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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MNUC, UK

SUBJECT: TNF BILATERAL WITH UK

1. BILATERAL DISCUSSION OF TNF MODERNIZATION AND GRAY SECRET

AREA PROBLEM WITH UK TOOK PLACE HERE OCTOBER 5. UK WAS REPRESENTED BY PATRICK MOBERLY, JOHN WILBERFORCE, DESMOND BRYARS AND RICHARD HILL FROM LONDON AND JOHN WESTON AND MICHAEL PACKENHAM FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY. US SIDE WAS REPRESENTED BY LESLIE GELB, REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW, JOHN NEWHOUSE, WALTER SLOCOMBE, LYNN DAVIS, DAVID GOMPERT, JAMES GOODBY, BRIG. GEN. VESSER AND REAR ADM. WELCH.
2. THE DISCUSSION LASTED ALL DAY AND SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED, ANY OF PARTICULAR POINTS OF VIEW. NEITHER SIDE PRESENTED NATIONAL POSITIONS: EACH SIDE MADE CLEAR THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WERE EXPLORATORY, AND THAT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED AT THE TABLE WOULD IN SOME Instances EVEN REFLECT PERSONAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS THEMSELVES.

3. AT PM DIRECTOR GELB’S SUGGESTION, THE DISCUSSION WAS LED OFF BY BRIEFINGS BY SLOCOMBE ON THE NUCLEAR BALANCE AND GENERAL VESSER ON US STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR PROGRAMS. JOHN NEWHOUSE AND GELB MADE BRIEF PRESENTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL POSSIBILITIES AND THE CONCEPT OF AN INTEGRATED APPROACH COMBINING TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL ALONG LINES DESCRIBED IN THE US DISCUSSION PAPER, WHICH HAD BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE BRITISH IN ADVANCE. DAVIS BRIEFLY DISCUSSED MILITARY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH HLG’S WORK. GOODBY PRESENTED APPROACH FOR ASSESSING POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNICAL FACTORS SUCH AS RANGE, SIZE, TYPE OF SYSTEM, BASING MODES, ETC.

4. UK COMMENTS CAN BE BROKEN INTO TWO PRINCIPAL CATEGORIES: FORCE POSTURE AND MODERNIZATION DECISIONS AND SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 258185

THEATER ARMS CONTROL; THE MAIN LINES ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW.

FORCE POSTURE AND MODERNIZATION

5. BRITISH NOTED THAT (1) A FEATURE OF NATO NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE FOR THE MID-1980’S WAS CONTINUING HEAVY RELIANCE ON US CENTRAL SYSTEMS (COMPARSED TO MUCH LARGER PRESENT AND PROJECTED PROPORTION OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IN OVERALL SOVIET/PACT NUCLEAR TOTAL); (2) THERE WOULD BE CONTINUING HEAVY NATO RELIANCE ON AIRCRAFT, AS COMPARED TO RISING PROPORTION OF MISSILE RV’S IN WARSAW PACT POSTURE; AND (3) US PROJECTIONS OF FORCE BALANCE DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT POSSIBLE NEW WESTERN DEPLOYMENTS OF LONGER-RANGE TNF, NOR THE CHANGES THESE DEPLOYMENTS MIGHT MAKE ON THE RELATIVE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF NUCLEAR FORCES BY BOTH SIDES BY 1985 -- NOR ESPECIALLY IN THE POST-1985 PERIOD WHEN NATO SYSTEMS MIGHT BE COMING ON LINE IN MORE SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS.

6. UK DREW ATTENTION TO INCREASING DEPLOYMENT OF NEW SOVIET LONG-RANGE TNF (SS-20 AND BACKFIRE) AND NOTED
That this development has once again aroused European concerns on the question of coupling. UK said that while its views of the emerging situation were less dramatic than those of the FRG, nevertheless, from the UK perspective it seemed clear that such deployments were heightening concern about the nuclear balance, particularly in view of the fact that there were no comparable deployments in NATO to improve the Western position. In the view of many Europeans, SALT has contributed to this problem of confidence by resolving such issues as the SS-16/SS-20 convertibility problem and backfire in ways which underline the theater nuclear question.

7. In the UK participants' view, the FRG has overreacted to the situation, particularly with respect to their secret

"Drive" to get negotiations on gray area systems. The UK construes the problem as both political and military, and believes that it can best be dealt with by a force modernization program which is consistent with the high level group's consensus in favor of an evolutionary adjustment in NATO long-range TNF capability. This evolutionary improvement, moreover, argued the British, should not be seen specifically as a response to the new Soviet deployments, but as a necessary adjustment in the Alliance's capability, and as a means to strengthen what UK participants termed the weakest part of the coupling linkage (i.e., long-range, land-based TNF).

8. UK representatives did not view the issue as fundamentally new in the history of the Alliance, but rather as a recurrence of concerns which have always been present in greater or lesser degree, and which have recently been aggravated and brought more to the forefront by ongoing Soviet deployments. UK side repeatedly emphasized that the key to the political and military situation is an evolutionary adaptation of NATO forces. When pressed for particulars on such issues as type of forces, numbers, and participation, UK representatives replied along following lines:

--- ALCM are very attractive to the UK as a means to sustain a manned bomber force, in view of aging Vulcan force, and could be presented to parliament, publics and the Soviets as a logical, follow-on replacement of a type of nuclear delivery system the UK has had for many years.
-- GLCM ON THE OTHER HAND IS SOMETHING PEOPLE ARE NOT USED TO AND WOULD PRESENT A DISTINCTLY HIGHER PROFILE. IN THIS CONNECTION, UK SIDE WAS INTERESTED IN US DATA ON PHYSICAL SIZE OF GLCM LAUNCHERS AND IN PLANNED GLCM DISPERAL PATTERNS, NOTING THAT GLCM WOULD BE CONSPICUOUS AND PERHAPS EVEN TOO LARGE FOR MANY ROADS IN PARTS OF UK.

-- SIMILARLY, A COMPLETELY NEW MRBM WOULD PRESENT A HIGHER PROFILE BOTH FOR ALLIED PUBLICS, AND FOR THE SOVIETS, IF ONE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF WESTERN DEPLOYMENTS ON THEM.

-- PERSHING II-XR, IN CONTRAST, IS ALSO A SYSTEM WHICH COULD BE PRESENTED AS A LOGICAL FOLLOW-ON TO THE EXISTING PERSHING 1A.

-- WITH RESPECT TO BASING, THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME DIFFERENCE OF VIEW WITHIN THE UK DELEGATION, BUT WILBERFORCE, WITHOUT CONTRADICTION FROM MOBERLY, CLEARLY SAID, AND LATER RECONFIRMED, THAT IN HIS VIEW WHAT WAS WANTED WAS: (1) INCREASED LONG-RANGE CAPABILITY IN THE HANDS OF THE PRESENT EUROPEAN NUCLEAR POWERS -- UK AND FRANCE; AND (2) A LARGER US LONG-RANGE PRESENCE IN EUROPE, WHETHER PERSHING OR GLCM -- BUT US ONLY, WITH NO RPT NO FRG PARTICIPATION IN ANY LONG-RANGE SYSTEM CAPABLE OF REACHING THE USSR. WHEN PRESSS ON HOW TO HANDLE THE FRG INTEREST IN MAINTAINING A NUCLEAR ROLE, WILBERFORCE SAID THIS SHOULD BE IN MODERNIZED SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS, SUCH AS AN IMPROVED PERSHING WITH THE SAME RANGE AS THE CURRENT PERSHING 1A. WILBERFORCE STRESSED AGAIN, WITHOUT COUNTER FROM HIS COLLEAGUES, THAT IT SHOULD BE ENOUGH -- IN TERMS OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION -- FOR THE UK AND FRANCE TO PROVIDE ENHANCED LONG-RANGE CAPABILITIES.

SECRET

PAGE 06  STATE  258185

-- WITH RESPECT TO NUMBERS OF SYSTEMS, UK SIDE INDICATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT IT FELT DEPLOYMENTS "IN THE HUNDREDS" OF NEW WEAPONS WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE "EVOLUTIONARY ADJUSTMENT" CALLED FOR BY THE HLG, AND WOULD SATISFY POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY NEEDS OF THE AL-
Liance. This level of deployment would also have the best prospect for avoiding the most acute forms of reaction from the USSR, in UK view.

9. British participants repeated frequently throughout this discussion that the HLG should proceed unhindered to define a force posture program for Alliance consideration and approval.

Theater Arms Control

10. British were uniformly negative about the prospects, feasibility or need for arms control on long-range TNF. British skepticism seemed to center around three main concerns:

-- They see no plausible arms control outcome which would be to NATO's advantage. Soviets already have advantage in long-range TNF and are in act of deploying new systems, while NATO, in contrast, has few long-range systems in the theater now, and only paper programs -- with deployments a distant prospect. Therefore, NATO's bargaining situation is too weak.

To achieve an acceptable outcome.

-- They fear that arms control, if launched before deployments had begun, or if tied in some way to Modern-Secret

ization, could undermine the Allies' ability to gain parliamentary and public support for modernization. They argue that European governments will need to be able to point to Soviet theater buildup as justification for NATO deployments, and arms control could give opponents of modernization a potent argument for doing nothing until arms control had run its course. Arms control, in the European political context, would not provide a justification for programs, but an excuse not to go ahead with them.

-- British believe TNF modernization is necessary in its own right, independent of what might be achievable in arms control, and even independent of fact of Soviet TNF modernization. NATO long-range theater systems are aging and the land-based component is concentrated in aircraft. NATO needs to replace these systems, and should do so in ways which enhance the
11. AT THIS POINT, MOBERLY POISED THREE QUESTIONS, TO WHICH HE REQUESTED A CONSIDERED US RESPONSE IN DUE COURSE. BRITISH SUBSEQUENTLY FOLLOWED UP BILATERAL BY PRESENTING THE QUESTIONS IN WRITING. BEGIN TEXT:

-- (ONE). DOES THE UNITED STATES VIEW THE EXPECTED SALT TREATY LIMITATIONS ON AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (ALCMS) AS PRECLUDING IN PRINCIPLE THE TRANSFER OF LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR-CAPABLE ALCMS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM AS PART OF AN AGREED PROGRAMME TO IMPROVE AND MODERNISE NATO’S THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES?

-- (TWO). IF THE ANSWER TO (ONE) IS YES, WOULD THE POSITION BE CHANGED IF THE UNITED KINGDOM WERE TO ESTABLISH SECRET THAT IT WAS SEEKING ALCMS ONLY TO REPLACE AN OBSOLETE THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEM (THE VULCAN FORCE) WITH AN UPDATED CAPABILITY?

-- (THREE). WOULD ANY LIMITATIONS UNDER (ONE) AND (TWO) ABOVE PRECLUDE A PARTIAL TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY RELATED TO ALCMS? END TEXT

US AGREED TO CONSIDER THE QUESTIONS CAREFULLY AND PROVIDE UK WITH A WRITTEN RESPONSE.

12. IN THE VIEW OF THE UK PARTICIPANTS, THE WORK OF HLG IN DEFINING NATO TNF REQUIREMENTS AND IN RESOLVING QUESTIONS OF BASING, PARTICIPATION, FORCE SIZE, MIX, ETC., SHOULD PROCEED UNIMPEDED BY CONSIDERATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL. WHEN THE ALLIANCE HAS REACHED A CONSENSUS ABOUT TNF MODERNIZATION, THEN ARMS CONTROL COULD BE EXAMINED. UK PARTICIPANTS ALSO MADE POINT THAT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO HOLD OFF ON AN ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE UNTIL NATO HAD ACTUALLY BEGUN DEPLOYMENTS, ON GROUNDS THAT TRADING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AGAINST DEPLOYED SYSTEMS PUT THE WEST IN A WEAK BARGAINING POSITION.

13. UK PARTICIPANTS’ VIEW OF ARMS CONTROL SEEMED NARROWLY DRAWN -- THEY APPEARED TO BELIEVE ARMS CONTROL MEANT, IN EFFECT, NATO GIVING UP TNF MODERNIZATION ALTOGETHER IN RETURN FOR SOME LIMITATION ON SOVIET ONGOING DEPLOYMENTS. WHEN THE US SIDE EXPLAINED ONE ARMS CONTROL AP-
PROACH MIGHT SIMPLY BE TO PUT A CAP ON SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS
OF SS-20 AND BACKFIRE IN RETURN FOR NATO WILLINGNESS TO
LIMIT ITS OWN DEPLOYMENTS TO THE SAME LEVEL, UK PARTICI-
PANTS SHOWED MORE INTEREST. HOWEVER, THEY EXPRESSED
DOUBT THAT IT WOULD BE IN NATO'S INTEREST TO AGREE ON A
SECRET

LEVEL OF NEEDED MODERNIZATION, AND THEN ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WHICH MIGHT CUT MODERNIZATION BACK TO A LEVEL BELOW THAT PREVIOUSLY DEEMED AS THE NECESSARY MINIMUM. THEY ALSO OBSERVED THAT IF NATO INFLATED ITS MODERNIZATION PLANS IN ORDER TO PROTECT ESSENTIAL MODERNIZATION IN ANY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, AND NO AGREEMENT WERE REACHED, NATO MIGHT BE COMPelled TO MAKE DEPLOYMENTS IT DID NOT ACTUALLY NEED. UK PARTICIPANTS CLEARLY REMAINED ANXIOUS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THEATER NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL ON NATO TNF MODERNIZATION AND SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE ABILITY OF NATO TO COME UP WITH AN ARMS CONTROL APPROACH THAT WOULD BE FEASIBLE.

14. UK PARTICIPANTS ENDED GENERAL ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSION BY STRESSING THAT THEY BELIEVE MOST URGENT TASK WAS TO GET ON WITH HLG WORK. HOWEVER, THEY RECOGNIZED THAT FRG AND OTHER ALLIES MIGHT HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS ON NEED FOR ARMS CONTROL, AND THAT NATO MUST CONTINUE TO EXAMINE ARMS CONTROL POSSIBILITIES AND TO STUDY WAYS TO INTEGRATE TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN A MANNER THAT WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE ESSENTIAL MODERNIZATION. THEY DID NOT DISMISS THE IDEA OF ARMS CONTROL, BUT EMPHASIZED THE POINT OF TIMING. THEIR OWN PREFERENCE WOULD BE "APPROACH B" IN THE

US DISCUSSION PAPER -- UNDER WHICH, IN THEIR INTERPRETA-
TION, ARMS CONTROL POSSIBILITIES WOULD BE EXAMINED ONLY
AFTER NATO'S TOTAL MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS HAD BEEN
ESTABLISHED.

15. ON MBFR OPTION III, BRITISH ASKED FOR FULL ACCOUNT
OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID TO SOVIETS ON PERSHING LIMITATIONS,
NOTING THAT NATO SHOULD EXAMINE CAREFULLY THE ALTERNATIVES
FOR USING PERSHING LEVERAGE IN MBFR AND GAS NEGOTIATIONS.
WILBERFORCE, SUPPORTED BY MOBERLY, EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT
GETTING A HANDLE ON SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ADVANTAGE THROUGH
AN MBFR AGREEMENT "ON OUR TERMS" WAS MORE IMPORTANT AT
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THIS TIME THAN "CAPping THE SS-20". BUT, BRITISH
STRESSED WHOLE QUESTION OF MBFR OPTION III/GAS TRADEOFFS NEEDED CAREFUL STUDY. THE US RESPONDED THAT NO FORMAL COMMITMENTS HAD BEEN MADE TO SOVIETS BEYOND THE STRAIGHT-FORWARD PERSHING REDUCTION OFFER, AND THAT WE TOO AGREED THAT THE MBFR OPTION III/GAS CONNECTION NEEDED SERIOUS EXAMINATION.

16. BRITISH ENDED BY RAISING QUESTION OF FURTHER CONSULTATIONS, BOTH IN NAC ON IMMEDIATE ISSUES OF TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL, AND IN LONGER TERM IF GAS IS BROUGHT INTO SALT III. US SAID WE WISHED TO ASSESS BILATERALS AND DETERMINE HOW BEST TO PROCEED WITH ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS, AND THAT WE CONSIDERED THAT A NAC WOULD BE NECESSARY IN NEAR FUTURE ON THESE TOPICS. US SAID IT WAS ALSO CONSIDERING SENDING US DISCUSSION PAPER, PERHAPS WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS, TO THE ALLIANCE. UK WELcomed IDEA OF US SUBMITTING DISCUSSION PAPER, BUT APPEARED CAUTIOUS ON TIMING, WITH WILBERFORCE SUGGESTING THAT EARLY SUBMISSION OF PAPER COULD CAUSE TNF/GAS ISSUE TO DOMINATE DISCUSSION AT DECEMBER MINISTERIALS.

17. ON GAS NEGOTIATIONS, UK REPRESENTATIVES SAID THAT INCLUSION OF ANY THEATER SYSTEMS IN SALT III WOULD TOUCH EUROPEAN SECURITY INTERESTS DIRECTLY, AND EUROPEANS WOULD EXPECT ARRANGEMENTS TO ALLOW THEM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORMULATION OF POSITIONS ON SUCH ISSUES. US RESPONDED THAT WE RECOGNIZED IMPORTANCE OF SPECIAL CONSULTATIONS IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THAT WE WERE OPEN TO IDEA ON HOW THIS MIGHT BE DONE. VANCE

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