BRIEFING NOTES
IRAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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IRAN IS NOT THINKING OF ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT IF THE SMALL STATES EQUIP THEMSELVES WITH SUCH ARMAMENTS, THEN IRAN WOULD REVISE ITS POLICY.

STATEMENT BY SHAH
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DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR-WEAPON OPTION?

1. IRAN HAS CONCLUDED AGREEMENTS WITH FRANCE FOR FIVE PWR REACTORS
   A. TOTAL CAPACITY OF 5,000 MWE
   B. PLANNED TO BEGIN OPERATING AT A RATE OF 1/YEAR AFTER 1980

2. ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS TO PURCHASE EIGHT ADDITIONAL REACTORS FROM U.S.

3. HAS PURCHASED 10% SHARE IN FRENCH EURODIF URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT

4. HAS APPROACHED U.S. ABOUT POSSIBLE LICENSING OF A PLUTONIUM REPROCESSING PLANT IN IRAN

5. PLANNING TO SEND 750 STUDENTS ABROAD DURING NEXT TEN YEARS TO STUDY NUCLEAR ENGINEERING

6. BUT, IRAN HAS SIGNED AND RATIFIED NPT

7. HOWEVER, IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM HEAVILY DEPENDENT UPON FOREIGN INPUTS
   A. VIOLATION OF NPT OBLIGATIONS AND NPT-IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS COULD LEAD TO TERMINATION OF FUTURE FOREIGN INPUTS
   B. REFERENCES TO PLANNED HEAVY RELIANCE UPON NUCLEAR POWER AS SOURCE OF ELECTRICITY: 35,000 MWE BY LATE 1990s

8. NOTHEDELESS, CONSTRAINT OF FOREIGN DEPENDENCE MIGHT BE WEAKENED
   A. SUPPLY OF ENRICHED URANIUM REACTOR FUEL FROM EURODIF
   B. AMBIGUITY ABOUT STATUS OF NPT-IAEA SAFEGUARDS ONCE A COUNTRY WITHDRAWS FROM NPT
   C. POSSIBLE EMERGENCE OF NUCLEAR EXPORTS "GREY MARKET"
POSSIBLE PRESSURES FOR AN EVENTUAL IRANIAN DECISION TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. A RANGE OF FACTORS MIGHT PRODUCE IN THE MID-1980s AN IRANIAN DECISION TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS (SEE CHART, P. 4)

A. DISSOLVEMENT OF THE PAKISTANI BUFFER-STATE, LEADING TO DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH A NUCLEAR-ARMED INDIA
B. TRADITIONAL FEARS OF THE SOVIET UNION, REINFORCED BY GALLOIS-TYPE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF AN INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR-WEAPON CAPABILITY
C. QUEST TO BE RECOGNIZED AS "THE FIFTH GREAT POWER"
D. A DECISION BY ITS FELLOW MOSLEM STATE, PAKISTAN, TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS
E. IRANIAN DESIRE FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY HEGEMONY WITHIN THE PERSIAN GULF
F. WEAKENED CONSTRAINT OF FOREIGN DEPENDENCE

2. DEPENDING UPON THE STRENGTH OF DIFFERING MOTIVATIONS, THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AN IRANIAN NUCLEAR-WEAPON PROGRAM WOULD PROBABLY VARY

A. MIGHT EMPHASIZE DEVELOPMENT OF A TACTICAL BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR-WEAPON CAPABILITY BACK-STOPPED BY A MINIMUM DETERRENCE POSTURE (SOVIET-FOCUSED PROGRAM)
B. COULD STRESS DEVELOPMENT OF A REGIONAL CAPABILITY BASED UPON PREVIOUSLY ACQUIRED NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (INDIA-Pakistan-Persian Gulf-Focused Program)
C. MIGHT BE SATISFIED WITH A SMALL PROGRAM DESIGNED TO MATCH THAT OF OTHER ASPIRANTS FOR GREAT POWER STATUS AND PRESTIGE (BRAZIL-FOCUSED PROGRAM)
D. OR COULD BELIEVE THAT CLAIM TO GREAT POWER STATUS REQUIRED MORE THAN SIMPLY DEMONSTRATING IRAN WAS IN THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON BUSINESS

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