HISTORY OF THE JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF:

BACKGROUND AND PREPARATION OF SIOP-62

HISTORY & RESEARCH DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
Preface

This document is the initial installment in the continued History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. It is concerned first with the development of problems in strategic target planning during the 1950s and the evolution of plans for the integration of the activities of the various commands into one plan; second with the organization of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at Headquarters SAC; and third with the preparation of the first Single Integrated Operational Plan. In the preparation of this history the historian did research in JSTPS files at Headquarters SAC and in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. Documents indicated as exhibits (Ex) are on file in the History & Research Division, Directorate of Information, Headquarters SAC.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Background.........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Search for More Effective Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization.......</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of SIOP-62.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary.............</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footnotes...........</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates' decision of 16 August 1960 to establish a joint staff at Headquarters Strategic Air Command (SAC) under the direction of Commander in Chief, SAC, brought together for the first time all elements of the armed services with a strategic nuclear capability into one integrated operational plan.\(^1\) Secretary Gates considered the decision the most important he had made in seven years in the Pentagon.\(^2\) Perhaps the magnitude of this action can be better appreciated after a review of the history of planning and coordination activities for the strategic nuclear offensive between 1952 and 1960. (U)

Between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Korean War, SAC had a virtual monopoly on the means of delivering atomic weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) drew SAC forces under its direct operational control in 1946 and strengthened these bonds in subsequent years by preventing usurpation of control of SAC forces by theater commanders.\(^3\) Therefore, during these years no coordination problems existed in planning and executing the atomic offensive, but by the early 1950s the situation was changing because of a proliferation of weapons and delivery vehicles. (S)

The United States Navy announced in 1952 that all of its new attack planes were capable of carrying tactical atomic bombs, and that it had on hand aircraft capable of delivering large bombs. Newly
activated tactical units in Europe and the Far East also became able
to deliver small weapons. Indeed, the Secretary of the Air Force,
Thomas K. Finletter, announced that "nearly all" USAF combat aircraft
were being modified to carry them. The time was also rapidly approach-
ing when the Soviet Union would become a major atomic power. It ex-
ploded an atomic device in 1949, and a year later USAF credited Russia
with already having a "formidable long range air force" which by 1952
could cover all of the United States.5

To meet this increased Soviet threat the JCS acted to gain more
direct control of the nation's expanding atomic force. In March 1952
an ad hoc committee of that group examined existing procedures for con-
trol and coordination of atomic operations and recommended centralizing
them for maximum bombing effect and minimum interference between forces.
The JCS agreed and established facilities for lateral coordination of
planning called Joint Coordination Centers (JCC) in Europe and the Far
East.* They were war room facilities for receipt, compilation, display,
review, coordination, and relay of information concerning the plans and
operations of atomic forces for the benefit of the unified and specified
commanders concerned and the JCS.** This was operational coordination,
that is, it took place after hostilities began.  

* Buckinghamshire, United Kingdom, and Pershing Heights, Tokyo, Japan.
** In Europe, Commander in Chief Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Medi-
terranean (CINCNEA), Commander in Chief United States Forces Europe
(CINCEur), and Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC),
and in the Far East, Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPac), Commander
in Chief Alaska (CINCAK), and CINCSAC.
Early exercises of the Joint Coordination Centers disclosed a requirement for pre-hostilities coordination of commanders' atomic plans. Accordingly, in 1954, the JCS asked each appropriate commander to submit an atomic annex, i.e., a target list, to his war plan and to coordinate it with theater commanders and CINCSAC. In 1955 SAC was directed to act as host for a conference of appropriate commanders to determine a methodology or "modus operandi" for defeat of communist air power. This conference failed to agree on anything except the requirement for periodic coordination of atomic war plans. With JCS approval these conclaves became known as World-Wide Coordination Conferences (WWCC). They were held each subsequent year through 1958. Plans coordinated at these conferences and approved by the JCS were prepositioned with the Joint Coordination Centers for operational coordination required by an exercise or the initiation of hostilities. The total coordination activity pre- and post-hostility, was known as the atomic coordination machinery.7

How successful was this machinery? The magnitude of the problem probably can be appreciated best by recalling the complex problems of generation, launch, mutual support, and maximum bombing involved in preparing a single command's strike plan. These factors were manageable because the work went on within the framework of a common doctrine. When coordination between commands with different concepts, doctrines, traditions, and techniques was attempted, the problems became formidable. On the positive side, world-wide conferences did enable commanders
to appreciate more fully each others capabilities, tasks, objectives, and plans. Target lists, forces, and strike timing were discussed and compared. Some conflicts were avoided. Yet the defects of the program were clearly more evident than its successes, at least to SAC. The conferences did not solve targeting conflicts; for example, in the 1957 and 1958 meetings duplications and triplications (two or more commands delivering weapons to the same target) were not significantly reduced. Neither did they achieve mutual support or unity of strategic effort among the JCS commanders. At the JCCs, operational coordination procedures depended upon a highly sophisticated communications system. During peacetime exercises the communications time lag between sending and receipt of messages tended to increase causing a backlog; under combat conditions the system's efficiency would be greatly reduced. In each of the exercises of the JCC machinery from 1958 through 1960 over 200 time over target (TOT) conflicts highlighted the degree of conflict in existing execution plans. In wartime, with disrupted communications, this could result in needless loss of aircraft and crews. A comparison of target lists and some conflict resolution were the net gains in four years of coordination effort.

General N. F. Twining, Chairman of the JCS, believed one fundamental principle had evolved from these coordination activities: "... atomic operations must be pre-planned for automatic execution to the maximum extent possible and with minimum reliance on post-E-Hour communications."
The Search for More Effective Coordination

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 (Public Law 85-599), passed by Congress on 23 July 1958, seemed to open new vistas for better coordination of the strategic offensive. President Eisenhower, in outlining his plan to the Congress, emphasized "... the vital necessity of complete unity in our strategic planning and basic operational direction." It was necessary that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs have the authority to take action in these matters. The Air Force, traditionally in favor of integration along functional lines, supported the President's program, as did the Army. The Navy was less enthusiastic.

Armed with increased authority over the development and operation of new weapon systems given him by the reorganization act, the Secretary of Defense, then Neil McElroy, examined plans for the new Fleet Ballistic Missile or Polaris, then in development. In December 1958 he asked the Joint Chiefs for their views on the future employment of the system. (U)

As spokesman for the Air Force, General Thomas D. White advocated creation of a unified US Strategic Command, to encompass subordinate units from the Air Force (heavy and medium bombers and intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles) and the Navy Polaris. With approval of the JCS, the CINCHOS would develop the organization so it could be functional by the time Polaris became operational. Strategic
Air Command personnel would be integrated with those of the participating services and assigned to the new headquarters. General White believed a unified strategic command provided the organizational structure best suited for developing maximum effective atomic offensive plans.  

The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps were in general opposition to the Air Force plan. Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, objected to integrating all strategic weapon systems into a single command and recommended rejection of the Air Force position. The Navy had earlier asked that Polaris be assigned to Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINLANT) and eventually to United States Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCUS) and Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINC Pac). Admiral Burke saw little need for change: in his opinion coordination had been working well since the 1958 Reorganization Act and integration of Polaris into the fleet would pose no targeting problems. Assignment of all weapon systems to a single command, on the other hand, "... would disrupt and alter the U.S. defense organization." Authority already existed in the JCS to prevent undesirable duplications in strategic targeting, planning, and weapons employment and the CNO believed it should remain there. The Army generally agreed with the Navy, but it believed the entire investigation was premature. It would assign Polaris to the fleet and examine its command structure later when it had become a proven system. The Marine Corps favored making the JCS responsible for selection of targets, after which the unified commanders would...
assign them to attack forces. It feared assignment of targets to one commander would create a "monolithic" structure to control aircraft and land and fleet missiles which would have great coordination problems and be vulnerable if communications were destroyed.21 (98)

As a result of this disagreement, a split decision paper was presented to the SecDef.22 Although General White reported Mr. McElroy did not believe a decision on command arrangements was urgent because the system would not become operational until late in 1960,23 there was no doubt that the Secretary intended to press for improvement of target coordination procedures. In late July, following an EWO briefing at Headquarters SAC for the SecDef and members of the JCS, he requested the Chairman present his views on this problem.24 (16)

In his reply, General Twining reviewed the history of coordination to date and concluded "... not much more progress can be achieved under the present arrangements ... "25 He rejected modifications to the existing machinery, advocating instead "fundamental changes" to the system. The problem divided into three categories: (1) targeting policy, (2) development of integrated operational plans, and (3) control of strike forces. Regarding the first, he inclined toward the Air Force counter force philosophy, believing the target system should include (in order of priority) long range nuclear delivery capability, government and military control centers, war making resources, and population centers. After adoption of a targeting policy, in the
Chairman's opinion the commander responsible for the strategic mission should develop a national strategic targeting system or list subject to review by J-2 (Intelligence). On the second question, he believed an integrated operational plan was definitely needed. He would charge CINCSAC with its development. Naval carriers would not be assigned any pre-planned strategic targets, but when Polaris developed a significant operational capability it would be brought into the integrated plan.

On the third issue, the Chairman reasoned that if the above actions were taken the question of operational control and problems of mutual interference would be "simplified." The promulgation of a national strategic target list (NSTL) and a single integrated operational plan (SICP) would, in General Twining's words, "... provide a sound basis for necessary coordination of operational plans of local commanders with CINCSAC's plan." Only after decisions on these issues were made, in the form of a command decision, and enforced, would there be progress in the area of target coordination.

At the time he presented his views to the SecDef, the Chairman sought the positions of the services on the issues of targeting coordination by requesting answers to 16 questions. Initially, an inter-service ad hoc committee prepared a reply to the questions. Later, each service individually prepared their answers. As in the issue of command and control of Polaris, a wide divergence of opinion existed between the services. But no further action was taken on the matter.
during 1959, awaiting the completion of Study 2009, an optimum target system for general war being prepared for Presidential approval. 31

Secretary McElroy also left office in December 1959; and the task of resolving the target coordination problem fell to his successor, Thomas S. Gates. The new SecDef gave early indications that he intended to take action. On 20 January he told the Joint Chiefs that he wished to discuss SK-171-59 (the split decision Polaris paper) at their convenience. 32 Events during early spring provided fresh evidence that action was needed. Representatives to a coordination conference at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) agreed that targeting of a wide variety of weapons without a waste of resources was "... far beyond the capability of coordination conferences." 33 The senior representative of CINCUur and CINCSAC stated in their memo to the JCS: "With the increased number of weapons and their diversified utilization, it appears that an efficient application of the force can only be accomplished by a single authority." 34

Meanwhile, the issue remained stalled at the roadblock of conflicting service positions. On 6 May General Twining advised the Secretary that the Chiefs could not agree on a response to the 18 questions; their individual views were forwarded. 35 After a two-day discussion in the middle of June in which the service positions were freely discussed with the new Secretary, 36 the Joint Staff prepared a paper expanding on differences in the areas of policy, target detection, and...
planning and coordination. The Joint Chiefs were in agreement that a basic targeting policy was needed to translate guidance contained in Study 2009 and the President's decision on the study into workable instructions for unified and specified commanders, and that guidance was needed for selection of targets in a national target list, but they differed on what that policy should be. General Twining felt the elements of this diversity arose, partially at least, from endemic conceptual differences. He urged that the JCS not wait for a "perfect solution." To fit action to the word, he proposed a national strategic targeting policy. Service positions went to the SecDef as SM-696-60 on 20 July 1960.

On 16 August 1960, after over a year of consideration by the JCS and two Secretaries of Defense, the issues of command and control of strategic systems and strategic targeting became the subject of a SecDef decision. It was a clear compromise, indorsing neither the Air Force position favoring a unified command, nor the Navy position that existing JCS machinery could do the work. Recognized by Secretary Gates was CINCSAC's extensive experience in strategic planning. The individual designated as CINCSAC, acting as the agent of the JCS, would collect at Headquarters SAC a team of experts from all services to prepare a plan for all U.S. forces committed to the initial strategic strike effort. CINCSAC's duties as Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) were an additional and separate responsibility. On 18 August Secretary Gates assigned as General Power's deputy Rear Admiral (subsequently
promoted to Vice Admiral) Edward N. Parker, an expert in nuclear weapons and former head of the Defense Atomic Support Agency. 42 (U)

Organization

General Power began immediately to gather his inter-service staff at Headquarters SAC. Actions to bring in new people and organize and train them in SAC methods proceeded at a brisk pace and they constituted the organization's main problems during the early formulative months. Time for preparation of the first plan was short; the SecDef wanted it done by early December. 43 (U)

The organization was kept as small as possible, with maximum participation of the existing SAC staff, but all services participated in all aspects of planning. Commands involved (SACEUR, CINCLANT, CINCPac, CINCAI, and CINCEM) were requested to send representatives to a 24 August meeting at Offutt AFB to discuss organization and manning. 44 Three days later a proposed organizational structure to perform the main work assigned, i.e., preparation of a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), was prepared and forwarded to the JCS. 45 (U)

The organization was divided into two general categories (see Chart next page). The first was the Office of the Director. General Power, in his capacity as Director of Strategic Target Planning, had as his mission to: 46 (U)
JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA

DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING

ARMY MEMBER
NAVY MEMBER
AIR FORCE MEMBER
MARINE CORPS MEMBER

POLICY COMMITTEE
SECRETARIAT

CINC'S SENIOR LIAISON REPRESENTATIVES

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

NA...fTJ:ONAL STRATEGIC TARGET DIVISION

NATIONAL STRATEGIC TARGET LIST DIVISION

SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN DIVISION

TARGETS BRANCH
ESTIMATES BRANCH
MATERIALS BRANCH

MISSION BRANCH
TACTICS BRANCH
COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH
MATERIEL SUPPORT BRANCH

JCS Publication No. 4, "Organization and Functions of the JCS," 1 Dec 60.
UNCLASSIFIED

a. Organize a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff consisting of personnel from the various services possessing the required skills to perform the targeting and planning functions. (U)

b. Develop and maintain the NSFL and the SIOP for attack of the targets on the NSFL. (U)

c. Submit the NSFL and the SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval, highlighting points of difference which he resolved during the preparation of the NSFL and the SIOP. (U)

Also assigned to this office was a deputy, who assumed the responsibilities of the Director in his absence and acted as his principal assistant and advisor on JSTPS activities, and one representative each from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. These service representatives served as a personal staff for the director and his deputy, represented their services in policy matters, and performed a liaison function. They were not in the command channel. Representatives from unified and specified commands supplying forces to the SIOP and a JCS liaison group were also attached to the staff. The CINC representatives (the number assigned was at the discretion of their commander) participated in the preparation of the SIOP and NSFL. They were not integrated into the staff, but were directly responsible to their respective commanders. A JCS liaison group, an integral part of the Joint Staff, JCS, assisted the DSTOP in interpreting JCS guidance and informed the JCS and the services of progress in the preparation of the NSFL and SIOP. The CINC and service representatives served as a Policy Committee under the chairmanship of the deputy director. This committee reviewed and
approved policy; disagreements went to the director for final decision. Also part of the Office of the Director was the Secretariat, responsible for administration and personnel supervision. The second category consisted of the two production units of the Target Staff—the National Strategic Target List Division and the Single Integrated Operational Plan Division—which took their names from the work they performed. 47 (U)

The initial Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) of 269 spaces requested for the above organization was divided as follows: SAC resources—140 officers; 57 airmen, and 22 civilians; Army—10 officers; Navy—29 officers; Air Force—8 officers; and Marine Corps—3 officers. 48 (S)

On 1 September 1960 the JCS approved the proposed organization, officially designating it the Joint Strategic Target Planning Agency (JSTPA),* and the initial Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) consisting of 50 military spaces to be added to the 197 SAC military personnel working in related areas. In one change, the JCS stipulated that the deputy chief of the SIOP Division be a Navy officer in the grade of rear admiral or captain. 49 (S)

Subsequently, as a result of the survey made of the NSRL Division's intelligence structure and the intelligence support agencies of SAC

* On 29 September 1960 the JCS redesignated the organization as the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. (SM-557-60, "Strategic Target Planning," 29 Sep 60.)
Headquarters, at the Chief of Naval Operation's request, the Deputy Director of JSEP requested 69 additional military spaces, which with the exception of 5 airmen from the Air Force were to be furnished by the Navy and Army. Forty of these were to be assigned to Headquarters SAC Intelligence functions and 29 to the JSEP. After review, the JCS approved the interim augmentation of 29 military personnel and 3 civilian spaces, but disapproved the additional 40.51

The organization to prepare the first NSNL and STOP was assembled in haste because the SecDef had ordered the two documents completed by 14 December 1960. Emphasis had been placed on acquiring the best people from the services to do the job; not much analysis had been made of existing capability within the SAC staff. But with completion of the initial NSNL and STOP, the organization could be adapted for the future, i.e., the work of keeping the documents current. General Power recommended a reduction; the non-SAC authorization would be reduced from 83 to 75 spaces and SAC personnel in a dual function status would be cut from 219 to 111. He also asked that the number of permanent representatives of the CINCs be held to a minimum.52

The Army and Navy did not agree. The Chief of Naval Operations did not think it adequately represented all services at all levels, but favored the Air Force. Because the duties of the NSNL Division concerned primarily intelligence and target selection, in the Navy's opinion all

* The preparation of these documents will be treated later in this history.
services should be equally represented. Neither did Admiral Burke favor the proposal to reduce the number of the CINC representatives, preferring instead to leave their appointment to the discretion of the commander concerned. Injecting a new feature, the CNO recommended creation of an intelligence panel, with representatives from the CINCs, the services, the Joint Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency, "... to provide the broadest and most expert intelligence base which can be achieved to support the SIOP." The Army did not think the proposed Manning met the criteria of a joint staff, nor did it agree with maintaining SAC officers with two jobs in key positions, except for the DSTP. It recommended equal representation among services in the NSFL Division and proportional representation (based on committed forces) in the SIOP Division.

The DSTP argued that existing JCS guidance for creation of joint staffs did not provide precedent for assignment of joint staff responsibilities to a specified command. He defended the JTD as representing his interpretation of JCS guidance: it was the most economical, made the most efficient use of space and technical equipment, and most adhered to the composition of forces and weapons assigned to the plan. He had not used forces submitted to the plan as a basis for representation; if he had the Navy and Marine Corps would have been reduced by one-half. In the document 14 key positions out of 34 were identified as Army, Navy, or Marine Corps (41 per cent). Although the DSTP had

___UNCLASSIFIED___
the best qualified would be chosen for these posts irrespective of service.57 In the DSEFP's opinion, the guiding principle of the JSEFPs organization was "... that of service representation proportional to the service forces involved."58 The organization as submitted was approved by the JCS on 14 June.59

Preparation of SIOP-62

General Power, in his capacity as DSEFP, was guided by the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP), a JCS document which formed the core of this nation's strategic strike planning. Specific objectives of this policy were to destroy or neutralize Sino-Soviet Bloc strategic strike forces and major military and government control centers, and to strike urban-industrial centers to achieve the level of destruction indicated in Study 2009. These objectives were to be accomplished by integrating strategic forces and directing them against a minimum list of targets.60

The first task of the JSEFPs after its organization was to determine what targets were to be attacked. On 18 August General Power directed his Directorate of Intelligence to prepare a preliminary target list. At the initial meeting of the Staff six days later Intelligence presented a working list, known as the National Strategic Target Data Base (NSTDB) of about 4,000 targets. A Steering Committee headed by Admiral

*From this list a team of experts from NSTL Division and the CINCs eventually prepared the final list.
Parker insured that the targeting needs of all the CINCs were satisfied. General Power wanted the final list to include only targets which had been positively identified and located. After assigning a relative worth to the targets in the base by means of a target weighing system,* the process of developing desired ground zeros (DGZs) began. Installations were grouped into target islands or groups of proximate installations identified as complexes. Computer programming then selected the optimum number and location of DGZs within the islands which when struck would achieve the desired degree of destruction. The results were verified manually. After the number of weapons available and the degree of assurance of delivering a weapon to each bomb release line were determined, a process of "optimum targeting" was employed in selecting the number of DGZs that should be attacked and the desired assurance of delivery to be applied to each DGZ. An "optimum mix" DGZ list, the best combination of types of targets (military and urban-industrial) considering the number of

* A complex process of determining the relative worth of potential military and urban-industrial targets by application of a point system. This ranking was the basis for DGZ development and DGZ priority. Existing SAC military and urban-industrial weighing system was modified in coordination with CINC representatives. (Manual, "Target Weighing System," 19 Dec 60, prepared by JSFPS, B-77750; ICM, Col J. M. Philpott, Ch, NSFL Div, JSFPS, to ICI, "JSFPS History," 9 Oct 61, B-80604.)
In the middle of September 1960, work began on applying weapon systems gathered by SIOP Division to the DGZs prepared by NSFL Division. Concurrent with work on the target system, personnel of the SIOP Division and CINC representatives analyzed capabilities of forces submitted by the CINCs preparatory to applying these forces to the target system.* Only forces and capabilities existing in December 1960 were considered in the SIOP-62. Reliability planning factors for each weapon system were also determined and submitted to the Policy Committee for approval.\(^54\)\(^{(e)}\)

In the middle of September 1960, work began on applying weapon systems gathered by SIOP Division to the DGZs prepared by NSFL Division. The target system was divided into two parts—those targets east of

* CINCLANT, CINCPac, and CINCSAC committed forces to the SIOP and they were integrated directly into the plan, but SACEur forces were included only on a coordinated basis. This came about because of the special nature of the command, i.e., it contained foreign as well as U.S. forces. The SACEur forces are shown in the SIOP; liaison between USCINCFOUR and JSTPS produced mutually satisfactory target coverage and support. (Memo for All Concerned, JSTPS "Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Policy Committee," 21 Oct 60; Interview, R. Kipp, Historian, with Lt Col F. N. Miller, Asst CINCSAC Rep, JSTPS, 21 Mar 62; ICM, Col P. J. Long, SACEur Senior Rep, JSTPS, to INM, "Review of History of JSTPS," 15 Mar 62, B-82560)\(^{(e)}\)
100° east longitude and those west of 100° east longitude. Two force application teams were formed, one for each sector. (See Chart next page) Their work consisted of studying air defenses, selecting tactics, determining attrition probability, and studying weapons effects and constraints policy.* A definite type aircraft or missile was then assigned to a definite target. Alert forces** reacting to tactical warning were integrated first against the highest priority targets. Follow-on forces,*** not maintained in a condition to react immediately, were then targeted to take advantage of the disruption caused by the alert strike, to increase probability of destruction of high priority targets, and to expand the NSIL coverage.] Coordinating

* The JCS constraints policy required that:

a. Surface bursts in satellite areas be held to the minimum demanded by military necessity. {TURN}

b. In Russia and China, weapons should be employed to: (TURN)

   (1) Reduce civil destruction and casualties to the minimum demanded by military necessity when primary undertakings apply.

   c. Surface burst weapons be limited in critical areas to insure that the expected dose limits set by the JCS are not exceeded. (TURN)

(See V to JSIPS Rpt 1, "JCS Constraints," to Memo for JCS, "Fallout Constraint Policy," from DSEP, B-78376.)

** This was a force of 874 delivery systems (1447 weapons) reacting within 35 minutes if located on fixed bases, and two hours if mobile (carriers and Polaris submarines) (Briefing, "NSIL and SEOF Presentation to SecDef," 1 Dec 60, Vol II, B-77571.) {SS}

*** Consisting of 1464 aircraft and missiles and 1976 weapons (Ibid.). {SS}
JSTPS TARGETING TEAM

Force Application/Target Selection
SIOP-Missions / NSTL-Targets

Recording

Support Functions

TACTICS
SAC PAC LANT

FORCE CAPABILITY
SAC PAC LANT

GAM LAUNCH DATA
NSTL-Materials

ANAL/VPN EFFECTS
NSTL-Targets

ATTRITION/PROB
NSTL-Estimates
strikes was difficult because of the great variety of delivery systems and weapons targeted. For example, forces available consisted of such divergent systems as the B-52, the F-100, and the ATLAS and the Mace; reliability factors varied from 61 to 95 per cent in aircraft to 38 to 75 per cent in missiles; weapons varied from 1 to 3000 tons in yield; and CEP's ranged from 300 to 3000 feet for aircraft to 2500 to 12,000 feet for missiles.

Detailed source data sheets were prepared on each sortie. They contained information on targets by sortie, sortie entry point on the 8-Hour Control Line (H8CL), tactics used, post-strike base or recovery area; type weapon delivered, and type vehicle. After further detailed flight planning, the complete source data program was run through SAC's 704 computer to resolve time over target conflicts. Strike timing sheets for each of 16 options became Annex F to the SIOP-62 and were delivered to the unified and specified commands. Task force commanders received only those sheets directly related to their mission. At the tactical unit, strike timing for individual sorties was extracted from the timing sheets and integrated into the individual combat mission folders.

After the work of applying committed forces to targets was completed, damage assessed, and necessary refinements and adjustments made,

The annex contained three appendices: strike timing for aircraft and missiles, aircraft and missile recapitulation by accounting line number, and aircraft and missile recapitulation by target number and DOZ.
the NSTL was produced. It was a list of all National Strategic Target Data Base installations to be attacked in the SIOP. These targets fell into three general groups. 68

(1) A minimum number of targets whose timely and assured destruction will accomplish the specific objectives set forth in the NSTAP (this was the minimum NSTL). (2)

(2) Defensive targets necessarily struck in order to strike the targets in (1) above. (2)

(3) Other targets which the DSTP and the CINOs agree should be taken under attack and those other installations in the National Strategic Target Data Base significantly damaged because of co-location. (2)

On 1 December 1960 the SecDef, JCS, commanders of unified and specified commands committing forces to the SIOP, and other high ranking military and civilian leaders, 32 in all, gathered at Headquarters SAC for briefings on SIOP-62. 69 [Presented were the NSTL; operational concepts; enemy defenses; force application; assessment of sortie success, damage, and casualties; and dissent to the plan.] 70 (2)

The complete SIOP-62 was a detailed plan of what targets were to be attacked, by what forces, and in what manner during the initial strategic attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It superseded any conflicting guidance contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Eight annexes represented the key portions of the plan: intelligence, responsibilities and command relationships, atomic, concept of operations,
coordinating instructions, strike timing, communications, and administrative procedures. The JCS, acting under orders from the President, reserved the prerogative of putting the plan into effect. Its mission was to:

a. Destroy or neutralize the Sino-Soviet strategic nuclear capability and primary military and government controls of major importance.

b. Attack the major urban-industrial centers of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to the extent necessary to paralyze the economy and render the Sino-Soviet Bloc incapable of continuing war.

Factors such as time over target, launch base, delivery vehicle, weapon, height of burst, DOZ, delivery route, tactics, and timing were planned in minute detail. A degree of flexibility was built into the plan, however. Sixteen options for executing the plan were available based on the amount of warning available.* Strategic Air Command's alert force could be launched under positive control. Follow-on forces could be held and redirected before the execution message was received and manned systems in the follow-on force could be recalled even when airborne; mobile forces (aircraft carriers and missile submarines) could launch from alternate positions; and fixed missiles had dual targets.

* Option 1 was the alert option; only the alert force could be launched under this condition. Options 2 through 15 were based on progressively increasing preparation time from 1 to 28 hours. Option 16 was predicated on a minimum of 28 hours preparation time for all forces (Appendix 1 to Chap 10, JSTPS Planning Manual, 1 Apr 61).
Disagreements with certain SIOP-62 planning factors were presented at the briefing by CINCLant's senior representative to the JCS, Rear Admiral J. J. Hyland. Although they had earlier been resolved by the DSTP, 75 by JCS direction they were presented as part of the SecDef briefing. 76 First, Admiral Hyland objected to what he called the JSTPS policy of justifying a maximum rather than a minimum target list. Forces were rigidly committed to the SIOP as first priority, giving the commander little latitude in hitting other targets important to him. Because of guidance that only SIOP forces would strike NSIL targets, many theater targets were placed on the list to make sure they were struck. This expanded the target list beyond what CINCLant believed to be specific objectives of the NSTAP. 77 The DSTP's decision had been that excess forces should be used to increase the assurance of delivery of high priority targets rather than for attacking additional targets not part of the minimum NSIL. 78 Second, the CINCLant Senior Representative disagreed with the weather factors developed for the SIOP. He believed the plan to use visual delivery aircraft to attack at random times to be erroneous. He also disagreed with the process of averaging the good daylight capability of these aircraft with their poor night capability. This resulted in a low assurance factor which must then be raised by assigning additional sorties. CINCLant contended that if a carrier visual delivery aircraft was assigned a DGZ and the strike order came at night or during bad weather it could wait and deliver the weapon the...
same as if the order had come in daylight and good weather. Because of carrier mobility, commanders were not required to launch immediately upon receipt of tactical warning. General Power had earlier emphasized that the weather factor was an important one in determining the probability that a non-all-weather mission would be capable of doing the job assigned at any time during the year. A delay of launching due to weather might not prevent the mission from eventually being accomplished successfully, but the mission would not be completed as planned. For planning purposes in SIOP-62, for a strike selected at random, percentage figures were promulgated which represented the probabilities that weather and visibility conditions in each area would permit target identification by non-all-weather aircraft. The percentage ranged from 38 to 54 per cent. General Power decided that in executing SIOP-62 if weather was favorable non-all-weather aircraft would go as scheduled, but if it was unfavorable individual CINCs would use alternate launch schedules. In his third dissent, Admiral Hyland disagreed with the assurance factor used in SIOP-62. Although he agreed that the specific percentage to use was a matter of judgment, in his opinion the effort and expense involved in planning for higher than 90 per cent assurance of delivery on any single target was too great for the results obtained.

The equation was thus: the probability of success is equal to the reliability of the weapon system times the enroute and target area survivability of the weapon system times the probability of correct target identification for all-weather aircraft.
The Single Integrated Operational Plan for 1962 represented a unique advancement in war planning. Prior to its development, atomic targeting was coordinated after the fact, handicapping mutual support and economy of force. After lengthy consideration of the issue by the JCS, there was no unanimity of opinion, the Chairman proposed a national strategic targeting policy. The Secretary of Defense accepted this plan and directed it be used as guidance by CINCSAC in his new capacity as Director of Strategic Target Planning. In his decision of 16 August 1960, the Secretary decided a strategic command was not needed, but neither did he think target planning could be done within existing JCS capabilities. He created the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, responsible to the JCS, but located at Headquarters SAC. The JSTPS replaced the World-Wide Coordination Conference method of planning coordination, although operational coordination was still required in the Post E-Hour phase.
Working with a short deadline, a nucleus of SAC officers, assisted by officers of other services assigned to the new organization, produced the first NSTL and SIOP in less than four months. As expected, the process was not completed without differences arising from diverse service concepts, but they did not interfere with submission of the final plan to the SecDef on 1 December and its acceptance at that time. The JSTPS was not a panacea for all the problems of nuclear strike coordination, but it was a beginning, a foundation for future development. (9)

* See JCS 2056/251, "Coordination of Atomic Operations," 11 May 61 [Decision on study by J-3], B-79820. The total effect of SIOP on the atomic coordination system could not be accurately evaluated until after completion of the world-wide atomic exercise scheduled for September 1961. (9)
FOOTNOTES

1. JCS SM-810-60, 19 Aug 60 (E-76643); TAB B, JCS SM-810-60, 19 Aug 60, Memo for Gen T. S. Power, USAF, "Director of Strategic Target Planning," to SM-373-60, 22 Aug 60, Memo for the SecDef, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," (E-76643).

2. N.Y. Herald Tribune, 18 Aug 60.


10. President's message to the Congress (Copy), 3 Apr 58, Ex 18, Chap I, Hist of SAC, Jun 58-Jul 59.


12. Ibid., pp 634-6392 (Testimony of Adm Arleigh A. Burke, CHO, USN).


16. JCS 1620/254, Memo, CNO, USN, to JCS, "Concept of Employment and Command Structure for the Polaris Weapon System," 20 Apr 59. The Navy position was supported by Representative Daniel Flood (Dem., Pa.), influential member of the House Subcommittee on DOD Appropriations (See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on DOD Appropriations, 86th Cong, 2nd Sess, Part 2, pp 118-125).


19. Ibid.


22. The positions of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force went to the SecDef as JCSM-171-59, 8 May 59.

23. Ltr, Gen T. D. White, CofS USAF, to Gen T. S. Power, CINCSAC, 8 Jul 59, Ex 16, Hist of SAC, Jul-Dec 59, Vol IV.


26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

Enclosure, Memo for JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," to JCS 2056/137, 3 Oct 59. Members of the ad hoc committee were Maj Gen G. W. Martin, USAF; Brig Gen J. K. Woolnough, USA; RAdm C. V. Rickets, USN; and Brig Gen W. J. VanRyzin, USMC.

JCS 2056/143, 22 Dec 59.

SM-340-60, Memo for Dir, Joint Staff, from Brig Gen H. L. Hillyard, Sec, JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 11 Apr 60.

Note to Control Div, JCS, from Brig Gen H. L. Hillyard, Sec, JCS, "JCSM-171-59, 8 May 59, subject 'Concept of Employment and Command Structure for the POLARIS Weapon System,'" 20 Jan 60.

Ltr, Gen T. S. Power, CINCSAC, to Gen W. F. Twining, Chairman, JCS, 1 Jun 60, Ex 21, Chap I, Hist of SAC, Jan-Jun 60.

Memo for the JCS, from Brig Gen C. M. Eisenhart, CINCSAC Rep, and Maj Gen R. T. Coiner, CINCUS Rep, "NATO Coordination Procedures," 14 Apr 60, Ex 19, Chap I, Hist of SAC, Jan-Jun 60.

JCSM 193-60, Memo, JCS (signed by Chairman) to SecDef, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 6 May 60.

Memo for Gen Power, from Col L. D. Clay, Ch, DELB, SAC, "Strategic Command," 15 Jun 60.

JCS 2056/161, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 29 Jun 60, forwarded to SecDef as enclosure to Memo, Twining to SecDef, same subject, as JCSM 273-60.

Ibid.

JCSM 280-60, Memo, JCS (signed by the Chairman) to SecDef, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 7 Jul 60. The Air Force would designate CINCSAC as national strategic targeting authority, but the Navy and the Marine Corps favored designating the Joint Staff to do the job assisted by the unified and specified commands and other agencies.

Memo, Chairman, JCS for JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," enclosure to SM-682-60, 15 Jul 60.

Memo for the Chairman, JCS, from SecDef, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 16 Aug 60 (3-76590); SM-809-60, Memo for Gen T. S. Power, USAF, from JCS, "Director of Strategic Target Planning," 19 Aug 60.

USN Bureau of Personnel Order 051664, 17 Aug 60.
43. Interview (tape recorded), Robert M. Kipp, and E. R. Caywood, Historians, with VADM E. N. Parker, DSEP, 29 Dec 61.

44. Memo for the Record, "Staff Meeting 18 Aug 60," Brig Gen S. J. McKee, Sec, JSTPS (D-76590).


47. JCS SM-372-60, Memo for the SecDef from Gen N. F. Twining, Chairman, JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 22 Aug 60, Tab A (D-76643); Memo for JCS from SecDef, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 16 Aug 60 (D-76590); Memo for the Record, "Daily Progress Rpt on JSTP Activities," Part I, Brig Gen S. J. McKee, Sec, 24 Aug 60 (D-77010); Memo for JCS, from Gen T. S. Power, DSEP, "Proposed Organizational Manning Requirements . . .," 27 Aug 60, Ex 1; Memo for JCS, from Gen T. S. Power, DSEP, "Statement of Functions and Job Specifications for Key Positions in JSTPS," 25 Jul 61, Ex 2; JCS SM-963-60, "Terms of Reference for JCSLG," 27 Sep 60; Briefing, "NTIL and SIOP Briefing to SecDef," by JSTPS, 1 Dec 60 (D-77659).


49. Msg, 962265, JCS to DSEP, 1 Sep 60.

50. Msg, 2161, DSEP to JCS, 27 Sep 60, Ex 3.

51. Msg, 984249, JCS to DSEP, 13 Oct 60.


53. Msg, JCS 989341, 26 Jan 61, Ex 5.

54. Msg, JCS 989342, JCS to DSEP, 26 Jan 61, Ex 6; JCS 2056/223, Memo, JCS to SecDef, 3 Mar 61, forwarded as JCSN 128-61, 3 Mar 61. The Air Force approved of DSEP's Manning without change.

56. Msg, JCS 9924-69, JCS to DStP, n.a., 22 Mar 61, Ex 7.

57. Ltr, Gen T. S. Power, DStP, to JCS, "JSTPS Manpower Requirements and Organization," 27 Apr 61, with 1 Atch, Ex 8.

58. Memo for Admiral Parker, from Gen Power, "JSTPS Organization and Table of Distribution Recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff," 10 Jan 61, Ex 9.


60. JCS SM-372-60, Memo for the SecDef, from Gen N. P. Twining, Chairman, JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 22 Aug 60, Tab A (B-76643).


63. Briefing, "NSFL and SIOP Presentation to SecDef," 1 Dec 60, by JSTPS, Vol I (B-77659).

64. Briefing, "NSFL and SIOP Presentation to SecDef," 1 Dec 60, Vol I (B-77659), and Vol II (B-77671).


67. Interview, R. Kipp, Historian, with Lt Col J. Ferris, DStP, 6 Sep 61; SIOP-62, Annex F (B-77620), description only, not actual Annex F.

68. JSTPS Planning Manual, 1 Apr 61, p 11.

69. Records in Presentations and Protocol Sec, Office Cofs, SAC. See Ex 10 for a complete list of participants.

71. SIOP-62, 2 Dec 60 (B-77620).

72. Change 1 to SIOP-62, 7 Jun 61 (B-77620-A). Complete SIOP filed in SIOP Division, JSTPS, HQ SAC.

73. Memo, VAdm E. N. Parker, DSNP, to Ch, SIOP Div and CINC Reps, "Integration of SACNUR Coordinated Forces in SIOP-63," 24 Mar 61, w/1 Atch.

74. Msg, B-79315, DSNP to DCS, n.e., 31 Jun 61.

75. JSTPS Memo for All Concerned, "Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of the Policy Committee, 1 Nov 60," 7 Nov 60, Atch 1, JSTPS Memo for Record, "Disagreements Resolved by Director's Decision," 31 Oct 60.

76. SM-310-60, 19 Aug 60, Tab C to SM-372-60, Memo for SecDef, from Gen N. E. Twining, Chairman, JCS, "Target Coordination and Associated Problems," 22 Aug 60.

77. NSTL and SIOP Presentation to the SecDef, 1 Dec 60 (B-77659).

78. Memo for DSNP, from RAdm J. J. Hyland, CINCLANT/EULN Representative to JSTPS, "NSTL and SIOP," 21 Oct 60 (B-77246); JSTPS Memo for All Concerned, "Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of the Policy Committee, 1 Nov 60, Atch 1, JSTPS Memo for Record, "Disagreements Resolved by Director's Decision," 31 Oct 60.

79. Briefing, "NSTL and SIOP Presentation to SecDef," 1 Dec 60 (B-77659).


81. Briefing, "NSTL-SIOP Presentation to SecDef," 1 Dec 61, Vol II (B-77671).

82. Ibid., Vol I (B-77659).

83. Atch 1, JSTPS Memo for Record, "Disagreements Resolved by Director's Decision," 31 Dec 60, to JSTPS Memo for All Concerned, "Minutes of Eleventh Meeting of Policy Committee, 1 Nov 60," 7 Nov 60.

84. Memo, VAdm E. N. Parker, DSNP, to DSNP, "JSTPS Progress Report Week Ending 2 Dec 60," 6 Dec 60, En 12; Memo, Gen T. S. Power, DSNP, to JCS, "JCS NSTL/SIOP-63," 16 Jan 61, En 12; Msg, JCS to Chairman, JCS et al., JCS 987018, 9 Dec 60 (B-77712).