ACTION: USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

INFO: USMission GENEVA
USMission NATO
Ambassador MOSCOW
Ambassador BONN
Ambassador ROME
Ambassador NEW DELHI
Ambassador TOKYO
Ambassador RIO DE JANEIRO
Ambassador BUENOS AIRES
Ambassador LONDON
Ambassador MEXICO CITY
Ambassador OTTAWA

STATE

DSTO/WATS

SUBJECT: NPT and Resumed GA

1. SUMMARY: Following are suggestions regarding certain tactical moves which might now be set in train to help achieve our objective to guide NPT through GA so that it may be opened promptly for signature. END SUMMARY

2. With agreement now imminent on April 24 as date for resumption GA to consider NPT, we will have to accelerate efforts, both our own and those of our friends, during next three weeks to facilitate successful GA outcome. We are currently discussing the
NPT in various capitals and seeking support for GA endorsement. Most responses have been generally favorable. Judging by past experience, however, we recognize in assessing such expressions of support that many smaller countries give considerable discretion to their Permreps in New York and attach importance to keeping in step with regional caucus decisions. In seeking broader support for NPT, we believe an early Canadian effort should be made to enlist assistance Japanese and others who have expressed their commitment to NPT (see STATE 138349). It will also be important in near future to solicit support of selected and respected members various blocs to gain benefit their advocacy within regional caucuses. We have in mind such countries as Mexico, Ethiopia and UAR would expect (because of Fahmy's position). We assume that Soviets will seek support from their friends among non-aligned on behalf NPT. One objective of these efforts should be to separate few near-nuclears from overwhelming majority countries having no prospect of developing nuclear security weapons and whose basic objective should be enhanced international security promised by NPT.

3. We must be prepared to explain and advocate vigorously the merits of the proposed NPT and its various provisions. To this end, guidance dealing with anticipated issues is being prepared for USDel use. We anticipate that major criticisms which will be directed against NPT and
which will provide basis of serious opposition to endorsement by the resumed GA, are charges that (a) NPT is inequitable in its balance of rights and obligations by requiring non-nuclear to give up something without equivalent arms control steps being taken by nuclear powers; (b) that non-nuclear are to renounce even peaceful nuclear explosive devices, nuclear should offer more extensive and concrete forms of assistance in development of peaceful applications atomic energy; and (c) that security assurances offered by US-UK-USSR are not adequate, since subjected to veto, and in any event should include non-use undertaking. In order to allow more time to consider these problems, and perhaps for various tactical reasons as well, a number of non-nuclear seem to be attracted to possibility of postponing definitive GA action on NPT until after Non-Nuclear August Conference (NNG) meets in September.

4. Without knowing just how tactical situation may develop in GA, it is difficult to develop precise guidelines for achieving our objective and base. USDel must have large measure tactical flexibility. Our objective--spelled out in detail in STATE 127763--is to obtain GA action which will permit NPT to be opened for signature after close of resumed session. Res 135015 we have discussed with USSR and UK (STATE 12888 would accomplish this. We assume that in next few weeks Res can be circulated more broadly among other countries with aim its becoming identified as their proposal patterned after action taken by GA in case Outer Space Treaty and Assistance and Return Agreement. There will
inevitably be attempts to load down RES with references to additional arms control measures and other desires reflecting main concerns of non-nuclear. As long as these references are basically hortatory and generally in line with long-range U.S. objectives, it would probably be wise to facilitate favorable action by resumed GA. At the same time there are limits to price we are willing to pay and we wish guard against premature concessions that would only whet appetites for more.

5. In light of uncertain tactical situation in GA, it is preferable to maintain as our public and private posture that present NPT draft is complete and effective, that it is best treaty which can be negotiated and effective to modify its substantive provisions now could inborn failure of earlier Treaty. We shall want to stress that present draft is responsive to repeatedly expressed desires of GA insofar as these are now achievable, that it already reflects extensive effort to meet legitimate needs of non-nuclear and that implementation NPT is urgent and should not further be delayed. We seek no extraordinary procedures and hope that fair consideration of its provisions will lead to GA endorsement. Major problem may arise if there is widespread interest in amending text of NPT. Posture described above should help to discourage bandwagon psychology toward amendment which flat
opposition to any change might precipitate. In discouraging amendments it may, of course, be necessary to indicate particular provisions (e.g. Arts.I,II and III) where amendments would upset solutions achieved only with the greatest difficulty and thus topple entire treaty; however, we will need to be careful not to convey impression that other parts of treaty, which have also been subject of extensive prior discussion and compromise at ENDC, are now fair game for amendments. If despite our efforts discourage amendments it appears that US-USSR acceptance some minor non-substantive changes will result in favorable action by GA, we will wish consider with USSR their incorporation in NPT. We shall therefore want, in cooperation USSR, enlist assistance First Committee Chairman in establishing tacit acceptance of fact that US and Soviets must continue play major role in sifting suggestions for "improving" draft text. We hope that solid evidence of US-Soviet collaboration will place NPT in context major step to promote detente and as result will help us head off disruptive proposals.

As noted above, for various reasons NNC presents potential NPT opponents with plausible excuse for postponing action by resumed GA. Sensitivity of issue and suspicion of our motives on part sponsors NNC argue for US taking no initiatives with respect to NNC or its work. Our position should continue to be that we support convening
of NNC and wish it to play meaningful role. If it appears useful to counter argument that NNC will be left with nothing of significance on its agenda should resumed GA endorse NPT, it should be pointed out that, to contrary, NNC could perform most useful service in considering appropriate ways to facilitate implementation certain NPT provisions, especially concerning peaceful uses. Imminence of that conference should not, however, forestall resumed GA from taking action it considers appropriate on critical subject such as NPT.

7. Handling of security assurances in GA and SC also presents special problems. Assurances concept may be subjected to extensive criticism in GA as being inadequate. We therefore will probably not on wish seek GA recommendation as proposed assurances Res. As pointed out USUN 4385, composition of SC makes it difficult to plan with confidence on timely adoption assurances resolution. Tactical handling, including timing of SC action relative to GA consideration of NPT, will require maximum flexibility and will have to be determined in light of developing situation in New York. Our goal is to seek UNSC approval of security assurances resolution if possible at early enough stage to exert positive influence on GA action regarding NPT. We are preparing paper for USDel use dealing with major substantive issues likely arise in discussion assurances.
8. Even with most vigorous diplomatic effort, we recognize there may be substantial support for postponement of action on NPT resulting from dissatisfaction over unwillingness nuclear powers themselves to undertake arms control measures, as well as alleged need of many non-nuclears discussing details of NPT for first time to have additional opportunity explore complex issues involved. Soviet adherence to Protocol II of Treaty of Tlatelolco would help counter such a trend and they should be urged to adhere. This may be key to enlisting unreserved Mexican and, through Mexico, LA support for NPT.

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END

KATZENBACH