# Report of the Central Intelligence Agency

## Amendments to the Construction Rider

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REPORT OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTRUCTION RIDER
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MONDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1949

United States Senate,
House of Representatives,
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to call, in Room 48-C, The Capitol, Senator Brien McMahon (chairman of the joint committee) presiding.

Present: Senators McMahon (chairman) Connally, Hickenlooper, Willikin and Knowland; and Representatives Durham, Holifield, Jackson, Price

Committee Staff members present: William L. Borden, Executive Director; Harold Bergman, Deputy Director, and Messrs Brobeck and Hamilton.

Representing the Commission present: Commissioners Lilienthal, Strauss, Smyth and Pike, and Messrs. Shugg, Hollis, Colby and Henderson.

Representing the Central Intelligence Agency:

Rear Admiral R. G. Willenkoetter, CIA
Lt. Col. W. R. Davis, CIA

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Dr. Willard Machle, CIA.
Lt. Col. Wm. E. Boyd, Air Force
Comm'd Klein, Navy
Dr. Louis Woodruff, USA
Joseph Chase, Department of State.

PROCEEDINGS

The Chairman. While we are waiting for a couple of
more of the members of the committee to come in, I will
just take a minute to read three items of information
which I know you will be interested in, which have developed
during the past week.

In the matter of heavy water, the Commission has
authorized the sale to Canada of an extra 3932.4 pounds
of heavy water to permit Chalk River to resume operations
with zero energy experimental pile. The sale is necessary
because of the loss of water in an accident in the manu-
facturing pile at Chalk River in October of 1947. I
might add that this is top secret.

Emergency clearances: The AEC has given emergency
clearances to 117 persons for access to restricted data
in June of 1949.

Green Salt: A sub-specification production of green
salt uranium hexaflouride in partial chemical composition
at Cleveland between April 29 and July 12, 1949, has been
uncovered by the Commission as a result of a new sampling
system. Marshall officials admit the incident. No financial material loss to the Commission has resulted although the unit cost of the uranium hexafluoride, or K-25 may have been slightly increased as a result.

Senator Knowland. What was that? I missed the start of that. What happened there?

The Chairman. Sub-specification production of green salt, that is uranium tetr fluoride took place in the Harshaw Chemical Company plant at Cleveland, between April 19 and July 12. It has been discovered as a result of the sampling system there. The officials of the company admit that this is true. No financial or material loss to the Commission directly resulted, although the unit cost of the uranium hexafluoride or K-25 may have been slightly increased as a result. The FBI has conducted a study of the case and the Department of Justice is pursuing the civil aspects. Corrective administrative action has been taken.

REPORT OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Gentlemen, we have with us today the Director of CIA, Admiral Hillenkoetter, and Dr. Colby, who takes care of intelligence for the Commission and their associates. They are here at the request or as a result of the request by two members of the committee, particularly, in which I
Joined, that these gentlemen come up and go over the intelligence situation as it pertains to Russian manufacture of atomic weapons. I have read to the Admiral the latest statement and estimate that has been made by CIA on the situation, namely they expect at the end of this year to have production.

Representative Jackson. Do we want to make a record?

The Chairman. Yes, I think so.

(The then following discussion, by direction of the Chairman, was not placed on the record.)

The Chairman. The thought was expressed, gentlemen, that the committee may find it necessary to take something more than a finished estimate, and they wish to be enlightened on the techniques and the information which went into making this estimate.

Now, Admiral Hillenkoetter, in view of that do you wish to lead off?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, as to that estimate I will try to explain how this joint nuclear energy intelligence committee arrived at that estimate. Before the explosion of the bomb, around the first of September, we had a great deal of fragmentary information that was very much like information that could be compared to a mathematical equation where you had lots.
of A's and B's and X's and Y's, but nothing to tie it down to, and it could fit anywhere in space. The moment you got a constant in, and the constant was the definite date when this happened, it tied down other fragmentary information that we had which you could work backwards and forwards from. One of the things that was explained and developed as a result of this was that our estimates were not too far off in the first place.

The first estimate that we had that the Russians would have the bomb or a possible one by mid-1950 was based on the fact that they did not start any work on atomic bombs until after the Hiroshima explosion. By going back over the information that we have as a result of this fixed date that was given, it looks very much now as if the Russians instead of starting in 1945 certainly started the theoretical side and made perhaps even part of the construction side in 1943, so our estimates of five years from the time they knew about the bomb until it was produced still checks fairly well. One was from 1945 to mid-1950, and the other was late 1943 to mid-1949, and there is only an error of a few months in there.

Senator Knowland. The report of the Royal Canadian Commission indicated that they had an interest back in 1943 because they were stealing samples of it in 1943.
or 1944, so that they did not wait until 1945.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. There was no check on that until we could get the absolute date. From that it appears now on the messages we have taken and on the information we have taken, that they worked much more on the Canadian inquiry report than we had given them credit for before.

The Chairman. I did not get that. They worked what?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. They used the Canadian reports and their espionage cases as it came out in the Canadian spy reports, they used that information much more than we gave them credit for, and that came as a check of working back over information we had starting with this date of around September 1 for an explosion.

To determine the number of bombs estimated that estimate was made on a re-check of the information that we had, on the amount of material that was available to the Russians, on the fact that it was a plutonium bomb, and on the fact that they had two piles running now, the third one shortly to come into operation.

The Chairman. Are we sure of that, that they have two?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir, and that in this estimate the thing that we had to take was that with the material they had and working their plants
as efficiently as we would work ours.

We have got to give them the full credit with the material available and the plants available, and they can have by the end of this year.

Senator Connally, is that on the assumption that they will get the raw materials or they have the raw materials available?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is on the assumption that they have the raw materials now, and on the raw materials we know enough of the quantity of raw materials that they can have. From then on until this raw material is exhausted, they should be able to produce.

Representative Durham. Do we know where they are located?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir; we know where three of the factories are, and we think that that is all that they have, sir.

The Chairman. These piles are air-cooled or water-
cooled, Admiral?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. They are water-cooled, but use graphite as a moderator, sir.

The Chairman. Are they under-ground or above-ground?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Above ground.

The Chairman. Is there any evidence that they are engaging in any high scale or high pressure research on thermal nuclear weapons?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. We have nothing to indicate that, sir, but I think that the only normal thing to do is say that they must be in that, but we have come across nothing to indicate that at all so far, sir.

The Chairman. Is there any indication of any change in your estimate of the number of people who are engaged in the project?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir.

The Chairman. That still is in excess of 150,000?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, in the three plants.

The Chairman. How about their raw materials position, Admiral? How close a check have we got on that?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is one of the easier things to do, sir, in getting a check on that because most of their raw material is now coming from the Yaukimov
mines in Czechoslovakia and we have had information of people working there

and that is why I think this estimate of the number of bombs possible is pretty good, because that is one of the easier things to check on.

The Chairman. You think if there were any good deposits that they would locate on the inside of Soviet Russia, that you would know about it.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think that we certainly would get indications of it and there has been no sign of certainly any extensive deposits so far.

The Chairman. Are they engaged in high pressure prospecting?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Very much, yes, sir.

Senator Johnson. The teletype today carries an unconfirmed story that they are getting uranium out of North Korea.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That story has been out several times, Senator, but we never have been able to confirm it and it is easier to confirm in Korea than it is in Russia proper.

Senator Johnson. May I ask a question. When we attempted to make the atom bomb, we tried in four different ways, and we found the way that perhaps is the best.
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How do you account for the fact that the Russians have adopted the way that we found most effective and most efficient? How do you account for that fact?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think that that might be accounted for in several ways, sir, certainly the Russian theoretical scientists are very excellent men, as a whole. They might have worked it out in theory and they may have gotten information again from Dr. May in the Canadian spy trial. I think it can be either one of those cases.

Senator Johnson. It seems unusual that they would stumble on to the very best way to do this job without a little assistance from some place or other.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That may be, but I don't know which is the better way of the two or which is the best way of the four, sir.

Senator Hickenlooper. I believe the Smyth report announced in 1946 that we centered on one method as the most efficient, and it was stated very frankly.

Senator Johnson. If they started in 1943, as indicated now, that was ahead of the Smyth report by two years.

Commissioner Smyth. May I speak to that point just a moment? There were two of our first-class scientists
who in 1939 or 1940, working entirely separate from any of the official enterprise, worked out the details of a graphite moderated pile including the lattice structure and everything else just from their general knowledge of the problems involved and the published information about the constants. It wasn't the best possible design but it was a design that probably would have worked.

They wrote it up and it was kept in the safe in the Bureau of Standards, in Dr. Briggs' office throughout the war. I never knew it existed until about 1945, but that was an entirely independent estimate.

Representative Durham. What was that published in?

Commissioner Smyth. I don't think it ever has been published, Mr. Durham. It never has been published. This was a private report. It was sent in to Dr. Briggs as a possible contribution, but it had been done quite independently of the authorized effort.

Senator Johnson. I have another question that isn't quite related to this present question, but Drew Pearson last night repeated what I have heard a great many times, that the Russians had discovered or captured, that is probably the better way of saying it, neutrons from cosmic rays. Are our scientists still laughing at that?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I can't answer that one, sir,
that is away over my head.

Commissioner Smyth. I can't laugh at it because I can't understand what the news reports or what the origin of the report is. I don't know what they are trying to say that they have done, so I can't say. They probably have learned something about cosmic rays that we don't understand, but we may not have learned something, I don't know, but what, this particular report means I can't tell.

If I may say so, when I read in our own press reports of scientific meetings when I know pretty well what the subject was that was discussed, many times when I have heard the paper, I am still not always able to establish the connection between what was said and what I read in the paper.

Senator Johnson. Well, for two years I have heard stories about the Russians attempting to use the neutrons that are supposed to occur in cosmic rays, and I have talked to some of our scientists about that and they say that it is a very foolish idea. Now, I am just wondering if that is still a very foolish idea from the scientific point of view.

Commissioner Smyth. I would say it is a very foolish idea, just in terms of the press reports that we have
available. What I was trying to suggest was that it is very hard to know from the press reports what in fact the Russians have been doing or have been suggesting.

Representative Price. Isn't this sort of touched on in this report from the Russian scientists that made a press release in Paris?

Commissioner Smyth. I have just been looking at it, and this is a beautiful illustration of the difficulty. Here it says this, that in a report presented to the Atomic Research Commission, he concluded that it was impossible in the present state of techniques to provoke a nuclear reaction of beta, and I suppose that is the thorium nuclear reaction. That is a mis-print, it should be "beta," and then it says something about an auxiliary mixture which means the combination of thorium plus brevium. Do you know what that is?

Dr. Colby. That is short for one of the properties, known as uranium X-2, known as 234.

Commissioner Smyth. It does make sense or it doesn't make sense?

Dr. Colby. If you twist the meaning some you can make sense out of it, but it isn't meaningful as it stands.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is the report of Colonel
Selof. We have some information on that. When that report came out a couple of days ago, we tried to check every file of biographical data we have and there is no Colonel Selof that exists. We do have quite a few on the writer who wrote this, a fellow by the name of Delbar. He is a suo-do-scientific writer with a very Communist tinge, and I think some of those articles, his and some of the others, are put out purposely, leaked out by the Russians.

They are not sure how we found out about this atomic bomb explosion yet and they would like to get some affirmations or some denials on stories like this. But there is no record in Russian scientific biographies or military biographies about a Colonel Selof, and if any Russian knew as much as he claimed to know in this interview on the Russian atomic energy development, he would not be roaming around Paris free. Even in the story it said that he had just left Paris for some other place, for South America.

I think that that is a leak to try to provoke us to either affirm or deny to get the information of how we did find these things. There have been a number of stories of that kind and I think that they are wondering just how the thing did come out because they have said
that we have got it from stations around the Mediterranean and a few other things.

The Chairman. I would like to believe that, but I find it very difficult for this reason, that anybody that is capable of making one of these things it would seem to me would have to know about the result of exploding one and the fact that the air would be loaded and would be found.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think that they do, sir, but they are not sure about it. They are making a guess but they would like to be certain about it.

Representative Price. They made every type of guess, too.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, and they would like to be certain which it is, that we don't have an apparatus that is either much more sensitive or much better than they have, and I think that they can estimate what it is but they are not sure which estimate is right, and that is the reason that these things are all coming out.

This fellow Delbar was the man who came out a year ago or 18 months ago with a story of Prague, that he had been told in Prague that somebody else had exploded a bomb the year before that, or something.

Representative Jackson. Is that the same source of
Representative Price. Is that Admiral Zacharias?

Representative Jackson. No, I have a recollection that some Paris weekly made an announcement in July that the Russians had exploded a bomb. Does that tie in?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is the same fellow that put that one out, and he put one out last year sometime about a purported dateline from Prague, that they had a bomb.

Representative Jackson. You don't attach any significance other than their desire to try to feel us out for information.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is a big thing behind it and another one is promoting the prestige that they had this thing a long time ago.

Representative Jackson. This chap came pretty close, whether it is a coincidence or accident or what, when he announced in July, on July 10 that they had the bomb.

The Chairman. He said an explosion occurred on July 10, that they had exploded one on July 10.

Representative Jackson. And when was this supposed to take place, August 28?

The Chairman. Somewhere around there.
Admiral Hillenkoetter. A lot of them came out the week after the President announced it. Drew Pearson came out, and he said that he knew it about a year and a half ago, the month that it was going to be exploded, and Walter Winchell said that he knew at least two years ago about it, the very month and everything when it would be exploded; but they are damn poor patriots that they didn't come around and tell us anything about it until after it had been announced.

Representative Jackson. Do we have any definite assurance that there has not been any prior explosion in Russia?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. As far as we can tell there has not. This is the first one, sir.

Representative Jackson. Has that been checked very carefully?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. As carefully as we could, and on the checking on this it was not only this committee who have intelligence people and scientific people, too, but the checking came from Dr. Bacher, Dr. Bush, Dr. Oppenheimer, Parsons and Conant, and it all checks that they had it.

Representative Jackson. And you have complete confirmation with the British on all of these?
Admiral Hillenkoetter. And we did our best when we were checking the thing, and we would have liked to have found it the other way, that it was not an atomic explosion, and the desire was to find that it wasn't one.

Senator Knowland. Is it possible that they might have planned an explosion earlier in July and then they didn't quite have the right combination or the critical mass or something, and some of these high officials could have gone down there for their Alamogordo and it didn't come off on schedule.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is very possible.

Representative Durham. When did you arrive at a definite conclusion that they had two piles operating and were building a third?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is within the last two or three weeks, on the information.

Representative Durham. Since the explosion?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, because the explosion gave us a tremendous help in working backwards and forwards, sir.

The Chairman. Is there any indication that they are trying to separate 235 in any large scale?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. We have not had that yet.

There is no indication of that.
The Chairman. Were there traces of anything else in the bomb, such as thorium?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I do not remember enough about that, and I would like to ask one of the scientific people to say about that.

Dr. Colby. There were no traces of 235.

The Chairman. There were none, you say?

Dr. Colby. There were no traces, it seemed quite conclusive.

The Chairman. It was a straight plutonium bomb?

Dr. Colby. It was not a mixed bomb, is that what you mean, Mr. Chairman? It seemed quite conclusive in that respect.

Representative Jackson. Reference was made, you mentioned three plants. Do you mean that they have three separate plants with piles in process of construction, or is this the whole program involved in the three plants?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. The whole program involves three plants, and we are trying to get more information on that now, but the whole program involves three plants.

Representative Jackson. And as far as you know, they only have the two piles in operation, and they will have a third one operating at the end of the year?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. It looks that way, sir.
Representative Jackson. And the piles are comparable to that at Hanford?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

Representative Jackson. For production?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

Representative Jackson. Is there any indication whether they are of more improved design?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir; we haven't anything on that, sir, at all.

Representative Durham. Have you been able to get a hold of any documents or anything printed in Russia at all in regard to the program?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir; I think that there are very few documents, sir.

The Chairman. They must have loads of them but they probably guard them pretty carefully; and, Admiral, I don't know how important this question is but I find it here, that you remember that on June 29 the committee wrote you with reference to an off-the-record statement made by General Walter R. Smith, while addressing the Governors' Conference in Colorado, and he predicted the time when Russia would explode its first weapon. Your reply merely quoted the Christian Science Monitor's press coverage of this speech.
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It is noted that in the September 30 Rochester Democrat Chronicle, General Smith is quoted as having made the statement in Rochester that he was not surprised by the Russian atomic explosion, and which recalled his speech on June 23 at Colorado Springs.

Now, the question is, in view of the foregoing, I presume that you have talked with General Smith and I was curious to know whether he possessed any information that was the base of that statement that he made back in June.

Senator Hickenlooper, What did he say in Colorado Springs?

The Chairman. He said in Colorado Springs, from the press accounts in general statements, I gather that he indicated in very general terms in an off-the-record session, that the Russians may soon test a bomb. The Christian Science Monitor on June 21 stated that General Smith emphasized his opinion that the Soviets do not have the know-how to make the delicate machinery needed for remote control handling of atomic materials necessary for production of any large number of bombs, when it is noted in this connection that the Russians can't even make watches yet. "As a wild guess," he added, "it might take the Soviets ten years or more to produce the..."
powerful type of bombs this country is stockpiling. Consequently, there is no evidence to indicate that General Smith's statement," -- this is your reply, and I am quoting from that.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I have talked to him since then and he has no information other than the fact that he lived up there and he saw them working with mechanical things and he did not have nearly as much as we had. It was a general over-all impression on that.

The Chairman. You know, Admiral, Russia seems to be filled with contradictions. You hear all of these stories about how they let our equipment go to the devil during the war, and yet we lost a B-29 and they copied it beautifully and they got these jet planes that go as fast, they say, as ours do, and of course now we know that they have made a bomb. I was just curious to know what General Smith's reaction to this thing was.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. He said that that statement was made as a very general one, and just from his living in Moscow.

The Chairman. In other words, they didn't show him their best side?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is probably it, sir.

The Chairman. I think that those are all of the
questions that I have got to ask you.

Representative Durham. Admiral, I was wondering about this Tito thing, about his illness. Was that correct information, or do we have any information?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. On Tito?

Representative Durham. Yes.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. He is not ill unless it is over the week-end. I haven't seen any reports today. He was perfectly all right last week. There have been two attempts at assassination within the past month but none of them even came close to him. They shot at his automobile, and another time somebody tried to shoot him when he was in a crowd, but he wasn't wounded or anything else, so unless something happened over the weekend I haven't seen other reports this morning.

The Chairman. They were not reported in the press, were they?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir.

The Chairman. Those attempts on his life?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir; I didn't see them in the press.

The Chairman. I haven't either, it is news to me.

Representative Jackson. There is a story in the Washington Post by Gervaci, and didn't he make some comment
there that an attempt had been made?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. They did shoot at his automobile and he has got a bullet-proof automobile and it didn't hurt him or hurt anybody in the car with him.

The Chairman. What is the purpose of censoring that, do you think?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think perhaps it was censored in Yugoslavia.

The Chairman. I agree, but I wondered why they would do it?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Simply to not let the idea spread around, there might be something to keep anybody else from thinking about it.

The Chairman. That is perfectly rational as a conclusion.

Well, gentlemen, those are all of the questions that I have.

Representative Jackson. I have a few short questions. Admiral, now that the Russians have the bomb, plus the fact that the Russians are having tough luck in the world in the cold war so far —

Senator Millikin. What is that?

Representative Jackson. In the cold war, and the Marxist dogma to the effect that the collapse of
capitalism is inevitable, and that is not working out according to plan, plus the apparent real trouble with the Tito aspects as affects the other satellites, what are the possibilities from the information coming in with reference to the Russians possibly making military moves into Western Europe, and I should add the last thing, coupled with the fact that within two or three years they know if we go ahead with our military preparedness program for Western Europe that they might not be able to break through -- what is all of this leading up to as far as mobilization within Russia for possible war?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Well, there is no indication of any mobilization of arms within Russia for a possible war. I think one of your assumptions ought to be changed a little bit, they are losing the cold war in Europe but they are not losing it in China, and they are gaining to beat the band in Asia. So you might balance one against the other and there is no indication at all they are preparing for any military move. On the whole things are working out the way they are expecting them to work out, and eventually the capitalistic society and capitalistic economy is going to crash of its own weight and I do not believe certainly in the immediate future
that there is any chance of any military movement as far as we could see ahead now in the immediate future.

Representative Jackson. But what if they come to these two points, what if they come to the conclusion that capitalism apparently will not collapse within the required period of time, that is number one, and number two, the second factor, that by 1952 or 1953 sufficient arms and assistance plus the will to fight exists in Western Europe -- what are they going to do then?

Those are my two main points.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think the first one is that they firmly believe in it. You can't deny the doctrines of the bible, it is hearsay to deny that it is not going to come and they think that will stay the same.

4. Representative Jackson. Do you think the men in the Politburo will completely follow that doctrine, although the faithful naturally, the rank and file on down through are following it, but what of the 12 or 13 men in the Kremlin that must make these decisions.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I don't think so. There is no indication now under present conditions, sir, and
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that is certainly good for about six months. It does not mean that it is going to change after six months but that is as far as we can see ahead, that you can predict definitely that there is not going to be any military moves within six months.

Representative Jackson. What about Yugoslavia, against Tito?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir; they will not.

Representative Jackson. Do you think that they are going to try to stir up a civil war?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think that is very definitely so, that there will be a civil war or insurrections there like in Greece, but there will be no military movement by the Soviet Union.

Representative Jackson. That would be the first step against Tito, would be to stir up a revolution, and then if that is not successful and the satellites continue to deviate from the orthodox line, such as has been taking place in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the terrific purges, then they might have to move lest they lose all control of their plan and program to extend Soviet dominance through the extension of Russian foreign policy.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, but I mean there is
no indication at all for at least six months.

Representative Jackson. Aren't there a lot of factors that are building up here? And they are building up quite rapidly to a point where something can happen?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think the factors that are building up, if they are building up they are building up that they won't go to war. The only thing they have lost in Europe is Tito.

Representative Jackson. You are basing that on the assumption that they are completely convinced of the inevitable collapse of capitalism, but if once they change that ---

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That and the fact that they are still away ahead in Europe. There are deviation movements in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and Poland but they are not getting very far, and the deviationists are going to jail.

Representative Jackson. But they are not making any headway in the other countries, in France and Italy in the recent elections over there, and of course in Austria they picked up a seat or two.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. In Austria you never did have any Communist Party of any size.
Representative Durham. How do you arrive at such conclusions, that they haven't reduced the Army? They have built up a much larger air corps and now they have the atomic bomb.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. They are not going to lose what they have. At any time that they get' into a military adventure, you don't know how that thing is going to go, and they are not going to take a chance. Every dictatorship that has been in power has never lost by its own people overthrowing it, it is always the result of an outside military movement that gets them.

Representative Jackson. Then they are not going to overrun Europe unless things don't work out.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think that they have got plenty of time, and they are not losing anything by going on with this, and it doesn't cost them anywhere near what it costs us to keep an Army, and it doesn't cost them much to keep laborers the way we do.

Representative Jackson. How about internal difficulty within Russia? Is there any evidence of it?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, definitely there is some.

Representative Jackson. Most of that is in the Ukraine?
Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is in the Ukraine and in Central Asia among the Turkish tribes, but that dissident movement has existed there since 1918 and it is an annoyance and a bother but it is never going to be a fatal disease. You are in the same fix there that the underground in France was in during the war. The French underground annoyed the Germans and they murdered a few people and that sort of thing, but if the British and the Americans had not landed troops there that underground might have stayed there 1000 years but the Germans would never have been kicked out by the results of the underground.

Representative Jackson. Is there any evidence of any possible division within the Politburo between the orthodox Marxists and Leninists?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. There is certainly no evidence now, sir, you may get a break on that if Stalin should die and you would have various groups fighting for successorship.

Representative Jackson. Where is Litvinoff?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Litvinoff is in Eastern European Russia but he is practically out now.

Senator Connally. He is still in the foreign bureau?
Senator Connally. I thought that he was.

Representative Jackson. He is in disfavor?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. He hasn't been shot or anything, he is living, but he is not in any official position.

Senator Knowland. What is the significance of the reports that the Russians had moved some armored divisions into proximity of the Yugoslavia border? Is that merely sword rattling or is that a fact?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is definitely a step in the cold war, Senator. To begin with we have had the order of battle there for a long time and it is the 57th guards mechanized division, and it is not an armored division but the newspaper accounts came out and I think very definitely they were put out that it was an armored division down there, and it wasn't an armored division and it wasn't mechanized to begin with, and then there were some divisions moving around down there and there is still one mechanized division, the 57th guards. They have done the old trick that Christofer did in Haiti years ago. They march from one place to another and each time they come into a new town it is a new division, and if you get to three towns in a day you have got three armored divisions there. That is the
way the press reports it, but they have not increased their armored divisions down there in Hungary on the border there.

Senator Knowland. Have the Hungarians or the Bulgarians or any others moved troops?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir.

Representative Jackson. Is there any indications that General Mao and his crowd will follow the Tito line?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. There is no indication of that now, no, sir, and that may come up in the future. But there is no indication of that now.

Representative Jackson. The ticker today carries an unconfirmed story that the military had revolted against Russia in Albania.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think that that is very possible, that the Albanians have revolted. But as to Tito, one of the things that he did to fight this Cominform is put a lot of Yugoslavian supporters, many of them Albanians by birth, into Albania to overthrow the present Albanian government. We reported that two months ago, that he had sent a lot of people in there, and the present government is not at all a particularly popular one.
Representative Jackson. Is Titoism something that is attachable to Tito in these countries, or is it an indigenous inevitable revolt against direction from Moscow? Does he really seem to be doing a pretty effective job?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. He has been doing a very effective job.

Representative Jackson. In these other countries?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. There are movements against them, there are dissident movements against them in all of the other countries, but you never want to lose sight of the fact that in spite of this movement Tito is still a very good Communist.

Representative Jackson. I understand that completely, and he just disagrees with Stalin.

Senator Connally. In this morning's paper it was commented there about some uprising, not uprising exactly, but it was in Bulgaria. Do you know anything about that?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. There have been troubles in Bulgaria in collecting grain from the farms, and the farmers have been holding out on the harvest and the Soviet inspectors and collectors have tried to get it, and there are Bulgarians up in the hills and the
mountains there that have conducted a campaign against the government. There are not enough to overthrow the government the way it is now.

The Chairman. You say that Tito is a good Communist, and I think that he is theoretically, and I am wondering whether he can continue to be practically inasmuch as 80 percent of the Yugoslavian people are engaged in agriculture. Of course he has revised or he has been forced to resist the Russian demands, as I understand it, for collectivization because his peasants simply wouldn't stand for it.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is very true, but he has still never dropped the idea that some day he is going to get it, and it is going to take more time than the Russians allowed. That was in his program and that was one of the points where the difference came up that they were pressing him to do this thing right away, and it was his view that the time wasn't ripe for that and you had better wait.

Representative Jackson. He didn't have any real Kulak problem there to any great extent.

The Chairman. In the last war in Yugoslavia they divided up the land pretty well, and they are landowners and I believe that they are not going to give it
up without a fight.

Senator Millikin. One of the strongest agrarian movements in Europe has been in Yugoslavia, and they had one of the strongest political parties, consisting of Kulaks and land-owners.

Representative Jackson. Isn't the story of Tito simply this, that the Russians had banked on the Marxist Leninist doctrine of world-wide revolution as a means of extending Russian foreign policy all over the world, and they had to run a calculated risk of fighting the culture, the history and the tradition and the nationalism in short, and Tito being a strong man, a good Marxist, but disagreeing with the dogma that had been announced or perpetrated by Stalin of the Marxist-Leninist approach, he has placed his own interpretation on it and in so many words has said, "You can have what Marx and Lenin thought we should have by individual countries having their own Communist faith," and that is the calculated risk that the Russians have taken.

However, they did not take into account the strong factor of nationalism and the tradition and the culture that exists in these countries, especially in a country like Yugoslavia. Isn't that basically the situation?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.
Representative Jackson. And they had hoped that their doctrine would give them the opportunity of ideological conflict, of taking over these countries and using it as an extension of their foreign policy.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir; and also things were made a little easier for him than in some of the other countries, in that the Red Army did not liberate Yugoslavia in the war, and he did that himself, and the Red Army never entered Yugoslavia in any great numbers at all.

Another good reason why he could get this feeling was that he stayed in the country all during the war and fought there, and he did not stay in Moscow and come in with the Red Army when the war ended. And I think another good reason is that Yugoslavia is not touching Russia at any one spot.

Representative Jackson. That is helpful, but look at the Finns. They have got a Russian Army in their country and they have resisted them very successfully and I think that the point is that they have a strong nationalism.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. You must have that nationalistic feeling, or the thing wouldn't have come at all.
Representative Jackson. They feel that they can be just as radical or even more radical in the sense of being revolutionaries in Yugoslavia, without having the thought of being incorporated lock, stock and barrel in the Soviet Union.

Admiral, I wanted to ask one last question. Speaking of your feeling that there isn't any immediate efforts to mobilize for a war, how much notice would you get, knowing the general make-up of the Russian system, that they were getting ready for a strike?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. You can figure a minimum notice of a month that they would get.

Representative Jackson. But aren't they prepared right now with the ground forces they have, and the air forces they have, and by the end of this year what they will have in the atomic weapon field, to move on very short notice?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir; it will take even with what they have now some time. They could start an air raid and put on an air raid over Belgrade or Paris or Berlin on practically no notice, but they could not move their ground forces or their air forces in any numbers without about a month's notice.

Representative Jackson. How many divisions do they
have now under arms in Russia proper?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Roughly 100 in Russia now and about 75 scattered around outside, sir.

Representative Jackson. And how much assistance could they get from the Satellites?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Well, the satellite assistance would be almost nil.

Representative Jackson. That is 175 divisions, and your point is that they don't have the logistics support to move the troops?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Well, even the Russian divisions in Germany are only up to about 60 percent of full strength.

Senator Millikin. What is the strength of a Russian division?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Roughly 15,000 men, Senator, and they can't march those people, just start them out.

Senator Millikin. Their railroads are bad?

Representative Jackson. Their railroads are in bad shape?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Well, they have food, ammunition, and you can take ten people and go down and buy them tickets from Berlin to Paris, but you can't take
fifty divisions and do that. Most of their divisions are going to be walking divisions.

Representative Jackson. How long do you think it will be before they will be in shape to move from the standpoint of the logistics?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Whenever they decided to make war, you will get a month's notice, and until they decide that they will never have anything that can be moved immediately because you have to lay up gasoline and lay up food and ammunition.

Representative Jackson. What was their position in 1941?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. In 1941 they had been preparing for two years for the Germans coming in on them.

Representative Jackson. Now they have been preparing for how long?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Well, they are not preparing for war now, sir.

Representative Jackson. They are not laying up any stockpiles or anything comparable to what they did in 1941? Our military were saying in 1941 that the Russians would last 30 or 60 days and that was the word to those of us who were here in Congress, and I remember it very distinctly, and they completely under-
rated them. I remember that very distinctly, and there were "statements from an informed source," being some of our top military people. I hope that we don't under-rate them again. I am not an alarmist.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. We are not under-rating them. We are giving them every benefit and every assumption in their favor and we are not trying to cut it down and say that they are only 40 percent efficient or 60 percent efficient.

Representative Jackson. When do you think that that will happen? You say that they will move whenever they want to move, but when can they move effectively from a military standpoint, knowing the requirements.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is why I say that we get a month's notice on that, when they start piling in gasoline and food and ammunition into Germany.

Representative Jackson. I thought that they didn't have the basic means to stockpile. They do have that?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. They have the basic means.

Representative Jackson. So that we could have war within 30 days?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, but you would have 30 days' notice.

Representative Jackson. That is 30 days' notice.
but there wouldn't be much time to get planes and a
lot of other things that we need to manufacture.

Senator Knowland. As I understand it, Admiral,
you have not said that they couldn't or were not in a
position to make war, but merely that in order for the
build-up to be completed that we would have about 30
days' notice that something was afoot. They have the
capacity to make war, but it is only a question of how
much notice we might get, if they decided to push the
button?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is right.

Representative Jackson. Do they have an effective
backlog now of the transportation equipment and the
food and all of the other essentials to supply an army?
That is what I am getting at. I mean, is it from a
military standpoint, is it physically possible for them
to wage war?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Well, on food, there is
plenty of food in Russia, and it has been stockpiled
since the end of the war, and there is plenty of food
to supply an army. The Russian civilian may go a
little hungry but there is plenty of food to give to
the Army.

Representative Jackson. They have disciplined them
through many centuries.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. As to their oil capacity, and that is the thing in any modern war, the petroleum capacity is just about enough now to completely supply the army.

Representative Jackson. For how long?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Continuously in combat now. They have got enough but if any of that is lost you get a situation where you have a good raid over there or some of the other things, the blowing up of the refineries, then you have a different situation.

Representative Jackson. Is that the full strength of the army?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is the full strength of the army.

Representative Jackson. That contemplates what army?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is the same army, the 175 divisions now.

Representative Jackson. But I mean their expanded strength?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. It is not enough for that. That means taking the oil both in the Caucasus and in the Rumanian oil fields.
Representative Jackson. So they have enough oil
and they have enough food, and what about their trans-
portation?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Their transportation facili-
ties are very weak in Russia, and they are going to be
weak for years there.

Representative Jackson. I assume it is part of
your job to evaluate all of these things and determine
whether or not from a professional military point of
view they have the capabilities of carrying on the kind
of war that will bring them victory. Do they have that
potential now?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. They have a potential of
carrying on a war and whether you get victory or not
I don't know, sir.

Representative Jackson. Knowing the Russian mind --

Admiral Hillenkoetter. If they knew that they
were going to have victory, you would probably have it
today.

Representative Jackson. Knowing the Russian mind,
do you think that they think that they have sufficient?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir; I don't, because
if they thought that they had they would probably say,
"Let us go," and there is a very great doubt in their
Representative Jackson. Aren't we in a pretty precarious situation? I mean if the boys of the Politburo say that they have enough or "X" number of bombs which they can send their suicide crews to the key spots where they will do the most important job, and they are going to catch America completely off-guard and here we go. They will say, "If we don't, they are going to have all of Europe re-armed and all of these other things that I mentioned earlier," and I am wondering if we are not in a situation where anything can happen, as you say, on 30 days' notice?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Well, that is always a possibility, sir, but we will get, I am sure, at least a 30 days' notice, and I don't think that there is any chance of it now because the odds are too much against a victory. If they could get a victory in two or three months and call it off then, they would probably try it, but they can't last four years now.

Representative Jackson. They couldn't stand a prolonged war?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir.

Representative Durham.
Admiral Hillenkoetter.
Representative Jackson.

Admiral Hillenkoetter.
The Chairman. Admiral, I have two questions. I really am asking you for what might be termed an educated guess, but looking at your crystal ball would you tell us what you see is the probabilities in Yugoslavia? Do you think that they will get Tito, do you think that they will be able to stave off this infiltration of revolutionists that they are probably putting in there now?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Right now, I think that they will, yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. They have already missed twice, and of course you never can tell when they might get him.

The Chairman. Do you think that he will hold the line?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. He knows all of the games, too. He has played all of those games all of his life and he knows them pretty well and I think that he can
hold out certainly against any insurrection inside
or anything on the order of Greece of guerrillas
coming over there from Hungary or Bulgaria. They can
hold out against those.

The Chairman. Admiral, the second question is,
has your organization given any thought to methods of
detection against bringing bombs in her on ships in our
harbors?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir, not directly.
There is a committee of internal security which takes
in the FBI and all of the military things, and the
Navy considered some of that.

The Chairman. General Bradley informed me one time
that that was a problem that had been before the Joint
Chiefs and had been given a great deal of concern.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That has been referred to
this committee, and Mr. Hoover is the chairman of
that thing to try to work out something.

Senator Millikin. I have been very much inter-
ested in why we were taken by surprise on the Russian
explosion.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. What do you mean, Senator?
I don't think that we were taken by surprise.
here as has been developed several times before the committee on a number of occasions, as to what our intelligence service consisted of, and we were told

It seems that we muffed it at least a year and maybe longer, and how did we muff it and what is wrong with our system?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think that I spoke about this before you came in, sir, that we are working on a very great number of fragments of information and up until you had some solid fact to go on it was sort of a curve in space and you couldn't tie it down to anything.

Now, when we got the fact of the explosion, that let us work backwards and forwards again and I think that we made a mistake. The actual rate that we estimated, about five years, was pretty exact, and it looks now as though the Russians started earlier than we had estimated their starting point.

Senator Millikin. Do you have any evidence of that
or is that a surmise?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. We have got some evidence of that, sir.

Senator Millikin. What is that evidence?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Oh, some we have picked up on that, sir.

Senator Millikin. When did they start?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. It looks now as if they started in late 1943 instead of after the Hiroshima bomb in 1945.

Senator Millikin. In the laboratory or in the field?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Both.

Senator Millikin. And our intelligence did not detect that?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir; you didn't have enough to go on in that.

Senator Millikin. Now let us take these things one at a time.
Senator Millikin. Let me say first to you that I have had considerable experience in the intelligence business so that I know the difficulties that you operate under and I know that you have to deal with fragmentary information, but I want to know Admiral Hillenkotter. Well, the only thing that I can give you on that is that we just didn't get enough information out on it.

Senator Millikin.
Senator Millikin. You always like to have it ten times as good as you have got it but you never do, and I am not critical on that point. I want to know why we didn't get the information as to what was going on.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I can't answer that "why", we didn't get enough to do it.

Senator Connally. We knew that they were working on it but we didn't know that they had the bomb until it went off?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. We knew that they were working on it and we started here, and this organization was set up after the war and we started in the middle and we didn't know when they had started and it had to be picked up from what we could get along there. That is what I say, this thing of getting a fact that you definitely have on the exploding of this bomb has helped us in going back and looking over what we had before and it will help us in what we get in the future. But you picked up in mid-air on the thing and we didn't know when they started, sir.

Senator Millikin. I don't consider that there is any doubt that there is a certain amount of usefulness in having a reference or a point of reference when you get that after a fact has happened that you are
watching very closely — that is not quite a victory
for intelligence.

Senator Connally. Well, the Russians didn't know
themselves that they had the bomb until it went off,
did they?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I doubt if they did, any
more than a lot of people in the United States knew it
when ours went off.

Senator Millikin.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. On this September 27,
no, sir. We still estimated that it would be in mid-
1950, sir.

Senator Millikin.

Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Senator Millikin.

Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Senator Millikin.
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Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

Senator Millikin.

Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Senator Millikin.

Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Senator Millikin.

Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Senator Millikin.
Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Senator Millikin.

Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Senator Millikin.

Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Senator Millikin. And how many

Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Senator Millikin.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

Senator Millikin. Does that begin to commence to start to represent an adequate intelligence organization?

Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Representative Durham. We have assumed of course that the German scientists were a great help and assistance in this program, and if you go back to 1943 how
does that get into the picture? Evidently the Russians were smart enough to start off this thing.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think that they are, and I think that any time that we take the view here that the Russian scientists are dumb or something, we are just deluding ourselves, because I think some of the Russian scientists were up among the number one people and they always have been.

Senator Millikin. I am not challenging that, I am challenging the fact that we apparently don't have the remotest idea of what they are doing until after they have done it, and I am not so much interested in what has happened but I am interested in how bad we are going to muff future developments.

Representative Jackson. Right along that same line, I was wondering, the information that we had earlier this year is that they wouldn't have a bomb until 1951 or 1952.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. In 1950, too.

Representative Jackson. The report came up here in July that there had been a change, a rather sudden change, and we got a report along in July that there had been a revision in the calculations, and that is my recollection and I may be entirely wrong, but as I
recollect it earlier in the year along in February or March or something, the committee was advised that they should have it by 1952, and you were giving the number of bombs they would have and so on, and that was if they had it by 1952 or 1953;

What was the reason for the sudden revision in the calculations as to when they would have it? I am not being critical.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. We just got more information and they were going along faster than we had expected, or they had started earlier.

Representative Jackson. There was quite a jump there from the information that we had in the spring.

Senator Millikin.

Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Senator Millikin. Then you did revise your estimates before the explosion?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

Senator Millikin. That there would be an explosion this year?
Admiral Hillenkoetter. Oh, no, we still said 4-5-50.

Representative Jackson. They sent a memorandum down here.

The Chairman. I will read it. It is dated July 1, 1949: The Joint Nuclear Intelligence Committee makes the following estimate on the status of the USSR atomic energy project:

"(1) On the 1 January 1949 report, it was stated that the earliest possible date by which the USSR might be expected to produce an atomic bomb was mid-1950 and the most probable date was mid-1953.

"The information now available substantiates these dates in general, although new information indicating one method which the Soviets are following suggests that their first atomic bomb cannot be completed before mid-1951."

In other words, they said the probable date was 1953, and the possible date was 1950, and the most probable date was mid-1951.

Senator Millikin. That is a very bad mis-estimate, as late as July of this year.

Representative Jackson. He is reading from the
January report.

The Chairman. No, this is July 1. No, that is true, I am quoting from the January 1 report. You see, the January 1 report stated that the earliest possible date by which the Russians might be expected to produce a bomb was mid-1950, and the most probable date was mid-1953. Then it says that "the information now unearthed substantiates these dates in general, although new information indicating one method which the Soviets are following suggests that their first bomb cannot be completed before mid-1951."

Senator Millikin. I repeat my suggestion that it is a very erroneous estimate as of January 1, 1949.

Senator Hickenlooper. As of July 1, you mean?

Senator Millikin. As of July 1 or January 1.

Representative Jackson. Our military plans were all predicated on this 1952 date or 1951.

Senator Millikin. Our diplomatic plans and the whole complexion has been predicated on having enough room to work out solutions, and that is what makes it so serious that we muffed it.

Now, I would like to ask about material going into Russia. We were assured that there was very careful surveillance of material going into there to determine
its significance so far as not taking and working on
this business might be concerned. Where have they
been?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. From Yakimov, in Czechoslovakia.

Senator Millikin. Does the stuff originate there?
And I am not going to talk about fissionable material,
I am talking about the industrial material.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is the ore, sir.

Senator Millikin. I am not talking about the ore,
I am talking about the equipment, the valves, the
filters, and the rest of it. Where have they gotten
that stuff?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Most of it they made them-
selves, sir.

Senator Millikin. They have built up the indus-
try which we have always estimated that they could not
build up for a number of years ahead of this time.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

Senator Millikin. They have done that and we
didn't know about it. Well, what are we going to do
now to keep from getting caught that bad off-base in
the future?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. We will do the best we can
to get all of the information. We would desire it more
than anybody else, to get all of the information.

Senator Millikin. What is there that we can do
to help you get it? Is there any deficiency in organi-
zation that can be supplied by Congress?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir. There is one
thing that is a deficiency and it would help us is the
fact that in yesterday morning's newspaper, they gave
out that General Bradley had been before a closed
session in the Appropriations Committee and said that the
Russians had 175 divisions and this and that, and every
time anything like that comes out the security steps
against us are just increased that much more, and it
makes us do a lot more work.

Senator Millikin. I share your worry entirely,
and I saw where Drew Pearson was talking about the
hydrogen bomb last night.

Representative Price. That was in the article
that was released from Paris, supposed to be coming
from the fictitious Colonel Selof.

Representative Jackson. He said that we were
working on the hydrogen bomb. I heard the broadcast
and I interpreted it as saying that we were working on
this so-called super-bomb, and that is what discouraged

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me very much.

Representative Price. It developed from that other article.

The Chairman. There has been a great deal in the press, and magazine articles in great number, about the possibilities of a super-weapon. I am not saying that he did not have information that was given to him that he shouldn't have gotten, that I don't know, but I merely cite that as a fact, that I could give you a dozen references on that. Isn't that right?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. There has been a lot in the press on a super-bomb of some sort.

The Chairman. Then of course, it doesn't take any wise man to deduct that we are not trying to do that or get there as fast as we can, which leads me to this observation, Admiral, I certainly hope and I know because I have talked with you privately, that you agree with me that the detection of progress upon the super-weapon is of the greatest and utmost importance to us. Because, frankly, if they should get it and we should not have it, to say nothing of us having it or not having it at the time, it might well mean the difference between our existence as a nation and not existing.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is right.

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The Chairman. You are bearing a very, very heavy responsibility.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I haven't slackened down on trying to get any more information, sir. We have increased as much as we can and given it high priorities and everything else and we are trying to get all we can, sir.

The Chairman. Now, Admiral, that is all that I can say to you. Are there any further questions?

Senator Millikin. I just get no comfort out of anything that the Admiral has said to us. We have not had an organization adequate to know what is going on in the past and he gives me no assurance that we are going to have one in the future.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. There is no way of getting an organization like that. We could put 10,000 people in Russia, and there is no assurance that we would have all of the information that we have, that you would be certain of it. I couldn't take the responsibility of saying that you can give us 100,000 and say that we would definitely know what they were going to do and when they were going to produce a bomb. This thing doesn't work that way.

It is not a case of asking if a thousand people will
do well, that 10,000 people will do ten times as well.

Senator Millikin. I am not suggesting that. I suggest that maybe one good man, a qualified observer, might be worth 10,000 or 100,000 that you are talking about.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I think that that is right.

Senator Millikin.

Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Representative Holifield. Mr. Chairman, I think that it might be well to call the attention of the Committee to the fact that your organization has only been in existence about two and a half years, and that you had to start from the ground floor in building up a foreign service, and it was testified at the time that
It seems to me like while I realize that we haven't had perfect prediction of future events,

Admiral Hillenkoetter. We are not trying to excuse ourselves, but being only in existence for two years

Representative Holifield. You can't order a piece of intelligence out of Russia like you order groceries in the morning.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. It is a little difficult and it is much more difficult getting intelligence out from there than they get from here.

Representative Holifield.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir.
Admiral Hillenkoetter.

Representative Holifield. There is no such thing as a wide diversification of information in the Soviet Union. There are only a few newspapers and they print just what they want them to know, and the freedom flow of information is nothing like it is here. You are up against a terrific job and I am not trying to excuse it but I am trying to reason the thing out.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. We are not asking for excuses, we are trying to do the very best we can, and we say it is not that we haven't been in existence

Senator Knowland. Might I ask a question just to follow up what Senator Millikin had asked here, and that is I certainly recognize all of the problems that you have facing you, but I would like to pursue this one point and that is, is there anything from the point of view of the Congress that the Congress can do in the way of funds or authority that you do not now have

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that you need, or is it the problem of placing the agents and correlating the information? I merely want to be certain that from the Congressional point of view there is nothing that you need.

I have supported the Central Intelligence Act when it was before the Congress and I have supported the appropriations for it, but I would like to know if there is anything that you need from the Congress which you haven't received.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Not a thing, sir.

The Chairman. Except to keep our mouths shut?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. It is not as easy as that, and if we knew any way that Congress could help us to get absolute information, we would be up here and would have been up here a long time ago asking for it.

Representative Durham. Of course in 1943 we were allies of Russia, and at that time was there any exchange at all of military information between the services of our country and the services of Russia?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Well, the CIA didn't exist in 1943, and whether there was any exchange of information I don't know.

Representative Durham. Didn't they get it by executive order?
Admiral Hillenkoetter. That was OSS and on the military things. Whether there was any interchange between Russia or not I don't know. I was in the Pacific and I don't know whether there was any interchange at all.

Representative Durham. I would assume that the records had been gone over as far as information is concerned, and you could base some opinions on it in the development of this atomic bomb back in those days.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Well, there was a Russian mission over here and there was a Russian mission in Alaska, and certainly the Canadian spy case was right from there, and Dr. May was in and out of the United States, so unquestionably they got some information there, sir.

Senator Millikin. When did we start our atomic energy work in this country?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I don't know that, sir.

The Chairman. It was in 1942.

Senator Millikin. It was prior to that time.

Senator Hickenlooper. The Manhattan District was set up and General Groves took charge in September of 1942, and Oppenheimer started in Los Alamos in about August.

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Senator Millikin. Subsequent to that time until we became angry with each other there was a lot of exchange between our scientists and the Soviet's?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, sir.

Senator Millikin. And our scientists had no notice of the developments in Russia which you now say were ahead of the time that we estimated?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. I don't know as they would know they were going to work on the bomb, sir.

Senator Millikin. I didn't get your answer.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. They had no notice that they were working on a bomb. They were working on the idea of atomic energy.

Senator Millikin. We knew that, but we had no information that they were actually working and approaching the point where they would have an explosion.

Admiral Hillenkoetter. No, sir.

Senator Millikin. Can we conclude this, that Russia has set up such a security system that we are badly handicapped in trying to find out what she is doing, is that right?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is right, unquestionably, sir.
they would be badly handicapped if we had security in this country?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Very definitely, yes, sir.

Representative Jackson. This bill and the legislation that we passed allowing a certain number of aliens, that has been quite a bit of help?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes.

Representative Jackson. The quota allotted there is adequate?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, more than adequate.

Representative Jackson. You do not need any amendment to that?

Admiral Hillenkoetter. That is right.

The Chairman. Admiral, of course we appreciate the top secret character of your testimony here today and you need not be concerned about it. I think that without any fear at all I can underwrite this committee and you know that there has never been any leak of information that has come out of here and I am sure that there won't be. We realize that in order to get this kind of information which we must have that it is imperative that security be just maintained rat-proof, and it will be. I feel certain of that.

Now, we have one other matter, gentlemen, that it w
is imperative that we take up, but it is not with you, Admiral.

(Whereupon Admiral Hillenkoetter and his party were excused from the room.)

CONSTRUCTION RIDER ON APPROPRIATION MEASURES

The Chairman. Now, gentlemen, you recollect that we have discussed on three or four occasions this business of the construction rider. We discussed it the other day, and I suggested that the two foregoing provisos, the restrictive provisos should have no application with respect to technical production facilities which includes immediate construction or whose immediate continuation of construction the Commission certifies to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to be necessary to the national defense and security.

I brought it up and Senator Hickenlooper suggested that the Director of the Bureau of the Budget should agree with the certification and then the work should go forward.

Now, the Commission has made representations of a serious nature to me about the delay that will be caused by these provisions, and I feel it my responsibility...