Vorontsov (Counselor Soviet Embassy) called me for lunch. Several points of interest were discussed.

1. I asked Vorontsov whether the Soviets had talked to the French since the recent Messmer statements on NPT. Vorontsov said the Soviets had and that they had been assured that the French position remained the same: the French would not sign the NPT nor support it publicly but they would work behind the scenes to get Germany to sign and they would pose no obstacle to completion of negotiations of the Treaty.

2. Vorontsov was curious as to our views on whether the Foreign Ministers might usefully conclude the ENDC discussions before the General Assembly session. I wondered out loud whether the security assurances package or the ENDC report were sufficiently important to bring the Foreign Ministers to Geneva. Vorontsov took the view that neither was of such importance. He seemed quite clear that there was no point in the Foreign Ministers closing down the ENDC. He mentioned particularly that there might be some disgruntled ENDC members (Romania (?)) and that the situation did not therefore seem to be the best kind of one for the attendance of Foreign Ministers. Vorontsov suggested, however, that it
might be useful for the Foreign Ministers to open the UNGA session. If other governments send Foreign Ministers, there would probably be fewer requests for minor changes in text and discussion might be kept in Plenary where it would tend to be more general. Vorontsov was curious about the number of changes we foresaw and whether any should be made at the UNGA. I mentioned the Swedish amendments of September 8 indicating that we don't see much problem with them and that they might well help achieve stronger support from the Swedes for the Treaty draft. Vorontsov expressed the view that it would be better to finish the text in Geneva and oppose any changes at the UNGA. I said that, while this was certainly desirable from the point of view of the United States and the Soviet Union, we could probably not be absolutely sure that there would be no further changes at the UNGA. Vorontsov seemed quite desirous of buttoning up the text and opening it for signature by July. He mentioned July 14 and seemed startled when I said this was Bastille Day. He may have been thinking about July 4.

3. During the lengthy discussion of security assurances, I urged Soviet acceptance of the United States non-use formula. Vorontsov was clear that the Soviet military would simply not agree to any formula which would inhibit the Soviets from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the Federal Republic as long as the Federal Republic had United States nuclear weapons on its territory. Vorontsov asked how we would feel about a limitation preventing us from using nuclear weapons on Cuba, assuming Soviet weapons were deployed there. (Comment: His assumption appeared to be that there was nothing we could call an armed attack by Cuba and that, under the US formula, we would therefore be inhibited from using nuclear weapons on the Soviet missile installations in Cuba although there would be no question that Soviet assistance had taken place.) Vorontsov seemed at first to want to find some compromise between the United States and Soviet non-use formulae. I made clear that we could not accept a formula which discriminated among our allies depending on whether
they had nuclear weapons on their territory or not. Vorontsov said we had accepted such a formula in agreeing to sign Protocol II to the LANFZ, none of whose members could have nuclear weapons stationed on their territory under the LANFZ Treaty. I pointed out that Protocol II was quite different from the Soviet Kosygin proposal. Moreover, in language its formula was like that proposed by the Romanians but opposed by the Soviet Union. I also described briefly our interpretation of the non-use provision of Protocol II. Vorontsov finally suggested that the practical solution to the current problem of achieving agreement on assurances was to leave out the non-use paragraph altogether.

4. I asked Vorontsov whether the Soviet Union would now sign Protocol II to the LANFZ. He said that there seemed to be no advantages in the treaty for the Soviet Union, only for the United States. He said that Moscow did not like the idea of approving a treaty which permitted United States transit privileges with nuclear weapons in and over other countries' territory. I suggested to him that the Soviet Union would want the same privileges for a nuclear free zone applying to Eastern Europe. He agreed that that was true but was not so sure that it would be true if the nuclear zone applied to all of Europe. He did not know whether Moscow's consideration of Protocol II would ultimately produce a signature or not.

5. I asked Vorontsov whether we might soon hear an affirming report to our request for bilateral talks on offensive and defensive missiles. I pointed out to him that in our last conversation he had suggested that another formal indication of interest by the United States might be helpful. After our conversation, United States representatives gave such an indication to Soviet representatives. Vorontsov replied that "everything that had been built up" before the North Korean incident would now have to be built up painfully again. I asked what the Soviets expected us to do if one of our ships was seized in international waters by North Koreans. He said we were doing the right thing now - we were talking. Earlier, however, we had had a large military
build-up threatening a military confrontation. The result of this had been, he said, that people in Moscow who had to be persuaded about the missile talks were instead busy ordering military forces Eastward. This had created an unfavorable atmosphere for agreement to the missile talks. (Comment: I got the distinct impression from the conversation that the Foreign Ministry supported the missile talks but was having great difficulty achieving the concurrence of others, particularly the military people.)