised Maj General J. S. Hardy, Deputy for Plans and Operations of PACAF Headquarters,

/ Ibid.
// Msg, 5AF to PACAF, Info to 13AF (TS), 5FCCR 56-3804, 9 Sep 58, Personal for Hardy from Burns and Msg, 313AD to 5AF (TS), 31300-58-222, 1 Sep 58, App. 3.
/// Msg, PACAF to 13AF, Info to 5AF, PFDOP 0187, 11 Sep 58.
///// Msg, 5AF to 18TFW, Info to 13AF (TS), 5FOOTP 58-3387, 29 Aug 58, App. 4
of his concern, and that of General Moorman over the crowding of deployed units at Kadena./

Looming importantly as a factor in the utilization of other bases than those in Japan for support of Taiwan operations was the known objection of the Japanese Government to such use.* In anticipation of protests, Fifth was considering availability of Naha, Futema, Clark and Korea Bases. /

But space considerations were uppermost in General Burns' efforts to avoid and relieve congestion at the bases involved, and he planned to propose moving the CASF B-57 aircraft from Kadena to Naha AB, if TAC's F-100 squadron, then stationed at Kadena, were not further deployed to Taiwan./ Naha was already slated to accommodate CASF tanker aircraft.

As a result of congestion felt at Clark AB after the Reds began their Quemoy shelling, the 13th Air Force Commander felt constrained to ask PACAF to restrict personnel

* Foreign Minister Jichiro Fujiyama had on 16 Sep received from Premier Nikita Krushchev a letter accusing Japan of aiding the USAF in its Taiwan movements in behalf of Nationalist China.
/ Msg, SAF to PACAF, Info to 13AF (TS), 5FCOR 58-3804, 9 Sep 58. App 3.
/ Ibid.
/ Ibid.
movement to and through his base to those having essential business connected with OPlan 25-58.\/

The squeeze persisted at Clark until late in November, when General Moorman's headquarters was able to advise, referring to its late August warning, that conditions no longer required restriction of movement of personnel at Clark to those connected with the Taiwan operations.\/

More is said concerning the slackening of USAF activities in the Taiwan crisis in the section of this report entitled "Roll-Up."
QUESTION OF CONTROL

With a rapid concentration of USAF elements building up in Taiwan and in such other places in the theater as the Philippines and Okinawa, the question of operational control of those forces inevitably arose, and the centralization of command naturally suggested itself. The matter assumed particular importance in the mind of General Moorman under whose command, the 13th Air Force with headquarters at Clark AB, so much of the initial disposition of forces was taking place.

General Moorman accordingly conveyed to General Burns his belief in a need for a "small command element in Okinawa under operational control of the 13th Air Force to control those elements of Fifth Air Force committed to implementation of 25-58 plus the units of CASF X-Ray Tango...and additional units being requested by PACAF." He proposed to Fifth's commander that a meeting be held at Clark or in Okinawa to discuss these matters together with Brigadier

/ Msg, 13AF to 5AF (TS), 13 GCR 58-TS-1620, 1 Sep 58.
App 6. / Msg, PACAF to 5AF (TS), PFOCC 0374, 30 Aug 58. App 7.
General Avelin Tacon who was heading a command element related to the CASF then en route.

General Burns readily assented, and on 4 September he met at Okinawa AB with General Moorman, General Tacon, and Colonel Wallace C. Barrett, the latter representing the 313th Air Division. General Burns was accompanied to the conference by Colonel Hanes, previously mentioned, Colonel Willis L. Belmontoler, Chief of Information Services and Colonel Thomas Ryan, Assistant Deputy for Materiel.

The conferees at once began discussing the establishment at Kadena of a forward command center under the 13th Air Force. It was at first agreed that the projected center would be called the Kadena Command Post, and its function would be the operational control of various units deployed to Okinawa for participation in the Taiwan action. As of 4 September, these units were:

TAC's CASF
- One squadron of the 3rd Bomb Wing (Tac).
- Two squadrons of the 16th Tactical Fighter Wing.
- Several task forces of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, equalling one squadron.

In an oral report on the 4 September conference, Colonel Hanes gave the following summary from his notes:

/ Intvw with Colonel H. A. Hanes, 5th AF DCS/Ops, 25 Sep 58.
General Moorman proposed putting General Tacon in charge of the projected center, but General Burns and Colonel Hanes felt that "the place for Tacon was Taiwan as Mr. Air Offense for 'Iron Bomb' (non-nuclear) operations, while General Dean should be Mr. Air Defense Forward for 13th Air Force."

As matters turned out, General Tacon was named as assistant to General Dean, and it was further decided that Fifth provide the head of the Kadena task force and most of its support personnel, drawing them from the 313th Air Division, the 6313th Air Base Wing and the 10th Tactical Fighter Wing.

General Moorman, next day, however, advised that he had changed his mind about the nominee for the Kadena task force, proposing Colonel Victor Warford of CASF X-Ray Tango as head of the projected agency.

Meanwhile Fifth received instructions from PACAF that as CASF units arrived Fifths own units would be relieved of their commitments. This meant that the bulk of forces committed to OPlan 25-58 would be CASF units.

We therefore agreed to Colonel Warford as top man and recalled Colonel Harry Hawthorne and Colonel Hendry of this headquarters whom General Burns had earlier agreed to leave there.

The 13th Air Force began referring to the Kadena task force as CASF, but Colonel Warford was without instructions.

When the B-57's of the CASF arrived at Kadena, PACAF informed us that the 3rd Bombardment Wing was relieved of the commitment of its 13th Bombardment Squadron to OPlan 25-58.

With this information, we dropped the Quick Strike targets under the plan. The CASF B-57's, however, did not assume these targets and Colonel Warford still awaited instructions.

// Ibid.
// Msg, 3d BW (Tac) to 5AF (TS), 3BW 58th WOC, 3 Sep 58. App 8.
I sent a message to Colonel Rex Fryer, Deputy for Operations of 13th Air Force, advising him that people were confused about the Kadena situation and that targeting assignments were not adequately taken care of. We still had units involved, even though CASF elements were on hand. I suggested that he send a senior officer to Kadena to straighten out the confusion. Within four or five days General Moorman and Colonel Fryer went to Kadena. I sent Colonel Hendry back down there with Major Chandler of our Tactical War Plans Office, as well as some men from the 3rd Bomb Wing with target folders and some reconnaissance people. Hendry and Chandler stayed there for nearly two weeks.

Colonel Hanes voiced his conviction that the Kadena task force should receive its instructions for high explosive bombing from 13th Air Task Force (P) and for atomic strikes from 13th Air Force direct, and he observed that this arrangement had been adopted.

As the overall control picture in the trouble zone shaped up by the last week of September, it found Taiwan Defense Commander, Admiral Smoot confirmed in his assignment, controlling US Forces on Taiwan and working on a level with the Nationalist Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MND). Under Admiral Smoot were the Navy Liaison on one hand maintaining liaison with the US Seventh Fleet; and on the other, Air Task Force 13 (P) forming the JOG and directing the ADCO.

As thus arranged, the military organization in Taiwan was depicted by Colonel Hanes in the diagram below:
Enlarging on the arrangement as diagrammed, Colonel Hanes explained that officers of the Seventh Fleet desired to extend lines from the northern tip of Taiwan to a position at the same latitude on the China mainland and from the southern tip of Taiwan to the opposite position on the mainland inside of which the Taiwan Defense Command and the US Marines could operate. Above and below the zone thus marked out in the China Sea the Seventh Fleet would give assistance inside the area "as they could."
In Colonel Banes' opinion, if this plan were adopted, "three different wars would be going on at once, if things popped."

Clarifying the control picture as far as Taiwan itself was concerned, was a directive from the JCS in Washington confirming the supremacy of command there of Admiral Smoot. While under this confirmation as Commander of the Taiwan Defense Command, Admiral Smoot would control the elements of the US Marine Corps; he would not control the Seventh Fleet.

A New Command Element

A new provisional command element was created in Okinawa on 19 September when the CASF Task Force Headquarters was officially redesignated the 13th Air Force Command Element, Ryukyu, Provisional, and attached for administrative and logistic support to the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena.

The general order of the 313th Air Division announcing this disposition indicated the following unit attachments from the Tactical Air Command to the new provisional organization:

313AD GO 33, 13 Oct 58, citing PACAF Msg PFCN 13485, 17 Sep 58; 13th AF GO 43, 25 Sep 58; and AFR 20-27 and PACAF Supplement thereto, App 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Major Air Command</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>477th Tactical Fighter Sq</td>
<td>Tactical Air Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>522nd Tactical Fighter Sq</td>
<td>Tactical Air Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>499th Tactical Bomber Sq</td>
<td>Tactical Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Element, Detachment 2,</td>
<td>Tactical Air Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4505th Air Refueling Wg</td>
<td>Tactical Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications Task Element,</td>
<td>Tactical Air Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>507th Communications and Control Group</td>
<td>Tactical Air Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another TAC unit participating in the Taiwan CASF operation was an element of the 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, though this organization was not among those mentioned in the cited 313th Air Division General Order.

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Chart illustrating briefing by Lt Colonel Emerson for officers attending SAF Cmdrs Conf, 19 Nov 58.
Taiwan Summit Conference

Before action evolving from the 4 September conference proposals crystallized, an assembly of the highest commanders in the Pacific convened in Taipei on 22 and 23 September 1958 for consideration of other urgent issues. This conference brought together Admiral Harry Felt, Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Forces, General Kuter as Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Air Forces, Admiral Wallace Beakley, Commander of the Seventh Fleet, and Admiral Smoot. These high officers met in the Offices of the Defense Ministry with Chinese Nationalist Defense Minister Yu Ta-Wei and General Wang Shu (Tiger) Ming. Admiral Felt and General Kuter later conferred separately with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek himself. Concerning these meetings, General Kuter made a statement at Fifth Air Force Headquarters enroute back to Honolulu. This statement, because of the light it casts upon the conference and because of its bearing upon Fifth's history and that of the USAF at large, is appended in full to this report. / 

In brief, General Kuter recalled that he had in 1955 urged finding a means of greatly increasing the military

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* Soon afterward succeeded by Adm Frederick N. Kivette.
capability of the GRC to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores and concurrently evacuating Matsu and Quemoy, because he regarded them as a great military liability. His recommendation, however, met with blunt rejection by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander-in-Chief of US Forces in the Pacific, and later with a similar response from Admiral Felix B. Stump, Radford’s successor.

It seemed to General Kuter that the concept of establishing the GRC in Quemoy and the Matsu’s originated with Admiral Radford, probably in connection with President Eisenhower’s advocacy in his first political campaign of “unleashing Chiang Kai-shek,” and he believed that the Admiral continued to defend the idea as a matter of personal pride and professional opinion.

General Kuter pointed out that he had since opposed this concept before General Nathan F. Twining, Air Force Secretary Donald R. Quarles and W. J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of Defense.

In his interview with Defense Minister Yu Ta-wei at Taipei on 22 September 1958, he found that official inexorably resigned to the necessity of using the Nationalist Chinese Air Force in what Yu termed “the unfolding of a Greek tragedy,” evolving from inevitable military action against Quemoy or the Matsu’s by the Communist Chinese.
General Kuter candidly asserted that he attributed a
beleagueredness to the Defense Minister's aims, suspecting him
of desiring to embroil the USAF in the struggle between the
Nationalists and the Communists.

Admiral Felt told General Kuter that Chiang Kai-shek
on 23 September had discussed greater USAF support to Chi-
inese Nationalist air drops on Quemoy.

"When the Gimo talked about psychological require-
ments," General Kuter added, "I believe he meant the en-
tanglement of the USAF aircraft and crews in the shooting
war, not merely 'cheering up the troops."

From the observations and reflections he made after
the Taipei conversations, particularly during his stop-
over in Korea, General Kuter was prompted to dispatch some
messages to Admiral Felt and others from this headquarters.
These messages also are appended herewith.

On the issue of airlift support to the GRC, General
Kuter's attitude was equally firm. His feeling was that
efforts to resupply the beleaguered off-shore islands
would cost many lives, and he wanted to give USAF crew
members a fighting chance. For that reason he preferred

// Msg. SAF to CINCPAC(TS), 5FCR 5BL197 and 5FCR 5BL199,
Personal from Kuter for Felt, 26 Sep 58. App 11 & 12.
that the aircraft they should fly be of the fighter rather than the transport type. /

"If we are going to accede to political pressure to expose USAF personnel and aircraft to Chicom flak and fighters over Quemoy, I wish to do it in fighting aircraft so that our crews would have some chance of fighting back," General Kuter declared. /

To Fifth Air Force, the views of persons at the highest levels of government were significant in that they afforded a basis upon which the duration and extent of the Taiwan crisis could be estimated and the likelihood of implementing the commands EWP could be gauged.

Whatever the Generalissimo's intentions may have been at the time of the late September meeting with the US military leaders, his response to questioning of news correspondents soon afterward expressed his attitude toward American support upon which he appeared to implicitly rely. /

His comment was evoked by an aspersive statement of Secretary Dulles as to the military value of the off-shore islands to Taiwan. /

/ 1 Msg, 5AF to 13AF, Info PACAF, 5FCGR-94229, Personal for Moorman from Kuter, 26 Sep 58. App 13. 
/ 3 USFJ Press Translation 2 and 3 Oct 58. 
/ 4 Ibid.
News reports emanating from Kaohsiung, Taiwan and Washington are reproduced herewith:

President Chiang Kai-shek expressed incredulity over the reports from Washington that US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had said it would not be "wise or prudent" to keep Chiang's large forces on the islands if a dependable ceasefire could be arranged.

"Mr. Dulles must know," Chiang declared in an interview, "that is only wishful thinking to ask the Chinese Communists for a ceasefire."

"Granted that Mr. Dulles made the statement attributed to him," he added, "it would be only a unilateral declaration and my Government would be under no obligation to keep it."

"We have confidence that Mr. Dulles is sincere toward us and that he has faith in our cause," the President added.

Chiang said press reports indicated that Dulles aimed at a ceasefire and to prevent the present battle for Quemoy from spreading.

"What he is quoted as having said seems completely incompatible with our stand and does not sound like him."

"There seems to be implications at variance with his own earlier utterances on the subject."

Chiang said the determination of his government to hold on to Quemoy and the other off-shore islands has been made so amply evident that it was not necessary to cover the same ground again.
INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE

The Office of the Deputy for Intelligence in Fifth Air Force Headquarters might be said to have had a "special stake" in the happenings along the coast of China in the latitude of Taiwan before and during the 1958 flare-up. For years the staff of that office had held the area under constant surveillance, watching closely the activities of the Communist forces and drawing from them some deductions of high significance.

As has been recorded in the periodic historical reports of this command, there had been taking place in the region in question a rapid buildup of airfields, of highways, of railroads and of a complex of radar installations which augured menacingly for the security of the off-shore islands held by the Nationalists and for the more distant Pescadores and Taiwan itself. /5

Fifth's Intelligence specialists were mindful of the repeated assertions of Chinese Communist leaders of their
purpose of invading and "liberating" Taiwan and its insular dependencies. They viewed the coastal preparations on the mainland as a logical sequel to these promises, and they kept their commander and his staff well advised of their findings and the interpretations they placed upon them.

It was thus a quite logical circumstance that when the heavy artillery bombardment of Quemoy and adjacent islands began in late August of 1958, it surprised no one in this headquarters. Instead, as has been seen, it was fully anticipated as evidenced by the fact that a part of 5AF OPlan 25-58, which had been developed for just such an emergency, was already in effect when the fusilade began.

In the eyes of the Intelligence Office, the action of the Communists, beginning on 23 August, was a culmination of trends long perceived. The Intelligence specialists had been watching "a gradual buildup of a defense system lacking offensive overtones," to quote Lt Colonel Willard L. Bolton, Director of Estimates in the Intelligence Department. His staff had evidence of improvement in the radar net along the China coast with equipment new to the Communists there, though it had been bequeathed to them after obsolescence in the Soviet system.

"We date the Taiwan situation from the movement of this equipment into the Shoran Fields opposite Taiwan," Colonel Bolton explained. He recalled that the Communist defense system had deployed considerably southward into the Canton area and was preparing obviously to deny the Chinese Nationalists reconnaissance efforts which, from the Red standpoint, were becoming more and more flagrant. A gradual stiffening of resistance to these efforts was seen in the south central air defense sector of the China coast, and it was observed that four new airfields were constructed to back up the coastal complex.

In the view of the Estimates Directorate, the Chinese Communists were surprised by the Lebanon flare-up and Iraq revolt of mid-July and opportunistic enough to take advantage of it while US Forces were committed to that area. The Reds felt, the Directorate reasoned, that it was a favorable time to move into airfields opposite Taiwan without fear of reaction which the Chinese Nationalists had threatened against such movement in 1955. Further, it was believed that the Red Chinese were desirous of winning the allegiance of overseas Chinese in Malaya and Southeast Asia, largely business people, some of whom were becoming politically active. By the capture of a few off-shore islands, it was thought, the Reds would impress the overseas Chinese, perhaps already wavering in their loyalties.
Meanwhile, on their part, the Chinese Nationalists, in the estimate of Fifth's Intelligence Office, would welcome an opportunity to involve the United States in support of their efforts to invade the mainland and possibly hoped to entice the Communists into serious aggression in order to invoke the American pledge of support.

On the basis of this appraisal of the situation, the Estimates Directorate were watching developments in the area for any reliable indication of actual preparation for a sizeable amphibious assault. No such evidence had appeared as of late September. What shipping had been observed in the Taiwan Straits had been sporadic and did not add up to a serious attempt in the opinion of Colonel Bolton and his staff.

Nor had the Directorate been able to detect any buildup of aggressive action either in Europe or in the Middle East which would lend support to Chinese Communist designs.

As seen by the Directorate on the late September date, the crisis in Taiwan appeared to be "a harassing program to gain utmost propaganda value for the Reds."

Colonel Bolton, speaking for his office, did however, foresee an increasing shelling of the off-shore islands to interdict supply lines and thus cause the Nationalists there to "wither on the vine," but he did not discount the newly
reported intelligence that the Communists were bringing into position a 203mm gun (equivalent to an 8-inch naval cannon) for possible use against concrete gun emplacements on the islands. He also foresaw the sinister prospect of US naval involvement if such a weapon were trained on any vessel of the Seventh Fleet currently riding in Taiwan waters.
COMBAT

On 25 August the Communists stepped up their assault against the off-shore islands, while on the same date the Nationalists announced their sea patrols had intercepted and driven back two Red flotillas attempting an invasion of one of the islands of the Quemoy group.

A two and one half day silence in the off-shore war was broken on 8 September when Communist coastal batteries blew up a Nationalist ammunition ship on Quemoy beach.

On the same date, Nationalist jet pilots reported shooting down five Communists warplanes over the Formosa Straits with no Nationalist losses.

General Curtis E. LeMay, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, visiting General Wang Shu-ming, Chief of the General Staff, Republic of China, in Taiwan on that date, personally congratulated the victorious Nationalist pilots at their home base.

Another engagement between aircraft of the combatants, occurring on 18 September, netted five more MIG's. They
were victims of Nationalist Chinese F-86s. This news, broadcast the following morning from the Tokyo studio of Far East Network, the US Forces radio system, was confirmed at the Commander's Briefing in this headquarters the same morning when the Intelligence Office reported that gun camera film revealed its accuracy. In answer to General Burns' inquiry as to the locale of the aerial engagement, Colonel William S. Boyd, Deputy for Intelligence, advised that it had taken place directly over Que-moy and also at a position 20 miles south of that island.

One week later, 24 September, Fifth received reports of the largest aerial engagement between Nationalist and Communist aircraft to date. In this encounter, of an estimated 100 Red aircraft aloft over the Taiwan Straits, ten were shot down, without loss of any Nationalist planes.

Intelligence received by Colonel Boyd's office tended to corroborate this report, and the following explanations were adduced for the lopsided tally:/

/ Chinese utilizing the F-86 have been eminently successful in air encounters with ChiCom Frescoes. Since August the total stands: Destroyed - 25, damaged - 13.

/ 

/ Captain R. L. Bury, 5AF DCS/Intel in Cmbr's Briefing, 19 Sep 58.
/ Intel Briefing for 5AF Cmbr by Capt Earnhart, DCS/Intel, 25 Sep 58. App 15.
On 20 September the Chinats probably bagged two more Frescoes not reflected in these totals. They are reluctant to claim them because of the US desire that they avoid engagements during the Warsaw meeting.

Encounters so far have paralleled our experiences in Korea with Frescoes attacking in large numbers with an altitude advantage. Daily missions summaries from TDC indicate that the Chicsms are utilizing poor tactics. Individual instances are: (1) Loose combat formation with the wing man losing his leader; (2) Poor mutual support between elements; (3) Overshooting while attacking; (4) Throwing away the altitude advantage; (5) Turning away from the attacker. Our observers report that the Chinats, on the other hand, have flown excellent combat formation and have pressed every advantage.

The Sidewinder Accounts for Itself

In reporting the spectacular performance of the Nationalist fighter planes against their Red counterparts, one of Fifth's Intelligence officers disclosed that four of the F-86F's taking part in the air battle of 24 September had each been equipped with two Sidewinder missiles. Aiming five of these weapons at the Chicom aircraft, they scored bulls-eyes on four, sending them to earth.

General Burns inquired as to the reliability of this information and was advised that it was accepted by the Intelligence Office. Associated Press dispatches of 30 September reported Chou En-lai as denouncing the US for
supplying the NCAF with the Sidewinder missile and of threatening "powerful blows" in retaliation.

Perhaps to the consternation of Red China's Premier, who may have expected a denial of his charges from the US State Department, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles publicly confirmed the fact that the NCAF had been given the heat-seeking air-to-air missile originally developed by the US Navy and known to possess extraordinary accuracy.

The gun camera film exposed by the Nationalist pilots in their engagements with Red aircraft on 18 and 24 September was developed in Taipei and brought to this headquarters a few days later. Here it was projected on 7 October for the staff and for General Kuter who had returned to Fuchu to meet Mr. Neil H. McElroy, US Secretary of Defense.

The film, although difficult to read, showed clearly that several of the Red aircraft were MIG-17s and that their operation was inexpert by USAF standards. It showed also that the MIG's did not jettison their wing tanks. But the fact of greatest importance revealed by the film was that it showed the effectiveness of the Sidewinder.

More is said about this weapon under logistics.
Red Tactics

Meanwhile the Reds were continuing an unrelenting artillery bombardment on Quemoy and little Quemoy from the mainland and by 28 September had fired approximately 384,000 projectiles of assorted diameters upon these islands. It was estimated that if the shelling continued unabated through 30 September, the total would reach 400,000.

Despite the heavy raking of Quemoy, Nationalist Chinese efforts to resupply the garrisons and the civil population there with necessities continued with some success. In these efforts, LST's and other small craft were employed during September, but at the close of that month LSD's (landing docks) were provided by the US Marine Corps. These vessels possessed six times the capacity of the LST's. In addition, they carried new mechanical apparatus increasing the volume and speed of the unloading operation.

Nature Takes A Hand

A manifestation of nature intervened at an early stage in the 1958 Taiwan crisis* to thwart the Communist's purpose at least momentarily. It was a visitation of fringe

* Typhoon Grace - 2 & 3 Sep confirmed at 5AF Cmdrs Briefing, 10 Sep 58, by Lt Col Sanders of 5AF TCC.
/ AF Report, 1 Oct 58.
/ Ibid.
winds of Typhoon Grace, which hampered the movement of Communist surface craft seeking to prevent the landing of Nationalist troops on the island in question. The same storms, of course, hindered Nationalist military activity and for an interval of approximately 48 hours operations in waters adjacent to the islands were checkmated.

Fire from the mainland was continued however, though sporadically in the opening days of September.\/

Again nature intervened in Fifth's operations, necessitating evacuation of some aircraft of this command to haven bases at a time when their instant ability was most desired. A second storm, designated Typhoon Helen, reached the Tokyo area at approximately 0800 hours on 18 September. Heralded beforehand by the Tokyo Air Weather Central, its arrival was fully expected and the fact that this headquarters was obliged to go into typhoon Condition 1 was duly transmitted to PACAF Headquarters.\/

One week later the command was alerted to the approach of still another typhoon and one of greater intensity.\/

It was named Ida, and as of 25 September, was located 570 miles SE of Okinawa. By 0600 hours on 26 September, however,

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Capt R. L. Dury, 5AF DCS/Intel, Cmdr Briefing, 9 Sep 58.
Msg 5AF to PACAF (TS), COMOC 110-G 5F001-TOC 58-1064, 17 Aug 58.
Wea Briefing for Cmdr 5AF by Capt Trogolo, 10th WQ, 25-26 Sep 58.
its position had shifted to 500 miles S-SW of Tokyo, and at 1100 hours, Fifth's Headquarters was experiencing fringe effects with heavy and continuous rain and gusts. All of the Tokyo complex of air bases were placed under Condition 1. The winds reached peak velocity of 70 knots at 2300 hours, but principle damage was done by the extremely heavy rainfall. Evacuation of command aircraft and other precautions prevented serious injury or damage to command property, but the storm seriously disrupted schedules.

Diplomacy at Warsaw

At approximately the same time, a statement attributed in press reports to Premier Chou En-lai expressed his government's amenability to proposals for a meeting of diplomats of both the United States and Communist China in Warsaw to resolve differences. The meeting, it was believed, would resume diplomatic talks broken off in Geneva several months earlier after failure of the Communist Chinese to liberate Americans whose confinement in China was one subject of contention.

Actually, the diplomatic meetings did take place in Warsaw between Mr. Jacob D. Bean, US Ambassador to Poland,
and Wang Ping-nan, Ambassador to Poland for Communist China.

The first in the series of discussions of the Taiwan Straits situation was held on 15 September 1958. The meetings were interrupted temporarily on 22 September, presumably as a result of a crisis developing in US-Soviet relations when President Eisenhower rejected an intemperate letter from Premier Nikita Khrushchev. A part of the President’s reply has been quoted.

The Russian leader’s letter threatened expulsion of US Forces from the Taiwan area by Chinese Communist forces with Soviet assistance. The inauguration of the Warsaw discussions did not, however, signalize a cessation of hostilities in the Taiwan Straits, for the Red Chinese shelling of the off-shore islands continued, while the Nationalist Chinese persisted, with some success, in their efforts to run the blockade and unload supplies to their forces on Quemoy. Warships of the US Seventh Fleet under command of Vice Admiral Wallace M. Beakley, meanwhile remained outside the three-mile limit.*

* The Chinese Communist regime had on 4 September, soon after the outset of the reopened siege upon the off-shore islands in the Taiwan Straits proclaimed a 12-mile limit off the China Coast. This new limit the US State Department and the British Home Office promptly rejected. The latter government, relying on British treaties with past Chinese Governments covering navigation through territorial waters around Hong Kong. Vice Adm Beakley assumed command of US Seventh Fleet, 26 Jan 57. Rear Adm Frederick N. Kivette, Asst CNO for Air, was enroute to Far East to relieve Adm Beakley at time of Taiwan Straits crisis.
Continuance of Red hostilities in the Taiwan Straits even while diplomatic negotiations were in progress in Warsaw did not surprise Fifth's Intelligence Deputate. That office recalled the continuing and intensified combat action carried on by the Red Chinese in Korea while armistice talks progressed slowly at Panmunjom during the Korean campaign. More is said later of Intelligence estimates of Red operations and of a ceasefire ordered by the Red Chinese Government early in October, apparently without reference to the Warsaw pourparler.

The Three-Mile Limit

In connection with the question of the extent of Red China's territorial waters, the Commander of Fifth Air Force, in his dual role as Commander of USFJ, received explicit instructions from the JCS in a message of 29 August which read in part:

The following actions are directed:

1. Within international waters, beyond three-mile limit, give convoy protection and escort to extent you feel militarily necessary to extent GBC forces cannot fulfill this task.

// Msg, JCS to Cmdr USFJ and MLtpl Addees; JCS S#7298, 29 Aug 58.
2. US Forces will maintain principle of "Freedom of the Sea" in Taiwan Straits by actions confined to international waters.

3. Commander, Taiwan Defense Command, at his discretion after consultation with GRC authorities, assume responsibility for air defense of Taiwan & Penghu using US Forces to the extent practical, GRC AF thus released will be available for defense of off-shore islands and air cover for convoys.

4. In event the Chinese Communists launch air attack on Kinmen or Matsu's and such action were met by GRC aircraft, the US would consider that GRC inherent right of self-defense would include GRC air action on Chinese Communist aircraft conducting the attacks and that right to pursue existed; i.e., GRC aircraft would be justified in following Chinese Communist aircraft to their bases and attacking aircraft at these bases.

As may be seen, the cited message did more than assert the US Government's insistence upon honoring only the traditional three-mile limit of territorial waters; it prescribed the extent to which US Forces under the Commander, Taiwan Defense Command could be used in the air defense of Taiwan and the Penghu under the existing situation, and it posed no objection to engagement by GRC aircraft of attacking Communist aircraft nor the pursuit of intruders by GRC aircraft even as far as the intruders' bases on the Chinese mainland.

The importance of this message could be gauged in the light of US State Department apprehensions, frequently expressed, that the Nationalist Chinese might take unilateral
action against the Communist forces of a more aggressive nature than the US Government would approve or support./

The opening statement in the OPlan 25-58 recalled that the Chinese Communists had repeatedly announced their intention of gaining control of Taiwan and the Pescadores, but by the date of publication, this statement appeared superfluous in view of the violence and persistence of the Communist attacks already underway upon Quemoy.

The actual events in preparation for which the plan was written were by 1 September 1958 broadcast throughout the world. By that date it had become widely known that the GRC was sending troop reinforcements of its own to the beleaguered islands and that the United States Government was moving armed ground and naval forces to Taiwan both to bolster the Nationalist Chinese defenses, should the need arise, and to assist in the transfer of men and supplies to the off-shore islands under attack.

In this movement Fifth Air Force was directly involved, for by 26 August 1958, this command had received, as has been said, some explicit instructions from PACAF on the immediate implementation of parts of OPlan 25-58.* These instructions

* Cy of 5AF OPlan 25-58, 26 Aug 58, fwd use to USAF Hist Div AU.
// Capt R. L. Bury, 5AF DCS/Intel in Comdrs' Briefing, Sep 58.
directed the movement to bases in Taiwan, Okinawa, and the Philippines of certain Fifth Air Force tactical elements, airlift of equipment and supplies, and augmentation of personnel manning the units initially sent to the theater where action was accelerating hourly.

Meanwhile, the home stations of these units served also as supporting bases, with Itazuke and Kadena Air Bases affording the locale for much preliminary activity, and Ashiya Air Base, utilized by the 315th Air Division, serving as the hub of transport aircraft dispatch. The particulars of the activities generated by this situation form the content of the following pages.

It is emphasized at this point that, quite uniquely, a phase of OPlan 25-58 was already underway at the time the plan was published. That was Phase I, as has been said, the patrol and reconnaissance aspect of the plan of defense of Taiwan. This phase involved US Naval Forces and the reconnaissance forces of the GRC as well as US Air Forces, including Fifth Air Force, 13th Air Force and the US Taiwan Defense Command (TAIWAN DEFCOM or TDC) headed by Admiral Smoot./

/ Annex B, 5AF OPlan 25-58, 26 Aug 58, p. 3.
The 67th TFW

Fifth's principal representative in this phase was the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, stationed at Yokota AB, Japan, under command of Colonel Owen G. Atkinson. This wing's 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron was deployed to Kadena at this time, and an element of the wing was also shifted to Clark Air Base for in-flight refueling service.

In this connection, Fifth alerted the 67th Wing on 23 August to the possibility of direct support requirements being levied upon it if the tactical situation so demanded. "Should this requirement develop, you will be advised," the reconnaissance organization was told.

This headquarters by joint action of the Office of Deputy for Materiel and the Director of Tactical operations, issued a movement directive to the 67th Tactical Hospital at Yokota Air Base to ready the unit's four officers and 25 airmen and equipment for transfer to Tainan Air Base. The time of the movement was stipulated as 0800 hours 31 August 1958.

Movement of the hospital unit was to be accomplished by organizational C-119 aircraft.

The 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing assumed that its tanker and reconnaissance forces placed under 13th Air Force

/ Msg, 5AF to 67th TFW (TS), 5PMELP-P 58-3201, 25 Aug 58.
operational control would not be deployed or redeployed from Clark and Kadena; that these bases would be used both for strike and recovery in any operations under 5AF OPlan 25-58. The wing advised that it intended to meet night photo reconnaissance requirements with RB-66B aircraft staging from Kadena. It offered the services of a reconnaissance staff officer if desired.

Cease Fire

President Dwight D. Eisenhower had told a news conference in Washington on 1 October that the Nationalist-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu, near the Communist mainland, were not vital to the defense of Taiwan. But he said he did not know whether demilitarizing those islands would offer a solution on which everybody could agree.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, at a news conference the day before, said the large Nationalist forces on the off-shore islands should be cut back if there were a cease-fire.

Mr. Eisenhower had expressed his conviction as a soldier, "It is not a good thing to keep large forces on the Nationalist Chinese off-shore islands."

// Associated Press dispatch, 1 Oct 58.
Because of a news report from Warsaw on 4 October that the diplomatic talks taking place there between Ambassadors Beam and Wang Ping-nan had been suspended for six days, this headquarters was hardly prepared for an announcement emanating from Peiping the next day that a seven-day ceasefire had been ordered by the Red Chinese Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai. The order became effective Monday, 6 October, to the surprise of many allied leaders and the consternation of some.

In Fifth Air Force Headquarters the ceasefire was studied for its possible intent, with some weight accorded the Nationalist Chinese view that it was "a propaganda plan to drive a wedge between the US and Nationalist China." It was known that the Nationalists meanwhile were exerting maximum efforts to resupply both civil and military requirements to Quemoy.

On 13 October the Red Chinese radio in Peiping announced that the ceasefire period had been extended for two weeks, effective on that date. The announcement was without amplification.

One week later, however, the Red shelling of Quemoy and little Quemoy was abruptly resumed. The reopening of the bombardment was accompanied by a Peiping radio broadcast that it

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\[\text{Capt. R. L. Bury, DCS/Intelligence in Cdr's Briefing, 7 Oct 58.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{Interview with Lt Col Ed Kandel, ISO, 13AF, Clark AB, 14 Oct 58.}\]
was punishment meted out to the Nationalists for their availing themselves of US Naval escort in the resupply of the garrisons on Quemoy.

While US Navy representatives denied escorting resupply vessels since the ceasefire began, it was acknowledged that an LSD had been sent to Quemoy to haul some landing craft off the beaches where they had run aground.

Abrupt termination of the ceasefire cast a serious pall over the conversations of Secretary Dulles and President Chiang Kai-shek which began upon the Secretary's arrival in Taiwan on the morning of 21 October.

Mr. Malcolm A. MacIntyre, Under-Secretary of the USAF, had visited Taipei on 11 October, one day before the arrival of Mr. Neil H. McElroy.

The visits of these two officials were for fact-finding purposes. Mr. MacIntyre remained in Taiwan only a few hours, while Mr. McElroy stayed until 15 October, proceeding from there to Clark Air Base for a visit with General Moorman.

While in Taipei, Mr. McElroy conferred with President Chiang Kai-shek and General Wang Shu-ming, familiarizing himself with their attitudes, and he visited military establishments in Taiwan to gain first-hand impressions. His itinerary is appended herewith.

/ TDC info Bureau itinerary of Secretary McElroy. Add lh.
At Clark Air Base the Defense Secretary saw the concentration of high-performance jet tactical aircraft, of transport aircraft of the C-130 type and of reconnaissance jets belonging to an element of Fifth's 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing. His visit to Clark coincided with that of Colonel Owen G. Atkinson, 67th Wing Commander, who flew to the Philippines to confer with 13th Air Force officers concerning reconnaissance matters.

Apparently uninfluenced by the nearness of high American officials conferring in Taiwan and in the Philippines during the ceasefire, the Peiping regime broadcast over its official radio the news that it would conduct bombardments on alternate days. These days, it indicated, would be the even-numbered dates of the calendar. The broadcast further announced that this curtailment of action would remain effective only as long as the United States refrained from sending its forces inside the twelve-mile area Peiping had prescribed.

The on-again off-again character which the Communist forces behavior thus assumed defied assessment in this headquarters, but it was generally felt that only the Communist Chinese could have conceived such a unique course of conduct.

USFJ Press Translation, 18 Oct 58
The announcement was followed by some desultory shelling of off-shore island targets on even numbered dates.

A Reassessment at High Level

In response to a call from General Kuter to a conference on the Taiwan situation to be held at 13th Air Force Headquarters in early November, General Burns asked Colonel Hanes, Colonel Helton and Colonel Maxwell to accompany him to Clark Air Base to join General Kuter and General Moorman.

The purpose of calling the conference, as General Kuter explained, was to enable him to prepare a presentation on the Taiwan crisis at a high-level meeting in Washington later that month.

The meeting took place on 5, 6, and 7 November with Clark and John Hay Air Bases as the locales. There, Fifth's representatives provided General Kuter with the needed information concerning what had already happened in the Taiwan Straits crisis and then reviewed their capabilities for the further conduct of OPlan 25-58. In the discussion that followed, the paramount issue was the employment of high-explosive versus (Iron Bomb)/nuclear weapons, and the following conclusions were reached:

\* Col E. Helton, DCS/Mat and Col E. B. Maxwell, DCS/Mat.
/ Mag, PACAF to SAF, PFCNC 15298, 18 Oct 58. App 16 & 17.
/ Ibid.
/ Intrvw with Col H. A. Hanes, 12 Nov 58.
a. Our posture could support only a few days of iron bomb operations.

b. An iron bomb war would quickly dissipate our EWP capability.

c. Quick reaction time by CASF would be essential to the retention of an EWP posture.

d. Command channels and relationships must be pre-planned and clearly delineated for contingency operations.

The question of which type of weapon to employ in case of actual combat in the Taiwan theater had been one of paramount importance to the Air Force commands concerned from the outset of the Taiwan operation, as exemplified in a succession of communications on the subject.
MANNING UNDER THE EMERGENCY

The task of manning the Air Force units and elements destined for the Taiwan area was one of herculean size. Its urgency was readily recognized by those remote from the theater as well as by those close to it, and the measures taken to provide the required personnel formed a singular example of expeditious action at all levels.

Illustrative of the grasp of requirements the Taiwan crisis presented and of promptitude in arranging to meet them was a succession of urgent messages exchanged between this headquarters and superior and subordinate commands. Hardly had the Red attack upon the off-shore islands begun than precise statements of manning needs were received in the office of Fifth's Deputy for Personnel.

Indeed, because of advance knowledge of Communist China's designs upon the islands, augmentation of personnel for units in the affected areas was actually begun several days before the Red attack was launched.

The 'Shakaleg' Program

In the early flow of correspondence pertaining to the Taiwan situation, two communications from General Laurence
S. Kuter, Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Air Forces, carried special significance. These messages, transmitted on 1 and 2 September 1958, respectively, were addressed to Lt General Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Hq USAF; Lt General Burns of this command; Major General Thomas S. Moorman of the 13th Air Force; Brigadier General Charles H. Pottenger of the 315th Air Division at Tachikawa Air Base; and Brigadier General Paul T. Preuss of Hickam Air Force Base.

In the first of these messages, General Kuter stated that arrival of Combined Air Strike Forces (CASF), mentioned previously, had created exceptional demands on currently assigned personnel. He explained that the essentially bare-stripe operation for these newly deployed forces and the operational command role newly imposed upon the 13th Air Force had brought about this circumstance, while the need for maintaining the Emergency War Plan (EWP) posture "at highest order" throughout PACAF still remained imperative.

At the same time, General Kuter's 1 September message pointed out, current MAV's* were not made up for the dual.

* Manpower Authorization Voucher.
/ Msg, PACAF to Hq USAF, Info SAF, 13AF, 315AD, & Base Comm Hickam AB (S), PFCOC 523, 2 Sep 58; Msg, PACAF to SAF, 13AF, & 315AD (T1) PFCOC 0656, 1 Sep 58, App 23 & 24.
// Msg, 6311 ABG to SAF (S), AGADSU 236 R, 16 Aug 58, Msg, PACAF to SAF (S), PFMRA-MSSZ, 4 Sep 58; Msg, PACAF to SAF (C) PFMRA-MPR 13945, 21 Sep 58; Msg, PACAF to SAF (U), EIFO/PFMRA-M-P 13967, 23 Sep 58. App 25, 27, 28, 29, and 30.
mission of EWP and the Taiwan defense. It therefore asserted
the need of extraordinary personnel action procedures to as-
sure orderly assignment of qualified personnel.

Against this urgency, the message acknowledged that no
emergency stockpile of people existed, and that the practice
of utilizing TDY personnel from PACAF resources had already
robbed Peter to pay Paul who must be repaid in order to main-
tain the EWP posture.

The message further pointed out that the "normal lead
times (in sending men) to the far reaches of this command
cannot be tolerated," and that sending personnel TDY from
the states for an unknown duration was also impractical. It
therefore recommended PCS assignments to Taiwan and the Phil-
ippines of unaccompanied personnel as "most desirable."

The message advised that PACAF would base its determi-
ation of personnel requirements in excess of current manpower
ceilings upon subordinate commander's recommendations and up-
on a pilot crew ratio of 1.5 for three fighter-interceptor
squadrons in Clark, Okinawa, and Taiwan and three tactical-
fighter squadrons in Clark and Okinawa directly committed to
the emergency.

90-Day Extension of Tour

The PACAF commander's message carried several other
highly important concepts in the nature of instructions, not
the least of which was PACAF's approval of involuntary ex-
tension of overseas tours (officer and enlisted) up to 90
days. In addition, the sender promised to provide the 13th
Air Force with TDU personnel from his resources. He made it
clear that the extraordinary measures would supplement the
normal flow of personnel and avoid duplication of regular
manning.

Because of the effect of his proposals and instructions
in initiating these extraordinary procedures for emergency
manning, General Kuter's message is appended in full to this
narrative./

Also appended in full is General Kuter's second message
of 2 September to Generals Thorns, Moorman, and Pottenger./

While this communication was primarily concerned with tacti-
cal aircraft availability, it dealt in terms of units equipped
with them, and the "packages" which it mentioned included crews
as well as aircraft. Its content afforded to the discerning
reader a glimpse of future problem areas in the manning of
squadrons whose early disposition in the Far East, the mes-
sage presaged. Because of the priority of the subject of air-
craft in this message, it is discussed under that heading in
this report. It was felt, however, that with approximately
25 aircraft assigned to each squadron, activated or prospective, and with a crew ratio of 1:5 per aircraft, the acuteness of the manning problem could be readily foreseen.

Such apprehensions as this message evoked were fully borne out only a few days later in a lengthy statement from the commander of the 313th Air Division asserting that his command's capabilities were "extremely limited" for providing ground support equipment for F-100's and B-57's, and complaining that there existed at Kadena Air Base "major deficiencies" in personnel and equipment for handling conventional bombs. This message itemized in detail the categories of personnel and materiel needed.

A third message in the succession of transmissions from CINCPACAF at the beginning of September carried further the instructions and authorizations instituted in General Kuter's first communication. It was sent by Major General Matthew K. Deichelmann, PACAF Deputy for Logistics and Administration, and it began by delegating to wing level the authority for involuntary extension of overseas duty up to 90 days, but it called for a reporting by name, grade, AFSC, and month of forecast, the names of persons

/ Msg, 313AD to 5AF (TS), 313 MC58-254, 7-Sep 58, ref 5AF msg 5FOOT-TOC 58-3578, 3 Sep 58 and 5FMDG LOC 58-3581, 3 Sep 58. App 31 & 32.
/ Msg, PACAF to 5AF, et al (S), PFDAL 533, 2 Sep 58. App 33.
so retained. It stipulated that the Commander of the 13th Air Force would go direct to Fifth's Commander and to the 315th Air Division for augmentation "as requirements dictate," citing OPlan 25-58 as authority for these requirements. It specified that all movements would be in TDY status, and it stressed importance of proper personnel accounting.

Of particular importance in the accounting system was the practice prescribed by General Deichelmann's message of accepting at PACAF Headquarters the information copy of the requirement message from 13th Air Force as a requisition for PCS personnel within the "Shakaleg" augmentation procedure. General Deichelmann directed that "as soon as 'Shakaleg' augmentations arrive, Commander, 13th Air Force will return to home stations those individuals borrowed from other commands."

The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing messaged Fifth Air Force on 7 September giving a revised list of personnel augmentations required to support operational missions. The wing asked that this headquarters disregard a message it had sent on 28 August concerning augmentation, explaining that revision was made possible through authorization granted to involuntarily

// Msg. 18 TFW to 5AF (G), WO039742, 7 Sep 58.//
extend overseas tours and to the fact that temporary duty CASF units were found to have more of their own field maintenance personnel than originally planned.

The wing, however, requested manning in excess of 100 percent of current authorizations for men with AFSC 42251 - to furnish liquid oxygen (LOX) servicing for the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, transient aircraft, and CASF units, 432X0 - to provide engine buildup for the 15th TRS and CASF units and 562X0 - to operate all LOX-producing facilities on Kadena on a 24-hour, 7-day basis.

The 18th Wing followed its 7 September message with another the next day inquiring as to the effect of Project "Shakalex" on time limitations for the utilization of ZI assignments. It asked, "Are assignments not utilized prior to end of month subsequent to month for which furnished due to involuntary extension to be retained and utilized? In what manner are substitute assignments to be procured? What length of time can we anticipate as necessary in the procurement of substitute assignments?"

The wing pointed out that holding of assignments for the 90-day period and utilization upon completion thereof would provide flexibility in effecting immediate release of extended

/ Msg, 18TFW to 5AF (S), PCA 18807, 8 Sep 58.
personnel as replacements become available from the ZI. It asserted that this information would have an important effec-
t on the implementation of Project "Shakaleg" and the morale of officers and airmen.

In response to urgent inquiries from the 313th Air Division and the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing concerning the status of ZI assignments for officers and airmen extended in this theater for 90 days before they could report to the waiting ZI command, this headquarters questioned PACAF about this matter. In its inquiry, Fifth pointed out the undesirability of the administrative workload which would be entailed in the turn-back of unfilled assignments and in the reforecasting of individuals unable to accept the ZI as-
signments within the 90-day period.

The reaction of PACAF to this inquiry was a prompt request to the Chief of Staff of USAF Headquarters for a tempo-
rary waiver of the applicable directive to allow utilization of ZI assignments as late as three months after month of travel (MOT). /?

* Para 3c(2), Chapter 6, Part III, ARM 35-11.
/ Msg, 313AD to 5AF (S), 313PG 9-110, 29 Aug 58, and
Msg, 18TFW to 5AF (U), 18FDC 09242, 9 Sep 58. App 34.
/ Msg, 5AF to PACAF (S), 5FDC 92016, 12 Sep 58. App 35.
/ Msg, PACAF to CoF S USAF, Info to 5AF (S), 5FDC 13749,
13 Sep 58. App 36.
PERSONNEL SUPPORT OF 5TH AF OPLAN 25-58

AS OF 8 SEP 58

I. DEPLOYED ORGANIZATIONS AND/OR DETACHMENTS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Airmen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16th Fighter Interceptor Sq</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Communications Group (Det)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67th Tac Hospital (Det)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Shoran Beacon Sq (Det)*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
<td><strong>312</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* In addition 1st Shoran Deployed 1 WO and 1 Civilian)

II. INDIVIDUAL PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION FOR 13TH AF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requested</th>
<th>Furnished</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Airmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158</td>
<td>551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>344</td>
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</table>

III. GRAND TOTAL OF 5TH AF PERSONNEL FURNISHED FOR 5TH AF OPLAN 25-58:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airmen</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>638</strong></td>
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</table>
PERSONNEL SUPPORT OF 5AF OPLAN 25-58
AS OF 19 SEP 58

I. DEPLOYED ORGANIZATIONS AND/OR DETACHMENTS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Airmen</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16th Fighter Interceptor Sq</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Communications Group</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67th Tac Hospital (Det)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Shorean Beacon Squadron (Det)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
<td><strong>336</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

II. INDIVIDUAL PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION FOR 13TH AF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requested</th>
<th>Furnished</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Airmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189</td>
<td>993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148</td>
<td>681</td>
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</table>

III. GRAND TOTAL OF 5AF PERSONNEL FURNISHED FOR 5AF OPLAN 25-58:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Airmen</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>1017</td>
<td>1222</td>
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STATUS OF INVOLUNTARY EXTENSION OF PERSONNEL

AS OF 31 OCT 58

Personnel Initially Extended

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airmen</td>
<td>2,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,345</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Personnel Released from Involuntary Extension

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airmen</td>
<td>1,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Personnel Currently Extended

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airmen</td>
<td>969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INDIVIDUAL TDY STATUS

AS OF 31 OCT 58

Returned from TDY

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airmen</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Currently on TDY

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airmen</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* From chart prepared by DCS/Per for briefing by Lt Col H. R. Emerson at 5AF Cadrs Conf, 19 Nov 58.*
LOGISTICS

What has been said about the alertness of Fifth's Intelligence staff to military developments in Red China may also be said of the staff of the Deputy of Materiel.

Before the Red's overt action against the off-shore islands in August and ensuing months, the Materiel Office had been readying against the very emergency which this action created. In fact, a highly developed program of stocking strategic bases in the Taiwan area with supplies needed in this event had been in actual progress for more than three years. This program was at first named Project "Pigtail," and it later became known as Project "Strongbox." Project "Seaweed" was another program of prestockage of bases figuring in the command's EWPs.

On 14 August PACAF transmitted to Fifth in teletype form Annex F to its OPlan 25-58. This message, the logistics part of the basic document, provided that forces moving to forward operating bases or to other bases for operations
would deploy only minimum equipment essential to the success of the mission, making maximum use of prestocked equipment. Additionally, mutual support and joint utilization of all available equipment would be effected.

The message further provided that Seaweed assets would be used in accordance with detailed instructions contained later in the same directive. It placed upon the Commander of 13th Air Force the responsibility for providing necessary ABG-type support for units, TAC or PACAF, deploying to Clark or to Chia-Yi.

The message called upon the 13th Air Force Commander to negotiate support agreements with the Commander of SAMAP with headquarters at Clark, to provide base supply and depot level logistic support to units deployed to Clark and Chia-Yi, and to arrange enroute support for CASF units at Andersen Air Force Base.

It prescribed that requirements, including conventional munitions, auxiliary fuel tanks, and POL to support the plan would be computed upon war planning factors provided for general operation, with duration of sorties adjusted to the geographical location of the planned operation.

It called for an estimate as soon as possible of war consumable requirements together with a report of current consumables available in 13th Air Force area.
The same directive placed definite responsibilities upon Fifth's Commander. First among these was base support for TAC units deploying to Kadena. It required Jet Engine Field Maintenance (JEM) for TAC CASF units in accordance with provisions of an agreement formalized at the PACAF/TAC conference of 12-16 May 1958.

It directed Fifth's Commander to provide or arrange for en route support of TAC CASF units deploying through Hickam Air Force Base, Wake, Midway, and Kwajalein.

The message placed responsibility upon the 315AD Commander for base support JEM and field maintenance to TAC C-130 units deploying to Ashiya in accordance with the 12-16 May agreement.

As to the utilization of Seaweed assets, Annex F prescribed that station set equipment, prestocked at Tainan, Chai-Yi, and K-2 for TAF, would be used to support the TAC or PACAF F-100 squadron deployed to Chia-Yi, only as needed to augment or offset shortages in the combined Chia-Yi-Tainan assets.

It further provided that equipment prestocked for SAC and MATS might be used in place, but that such equipment would not be removed from station where prestocked and would be used only as a stop-gap measure.
As to housekeeping equipment at Chia-Yi, the Annex directed that Fifth Air Force and 13th Air Force supplement it with Seaweed or base assets. It placed upon the 13th Air Force Commander the task of determining housekeeping requirements to support the F-100 squadron at the base in question, while it prescribed that housekeeping sets available at Futemai be deployed to Kadena Air Base. It enjoined immediate replacement of any expendable supplies contained in these sets.

Realizing that personal attention of knowledgeable officers to the on-the-scene problems would be imperative if smooth coordination on OPlan 25-58 between this command and 13th Air Force were to be achieved, Colonel Elbert Helton, Fifth's Materiel Deputy, ordered two of his staff officers to Clark Air Base several days before the August outbreak of Red action against the off-shore islands. The officers sent to the headquarters of the 13th Air Force were Lt Colonel C. W. Fowles and Major Milton F. Gregory, specialists in mobility planning. Major Gregory had been project officer in the Pigtail, Seaweed, and Strongbox projects of material prestocking and was thoroughly familiar with the lay of the land in Taiwan. The two officers traveled to Clark on 19 August, Colonel Fowles remaining there until 29 September, and Major Gregory staying until the 19th of that month.
During this time the efforts of the two officers were devoted to itemizing the equipment and supplies needed at the bases involved in the Taiwan operation.

Support Question

Endeavoring to anticipate and to obtain its material requirements for the expected operations in the Taiwan area, the 313th Air Division queried this headquarters on 12 August. The Division asked about Taiwan bases to be utilized, what support could be expected from 13th Air Force other than provided during deployments under 5AF OPPlan 12h-58, and adequacy of tentage and bedding. This message also inquired as to personnel to operate LOX generator, anticipating a requirement of 100 gallons per day, 50 gallons for Chia-Yi and 50 gallons for Tae-Yuan. It also asked that two 601st and 60th Air Force personnel be made available to Chia-Yi, that conventional ammunition at Taiwan for strike and restrike be prepositioned, and it anticipated expenditure of 25,000 rounds of 20mm ammunition per day and fifty 500-lb bombs for the 18th TFW, 1,500 each 2.75 HFFAR-HE rockets per day and initial stock of 600 rounds of 50 caliber ammunition for the 51st FIM unit, with stock of 16,000 rounds of 50 caliber ammunition for 15th TRS.

/ Msg, 313th AD to SAF (TS), 313MC 58-162, 12 Aug 58.
Responding to the 313th Air Division on 18 August, Fifth's Materiel Deputate asked that headquarters to advise as to specific shortages in cots, tentage, and field kitchen equipment, promising to initiate supply action upon receiving the answers.

As to LOX handling personnel, the Material office agreed to deploy these specialist from resources of the 313th Air Division for a temporary period pending arrival to TAC augmentation personnel.

To determine the communications requirements of the B-57 squadron of the 3rd Bombardment Wing, ordered to deploy to Kadena Air Base, the 1st Shoran Beacon squadron was directed to conduct site surveys on Tainan and the Pescadores.

Because of the plan to deploy the B-57 squadron to Okinawa, the 313th Air Division was advised of its responsibilities toward that unit and given guidance for its support in addition to that provided in the subject plan.\/

In accordance with this additional advice, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing was to share communications maintenance facilities and equipment with the B-57 squadron to the maximum extent. The 18th Wing was also to afford assistance for loading special weapons on the B-57 aircraft. Direct communications between the 3rd Bomb Wing and the 18th TFW was authorized.

\* This deployment was prescribed in a change to SAF OPlan 25-58.
\/ Msg, SAF to 313AD, et al (TS); SMLP-P 58-3190, 24 Aug 58.
// Msg, 313AD to SAF (TS) 3130C 58-222, 1 Sep 58, App 37.
Fifth learned on 25 August that CINCPACAF was undertaking to supplement its basic Taiwan defense plan to meet the possible contingency that while defense by US forces of the off-shore islands might be ordered, use of nuclear weapons in that operation might not be authorized. 

CINCPAC's revision of its own plan, and the revision which would thus become mandatory upon the corresponding plans of PACAF and Fifth, the parent pointed out, must provide for increasing pressure against the Chinese Communists to prevent capture of the subject islands. The contingencies which CINCPAC envisioned and the measures with which it would meet them were outlined as follows:

A. If the Communists were to overfly the Off-Shore Islands, the US would assume responsibility for air defense of Taiwan and Penghu in order to free the CNAF for defense of the Off-Shore Islands.

B. In case of sporadic air and artillery attacks upon Off-Shore Islands, US Forces would collaborate with GRC in defense of Off-Shore Islands, attacking blockading forces as well as their supporting bases. Hot pursuit by US forces would be authorized.

C. Same as B.

D. In case of air-naval blockade of the Off-Shore Islands, US Forces would collaborate with GRC in defense of the Off-Shore Islands attacking blockading forces as well as their supporting bases. Hot pursuit by US forces would be authorized.

// Memo, CINCPAC to CJCSUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, COMUSDC/MAAG, Info to SAFP (TS); CAT-ALFA, 25 Aug 58.

// Ibid.
E. If Communists attempted to invade the Off-Shore Islands, US and GRC forces would attack staging areas, mainland bases and assault forces.

The CINCPAC message enjoined an immediate appraisal of logistic requirements, capabilities, and limitations under a concept of high explosive warfare in conducting the operations enumerated.

This headquarters took cognizance of the considerable interval between the date of publication of the CINCPAC OPlan 25-58, and that of the PACAF counterpart. The former was published on 16 May, while the latter was issued on 7 August.

Inasmuch as the Taiwan Straits hostilities had already erupted when Fifth developed its plan in support of the CINCPAC and PACAF plans, utmost speed in drafting the documents was exacted at this headquarters. The date of publication, as has been seen, was 26 August 1958.

PACAF's provision in its Annex F for depot level support from SAMAP to units deployed to Clark and Chia-Yi, raised a question at 13th Air Force Headquarters as to degree of support intended in view of scheduled phase-down of depot level activity. /

/ Msg, 13AF to PACAF and AMPPA, Info to 5AF (TS), 13MLP 58-TS-1334, 25 Aug 58.
Concerning movement of ammunition into Chia-Yi only upon instructions from PACAF, a question also arose as to when movement of such munitions, particularly 2.75 rocket and 20mm ammunition, would be directed.

The feeling at 13th Air Force Headquarters was that the rockets should have been in place prior to arrival of the F-86D aircraft which would carry them, and that office gave the following estimates of ammunition requirements based on PACAF WPC 1-57:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Period of use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.75 Rocket</td>
<td>7,200 ea</td>
<td>15 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20mm</td>
<td>1,000 rds</td>
<td>15 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-39 gun barrels</td>
<td>29 ea</td>
<td>15 days</td>
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</table>

The material office advised PACAF and Tactical Air Command on 29 August that a zero capability existed in Fifth's Seaweed-asset's 200 and 275-gallon F-100 fuel tanks. — The outlook for supply of this item indicated no immediate availability, though NAMAP was expected to begin assembly of 275-gallon tanks at Kadena early in September, with supplemental supply program at Itazuke, Kunsan, Osan, and Misawa.

Ibid.  
/ Msg, 5AF to PACAF, TAC and 13AF (TSG), SPMILP-P 58-3509, 29 Aug 58.
The advice to the higher command incidentally included similar information concerning M-29 gun barrels about which precise data was unknown at the time.

For utilization by the F-86's at Tainan, Fifth's Materiel and Operations offices on 29 August directed movement of 25 sets of 120-gallon auxiliary tanks from resources of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha. /

/ Msg, 5AF to 313AD, 51st FIW and 315AD (TS), 5FMLP-P 58-3410.
Whatever the capacities of the various installations in the Taiwan area may have been before the shelling of Quemoy, the flow of equipment and supplies to Air Force elements had begun, and the tide could hardly have been stemmed.

In accordance with the OPlan 25-58, the Taiwan campaign was expected to embrace either nuclear or non-nuclear modes of warfare or both, with the former now being regarded as the conventional. Thus it became imperative that the types of aircraft employed be adaptable to both modes, and this requirement meant a larger inventory than if only nuclear weapons alone were to be used.

Tactical aircraft of familiar types characterized the earliest commitments of this command to the trouble zone. The units deployed and the types of aircraft they employed at the outset are shown:

- 12th Tac Ftr Sqn
- 13th Bomb Sqn (Tac)
- 15th Tac Recon Sqn
- 16th Ftr Intop Sqn
- 67th TRW Composite Force

While the tactical aircraft which Fifth committed to the opening stage of the Taiwan action were of the familiar

\[5AF TOG, Summary of Major Events Associated with Taiwan Situation, 26 Aug - 1 Sep 58. App 38.\]
types, some of the aircraft to support them were the C-130 Hercules turbo-prop transports making their debut in this theater. They were provided by the 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) with which Fifth had very close ties. Other cargo craft utilized extensively by Fifth at the outset were the giant C-124 Globemasters also belonging to the 315th.

It was the new high performance aircraft of the Tactical Air Command's Composite Air Strike Force, X-Ray Tango, which imparted a note of modernity to the assortment of aircraft assembled for the tasks at Taiwan. An inventory of these airplanes was contained in a 1 September message from PACAF to Fifth, advising as to what arrivals might be expected in the CASF "package." These included RF-101's and C-130's as well as the familiar KB-50's and F-86D's.

In connection with the promise of transport planes in the CASF package, PACAF pointed out that authority for the 315th to increase CAT contract operations was expected to provide additional airlift./

// Msg, PACAF to 5AF, 13AF, and 315AD (TS), PFCNC 0656, 1 Sep 58. App 24.
// Ibid.
The F-104

But in the matter of tactical airplanes the type on which
greatest interest centered was the F-104, the Lockheed Star-
fighter, brand new to this theater.

The Starfighter arriving in the vanguard of the USAF's
jet aircraft reinforcements in Taiwan belonged to the 83rd
Fighter Interceptor Squadron of Hamilton Air Force Base,
California.

Soon after arrival in Taiwan in early September, they
were shepherded to Tao-Yuan in the northern part of the Na-
tionalist stronghold.

Expecting flights of F-104's to participate in its
current operation, the 13th Air Force queried PACAF about
it before their actual arrival. The Philippine-based
command, entrusted with responsibilities in the Taiwan ac-
tion, wanted to develop firm plans and submit timely sup-
port requirements if the new jet were to be added to its
inventory. The 13th was particularly eager to learn the
number of F-104's to expect, whether or not support person-
el of the air base group type would accompany the airplane,
and where field maintenance would be accomplished on its J-79 engine.

The 13th Air Task Force Provisional (ATF 13 (P)), under command of Brigadier General Dean, for its part was prompt to plan for the deployment of the Starfighter to Tao-Yuan on Taiwan, and with good reason, for congestion at other bases, discussed elsewhere, dictated this selection. As soon as the provisional headquarters' preference for this base was made known to PACAF, General Kuter advised General Moorman of the decision to airlift twelve of the spectacular jets to that location.

The Commander-in-Chief felt that "all out action by PACAF, ADC, MATS, and AMC to accomplish this deployment should firmly convince the Chicom Air Force and our Chinese allies that we intend to support the ORC cause with our latest weapons system."*

* Although all official communications about the F-104 were safeguarded by high classification, the actual arrival of the swift new weapon was trumpeted by radio and newspaper throughout Japan, lending a touch of irony to official efforts at secrecy but at the same time accomplishing the publicizing which General Kuter felt would be desirable.

/ Msg (Partial), ATF 13 to PACAF, Info 5AF (T5), TFQDC 58-659, 8 Sep 58 and Msg, PACAF to 13AF, Info 5AF (T3), FQVQ 01447, 8 Sep 58, Personal for Moorman from Kuter. App 42 & 43.
/ Ibid.
/ Ibid.
PACAF followed up General Kuter's expression with detailed information on the deployment of the F-104, explaining to 13th and to Fifth that the Starfighter would be transported by cargo aircraft and going into specifics of support equipment and personnel to be supplied.

Move of 21st TCS

In mid-September, the 315th Air Division requested PACAF approval to move the first increment of C-130's into Naha as part of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron in the near future. Since the C-119's were to stand down on 1 October 1958 at Tachikawa, the 315th Air Division felt that there should be a concurrent buildup at Naha to absorb the personnel into the C-130 program as they become available. The 315th Air Division proposed to redeploy four C-130's from Ashiya to Naha on or about 25 September, and four C-130's each month thereafter. The initial movement of 25 September took place as planned.

// Msg, PACAF to 13AF and 5AF (TS), PFMDC 01450, 9 Sep 58. App'ed.
// 5AF Jnl, 23 Sep 58, DCS/Materiel.
// Intvw with Maj Samuel J. Huskins, Jr., DCS/Materiel, 2 Oct 58.
Transfer of Aircraft

On 30 September, it was learned that the Office of the Secretary of Defense had approved delivery of F-86F aircraft to the ROKAF. The Chinese Air Force, however, had an immediate requirement for this type of aircraft, and it was therefore decided that the first thirty-five aircraft out of the IRAN facility at Tainan, originally scheduled for ROKAF, would be transferred to the Chinese Air Force.** The first twenty-four aircraft out of deprocessing in Japan would also be transferred to the Chinese Air Force.*** One F-86F undergoing modification for Sidewinder capability would be transferred to the allied force./*

* Inspection and repair as necessary.
** Proj MPA-9F-72.
*** Proj MAP-9F-72.4.
/ 5AF Jnl, 30 Sep 58, DCS/Materiel.
A message which marked a milestone in the relations between this command and the Nationalist Chinese Air Force, and which signaled an important turning point in the growth of the allied force came on 28 August from PACAF. This communication announced the assignment of F-100F aircraft to the CNAF and gave the schedule of delivery of the new planes to enable the organization "to achieve a qualitative superiority over the opposing force."

The message advised that six of the high performance aircraft had departed Hickam Air Force Base en route to Taiwan on 27 August, operated by instructor pilots who would remain in Taiwan until a cadre of Chinese pilots had been familiarized with the new equipment.

The message placed upon 13th Air Force the responsibility of assistance to MAAG-Taiwan in developing the training program and providing needed materiel for it. It stipulated that support equipment for the project would be positioned at Chia-Yi.

/ Msg, PACAF to 5AF and 13AF (TS), PFCO-T 0722, 28 Aug 58/
PACAF advised Fifth Air Force on 30 August that decision to deploy CASF or Fifth Air Force B-57 squadrons and additional shoran equipment was being delayed by a Taiwan Shoran Survey which the higher command had requested earlier. Concerning the shoran capabilities in the area in question, PACAF gave Fifth the following questionnaire to be answered as soon as possible:

1. What is the maximum effective Chicom target area (give coordinates) that can be coordinated by locating shoran stations on Taiwan and/or the Pescadores?

2. How many shoran stations will be required to give maximum coverage to Chicom targets in supporting OPlan 25-58?

3. What shoran equipment, spares, etc., and personnel will be required from ZI to augment re-equipment available from Fifth AF resources, so as not to detract from EWP capability?

The higher command stressed its desire to develop optimum shoran all-weather and night coverage of OPlan 25-58 targets.

In a lengthy message to Fifth Air Force on 2 September, the Fifth Air Force Liaison Officer with the Taiwan-based provisional command received certain dispositions of the
MSQ-1A guidance equipment. His purpose was to bring about a disposition of the radar guidance apparatus that guidance could be furnished for F-100 and B-57 aircraft at the same time that it could be given for the TM-61 Matador launchings. The Makung MSQ-1A facility was the one in question.

The liaison officer’s message also proposed that TM-61 launch rate be reduced if the Joint Operations Center (JOC) decided to continue MSQ guided B-57 and F-100D missions during the same period.

The message also complained that personnel were continuing to arrive at Chia-Yi and Tainan without full coordination and due recognition of the bases’ capacity to support such deployments. The message continued: “In view of the tremendous logistical play, it is essential that full coordination be maintained with 13th Air Force and ATF 13 on all movements of Fifth Air Force equipment and personnel to Taiwan. It is requested that base commanders concerned in Taiwan be included as information or action addresses as deemed necessary.”

The 13th Air Force had earlier asked this headquarters to provide three AG&W controllers on 30-day TDY to augment MAAG-Taiwan personnel, and to provide LOX operators after 15 August. This information was delayed 11 days in delivery.

/ Msg, 13AF to PACAF, Info to 5AF (TS), 13ODC 38-TS-1177, 9 Aug 58. /
to Fifth's Materiel Deputate, but the requirement had been anticipated, and action completed two weeks prior to receipt of the advice from the sister command. /

16th FIS Support

Explicit instructions to deploy the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron to Taiwan came from PACAF on 28 August. /

A message received from the higher echelon on that date directed the movement and stipulated that operational control of the squadron should pass to the 13th Air Force upon the units arrival in Taiwan.*

The message amplified the instruction by directing that prior to taking up operational duties, the pilots and controllers would be briefed on current rules of engagement as specified in PACAFR 355-2. It further provided that the units aircraft would be controlled only by US personnel. It also afforded detailed instructions on auxiliary fuel tanks and high explosive munitions for outfitting these airplanes, and it stipulated that while 13th Air Force would be responsible for logistics for the squadron, Fifth would furnish personnel equipment and services support to augment that of the 13th.

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/ Longhand notation of Lt Col William Morrison, DCS/Materiel, 6 Oct 58.
/ Msg, PACAF to 5AF, 315AD, et al (TS), PFDOP 0732, 28 Aug 58.
The message explained to Fifth that Tainan had been selected for deployment of the 16th Squadron, since it was intended to base the CASF F-100 squadron at Chia-Yi.

Supplementing this message was another from PACAF the next day which authorized Fifth in connection with the move of the 16th Squadron to move any equipment and supplies deemed essential for the unit's support which 13th might be unable to provide. This authority was granted in response to a query from this headquarters transmitted the day before.

Fifth was able to advise 13th on the following day (29 Aug) that the unit move was already in progress.

The disposition of the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron was altered, as far as personnel was concerned, as the result of a request from the 313th Air Division to this headquarters for permission to rotate the squadron's personnel on Taiwan with that of the 25th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron still at Naha. The request applied to both combat-ready air crews and ground personnel, but it expressly excluded aircraft and support equipment.

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\[\text{Msg., PACAF to 5AF (TS), DODCH 013h7, 29 Aug 58. App 45.}\]
\[\text{Msg., 5AF to PACAF (TS), SCCR 58-3366H, 28 Aug 58.}\]
\[\text{Msg., 5AF to 13AF (TS), SMLP-P 58-3311, 29 Aug 58.}\]
\[\text{Msg., 313AD to 5AF (TS), 313-00-T/C-9-96, 16 Sep 58.}\]
Fifth's Deputy for Personnel, Colonel Ernest B. Maxwell, granted the 313th's request on 23 September. 

In asking permission to effectuate the rotation scheme, Colonel Wallace G. Barrett, Acting Commander of the 313th in absence of General Dale O. Smith, pointed out that the period of rotation would be for approximately 30-days. PACAF held this headquarters responsible for the maintenance and supply support of the F-86D squadron at Tainan, although it stipulated that Seaweed resources there would be used for the benefit of the CASF F-100D squadron at Chia-Yi. 

The higher echelon directed Fifth and the 315th Air Division to arrange airlift of fifty 120 gallon auxiliary fuel tanks to Tainan for the F-86's scheduled for deployment there. The airplanes were to carry to Tainan two tanks each already mounted, and these added to those to be airlifted were expected to sustain operations approximately 15 days. 

GAR-8*

On the subject of the Sidewinder (GAR-8), PACAF advised that the heat-seeking air-to-air missile was due in this*

* See Combat.
/ Msg, 5AF to 313AD (S), 5FDC-23669, 23 Sep 58.
/ Msg, PACAF to 5AF (TS), PFMLP 0726, 28 Aug 58.
/ Msg, PACAF to 5AF, Info 315th AD (TS), PFMLP 0724, 28 Aug 58.
theater by 15 August. The higher command had on that date sent to MAAMA a follow-up message requesting confirmation of expectation that the first 140 of these weapons would be available for CASF at Chia-Yi.

The balance of 420 missiles due would be allocated as the situation demanded.

Pursuing the problem of Sidewinder supply, PACAF on 29 August asked the 18th Wing what the number of GAR-8's on hand totaled, warning that should the CASF F-100 Squadron be deployed to Chia-Yi, 140 of these items and necessary GSE would be required from the Wing assets.

Fifth received instructions from PACAF late in August that the MAAG Mobile Training Team currently engaged in the F-86F Sidewinder modification program be utilized for GAR-8 training of NCAF personnel. The higher command advised that AMC had been directed to establish supply support for the project.

The directive from PACAF cautioned: "It is imperative that the accomplishment (directed from the highest levels) of the required training be effected at the earliest possible date."

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/ Msg, PACAF to SAF (TS), TMR 811466, 8 Aug 58.
/ Msg, PACAF to USAF, TAG, Info SAF (TS), PFMDC 0677, 15 Aug 58, and PACAF to SAF FFONC 01341, 27 Aug 58, App 46.
/ Msg, PACAF to 10 TFW (TS), PFMSS-W 01345, 29 Aug 58.
It placed upon Fifth the responsibility for providing all requested assistance within its capability to 13th Air Force.

In the matter of logistic support of the Taiwan operation, the Materiel Deputate prepared a written commentary on its efforts from the beginning in August to late September. The commentary, written by Lt Colonel William D. Morrison, as a briefing for General Kuter, is appended to this report.

Writing with broader knowledge gained from lengthier experience in the Taiwan situation, the same officer reviewed the Fifth's activities from the logistic standpoint several weeks later, and summarized the lessons learned.

The Roll-up

When the Taiwan situation reached such a state that withdrawal of US forces seemed feasible, questions arose at high level as to the manner of accomplishing this redeployment. On this issue there were differences of opinion between CINCPAC and CINCPACAF which were being worked out as

\[\text{Lt Col William D. Morrison, DCS/Materiel, in briefing for Gen Kuter, 26 Sep 58. App. 17.}\]
\[\text{Lt Col Morrison in briefing for Gen Kuter, 5 Nov 58. App 48.}\]
the eventful year ended. It was clear from the correspondence between these two officers that both recognized the unpredictability of Chinese Communist action and both felt that the state of affairs in Taiwan did not justify continuing the current commitment of US augmentation forces there. 

On 25 November, General Kuter addressed a lengthy message to Fifth's commander carrying certain proposals of CINCPAC which altogether would constitute a systematic evacuation of Air Force elements from the Nationalist bastion. In the words of Admiral Felt, whom General Kuter quoted, the recommendations "reflected the demonstrated capability of the Nationalist Air Force against recent opposition, absence of current need for escort of air-resupply, improved air defense capability since introduction of Nike battalions and Sidewinder, and necessity for US units to resume normal training and operation."

At the same time, Admiral Felt expressed concern over the "political-psychological aspects" of roll-up and his belief that the present relaxation of tension in the straits is due in part to present strong US-GRC military posture."

/ / Intrvw with Maj Gen K. B. Hobson, 5 Dec 58.
/ / Msg, Personal Gen Kuter to Gen White, AFCSS, Info to SAF et al, 3125, 18 Nov 58, App 49.
/ / Msg, PAGAF to SAF (TS), PFOOP-01038, 25 Nov 58.
He anticipated that the phase-down would be exploited by the Reds as evidence that the US was doing exactly as the Reds predicted, and he foresaw the possibility that the GRC would feel their military position weakened by the withdrawal of US forces, a threat in case of possible resurgence of the Chinese Communist offensive.

In view of these considerations, Admiral Felt believed it expedient to improve the NCAF, particularly in all-weather capability and to modernize it in other respects.

A significant paragraph in General Kuter’s 25 November message quoted Admiral Felt verbatim:

> In world opinion, prompt withdrawal of US forces when no longer required is probably as convincing evidence of US good intentions as prompt response to emergency which established requirement for augmentation. In addition, withdrawal will re-establish capability for quick and dramatic response, if required by future emergency. In response to possible news media query, answer should be along following line: "In view of improved Chinese Nationalist defensive capability, US and GRC agree that certain US units are not required in Taiwan area. Consequently, some US units will be redeployed during next several months."

Admiral Felt stated General Kuter’s view that since these actions could not take place without the knowledge of the Communist in any case, the Americans should seize the initiative by highly publicizing the redeployments.

Admiral Felt believed that withdrawal actions should be carried out quietly and that world opinion would be more likely...
to favor the American side if "we did not make a production
or 'country tour' out of it but did keep the GRC fully in-
formed. He then recommended the following schedule of re-
deployment of air units:

1. Units to be redeployed in December or as soon
   as possible:

   a. TAG CASF F-101 Okinawa to Continental US.
   b. PACAF F-86D element from Taiwan to Clark,
      resuming normal rotation to Taiwan.
   c. TAC CASF F-57 units, Okinawa to Continental
      US.
   d. TAC CASF F-100D (one squadron) Okinawa to
      Continental US.

2. Units to redeploy in accordance with PACAF re-
   quirements in support of redeployments outlined above:

   a. TAG CASF KB-50, Clark-Okinawa to Continen-
      tial
   b. TAG CASF C-130's, Clark-Okinawa to Continen-
      tial US.

3. Units to redeploy in February or as soon there-
   after as possible:

   a. TAG CASF CINCPACFLT MAG 11, Taiwan to Japan.
   b. CINCPACFLT MAG 13, Japan to Hawaii.

4. Recommended for transfer to CAF:

   a. TAG CASF F-100D Sidewinder equipped aircraft
      and related equipment of 388th Squadron currently
      on Taiwan, USAF personnel to be retained as necessary
      for transition training.
   b. PACAF F-86D aircraft and equipment currently
      on Taiwan, together with pilot transition and related
      training with PACAF assistance. (Classified components
      of E-4 fire control system to be removed pending ap-
      proval of release of information concerning them to
      the Nationalist Chinese.)
   c. TAG CASF RF-101, transfer four RF-101 to CDJLAS
      substitution four RF-100 now approved or as addition
      deletion RF-100 project not now feasible (sic).
d. PACAF C-119, in absence of information from USAF, transport aircraft to replace C-47 and C-46 types.

5. Unit to be retained in Taiwan:

a. ADC F-104 element in view of psychological advantage and to retain strong defensive posture, until attainment by NCAF of satisfactory progress in NCAF transition to F-100D and F-86D.

6. Other:

a. GASF GRC mobile radar - Transfer to NCAF to remain in place on Quemoy.

b. Army USAF Communications - Transfer equipment on hand to NCAF to correct deficiencies, AN/TRC 2k etc.

c. Barracks warehousing and other facilities - transfer to GRC in consonance with redeployment schedule with proviso that they be made available to US forces in event they should be required in future augmentation.

In the second part of General Kuter's message conveying Admiral Felt's recommendations, the PACAF commander advised that he had prepared a message to USAF Headquarters referring to these proposals and requesting early JCS decision on the matter. He directed Fifth in the meanwhile to proceed with planning for GASF rotation, bearing in mind that JCS might order a 25-58 roll-up.

10 December as R-Day

While the redeployment of GASF units to their home stations was not a matter of primary interest to Fifth Air Force,
the retention of an F-86D squadron in their place in Taiwan was purely a concern of this command. A plan which PACAF advanced to CINCPAC for the retention of such a squadron in the Nationalist Chinese bastion was made known to Fifth as information addressee in a message of 29 November. That message expressed PACAF's desire that return of CASF units be based upon an operation plan of the 12th Air Force* and that R-Day be established as 10 December.

Action followed quickly upon the PACAF proposal, and whether or not in consequence of it, the Taiwan Defense Command advised the 13th Air Task Force on 2 December of its release to CINCPAC of operational control of the 388th TFS, effective 10 December.*/ The Taiwan-based command indicated in the same communication that it would retain control of the F-102's of the 83d FIS and of the F-86D's of the 16th FIS until further advised.

Two days later, the 13th Air Task Force informed its parent organization and Fifth Air Force that, effective upon the redeployment of the 388th TFS from the area, it intended to deploy units of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Group (16th

* 12 AF OPlan 37-58.
/ Msg, PACAF to CINCPAC, Info 5AF (TS), PFDOP 01490, 29 Nov 58.
/ Msg, TDCUSMAAC-Taiwan to 13ATF (P), Info 5AF (TS), CINCPAC 020200Z, 2 Dec 58.
and 25 FIS) to Chia-Yi rather than to Taiwan. It anticipated that this action would have been completed by 15 December.

Casualty Estimates

Meanwhile, as the eventful year approached its close, the shelling of the off-shore islands, reduced to a schedule of alternate days, now dwindled from what had on occasion been an estimated bombardment of as many as 40,000 rounds in a single day to a spasmodic obbligato of almost negligible effect.

The actual toll in terms of casualties among Nationalist Chinese military was never published. An occasional report was released in Taipei of fatalities among the inhabitants of the islands, chiefly farmers and fishermen and their families, but in December isolated instances of loss or life to Communist gunfire were reported more as rarities than as commonplaces.

Signalling the denouement of the Taiwan effort, while at the same time recognizing the possibility of resurgence of Communist hostilities, CINCPAC on 2 December sent to PACAF and to other components of US Armed Services in the Far East, instructions on the release of information concerning the roll-up.

/\ Msg, 13AF to 13AF, 5AF, et al (TS), TFOD 58-1049, 4 Dec 58.
/\ Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACAF et al (C), 2 Dec 58. App 50.
The message directed that:

No public announcement of the phase-down of US Forces on Taiwan will be made. No movement of individual units... will be confirmed until... movement is actually underway and then only in answer to queries. The ultimate destination of units concerned will not be disclosed. COMUS-JAPAN and CINCPACAF Phil will inform respective host governments officials through established channels any movements of US forces of concern to them in time to avoid embarrassment. The departure of US units from Taiwan may be confirmed in answer to query with the following statement, "In view of the improved Chinese Nationalist forces' capability, US and GRC officials agree that the presence of this unit for the defense of Taiwan area is no longer required."