FROM: TOKYO - CORRECTED COPY.

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2335, APRIL 4, 7 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

OPERATIONAL: IMMEDIATE

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 2335, INFORMATION CINCPAC 331, COMUSJAPAN 128.

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REFERENCE: DEPTEL 1810

1. I MET WITH FONMIN OHIRA FOR BREAKFAST APRIL 4 AT EMB RESIDENCE. TO AVOID PUBLIC ATTENTION AND RAISED WITH HIM POINTS IN REFTEL. WITHOUT COMMENTING (OR BEING ASKED TO COMMENT) ON CONCRETE QUESTION OF PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ABOARD OUR VESSELS, I ARRIVED AT FULL MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING WITH HIM REGARDING INTERPRETATION OF CLASSIFIED RECORD OF DISCUSSION ENTIRELY ON LINES OF EXISTING US INTERPRETATION (OUR INTERPRETATION AND INDEED EXISTENCE OF CLASSIFIED RECORD WERE BOTH OBVIOUSLY NEWS TO OHIRA). OHIRA TOOK PRESENTATION IN STRIDE AND SHOWED NOT RPT NOT SLIGHTEST DESIRE TO PERSUADE US TO ALTER STANDING PRACTICE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OR PUBLIC STATEMENTS, AND APPEARED CONFIDENT THAT HE COULD GET TOP GOJ SPOKESMEN TO BE MORE CIRCUMSPECT IN LANGUAGE USED ON THIS SUBJECT. IN SHORT, ALTHOUGH DANGER OF LEAK OR OF RESISTANCE ELSEWHERE IN GOJ CANNOT OF COURSE BE RULED OUT ENTIRELY, THIS ACTION WENT AS SUCCESSFULLY AS WE COULD POSSIBLY HAVE HOPED, PROVIDING STRIKING EVIDENCE HOW MUCH OUR MUTUAL CONFIDENCE HAS GROWN SINCE 1960.

2. WHILE BASING PRESENTATION ON REFTEL, I TAILORED IT ALONG FOLLOWING LINES, WHICH I SHALL OUTLINE IN DETAIL, SINCE THEY CONSTI-
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TUTE PRESENT BASIS OF OUR COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF ARTICLE VI OF TREATY AND RELATED DOCUMENTS:

A) SAYING THAT I WAS SPEAKING TO HIM INFORMALLY AND PERSONALLY, I TOLD OHIRA THAT INCREASING CLOSERNESS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP MADE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ALL THE MORE NECESSARY, MUTUAL MISUNDERSTANDING ALL THE MORE HARMFUL. SOME RECENT EXCHANGES IN DIET (I CONTINUED) HAD CAUSED ME TO FEAR THAT DIVERGENCE MIGHT BE SHOWING UP BETWEEN OUR VIEWS ON IMPORTANT MATTER AFFECTING OUR DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP.

B) I THEN REHEARSED OUR INVARIABLE POLICY OF REFUSING TO CONFIRM OR DENY LOCATION OF OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN THIS CONNECTION I MADE POINT (WHICH SEEMED TO CARRY MUCH WEIGHT WITH OHIRA) THAT FOR US TO REVEAL PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON ANY SPECIFIC SHIP AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME WOULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE STRATEGIC BENEFIT TO SOVIETS. I EXPLAINED THAT OUR TREATY MADE JAPAN SOME WHAT SPECIAL CASE, AND WE HAD ACCORDINGLY MODIFIED OUR STANDING POSITION TO EXTENT OF BEING WILLING SAY NO RPT NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD BEEN "INTRODUCED" IN JAPAN OR WOULD BE WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION. (I TOOK OCCASION TO MAKE CLEAR SIGNIFICANCES OF OUR STICKING TO WORD "INTRODUCE", AS IMPLYING PLACING OR INSTALLING ON JAPANESE SOIL, AND OUR PREVIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT JAPANESE HAD BEEN INTENDING ACHIEVE SAME EFFECT BY THEIR USE OF WORD "MOCHIKOMU". OHIRA THEN REMARKED THAT UNDER THIS INTERPRETATION "INTRODUCE" WOULD NOT RPT NOT APPLY TO HYPOTHETICAL CASE OF NUCLEARS-ON-VESSEL-IN-JAPANESE WATERS OR PORT, AND I AGREED HE THEN SAID THAT WHILE JAPANESE HAD NOT RPT NOT IN PAST USED MOCHIKOMU WITH CONSCIOUSNESS OF THIS RESTRICTED SENSE, THEY WOULD SO USE IT IN FUTURE.) I POINTED OUT THAT IN CASE OF SEVENTH FLEET, HOWEVER, WE HAD ALWAYS STUCK TO STANDARD POLICY OF NEITHER AFFIRMING NOR DENYING LOCATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANYWHERE IN WORLD, COUPLED WITH STATEMENT THAT WE WERE FAITHFULLY OBSERVING TREATY COMMITMENTS TO JAPAN. I THEN REVIEWED WITH OHIRA ENGLISH AND JAPANESE TEXTS OF EXCHANGE OF NOTES OF JANUARY 19 RE ARTICLE VI AND ENGLISH TEXT (LACKING THE JAPANESE) OF PARAS

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C) AFTER GIVING OHIRA OPPORTUNITY TO BREAK OFF DISCUSSION IF HE
DESIRED, I PROCEEDED WITH REVIEW OF RECENT STATEMENTS WHICH ILLUS-
TRATE APPARENT DIVERGENCE. I MENTIONED GILPATRIC STATEMENT IN
PRESS INTERVIEW AT HOTEL OKURA. "WE HAVE NO RPT NO PLANS FOR
PLACING RPT PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN JAPAN," AND CITED OHIRA'S
OWN STATEMENTS IN DIET DEBATE ON MARCH 7 AND MARCH 2, WHICH
I SAID WE HAD FOUND IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH OUR INTERPRETATION
OF TREATY. I THEN TURNED TO EXAMPLES OF DIET STATEMENTS WHICH
DID NOT RPT NOT SQUARE WITH OUR INTERPRETATION, INCLUDING SHIGA'S
OF MARCH 2 AND PRIMINS OF MARCH 6.

D) I CLOSED MY INITIAL PRESENTATION BY REITERATING INvariable
US POLICY OF NEITHER AFFIRMING NOR DENYING, ETC., AND REASONS FOR
IT. I STRESSED DANGER THAT STATEMENTS OF KIND JUST MENTIONED
WOULD LEAD TO CONFLICT WITH THIS POLICY AND COULD BE UTILIZED BY
ELEMENTS UNFRIENDLY TO OUR TWO GOVTS.

3. THROUGHOUT PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED, I CARE-
FULLY AVOIDED STATING OR IMPLIED THAT ANY US NAVAL VESSEL OR
AIRCRAFT IN JAPANESE PORTS OR TERRITORIAL AIR HAD CARRIED OR WOULD
ACTUALLY CARRY NUCLEAR WEAPONS, KEEPING STRESS INSTEAD ON DANGERS
OF DIVERGENCE BETWEEN STATEMENTS BY SPOKESMEN OF TWO COUNTRIES AND
UNDESIRABILITY OF CLEARLY TELLING SOVIETS WHETHER SPECIFIC AMERI-
CAN SHIPS CARRIED NUCLEARS OR NOT RPT NOT.

4. RE SSNS, OHIRA ON OWN INITIATIVE BROUGHT OUT POINT THAT UNDER
TREATY WE HAD RIGHT TO BRING IN SSNS BUT OUT OF CONSIDERATION FOR
POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND "KINDNESS" TO GOJ WE HAD ASKED GOJ OPINION
ON PROBLEM. HE SAID GOJ CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT
"PRIOR CONSULTATION" IN SENSE OF TREATY. I SAID THIS WAS CORRECT,
BUT THAT INASMUCH AS WE HAD MADE PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT SSN
VISITS AND POLARIS, WE WOULD, OF COURSE, ABIDE BY THEM. OHIRA
SAID WE SHOULD OF COURSE MAINTAIN PRESENT POSTURE RE SSN VISIT.

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5. OHIRA'S REACTION WAS EXCELLENT. HE ADMITTED THAT HE (AND PROBABLY PRIMIN IKEDA) HAD NOT RPT NOT UNDERSTOOD WHAT US MEANT BY ITS USE OF "INTRODUCE", BUT HE SHOWED NO RPT NO CONSTERNATION OVER THIS REVEALATION. HE SEEMED ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH OUR LINE OF REFUSING TO CONFIRM OR DENY PRESENCE OF NUCLEARS ON OUR SHIPS AND SIMULTANEOUSLY ASSERTING THAT WE WILL LIVE UP TO LETTER OF TREATY. HE AGREED WITH ME THAT SUDDEN ATTEMPT TO "CORRECT" OR MATERIALLY ALTER LINE OF JAPANESE STATEMENTS WOULD ONLY SERVE TO CALL UNNECESSARY ATTENTION TO PROBLEM; HOWEVER, HE AGREED THAT HENCEFORHE AND OTHERS IN GOJ WOULD FOLLOW LINE OF ASSERTING THAT THEY HAVE FULL TRUST IN OUR ASSURANCES THAT WE WILL LIVE UP TO TREATY; THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO USE WORD "MOCHIKOMU" FOR "INTRODUCE" BUT WOULD HENCEFORTH UNDERSTAND BY IT WHAT WE MEAN WHEN WE SAY "INTRODUCE".

6. RE FUTURE OF PROBLEM, OHIRA SAID HE WOULD LOOK UP TEXT OF JANUARY 6 CLASSIFIED RECORD OF DISCUSSION AND TALK PROBLEM OVER WITH IKEDA, BUT HE FORESAW NO RPT NO PROBLEMS. HE PROMISED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME IF THERE WERE ANY NEED FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF MATTER. RE LONGER RANGE FUE, ANY POSSIBILITY THAT GOJ MIGHT SOME DAY BE TAXED TO EXPLAIN APPARENT DISCREPANCIES IN SOME RECENT DIET STATEMENTS, OHIRA SAID THAT GROWING REALIZATION BY JAPANESE PEOPLE OF NECESSITY FOR NUCLEAR DEFENSE WOULD PROBABLY MAKE WHOLE PROBLEM ACADEMIC IN THREE YEARS OR SO.

7. TOWARDS END OF CONVERSATION, OHIRA EXPRESSED HIS AGREEMENT THAT ABSOLUTE TRUST IN EACH OTHER WAS MOST VITAL POINT IN OUR RELATIONSHIP, AND SAID THAT OUR ABILITY TO HAVE TALK OF SORT WE
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We were having an exchange of progress our two countries had made in their relationship since 1960. Almost as if to illustrate the point he asked me if there were not some other general problems regarding Japan I would like to bring up. I took opportunity to say Frank Pace preceding day had told me of his conversation with Ikeda, in which Pace had said American people's willingness carry disproportionate share of world's burdens was fast coming to an end, and time was coming sooner than world's leaders realized when other nations must take much larger share of burden. I told Ohira I realized political reeducation of Japanese public would take time, but there was need for speed. Ohira agreed but said he felt Japan was definitely speeding up and would be able to take its share of burden soon enough to meet need. He added that he personally found our position reasonable and that of Japan unreasonable (in fact he was sometimes accused by his colleagues of being our spokesman), but he was optimistic about Japan's ability to take up its share of load.

8. COMMENT: I would like to express my appreciation to Dept for wise and courageous guidance. I believe action has advanced our interests not only by eliminating dangerous discrepancy in our interpretation of treaty but also by reinforcing GOJ friendliness toward and confidence in us. There is still of course risk that Ohira will encounter less forthcoming attitudes on part of Ikeda or others in GOJ, or that leak will occur, but I consider these risks small by comparison with risks we would have run by keeping silent.

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