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FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6780

SECRET BONN 7557

EXDIS

SUBJ: FRG DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING ON NPT

1. A MEMBER OF THE FONOFF DISARMAMENT STAFF HAS GIVEN US, IN
   STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF YESTERDAY'S
   NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING WHICH HE ATTENDED IN A STAFF
   CAPACITY. THE MEETING WAS CHAIRMED BY THE CHANCELLOR AND
   ATTENDED BY BRANDT, STOLLENBERG, STRAUSS AND VON HASE.

2. THE CHANCELLOR CONFIRMED THE FRG'S DECISION TO WELCOME RATHER
   THAN OPPOSE PUBLICLY THE TALKING OF NPT TO AVOID A SITUATION IN
   WHICH GERMANY COULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR OPPOSING THE TREATY
   AT THIS STAGE. HOWEVER, OUR SOURCE SAID THE ATMOSPHERE AT THE
   MEETING WAS HEAVY AND DESPONDENT, ALTHOUGH THERE
   WAS GENERAL RECOGNITION THAT THE RUSSIAN AGREEMENT, PARTICU-

3. THE COUNCIL'S PRINCIPAL CONCERN FOCUSED ON THE NPT'S CON-
   TINUING "INFLEXIBILITY." THE CHANCELLOR SPOKED AT LENGTH ON THIS
   POINT, NOTING HIS PERSONAL DISAPPOINTMENT THAT LITTLE HAD BEEN
   DONE TO MEET HIS REQUESTS ON THIS SCORE. HE AND THE
OTHERS AGREED THAT THE PRESENT RATE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE WAS SUCH THAT THE TREATY'S "INFLEXIBILITY" REPRESENTED A REAL DANGER FOR THE FRG'S SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE LONGER TERM.

4. IT WAS DECIDED THAT A FURTHER DEMARCHE SHOULD THEREFORE BE MADE TO THE US ON THIS POINT, PROBABLY BY KNAPPSTEIN IN WASHINGTON. THE FONOFF WILL TRY TO STEER IT AWAY FROM DURATION AS SUCH, TOWARD LIBERALIZATION OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE PROVISION. THE DEMARCHE PROBABLY WILL BE MADE AFTER TOMORROW'S CABINET MEETING.

5. OUR SOURCE, EMPHASIZING THE SPECIAL SENSITIVITY OF THIS POINT, THEN EXPLAINED THAT THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE THE ONLY FURTHER MAJOR REQUEST THE FRG WOULD MAKE OF THE US ON NPT. THERE WERE IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL CONCERNS, FOR INSTANCE AS REGARDS NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL. FOR THERE WAS A GROWING NUMBER IN THE

PAGE 3 RUFHOL 7557 S E C R E T
FONOFF DEEPLY WORRIED THAT FURTHER WESTERN TROOP WITHDRAWALS WERE INEVITABLE AND THAT POSSIBLE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST SOVIET PRESSURES SHOULD BE OBTAINED. THERE WERE ALSO IMPORTANT POINTS STILL TO BE DEALT UNDER ARTICLE III: HOWEVER, BRANDT AND THE CHANCELLOR WERE EVIDENTLY AGREED, NOW THAT THE US AND THE USSR HAD REACHED A BASICALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FRG SHOULD NOT STAND IN THE WAY, AND SHOULD PROVE NOT ONLY ITS SUPPORT FOR NON-PROLIFERATION BUT THAT IT IS A GOOD ALLY. THE FRG WOULD THEREFORE LIMIT ITS FURTHER REQUESTS TO THE ESSENTIALS.

6. FOR THE SAME REASON, THE CHANCELLOR IS MOVING TOWARDS A DECISION THAT THE FRG SHOULD, IF SOME GREATER FLEXIBILITY CAN BE ACHIEVED, NOT ONLY SIGN THE NPT, BUT PERHAPS TRY TO BE ONE OF THE FIRST TO SIGN. THE CHANCELLOR HAS EVEN BEGUN THINKING OF THE KIND OF SPEECH HE COULD MAKE RECOMMENDING NPT TO THE BUNDES TAG. HE IS AWARE THAT HE MUST MAKE A PERSUASIVE CASE; FOR THIS REASON ALSO HE IS DISAPPOINTED AND FRUSTRATED THAT HE IS NOT IN A POSITION TO REPORT THAT THE FRG SUCCEEDED IN GETTING SATISFACTORY ON FLEXIBILITY, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT IS KNOWN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
WEFRENT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
7. AS REGARDS ARTICLE III, THERE WAS DISCUSSION OF FRENCH ATTITUDES ON EURATOM-IAEA NEGOTIATIONS AND SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PRECISE US VIEW OF VERIFICATION. OUR SOURCE BELIEVES THAT BRANDT RECOGNIZES THAT VERIFICATION INVOLVES MORE THAN A PAPER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EURATOM AND IAEA, BUT THOUGHT PERSONALLY THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO RESTATE OUR POSITION ON THIS POINT, IF AND WHEN THE QUESTION IS RAISED BY THE GERMAN SIDE.

8. AS REGARDS THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS AT THE DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING, STRAUSS WAS THE ONLY ONE WHO FORCEFULLY CALLED FOR A DECISION TO REJECT NPT AT THIS STAGE. STRAUSS ARGUED THAT FURTHER ALLIED FORCES ARE Bound TO BE WITHDRAWN AND THAT, UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, EUROPE COULD NOT AFFORD TO BE LEFT WITHOUT A NUCLEAR DEFENSE. THE FRA, THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT BOX ITSELF IN WITH SUCH A TREATY. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, THREATEN TO RESIGN. MCGHEE.
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