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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
PROBLEMS FOR THE WEST

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SUMMARY

1. Introduction. Between the present and the mid-1970's, the "nuclear proliferation" issue is likely to arise in the case of a limited number of countries:
   (a) where the necessary technical base already exists or could readily be completed; and (b) where the incentive to "go nuclear" is strong or the "nuclear proliferation" issue is itself politically explosive.

2. Specific Countries. The following "nuclear capable" countries are of principal concern:
   (a) Now preoccupied with more immediate problems, India may defer a decision for several years. However, the political and military challenge posed by Communist China will probably lead to an eventual Indian decision to join the "nuclear club." Such a decision would have an immediate impact on Pakistan which, although currently
currently lacking the necessary technical capabilities, would move as rapidly as possible in that direction while seeking protection wherever it might be found.

(b) Although still holding its own, Israel fears that it will eventually be overwhelmed by its more populous Arab neighbors. A nuclear "ace-in-the-hole" might, in Israel's view, provide an answer. It is not clear when the issue will come to a head, but the suspicions of the UAR, which lacks Israel's technical capabilities, have already been aroused.

(c) Sweden sees a possibility that nuclear weapons may be required to defend the principle of neutrality. Continuing uncertainty concerning how well this approach would fare in practice and continuing reluctance to set an example have led to deferral but not to resolution of the issue. Sweden's policy of indecision may last no longer than the period required for others to make up their minds.

(d) Still widely anti-military and militantly anti-nuclear, public opinion in Japan continues to abhor nuclear
nuclear weapons. However, Communist China's nuclear weapons program has forced Japan's leaders to take a new and open-minded look at future security problems. The prospect is that the nuclear defense of Japan will be a major focus of attention when the US-Japan Security Treaty comes up for renewal in 1970.

(e) West Germany's inhibitions against acquiring nuclear weapons remain strong. However, the proliferation that already exists in Western Europe places West Germany in a position inferior to that of the UK and France, and periodic bouts of anxiety concerning what are viewed as inconsistencies in US policy make the "nuclear proliferation" issue potentially explosive. The risk is probably less, however, that of a national nuclear program than of a nationalist reaction in Germany to the sense of discrimination and second class status which will arise in the absence of a constructive alternative.

3. Problem. In all these countries the real "nuclear proliferation" issue is whether ways can be found to meet
to meet the disparate political and security interests which generate pressures for proliferation.

4. **Arms Control.** Arms control and disarmament measures offer one way of addressing some of these interests, and efforts should be continued to this end.

(a) **Non-Nuclear Countries.** It would be psychologically useful if the principle of "non-proliferation" could be embodied in an international undertaking, provided that this did not foreclose arrangements to meet the need set forth in para. 5, below. However, this idea has been opposed by key nuclear capable countries such as India unless concrete progress can be made in turning back the proliferation that has already occurred and that, in their own view, threatens their political position and security. India would probably not sign a non-proliferation agreement which did not limit China's production.

(b) **USSR.**
(b) USSR. In the view of the Soviet Union, the "nuclear proliferation" issue has obviously represented an opportunity to seek to divide and weaken the West. This attitude is evidenced both in Soviet tactics and in the substance of its "negotiating" positions. While asking an exorbitant price for its own adherence to a non-proliferation agreement, the Soviet Union continues to give higher priority to maintaining its policy of secrecy (or isolation) than to achieving the broader, reinforcing measures of arms control and disarmament which would be necessary to ensure the viability of a non-proliferation agreement. It is at least a question whether the Soviet Union would have any interest in such broader measures if it were permitted to succeed in its priority objective of dividing and weakening the West.

(c) Communist China. Under no foreseeable circumstances is Communist China likely to accede to effective measures of arms control and disarmament. Such measures, therefore, offer no answer to the Communist Chinese
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Chinese threat -- nuclear or conventional. Furthermore, while fighting its own political battle with Communist China, the Soviet Union is far from ready to offer guarantees which could involve it joining others in fighting military battles against the Communist Chinese.

5. Intra-Free World Approach. A concerted approach to the "nuclear proliferation" issue must be mounted in the free world:

(a) Country by Country. In the case of each of the principal nuclear capable countries greater efforts (spelled out in the main paper) should be made, tailored to individual country needs, to build on existing disincentives; to open alternative routes to desirable political and security objectives; to accord countries a respectable voice and presence in order to dispel any notion that the only way to be heard in the nuclear weapons era is through exploding a nuclear device; and, because these efforts may not succeed in all cases, to provide insulation against the "snowball" effect that may occur when any additional country acquires nuclear weapons of its own.

(b) Collective

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(b) **Collective Arrangements.** We should also try to demonstrate the feasibility of major non-nuclear countries fulfilling their legitimate aspirations, including the desire for nuclear equality *vis-a-vis* each other, within the framework of collective arrangements. Neither the character nor the eventual feasibility of such arrangements in Asia can now be determined. However, if nuclear sharing arrangements can succeed within the Atlantic world, and particularly if such arrangements can lead to a reduction in the number of existing national nuclear capabilities, the example will have relevance and significance in the Asian-Pacific region.

6. **Conclusion.** Proliferation illustrates and affects the basic question which we have faced since World War II: Are the needs of our day to be met by competitive nationalism or by collective effort? It will be difficult to go collective in other fields, if the national route is being favored by a growing number of European and Asian nations in the nuclear field.

Conversely

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Conversely, a choice for the collective route in the nuclear field will increase the likelihood of collective effort in other fields.

This choice as to how the free world is to be organized should not be obscured by an over-optimistic view as to the extent to which intra-free world problems can be resolved in the period immediately ahead primarily via East-West agreement. An accommodation with the Communist nations is our objective. But the surest way to get there is not only to negotiate with the Communists but to make a success of free world efforts to build a viable order -- one in which all nations can eventually hope to see their legitimate aspirations fulfilled. It is in this context that the nuclear issue takes on particular importance.
The issue of proliferation puts all this in microcosm. That issue is the more urgent since an Indian national nuclear program, which may prove difficult to avoid, could well have serious repercussions in two key allied countries: Germany and Japan. It will be important to have developed a workable collective arrangement in Europe, which will meet German aspirations and -- by subsuming the UK's national capability -- set a useful example for Japan, before India goes nuclear.

We probably have several years within which to meet this need but, given the complexity of the problem, that is small comfort. Indeed, one of the greatest difficulties that we face is just this question of timing: The need for forehanded action in devising collective alternatives to national nuclear deterrence is not persuasive when the problem still seems pretty far down the pike. But if we wait till that problem has us by the throat, the opportunity to devise collective approaches could well be endangered by rising nationalism in even those nuclear capable countries where the issue now seems largely quiescent.
THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
PROBLEMS FOR THE WEST

A. THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE "NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION"
ISSUE.

1. The Emergence of Nuclear Capable Countries.

   a) In matters pertaining to nuclear weapons as
      in other aspects of international affairs, the world does
      not obligingly divide itself into neat categories. Five
      countries have tested nuclear weapons devices, and there
      exist on this basis categories of "have" and "have not"
      countries. Such a distinction is invariably troublesome,
      and this has proved to be the case where nuclear weapons
      are concerned. However, these broad "have" and "have not"
      categories require amendment in important respects.

      First, the five nuclear "haves" differ widely
      in their present and prospective capabilities.
      Moreover, no common interest is shared by all five,
      and no overriding common interest appears to be
      shared by a majority of the five. Although there
      is a common appreciation of the risks that would
      be entailed in a major nuclear war, this has not
      provided
provided a sufficient basis for common constructive action. The so-called "nuclear club" is thus a "club" in name only.

Second, among the nuclear "have not" countries there are those -- still limited in number -- which have, in a technical sense, a real prospect of acquiring nuclear weapons through their own efforts. However, the incentive to join the "nuclear club" falls unevenly among these "nuclear capable" countries. Some evidence no desire for club membership. In the case of others, the source and the strength of the incentive to "go nuclear" varies widely.

Third, a few non-nuclear countries which do not now have the capability to "go nuclear" feel some pressure to move in that direction.

b) The "nuclear proliferation" issue derives from conflicting political and security interests that cut across these several categories. In this regard, the center ground is occupied by the nuclear capable countries.
countries, and the "issue" is whether ways can be found to meet the political and security interests of the countries in this category.

2. The Scope of the Issue in the Near Term.

a) Barring unexpected acts of careless generosity by countries which have already tested nuclear weapons devices, the "nuclear proliferation" issue in the near term will arise in the case of the limited number of nuclear capable countries where the necessary technical base already exists or could be readily completed, and where the question of "going nuclear" may either come to be viewed as an essential step or may create political issues which are themselves potentially explosive. Between the present and, say the mid-1970's, there are perhaps five countries where these conditions may become important: India and Israel, where the problem is reaching acute proportions; Sweden, which does not wish to lead a parade but might follow; Japan, where the case against "going nuclear" remains strong but where changes during the next ten years could lead to
to substantial shifts in the balance of the argument; and West Germany, where strong disincentives also exist but where political effects of the issue cannot be discounted.

b) An Indian or Israeli nuclear weapons effort -- or strong suspicion that such an effort was under way -- would spark similar efforts in Pakistan and the UAR respectively. However, a wide technological gap separates both Pakistan and the UAR from the indigenous development and production of nuclear weapons. Whether either of these cases of "derivative proliferation" would actually result in the emergence of another national nuclear weapons capability by the mid-1970's is doubtful. In any event, the political steps taken by these countries to ensure their security in the interim could in and of themselves generate substantial problems.

c) It is conceivable that a few other countries might "decide" to "go nuclear" at some point within the next ten years. Switzerland's policy of neutrality, like that of Sweden, may provide some motivation. Like India and
and Japan, Australia must find security from the slowly materializing Chinese Communist nuclear threat. And South Africa will bear watching if for no other reason than the enormous psychological impact a South African nuclear weapons program would have in Black Africa. These latent possibilities suggest some of the twists the course of "nuclear proliferation" issue may eventually take, but the technical odds are against the emergence of any of these countries as a "nuclear power" by the mid-1970's.

3. **Beyond the Mid-1970's: Increasing Numbers of Nuclear Capable Countries.**

   a) Beyond the mid-1970's, the outlines of the problem are less distinct. Nuclear power reactors will be coming into relatively widespread use, and fissionable materials produced in such reactors could be employed in developing and producing nuclear weapons. In part this will mean an increase in the capabilities of countries already in the nuclear capable group. However, the total number of such countries will increase. But reactors alone
alone do not produce nuclear weapons, and even where other necessary technical facilities may be available, the process of developing and producing nuclear weapons does not occur automatically. Specific decisions are required. It would clearly be short-sighted to encourage the spread of unsafeguarded nuclear power reactors, but the potential effectiveness of safeguards -- as the potential extent of the "nuclear proliferation" issue in the future -- will depend on the factors which influence the decisions of the nuclear capable countries of that period.

b) How strong and how widespread the incentive to "go nuclear" may become cannot be predicted. However, two facts are clear. First, the proliferation that has already taken place has resulted in the spread of the incentive to "go nuclear" and the attrition of existing disincentives. Second, further proliferation would lead to some magnification of both problems. Whether this occurs will depend in part on the decisions of the five nuclear capable countries of interest today, and in part on whether efforts to resolve the "nuclear proliferation"
proliferation" issue in these cases move in the direction of constructing a framework within which the political and security interests of future nuclear capable countries can be accommodated.

B. THE FIVE KEY NUCLEAR CAPABLE COUNTRIES

1. India.

   a) From India's standpoint, the crucial corner in the proliferation of nuclear weapons has already been turned. Communist China's nuclear weapons program has been perceived by India as a direct blow to its own prestige and political position, and as a potential threat to its security. On both counts, proliferation in the case of Communist China has immeasurably increased India's incentive to join the "nuclear club."

   b) India's ability to "go nuclear" is a by-product of its program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. India's leaders continue to affirm their intention of confining their nuclear endeavors to peaceful applications, and only by reneging on past pledges could India move ahead with a nuclear weapons program in the near
near future. However, if that step were taken, India might well be ready to test a nuclear weapons device in perhaps a year's time. Such a test would presumably be conducted underground. Since India's present facilities are limited in capacity, only a "token" number of nuclear weapons could be produced by the end of the decade. During the 1970's, additional fissionable materials for nuclear weapons could be drawn from power reactors now under construction, although India has tentatively indicated it will place these reactors under IAEA safeguards.

\[c\) Obtaining a suitable delivery capability would present more substantial difficulties. In an Indian-Communist Chinese nuclear arms race, geographic asymmetries would favor the Chinese, for Communist China's major cities lie far from India's borders whereas major Indian cities are within easy range of territory held by the Communists. Long-range aircraft might be sought from external suppliers. However, a limited number of vulnerable aircraft would afford India scant comfort after Communist China acquires MRBM's. It is likely that
that India would itself feel compelled to seek missiles. If they could not be procured, Irdia would have to undertake a prolonged development program for which its industrial base is not well suited.

d) The cost of the first step down this path -- that is, the cost of testing a nuclear device -- would be small. However, to proceed toward a credible nuclear deterrent would entail mounting costs and impose a steady economic drain. This prospect evidently concerned Prime Minister Shastri and will doubtless be of concern to Mrs. Gandhi.

e) At present, the new Prime Minister finds herself confronted with more pressing questions than "going nuclear": an urgent food crisis; the need to resume the pace of economic development; and the problem of reconstructing India's relations with Pakistan. For a time, these tasks can be expected to consume the new Prime Minister's energies, and the country's as well. Moreover, India's military leaders continue to place priority on capabilities for conventional defense against
against the ever-present threat posed by Communist China along the border. Collectively, these considerations suggest that an Indian decision concerning nuclear weapons is not likely to be made this year and, indeed, may not be a major issue for several years.

f) Nonetheless, as Communist China's nuclear weapons effort proceeds, India's concern respecting its nuclear security in the future will inevitably increase. Combined with the political and prestige considerations which have a strong and continuing influence, the pressure of Communist China's growing nuclear capabilities will probably bring the issue of India's "going nuclear" to a head earlier than in the case of the other nuclear capable countries.

g) The most immediate impact of an Indian nuclear weapons program would be within the sub-continent itself. The basis for any lasting accommodation with Pakistan would be destroyed, and the sub-continent would be condemned to further turmoil. Although now lacking in the technical capabilities necessary for a nuclear weapons
weapons program, Pakistan would undoubtedly seek to acquire them and, in addition, might seek "guarantees" against India from whatever source they could be obtained. A new Pak alignment with Communist China could result. Although India is not insensitive to the need for constructing a modus vivendi with Pakistan and although the chain of events following a decision to "go nuclear" could increase rather than decrease India's political and security problems, it remains probable that India will seek nuclear weapons of its own unless alternative ways can be found to meet the political and security incentives that are at the root of the "nuclear proliferation" issue as it has arisen in India.

2. **Israel**

   a) At present there obtains between Israel and its hostile Arab neighbors a rough balance of military strength. Outnumbered by the Arabs, Israel regards the existing balance as tenuous and fears that a decisive shift could arise from either of two hazards. The first rests on the assumption that the UAR may one day be able
able to field a force not only larger than Israel's and equally well equipped, but equal also in training, discipline, and determination. The second hazard postulates that the several Arab States that encircle Israel's narrow beachhead may in time gain the capacity for joint military action.

b) If these hazards cannot be ruled out, neither do they appear imminent. The Arab States continue to display a marked capacity for individualistic policy that has thus far defied common enmity toward Israel. The UAR's adventure in Yemen does not suggest that the effectiveness of the Egyptian army is rapidly becoming the equivalent of Israel's. To date, the principal results of the Egyptian missile development effort have been a drain on foreign exchange and, inevitably, a comparable Israeli venture.

c) There is some possibility that the UAR, confronted with a deteriorating economic position, may for a time concentrate on the domestic problems which represent its real enemy. Moreover, there is at least some
some reason to suppose that Bourguiba's sensible plea for toleration of Israel, while calling forth mandatory public denunciation by most Arabs, may have touched the private sensitivities of some. Such straws do not suggest that the world is about to be deprived of the need to worry about the peace of the Middle East. However, it is possible that dangers to Israel may remain within tolerable limits provided Israel can continue to obtain necessary arms, and provided Israel itself does not make credible Arab fears concerning its own nuclear intentions. The first of these provisos can be assumed. The second is more elusive.

d) Israel's reactor at Dimona, constructed with French assistance, is capable of producing adequate fissionable material for a small weapons program. Israel does not appear to have a plutonium separation facility, but obtaining such a facility would probably not be difficult. If Israel should decide to "go nuclear," the testing stage might be reached within perhaps two years. Although underground tests would be feasible, testing might be deferred, and it is not inconceivable that Israel might
might have sufficient confidence in weapons design to proceed directly to production. Either course might be adopted to minimize the chance of prematurely generating adverse reaction. Delivery by aircraft would probably be practical, and Israel is seeking offensive surface-to-surface missile systems of relatively long-range (measured in terms of Middle Eastern geography). The French are cooperating in this effort. Although such missiles might be employed with conventional warheads, they could become Israel's nuclear delivery capability.

e) The case for Israel's "going nuclear" apparently rests on the assumption that nuclear weapons might afford the Israeli a trump card in the ultimate mortal confrontation with the Arabs. In effect, the hope might be to play this card as a deterrent to conventional attack. Since the UAR is far behind Israel in nuclear technology, such an ace-in-the-hole might, in Israel's view, give it a technological advantage for some years to come. While there is no evidence that Israel has committed itself to this approach, it displays no
no interest in foreclosing the option. Moreover, the Israeli evidently regard leaving the option open as an asset in the continuing war of nerves with the Arabs. The assumption may be that the Dimona reactor may serve as an implicit form of "nuclear blackmail" even if no nuclear weapons are ever produced.

f) Suspicion of Israel's nuclear efforts is already strong among the Arabs, and should Israel introduce offensive missiles, the Arabs will interpret such a move as foreshadowing, if not immediately involving, an Israeli nuclear weapons effort. The UAR would doubtless feel compelled to respond in kind but has no existing capability to do so. The UAR has no reactor which could produce fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, and even if such a reactor were to become available, externally supplied technical advice and assistance would be required in order for the UAR successfully to develop and produce weapons in the foreseeable future.

g) The UAR's major source of arms has been the Soviet Union, and unconfirmed reports from Cairo suggest
suggest that the UAR may already have raised with the Soviet Union the question of how an Israeli nuclear capability might be countered. It is improbable that the Soviet Union would either supply nuclear weapons as such to the UAR or station such weapons there, repeating the pattern of Cuba. The Soviets might offer nuclear support along the lines offered in 1956 and might hope that such assurances, together with further conventional arms (or missiles with conventional warheads) might solve the problem. Whether the Soviets would supply the technical advice and assistance required by the UAR must at this time be considered problematic.

h) However the game might be played out, the first casualty would be the admittedly slim hope of encouraging favorable evolution in the UAR and in the attitudes of the Arab States toward Israel. Since this hope cannot be expected to seem realistic to the Israeli, the temptation to acquire nuclear weapons is likely to be as strong and as durable in Israel as anywhere else in the world.

3. Sweden
3. Sweden

a) The argument in Sweden concerning acquisition of nuclear weapons has been going on for over a decade. The decision has been repeatedly postponed but not resolved. A "Freedom of Action" policy has resulted. As in the case of India and Israel, the technical option is within reach, and if the advice of the Swedish military is accepted, steps may be taken to shorten the remaining technical lead-time without pre-empting the eventual political judgment, which is scheduled to be reviewed again in 1968. Whether or not efforts are made to narrow the lag between decision and fact, nothing in the Swedish situation suggests that an underground test would be likely before early in the next decade. Moreover, nothing in the Swedish debate on the issue reflects any desire or determination to be the world's next nuclear power. On the contrary, there has been marked reluctance to take the lead.

b) Sweden's military policies -- and the conventional forces generated by them -- have been focussed on
on tactical defense and have had as their main purpose the preservation of a sufficient defense capability to ensure that no opponent could equate neutrality with an invitation to attack. Sweden's survival may have been due less to the impenetrability of its defenses than to other factors, but there can be little question that the absence of strong defenses might have worked to its disadvantage. The question Sweden has been considering so long and hard can more properly be described as whether the absence of nuclear weapons might work to its disadvantage at some future time, rather than whether the presence of nuclear weapons would ensure its continued survival.

  c) It has evidently been difficult for Sweden to find a military concept to support the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons. In the absence of a major conflict in Europe, a separate invasion of Sweden seems exceedingly unlikely. If a major nuclear war should occur, it would be optimistic to suppose that a tactical nuclear weapons capability could ensure Sweden's safety. Some Swedish theorists apparently argue that in the event
of a conventional threat to Sweden during the course of a larger conventional conflict in Europe, it might be possible to deter attack by threatening to raise the conflict to nuclear levels, or to force the conventional attackers to disperse his forces should an attack actually occur. The first approach seems unlikely to be persuasive since Sweden itself would have little to gain by precipitating nuclear war. The second approach might effect a delay in the attacker's plans without affecting the eventual outcome in any essential way.

d) Despite such conceptual difficulties, the question of acquiring nuclear weapons remains a serious one for Sweden's political and military leaders, and although "going nuclear" would be an unpopular decision under existing circumstances, Sweden's leaders are clearly not prepared to trade "Freedom of Action" for anything less than tangible gains for their country's security. They have seen the possibility of such gains through major arms control and disarmament measures, and they would be reluctant to make such measures more difficult.
difficult to achieve by precipitate action on their part. However, if other nuclear-capable countries should take the lead, the likelihood is that Sweden would follow.

4. Japan

a) In Japan, the popular anti-military and anti-nuclear sentiments which form a central part of the heritage of the Second World War remain strong and show little sign of basic change. At the same time, Communist China's nuclear weapons program has stimulated a reconsideration of Japan's future security interests. The possibility of Japan's acquiring nuclear weapons has passed from the stage where the question simply did not present itself for serious consideration to the point where that possibility is the subject of thought and discussion in political and military circles and in the press. The distance from this point to a decision to "go nuclear" is substantial, but it can no longer be taken for granted that the distance will never be closed.

b) It is significant that the already apparent shift in the status of the question of "going nuclear" has
has resulted from Communist China's effort to acquire a nuclear weapons capability rather than from the potential nuclear threat to Japan posed for many years by the Soviet Union. This fact suggests that Japan, like India, may view the question partly in terms of political leadership in Asia as well as in terms of narrow security interests. Although Japan has not vied for such leadership, it is coming to play a more active role in Asian affairs, and there is, in any event, a difference between taking the lead and allowing it to pass elsewhere. The possibility that Communist China may be the only Asian nuclear power will be a factor in Japanese consideration of the nuclear weapons question. Moreover, although Japan and India are separated by differences in attitude and experience as well as by geographic distance, an Indian nuclear weapons program would have some bearing on Japan's eventual decision.

c) From the standpoint of scientific, technical, and industrial capabilities, a Japanese nuclear weapons program would over time be equal or superior to that of Communist
Communist China, and there is no question that Japan could outdistance India. As with India, Japan's present nuclear facilities are a product of its program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy and its present capacity for producing fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons is limited. Japan has no plutonium separation facility but is considering building such an installation. Its principal deficiency is in raw materials, but that hurdle might not be impossible to overcome. However, in order to proceed with a nuclear weapons program at an early time, Japan would have to violate safeguards which it has accepted. There is no prospect that this step would be taken in the near-term. Consequently, for this reason as well as the barriers raised by popular opinion, a Japanese decision to "go nuclear" is exceedingly unlikely during this decade.

d) The problem of acquiring a suitable delivery capability would be much less difficult for Japan than India. Japan's interest in rocketry and its capabilities in that field are pronounced. Japan may well become
become the fourth nation to place an earth satellite in orbit by employing a launching vehicle developed and produced by itself - and soon. The technology involved could be readily transferred to the development and production of missile delivery systems. Like India, Japan would have to consider the question of what specific approach would offer it the prospect of a credible, survivable deterrent. A sea-based capability might be attractive.

e) Consideration of such problems will probably increase when Communist China acquires an MRBM capability, and that development will confront Japan's political and military leaders more squarely with the need to be sure of the adequacy of future security arrangements. These now rest on the US-Japanese Security Treaty of 1960, which will come up for renewal in 1970. The nuclear superiority of the U.S. over Communist China will continue to be overwhelming, and at present, there is no reason to suppose that Japan would prefer a national nuclear capability, which would inevitably weaken collective defense.
defense arrangements. However, the question of Japan's nuclear defense will be a major focus of consideration in the forthcoming renegotiation of the existing security treaty.

5. West Germany

a) In certain respects, the question of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by West Germany superficially parallels the Japanese case. Both countries possess major scientific, technical, and industrial capabilities which could provide the basis for the development and production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. Both are confronted with the twin problems of meeting a nuclear threat and of constructing a viable political role. Both are subject to substantial inhibitions which operate against seeking national nuclear weapons capabilities. Both are members of collective security arrangements. However, basic political and security considerations differ markedly, and the character of the "nuclear proliferation" issue differs in important respects.

b)
b) On the one hand, the situation with which West Germany finds itself confronted is characterized by dependence on collective security arrangements for conventional as well as nuclear defense. West Germany has placed its own armed forces within such arrangements, and a fully independent West German military capability is not regarded as either attainable or desirable by the West Germans themselves. On the other hand, the national nuclear weapons capabilities of the UK and France serve as an abrasive reminder of West Germany's unequal status among the European members of NATO.

c) It is, of course, the U.S., not the UK or France, that has underwritten the security of Western Europe since the end of the Second World War, and West Germany continues to be fundamentally dependent on the U.S. commitment of conventional forces and nuclear arms. A firm political relationship with the U.S. is also highly valued by the West Germans. Nonetheless, West German anxiety concerning the possibility of change in the political and strategic relationship of the U.S. and
and the Soviet Union has not been absent and has occasionally been brought to the front in considering NATO strategy and in considering problems in the field of arms control and disarmament.

d) Neither West Germany's sense of inequality with its neighbors nor its periodic anxiety concerning U.S. intentions is likely to precipitate a West German nuclear weapons program. However, in the absence of a constructive alternative which holds out the prospect of eventual equality with the UK and post-de Gaulle France, one could expect the kind of reaction to a sense of discrimination and second class status which could make for an unhealthy political situation within West Germany. It is not possible to close all doors to West Germany and at the same time expect a stable situation to result.

C. THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES

1. Arms Control and Disarmament Measures.

   a) In considering arms control and disarmament measures as a means of curtailling the further proliferation of national
of national nuclear weapons capabilities, three inter-related problems arise:

First, whether the acquisition of such capabilities by additional countries can effectively be ruled out through the medium of a separate international agreement;

Second, whether, or under what circumstances, broader, reinforcing measures might be achieved; and

Third, whether such measures, considered collectively, would negate the incentives which generate the "nuclear proliferation" issue.

What is in question here is neither the inherent desirability of arms control and disarmament measures, nor the need for continuing efforts to achieve them. The central question that needs to be considered concerns the adequacy of such arms control and disarmament measures as are likely to be feasible under foreseeable circumstances in meeting the proliferation problem.
b) Achievement of a separate "non-proliferation agreement" would create an additional moral, legal, and political barrier to proliferation of some consequence. Such an agreement would, from the standpoint of U.S. interest, be desirable for that reason. However, as the international debate concerning a non-proliferation agreement has escalated during the past year, a number of nuclear capable -- or potentially nuclear capable -- countries have questioned both the desirability and effectiveness of this type of agreement, unless accompanied by broader measures.

c) Indian, Swedish, Japanese and Australian statements in this sense are at Appendix A, which is unclassified. In addition to these public statements, in a recent discussion between U.S. and Indian representatives at Geneva, the latter said explicitly that a non-proliferation treaty would not be worth having if it focussed on what he termed the hypothetical Nth Country problem rather than the real problem posed by Communist China's growing nuclear capability. He added that U.S. non-proliferation priorities were lop-sided

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lop-sided and what India needed was for a non-proliferation treaty to provide for cessation of all production of nuclear weapons.

The Germans have indicated their reluctance to sign new non-proliferation commitments until the nuclear sharing question has been settled to their satisfaction within the alliance.

d) It is not necessary to sympathize with or endorse all the views of these several countries to recognize the seriousness of the challenge that has been presented. That such a challenge has been raised does not mean that the countries involved are unconcerned with the problem of proliferation in a generalized sense but that they are more concerned with the manner in which their own interests have been affected by the proliferation that has already taken place. It does mean, however, that some of these countries (not only India) would probably not adhere to a non-proliferation agreement which did not limit Chinese nuclear production; others might do so, but only with reservations; still others might choose to rely on their ability to invoke the "escape clause" at some future time.

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f) As indicated previously, it would be of value to embody the principle of non-proliferation in an international undertaking, provided that such an undertaking did not foreclose collective arrangements which would serve as politically viable alternatives to national deterrence. The full range of Western arms control and disarmament proposals (which non-nuclear countries have variously described as essential if such an undertaking is to prove really effective) includes: a halt to nuclear weapons testing, cessation of the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons and the destruction of a number of existing warheads, a freeze and possibly the reduction of significant numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and, ultimately, the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the concurrent establishment of far-reaching international peacekeeping arrangements. At this point, however, it is necessary to consider the attitudes of the Soviet Union respecting both a non-proliferation agreement and broader, reinforcing measures of arms control and disarmament.

g)
g) As regards the achievement of a non-proliferation agreement, the Soviet Union's approach thus far has clearly included an effort to exploit the situation with a view to dividing NATO. Although the Soviet Union should, and may, be concerned with the problem of proliferation, any such concern does not detract from the fact that it also wishes to weaken the political unity and the security of the West. This objective is evidenced both in the tactics employed by the Soviet Union and in the price it has asked for its adherence to a non-proliferation agreement. At the same time, the Soviet Union's negative attitude toward verification of arms control and disarmament measures (stated differently, its continuing preoccupation with maintaining secrecy and with protecting Soviet society from the "shock of recognition" that would come with loss of isolation) hinders early progress toward the broader measures required to render a non-proliferation agreement effective. Adding the two halves of the problem together, the question must be asked whether, if the Soviet Union were permitted
permitted to succeed in dividing and weakening the West, it would in fact have any interest in reaching effective measures of arms control and disarmament.

h) Achievement of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing would come closer than a non-proliferation agreement to meeting the charge of "discrimination" that has been levelled by the non-nuclear countries, and would receive wider adherence. Nonetheless, testing by Communist China would periodically illustrate the continuing emergence of a new threat.

2. Safeguards. As peaceful nuclear power reactors come into more widespread use in the late 1970's, the scope of the "nuclear proliferation" issue will broaden. It would clearly be foolish to permit the spread of such facilities without safeguards. However, in the final analysis, the effectiveness of safeguards will depend on whether a framework can be erected within which the political and security interests of nuclear capable countries can be accommodated without resort to nuclear weapons of their own.

3. The Security and Status of Nuclear Capable Countries.

a) While there is every reason to continue to seek
seek effective arms control and disarmament measures, there remains an urgent need to find ways of dealing with the "nuclear proliferation" issue in terms of the incentives which exist in specific cases. Because the issue takes various forms and because incentives vary in kind and in degree, a single, generalized approach is not likely to prove feasible. Whether specific approaches can successfully be developed in all cases remains problematical, but efforts along three lines are indicated.

The first is to build upon the disincentives which exist.

The second requires consideration of political and security aspects of each case.

The third involves providing insulation against the "snowball" effect that would be created if additional countries decide to seek their own nuclear weapons. Without attempting to develop detailed lines of action for each case, generalized approaches are suggested below.

b) India.

(i) In the near-term, India is confronted with major internal difficulties as well as
with the need to set its relations with Pakistan in better order. To the degree that India's energies are engrossed in promising programs to these ends, she may be the less likely to dissipate her resources in nationalist diversions. To the extent that India is in fact prepared to accord priority to these problems, the West should cooperate in providing economic and technical assistance. A major purpose should be to encourage a durable modus vivendi between India and Pakistan -- hopefully one that might survive an Indian nuclear weapons program.

(ii) India has a valid claim to recognition of its scientific and technical achievements. Ways should be sought to make clear to India that she does not have to consider exploding a nuclear device to achieve such recognition.

(iii) As conditions within the subcontinent permit, military aid should be made available to strengthen India's defense against the Communist Chinese conventional threat. This threat will for many years remain the major military threat to India, and if this threat can be effectively met, the actual risk of
Communist Chinese nuclear attack against India is likely to remain low, although the Indians may not see the matter in this way.

(iv) Soviet attitudes preclude the possibility of joint assurances of India's nuclear security. However, the U.S. could itself offer firm assurances against Chinese Communist nuclear attack. It is not inconceivable that India may be prepared (tacitly if not openly) to rely on such assurances while preoccupied with internal matters and until Communist China's actual militarily effective nuclear capabilities become larger. There could thus be a way of gaining some time.

(v) India's policy of non-alignment, so long as it continues, will bar collective alternatives to national deterrence which involve a closer nuclear relationship with the U.S. If this policy should change, some form of two-key bilateral or collective arrangement might eventually be offered to India, or to India and Pakistan. At present, however, the political basis for such arrangements does not exist and is not likely to materialize before many years have passed if, indeed, it materializes at all.

(vi)
(vi) Should Communist China be permitted to occupy a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, India would conclude that "going nuclear" was essential for political as well as security reasons.

c) **Israel.**

(i) The U.S. has significant leverage in the case of Israel. That leverage is not always able to produce the desired results, but if the U.S. chooses to make the possibility of Israel's acquiring nuclear weapons the key issue in the relations of the two countries, it should be possible to hold the line against an overt Israeli nuclear weapons program for an extended period of time.

(ii) While continuing to make certain that sources of needed conventional arms are available, an effort should be made to disuade Israel from exacerbating the situation by introducing offensive surface-to-surface missiles. Whether there is any possibility of a trade-off between continued assurance of the availability of conventional arms and the abandonment of the missile effort should be explored.

(iii)
(iii) Additional efforts should be made to induce Israel to place the Dimona reactor under international safeguards, and to preclude the provision of any additional unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

(iv) To the extent that economic aid to the UAR would be useful in strengthening the position of the "Egypt firsters" against the "adventurers", such aid should be offered. At the same time, no technical assistance should be provided to the UAR's missile effort, and a firm commitment should be sought that any additional reactors constructed in the UAR would be subject to international safeguards provided only that Israel adopts a similar course.

(v) Further efforts should be made to enlist Soviet interest in damping the Middle East arms race and in ensuring that it does not take a nuclear turn. The strongest argument is that such a turn in the situation would embarrass the Soviet Union's own interests.

d) Sweden.

(i) If --or as long as-- the line can be held in India and Israel, Sweden's dilemma will remain difficult. The actual military effects of a Swedish decision to
"go nuclear" would be quite limited. The "snowball" effect might be larger and that point should be continually stressed since Sweden does not wish to precipitate similar decisions in other cases.

(ii) In addition, the shaky conceptual basis of a Swedish tactical nuclear weapons program invites skeptical examination as does the question of what threat such a capability would counter. Both aspects warrant closer examination by Sweden and by others.

e) Japan and West Germany are allied with the nuclear power of the U.S. It may be possible to find answers to the "nuclear proliferation" issue, as it arises in these countries, through strengthening alliance relationships. This is discussed below.

4. Collective Security and the Reversal of "Nuclear Proliferation"

a) The nuclear proliferation that has already occurred has helped to set in motion the political and security drives that are propelling other countries in the direction of acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. Few countries could actually find security in pursuing this course and, because
because some of the nuclear capable countries are neutral or non-aligned, collective security arrangements may not prove feasible in all cases. Nevertheless, the security of nations in the nuclear weapons era is in fundamental respects interdependent, and demonstrating the utility and viability of collective security arrangements is important for its own sake and as an alternative to national nuclear weapons capabilities.

b) Within the Atlantic world collective security arrangements have already proved valuable. The need now is to show that they can meet the changing needs of the nuclear weapons era. A nuclear sharing arrangement in which the UK and FRG played equal roles in joint ownership and control, would serve this purpose. Furthermore, if the nuclear capability of the UK could be brought fully within the framework of such a nuclear sharing arrangement, an important example would be set, one that would suggest a reversal of the trend toward additional national capabilities. After de Gaulle, France might eventually follow suit. The tests which such Atlantic arrangements must meet are three: they must be genuinely integrated, so as not to serve as cover for
for spreading national capabilities; they must envisage eventual German equality with the UK and post-de Gaulle France, to prove politically viable within Germany over the long term; and they must hold out to Europe, as it moves toward unity, a role vis-a-vis the US which supporters of the collective approach can defend against domestic criticism. The need for such arrangements is the more urgent since an Indian national nuclear program, which may prove difficult to avoid, could well have serious repercussions in two key allied countries: Germany and Japan. It will be important to have developed a workable collective arrangement in Europe, which will meet German aspirations and -- by subsuming the UK's national capability -- set a useful example for Japan, before India goes nuclear.

We probably have several years within which to meet this need but, given the complexity of the problem, that is small comfort. As we have found in the last several years, the need for forehanded action in devising collective alternatives to national nuclear deterrence is not persuasive when the problem still seems pretty far down the pike.
pike. But, if we wait till that problem has us by the throat, the opportunity to devise collective approaches could well be endangered by rising nationalism in even those nuclear capable countries where the issue now seems largely quiescent.

c) In the Asian-Pacific region, the character of the security system that will emerge is far from clear. Because, among other reasons, the Asian-Pacific region lacks the geographic concentration that makes integrated security arrangements essential in Western Europe and the Atlantic area, a different pattern may evolve. Nonetheless, while not directly translatable to conditions in the Asian-Pacific region, nuclear sharing arrangements in the Atlantic area would set a useful example, and reduction of the number of existing national nuclear weapons capabilities in Western Europe might help stem the development of a trend in that direction in Asia.
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APPENDIX A

STATEMENTS CONCERNING
NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

1. Statements of Non-Aligned and Neutral Countries

a) In a statement before the UN Disarmament Commission, May 4, 1965, the Indian spokesman offered the following comments:

"We want not only the prevention of further proliferation but also the reversal of present proliferation. Statements were made by many delegates in the General Assembly pointing out that it is unrealistic to ask countries to forswear for ever a programme of nuclear weapons production, when the existing nuclear Powers continue to hold on to their awesome arsenals and when, we may add, new countries embark on nuclear programmes. My delegation is in entire agreement with this view.

"...It is no use telling countries, some of which may be even more advanced in nuclear technology than China, that they should enter into a treaty which would stipulate that they must not acquire or produce these weapons. Again, it is no use telling them that their security will be safeguarded by one or other of the existing nuclear Powers. Such an assurance has to be really dependable. Moreover, nations are not interested in having another Hiroshima on their soil before an assurance of this nature could come into effect. Unless the nuclear Powers and would-be nuclear Powers undertake from now on not to produce any nuclear weapons or weapons delivery vehicles and, in addition, agree to reduce their existing stockpile of nuclear weapons, there is no way of doing away with the proliferation that has already taken place or of preventing further proliferation."

An Indian

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An Indian statement to the ENDC on August 12, 1965, recalled that: "...The non-aligned delegations have ... spoken on many occasions on this central theme, namely, the unrealistic and irrational proposition that a non-proliferation treaty should impose obligations only on non-nuclear countries while the nuclear powers continue to hold on to privileged status or club membership by retaining and even increasing their deadly stockpiles."

The most recent Indian statement at Geneva (February 15, 1965) again called for ending all talk of a "select club" or of a "superior" group of four or five "to work out the salvation of the world." This statement, as previous Indian statements, affirmed the view that broader arms control and disarmament measures are required; the term "spurious" was applied to a treaty "which keeps all limitations on non-nuclear countries while allowing nuclear weapon countries to continue to manufacture nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles."

b) A Swedish statement of May 20, 1965, before the UN Disarmament Commission also dealt with the inter-relation between non-proliferation and disarmament:

"...We
"...We hold ... that priority should be given, not to one isolated measure, but to several elements combined into a 'package' to be agreed upon simultaneously. Such a 'package' must consist of well-integrated measures, aimed at achieving a reduction of armaments, or at least a 'freeze' of the status quo over a fairly broad field, and giving scope for active contribution by both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. The three measures contained in the Swedish 'package' for implementation without delay all envisage renunciatory action in the nuclear field -- namely: (a) a comprehensive test ban, also covering underground explosions; (b) the halting of all production of fissionable material for military purposes, and (c) an agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"...I have purposely deferred the mentioning of an agreement to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations which do not now possess them or control them to third place. The reason is that my Government has not expected such an agreement, in the form it has been envisaged, to have the character of an 'Open sesame.' There exists an interdependence, both technically and politically, as I have tried to indicate earlier, between measures intended to close the door to 'the nuclear club' and the question whether the production and testing of nuclear weapons should be allowed to continue by members of that nuclear club. This connexion between curtailing the freedom to continue present activity and preventing the use of any freedom to start the same kind of activity is particularly evident to smaller countries, and most particularly, of course, to those outside of any alliances with nuclear Powers. To institute an international obligation which binds only the non-nuclear Powers to the status quo does not seem to us to be as significant a disarmament measure as the world is now expecting..."

2.
2. Attitudes of Non-Nuclear Members of Alliances.

a) Japan, which is not a member of the ENDC, offered its views to the UN Disarmament Commission May 14, 1965:

"...in considering proposals for such an [non-proliferation] agreement, Governments -- which are necessarily concerned with the security of their peoples -- must take fully into account, and realistically so, the facts of contemporary international life in our sorely divided and troubled world. They dare not, without grave dereliction of duty, indulge in wishful thinking or undertake lightly vague or ill-defined commitments, without the most careful regard for all the implications involved. In our view, therefore, a non-dissemination agreement would not be feasible and effective unless, first, it would maintain the balance of power in the world; second, it were adhered to not only by all the nuclear Powers, but also by all other countries with a potential nuclear weapon capability; third, it had a built-in system of safeguards based on adequate inspection and control; and last, but not least, it were accompanied by measures of nuclear disarmament, and in particular by a comprehensive and universal nuclear test ban treaty.

"Such are the considerations that might lead, if taken fully into account, to an effective -- I repeat: an effective -- non-dissemination agreement that would reassure, and not delude, Governments and peoples."

b) The February 18 Washington Post carries a report that Japanese "Deputy Foreign Minister Takezo Shimoda has expressed Japan's support of India's view that nuclear powers should not
should not seek to prevent other countries from building a nuclear arsenal without themselves disarming."

c) Like Japan, Australia is not a member of the ENDC but is a member of an alliance. In a statement of October 25, 1965, before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, an Australian spokesman suggested that non-proliferation was related not only to nuclear disarmament but to conventional disarmament as well. He summarized Australia's views as follows:

"...Thus, the Australian Government strongly supports all the efforts that are being made to reach agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We regard it is important and urgent. But we are very conscious of the fact that these things are only elements in the wider problem, that until agreement is reached on a wider range of disarmament matters, any agreements we reach in the nuclear field are essentially unstable; and that if greater progress is not made in other fields, and if important questions are kept out of agreements on test bans and the dissemination of nuclear weapons, then pressures will mount on some of the non-nuclear countries with capacity to make nuclear weapons, and we may find that, irrespective of escape clauses or otherwise in treaties, some of these countries will be pushed by their own public opinion, or the realities of the situation, into getting into the nuclear field themselves."