MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION


I originally initiated this project to exploit the opportunity afforded by the collapse of the USSR and what I expected to be a relatively short window of opportunity to interview effectively key Soviet military officers and defense officials. I hoped to understand how key US and Soviet senior defense officials viewed and assessed the military balance and associated doctrines and force postures. Also, the methods of assessment used were of special interest to me.

This effort was able to identify and compare differences (and similarities) in US and Soviet assessments of the military balance and to analyze the two very distinct ways in which Washington and Moscow developed and operated their nuclear arsenals. Of particular interest may be the evolution of Soviet views on the utility of nuclear warfare, the relationship between their military doctrine and actual force deployment decisions, and the complex, antagonistic relationship between Moscow's military and defense industrial establishments.

The report, however, leaves some questions unanswered. The failure to complete the report prior to John Hines' departure from BDM resulted in some unresolved issues. Thus it remains for other analysts to determine if it was the General Staff or the defense industrialists who drove the Soviet strategic force deployments. Questions of the disconnect between Soviet doctrine and observed force structure, or the claimed fear on the part of the Soviet leaders of falling behind remain to be answered.

Nevertheless, the report is quite interesting. In particular, those who worked on the military balance issues in the past will be particularly interested in the views held by their Soviet counterparts in the not too distant past. Ongoing developments in Russia, make it appear that the opportunity to interview key participants and to freely obtain data on relatively sensitive issues is rapidly closing, if it has not already closed.

A. W. MARSHALL

Attachment