EXDIS, USNATOTWO, USNATO: ALERT DUTY OFFICER AT 0700 HRS.

E.O. 11652: GDS DECAPIIONED

TAGS: PARM; NATO, MNUC, MPOL

STATEMENT FOR THE NOVEMBER 20 NAC ON TNF ISSUES

REF: STATE 279668

1. FOR USNATO: PARA 3 CONTAINS TEXT OF AMBASSADOR'S STATEMENT FOR NOVEMBER 20 NAC CONSULTATION ON TNF ISSUES. YOU SHOULD NOT PROVIDE TEXT OF STATEMENT TO ALLIES UNTIL TIME OF PRESENTATION. CHART REFERRED TO IN SECOND PARA OF SECTION "POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL ISSUES," AND TO BE DISTRI-
2. FOR PARIS, BONN AND LONDON: PLEASE INFORM PAGNIEZ, BLECH AND MOBERLY THAT US PRESENTATION ON TNF ARMS CONTROL AT NAC, WILL NOT BE OF SAME DEGREE OF DEPTH OR SPECIFICITY AS DISCUSSIONS IN OCTOBER BILATERALS. WE PLAN SIMPLY TO SURVEY IN GENERAL TERMS THE PRINCIPAL POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS ON TNF, AND TO OUTLINE SOME OF THE POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES. WE DO NOT PLAN TO TABLE ANY ILLUSTRATIVE ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS. PLEASE STRESS THAT WE ENVISAGE MONDAY'S NAC AS ONLY THE BEGINNING OF ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION OF TNF ARMS CONTROL AND WOULD HOPE THAT IT WOULD NOT BE USED AS A FORUM TO ARGUE NATIONAL POSITIONS. DO NOT PROVIDE TEXT OF STATEMENT UNTIL DAY OF NAC.

3. TEXT OF STATEMENT TO NAC ON TNF ISSUES:

I AM PLEASED TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TODAY TO SPEAK WITH YOU ABOUT THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF TREATING THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IN ARMS CONTROL.

THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET THEATER AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OVER THE PAST DECADE HAS RAISED A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT QUESTIONS -- BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL -- THAT ARE OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE ALLIANCE. THE ELEMENTS OF THIS EVOLUTION ARE WELL-KNOWN TO ALL OF YOU: SOVIET IMPROVEMENTS IN THEIR LONG-RANGE THEATER CAPABILITIES, AS MANIFEST IN THE SS-20 AND BACKFIRE; SOVIET MODERNIZATION OF SHORTER-RANGE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES; AND THE EMERGENCE OF PARITY IN NUMBERS OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS. COUPLED TO THIS IS THE NEED FOR DECISIONS ON NEW THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN THE WEST.

THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND IS PREPARED TO WORK WITH THE ALLIANCE IN DEVELOPING A POLICY WHICH BEST SATISFIES OUR COMMON POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTERESTS.

IN DEVELOPING AN ALLIANCE POLICY, WE FACE A UNIQUE CHALLENGE IN THAT BOTH FORCE POSTURE AND ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN POSED AS ISSUES FOR THE ALLIANCE AT THE SAME TIME. THE QUESTIONS WE ARE ENGAGED IN ANSWERING ARE: FIRST
"WHETHER AND HOW SHOULD WE RESPOND TO THE CHANGES IN THE THEATER SITUATION BY OUR OWN FORCE DEPLOYMENTS?" SECOND, "WHETHER AND HOW SHOULD WE SEEK TO USE ARMS CONTROL IN OUR RESPONSE?" AND FINALLY, "WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN OUR FORCE MODERNIZATION AND OUR ARMS CONTROL POSITIONS?"

THE ALLIANCE IS ALREADY GIVING CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO THE QUESTION OF TNF MODERNIZATION THROUGH THE WORK OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP, AND I DO NOT PROPOSE TO REVIEW THAT HERE. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THE ALLIANCE SHOULD ALSO GIVE SERIOUS AND EARLY CONSIDERATION TO WHETHER ARMS CONTROL COULD SERVE AS A COMPLEMENT TO FORCE MODERNIZATION IN ENHANCING NATO'S OVERALL SECURITY. WHATEVER ACTIONS WE TAKE CAN HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO'S DETERRENT AND DEFENSE CAPABILITIES, EAST-WEST RELATIONS, INTRA-ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS, AND THE FUTURE OF SALT AND MBFR. THEREFORE, IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD EXAMINE CAREFULLY THE POSSIBILITIES AND PROBLEMS OF ARMS CONTROL.

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CONCURRENTLY WITH THE ALLIANCE EXAMINATION OF THE SCOPE AND CHARACTER OF A MODERNIZATION PROGRAM. EVEN IF WE ULTIMATELY DECIDE THAT PURSUING FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS ON SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS IS NOT IN THE ALLIANCE’S INTERESTS, CAREFUL STUDY OF THEATER NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL WILL BE NECESSARY. THE SOVIETS, AFTER ALL, ARE LIKELY TO RAISE THE PBS ISSUE AGAIN IN SALT III, AND SO WE WILL NEED TO HAVE AN AGREED POSTURE FROM WHICH TO RESPOND.

OUR OWN VIEWS ON TNF ARMS CONTROL, AND ITS POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP TO TNF MODERNIZATION, ARE PRELIMINARY. WE HAVE REACHED NO DECISIONS THUSFAR. WE NEED YOUR VIEWS IN ORDER THAT WE MAY COLLECTIVELY BEGIN TO JUDGE WHAT IS THE MOST APPROPRIATE COURSE OF ACTION.

THE COUNCIL IS THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL -- AS WELL FOR ENSURING CONSISTENCY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALLIANCE’S POLICIES ON THE RELATED ISSUES OF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL.

OUR PURPOSE TODAY IS TO SKETCH OUT THE BASIC ISSUES AND FACTORS INVOLVED IN ARMS CONTROL FOR THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, AS THE BASIS FOR FURTHER ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS OVER THE COMING MONTHS. WE HOPE THAT THIS AND SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WILL PROVIDE A FREE AND FRANK DIALOGUE, WITH NO DEFINITIVE NATIONAL POSITIONS BEING ADVANCED UNTIL ALL THE KEY ISSUES AND IDEAS HAVE BEEN SURFACED.
ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES

AS WE THINK ABOUT WAYS TO ADDRESS THE THEATER NUCLEAR SITUATION IT IS USEFUL TO RECALL THE VARIOUS OBJECTIVES OUR POLICY MUST SERVE -- AND PERHAPS RECONCILE. MOST

BASICALLY, OUR GOAL IS TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE BY STRENGTHENING ITS DETERRENT AND DEFENSE POSTURE. OUR DETERRENT MUST BE CREDIBLE, AND THISRequires THAT WE RETAIN A BALANCED AND LINKED CONTINUUM OF CONVENTIONAL, THEATER NUCLEAR, AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES IN SUPPORT OF OUR FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY. TO MAKE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE CREDIBLE, WE MUST LOOK TO OUR MEANS OF RESPONDING TO AGGRESSION AT ANY LEVEL. IN PARTICULAR, WE MUST PRESERVE A CLEARLY PERCEIVED COUPLING OF THEATER FORCES TO THE US STRATEGIC DETERRENT. WE MUST ALSO ENSURE THERE ARE NO REAL OR PERCEIVED GAPS IN THE CONTINUUM.

A SECOND OBJECTIVE IS TO PRESERVE THE UNITY AND SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE. THIS IS IMPORTANT FOR DETERRENCE, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WILL UNQUESTIONABLY ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT FOR PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE ANY NORTOT TO

ACQUIRE NEW THEATER SYSTEMS. A COMBINED ARMS CONTROL/MODERNIZATION STRATEGY SUPPORTED BY A FIRM ALLIANCE CONSENSUS, REACHED THROUGH FULL ANALYSIS OF ALL IMPLICATIONS, COULD HELP REDUCE SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES IN THIS REGARD.

A THIRD OBJECTIVE IS TO MAINTAIN STABLE EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WHATEVER STEPS WE TAKE TO STRENGTHEN NATO’S SECURITY POSITION, WE SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BOTH THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPACT ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS. FORCE POSTURE DECISIONS SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE CREDIBILITY OF THE DETERRENT -- WHICH ITSELF CONTRIBUTES TO STABILITY IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS -- BUT WE SHOULD ALSO BE ALERT TO DOING THAT IN WAYS THAT SUPPORT POSSIBLE EFFORTS AT ARMS CONTROL TO REDUCE AND LIMIT THE WARSAW PACT THREAT.

A RELATED OBJECTIVE IS TO SUSTAIN THE SALT PROCESS. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF EFFECTIVE SALT LIMITATIONS CONTRIBUTES SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, AS WELL AS TO THE PROGRESS OF DETENTE. THE

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UNIFIED STATES IS COMMITTED TO TAKING ALLIED VIEWS AND INTERESTS FULLY INTO ACCOUNT THROUGH THE INTENSIVE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS WHICH HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. AS WE CONSIDER IMPROVEMENTS TO NATO'S TNF POSTURE, AND THE POSSIBLE ARMS CONTROL TREATMENT OF THEATER NUCLEAR ISSUES, WE WILL WANT TO ENSURE THAT WE TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF OUR OVERALL ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES IN NEGOTIATING FURTHER LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES. HOWEVER, IN DOING SO, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT TREATMENT OF TNF IN ARMS CONTROL WILL HAVE A BEARING ON SALT. INCLUDING TNF ON THE SALT III AGENDA CAN CREATE PROBLEMS FOR SALT, BUT THE EXCLUSION OF TNF COULD POSE ITS OWN SET OF PROBLEMS.

ANOTHER OBJECTIVE IS TO ENSURE THAT ALLIANCE RESOURCES ARE ALLOCATED EFFECTIVELY. WE HAVE AGREED, IN THE LITDP, ON A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM TO IMPROVE NATO'S CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES, AS WELL AS THE BASIC DIRECTION FOR EXAMINATION OF MEASURES TO REMEDY DEFICIENCIES IN ALLIANCE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES. WE MUST STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN POSSIBLE EXPENDITURES ON ADDITIONAL LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND EXPENDITURES IN SUPPORT OF OTHER HIGH-PRIORITY MODERNIZATION GOALS, NOTING THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS DECLARED THAT CONVENTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS HAVE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY.

STRATEGIC BALANCE

A DECADE AGO SOVIET FORCES, ALTHOUGH MUCH SMALLER THAN US FORCES, ALREADY HAD A SECURE "SECOND STRIKE" CAPABILITY AGAINST THE US. DURING THE LAST DECADE, SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES HAVE CONTINUED TO GROW AND DIVERSIFY, REACHING IN THE MID-1970'S ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE WITH US STRATEGIC FORCES. AT PRESENT, THE SOVIETS HAVE AN ADVANTAGE IN NUM-
ADDITION OF ALCM WILL CONTRIBUTE TO MAINTAINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BOMBER PORTION OF THE STRATEGIC TRIAD AGAINST SOVIET AIR DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS. THE SOVIET IMPROVEMENTS IN ICBM ACCURACIES AND NUMBERS OF REENTRY VEHICLES WILL POSE AN INCREASING THREAT TO THE US LAND-BASED ICBM FORCE, ALTHOUGH OPTIONS FOR ALTERNATE BASING MODES ARE BEING DEVELOPED TO ENHANCE THE SURVIVABILITY OF THE US LAND-BASED MISSILE FORCE.

THE U.S. WILL MAINTAIN THE NECESSARY STRATEGIC FORCES TO BACK ITS CONTINUING AND FUNDAMENTAL COMMITMENT TO NATO DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE.

TNF MODERNIZATION

IT IS AGAINST THIS STRATEGIC BACKDROP THAT THE NPG HIGH LEVEL GROUP HAS BEEN STUDYING NATO'S THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE REQUIREMENTS. THE HLG'S REPORT TO THE APRIL 1978 NPG CONCLUDED THAT "THERE IS EVIDENT A NEED FOR AN EVOLUTIONARY ADJUSTMENT IN NATO TNF THAT WOULD PROVIDE SOME WHAT MORE IN-THEATER LONG-RANGE CAPABILITY THAN AT PRESENT"

THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP MET IN OCTOBER, AND WILL BE MEETING AGAIN AT THE END OF THIS MONTH TO DEVELOP FURTHER THE CONSIDERATIONS FROM WHICH ALLIED GOVERNMENTS CAN

DETERMINE NATO'S THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE FOR THE NEXT DECADE AND BEYOND. THE UNITED STATES, AS YOU KNOW, HAS A VARIETY OF LONG-RANGE THEATER SYSTEMS UNDER DEVELOPMENT, AND OTHERS UNDER CONSIDERATION. THESE SYSTEMS ARE SUMMARIZED IN THE US REPORT TO THE OCTOBER HLG MEETING.

AT PRESENT, THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP IS ASSESSING SUCH ISSUES AS ALTERNATIVE FORCE SIZES, FORCE MIXES, RANGE CAPABILITIES, BASING MODES, AND POSSIBLE COST-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS IN ORDER TO DEVISE FORCE POSTURE OPTIONS THAT WILL BEST CONTRIBUTE TO DETERRENCE, AND TO NATO'S CAPABILITIES BOTH TO ESCALATE AND TO CONTROL ESCALATION SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL. THESE ISSUES HAVE IMPORTANT POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS, WHICH ALL OF US IN THE ALLIANCE SHOULD DISCUSS AS THE HLG PROCEEDS WITH ITS WORK.

ARMS CONTROL FOR THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS

I WOULD LIKE NOW TO TURN TO THE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS ON THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.

UNCLASSIFIED
ARMS CONTROL FOR THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS SHOULD SERVE MANY OF THE SAME ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES AS TNF MODERNIZATION. BEFORE THE ALLIANCE CAN DECIDE WHETHER ACTIVELY TO PURSUE LIMITATIONS ON THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, IT WILL BE NECESSARY CAREFULLY TO WEIGH THE PROBLEMS AND UNCERTAINTIES INVOLVED AGAINST THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS, IN ORDER TO JUDGE WHETHER, AND IF SO HOW, TO DESIGN AN ADVANTAGEOUS APPROACH.

ONE CONSIDERATION IN AN ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE LIMITATIONS ON TNFS IS THE FACT THAT THE INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES (IOC) OF US DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS ARE SEVERAL YEARS AWAY, WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE LARGE NUMBERS OF LONG-RANGE

TNFS ALREADY DEPLOYED, AND ARE ACTIVELY DEPLOYING NEW ONES. THUS OUR BARGAINING POSITION WOULD DEPEND INITIALLY ON PROGRAMS THAT HAD NOT REACHED FRUITION -- ALTHOUGH OUR LEVERAGE WOULD IMPROVE AS PRODUCTION DECISIONS WERE MADE, IOCS APPROACHED, AND DEPLOYMENTS BECAME A CLEAR PROSPECT IN SOVIET EYES. AS WE MAKE DECISIONS ON DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEMS, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT WE TAKE CARE NOT TO ACT IN WAYS WHICH LOSE US LEVERAGE IN THOSE SYSTEMS WE MAY NOT WANT TO DEPLOY.

A SECOND CONSIDERATION IS THAT THE COMPLEXITIES OF NEGOTIATING ON TNFS AS PART OF AN EXPANDED SALT AGENDA, WHEN ADDED TO THE ALREADY COMPLEX PROBLEM OF NEGOTIATING FURTHER SALT LIMITATIONS ON CENTRAL SYSTEMS, COULD OVERBURY THE WHOLE PROCESS -- WITH CONSEQUENT IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST-WEST POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY. MOREOVER, EQUAL CEILINGS ON A RELATIVELY BROAD SET OF THEATER SYSTEMS, EVEN IN THE SALT FRAMEWORK, COULD CREATE IMPRESSIONS OF A SEPARATE REGIONAL NUCLEAR BALANCE, WHICH IS INCONSISTENT WITH NATO DOCTRINE. WE WOULD NEED TO ENSURE THAT NO PERCEPTION OF DECOUPLING EMERGED FROM ANY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION.

ANOTHER ASPECT IS THAT NEGOTIATING ON LONG-RANGE TNFS COULD LEAD TO THE CODIFICATION OF HIGH EQUAL CEILINGS WHICH COULD CREATE PressURES IN THE ALLIANCE TO MAKE GREATER DEPLOYMENTS THAN WERE DEEMED NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE OR TO SUSTAIN POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS OF PARITY. BUT AVOIDING THIS PROBLEM BY AGREEING TO ASYMETRICAL CEILINGS WOULD CONTRACTUALIZE A SOVIET NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE WHICH COULD POSE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES.
ONE OTHER FACTOR IS THAT CONSTRAINING NUMBERS OF LONG-RANGE THEATER SYSTEMS COULD WORK TO THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE, SINCE LIMITS ON THE SS-20 AND BACKFIRE WOULD NOT PRECLUDE INCREASED DEPLOYMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE OF SHORTER-RANGE TNFS, GIVING THEM ALTERNATIVE COVERAGE OF WEST EUROPEAN TARGETS, WHILE NATO’S ABILITY TO TARGET THE USSR WOULD BE LIMITED. ANOTHER CONSIDERATION IS THAT, EVEN IF WE WERE SUCCESSFUL IN CONFINING NEGOTIATIONS TO US AND SOVIET SYSTEMS, THE SOVIETS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY SEEK COMPENSATION FOR ALLIED NUCLEAR FORCES AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR LIMITS ON THEIR THEATER SYSTEMS. THESE CONSIDERATIONS ASIDE, THERE MAY BE CONSIDERABLE POSITIVE BENEFITS TO BE GAINED THROUGH ARMS CONTROL. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE MAY BE POSSIBLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS ON TNF WHICH COULD IMPROVE NATO’S NUCLEAR POSTURE RELATIVE TO THE SOVIET UNION AND WARSAW PACT. THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED BY AN AGREEMENT WHICH DIRECTLY LIMITED THE SIZE AND CHARACTER OF THE SOVIET THREAT. THIS COULD REDUCE THE VULNERABILITIES OF NATO’S DETERRENT POSTURE, AND COULD ENSURE THAT NATO’S OWN TNF MODERNIZATION EFFORTS WOULD NOT BE OVERTAKEN BY UNCONSTRAINED SOVIET COUNTERDEPLOYMENTS. ARMS CONTROL FOR THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS COULD HELP PREVENT A COMPETITION IN LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, AND GUIDE BOTH SIDES IN DIRECTIONS WHICH WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY. THEATER ARMS CONTROL COULD ALSO MINIMIZE THE DANGER THAT THE BENEFITS TO THE ALLIANCE OF FURTHER SALT REDUCTIONS ON INTERCONTINENTAL SYSTEMS COULD BE UNDERCUT BY AN UNCONSTRAINED EAST-WEST COMPETITION IN THE "GRAY AREA" OF LONG-RANGE TNFS. THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE SIMILAR INTERESTS TO THAT EXTENT, ARMS CONTROL COULD CONTRIBUTE TO IMPROVING THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN EUROPE, AND TO STABILITY IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. MOREOVER, AN ARMS CONTROL EFFORT ON OUR PART MAY IMPROVE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR TNF MODERNIZATION.

OBVIOUSLY, NO AGREEMENT CAN BE EXPECTED TO INVOLVE

SOVIET CONCESSION OF A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO NATO. MOREOVER, THE SALT II PROTOCOL LIMITS ON CRUISE MISSILES, TOGETHER WITH THE AGREEMENT IN THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, ENSURE THAT PROTOCOL ISSUES WILL BE ON THE SALT III
AGENDA. WE CAN ALSO ASSUME THAT THE SOVIETS, GIVEN THEIR
LONG-STANDING CONCERNS ABOUT US THEATER SYSTEMS, WILL SEEK
TO LINK PROGRESS IN SALT III WITH CONSTRAINTS ON THESE US
SYSTEMS. THEREFORE, WE WOULD AT LEAST NEED TO DEVELOP AN
ARMS CONTROL POSTURE WHICH WOULD PERMIT US TO DEAL WITH
THESE PRESSURES, WHILE PROTECTING OUR ABILITY TO MODERNIZE
OUR TNF, IF WE DECIDE NOT TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE BY AD-
VANCING OUR OWN PROPOSALS.

THE PLANNED US STATEMENT THAT "ANY FUTURE LIMITATIONS
ON US SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THEATER MISSIONS
SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET
THEATER SYSTEMS" PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR DEFLECTING ONE-
SIDED SOVIET DEMANDS IN SALT III. HOWEVER, THE STATEMENT
DELIBERATELY DOES NOT SPECIFY WHAT LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET
THEATER SYSTEMS WE WOULD SEEK IF THE SOVIETS PressED FOR
LIMITS ON US THEATER SYSTEMS.

POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL ISSUES

I WOULD LIKE NOW TO SURVEY TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL
ISSUES WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED IN ORDER TO NEGOCI-
ATE LIMITS ON TNF. THESE BRIEF COMMENTS AND MY PREVIOUS
REMARKS SHOULD SERVE AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR DIS-
CUSSION TODAY AND IN SUBSEQUENT CONSULTATIONS.

THE MOST BASIC QUESTION IS: WHAT SYSTEMS SHOULD BE
COVERED BY THE PROPOSED LIMITATIONS? RATHER THAN RUNNING
THROUGH THE INVENTORIES OF SHORT-, MEDIUM-, AND LONG-RANGE
TNFS ON BOTH SIDES, I HAVE DISTRIBUTED A CHART WHICH LAYS
OUT THE DIFFERENT DEGREES OF COVERAGE WHICH COULD CON-

CEIVABLY BE PURSUED. AS YOU CAN SEE, AN IMPORTANT PROBLEM
WOULD BE THE SELECTION OF APPROPRIATE TECHNICAL CRITERIA --
SUCH AS RANGE THRESHOLDS, BASING MODES, LOCATION OF SYSTEMS,
TYPES OF MISSION, DATE OF DEPLOYMENT, ETC. -- TO DETERMINE
WHICH SYSTEMS WERE SUBJECT TO LIMITATION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE
FOCUS COULD BE RESTRICTED TO LONG-RANGE LAND-BASED THEATER
MISSILES. OTHER APPROACHES COULD INCLUDE BOTH LAND-BASED
MISSILES AND LONG-RANGE THEATER AIRCRAFT. ANOTHER COULD
BE TO INCLUDE OFFSHORE TNFS. SYSTEMS OF SHORTER RANGE
THAN THE LAND-BASED IR/MRBMS AND MEDIUM BOMBERS OF PRINCIPAL
CONCERN COULD ALSO BE INCLUDED. A SUB-ISSUE RELATING TO
THE ISSUE OF SYSTEMS TO BE INCLUDED

IS WHETHER ALL SYSTEMS OF A GIVEN CLASS, OR ONLY MODERN
VARIANTS SHOULD BE COVERED.

A RELATED ISSUE CONCERNS THE GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF PROPOSED LIMITATIONS: SHOULD THEY RESTRICT WORLD-WIDE DEPLOYMENTS OF SPECIFIC CLASSES OF SYSTEMS, OR SHOULD THEY ONLY AFFECT DEPLOYMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER? MOST OF THE NEW-GENERATION TNFS ON BOTH SIDES ARE MOBILE, AND SO LIMITATIONS CONFINED TO EUROPE COULD BE UNDERMINED IN A CRISIS. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF AIRCRAFT LIKE THE BACKFIRE, WHICH COULD BE RAPIDLY REDEPLOYED TO EUROPE FROM ASIAN BASES. IT IS ALSO, IN PRINCIPLE, TRUE OF MANY TYPES OF CRUISE M MISSILES AND MOBILE BALLISTIC MISSILES. YET WORLDWIDE LIMITS WOULD INTRODUCE THE ISSUE OF SOVIET FORCES DIRECTED AGAINST CHINA, AND THUS COULD RAISE ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND PRODUCE A MORE COMPLICATED AND HARD-TO-MANAGE NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK.

ANOTHER ISSUE WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED IS THE TYPES OF LIMITATIONS TO BE IMPOSED. THERE COULD JUST BE NU-

ME RICAL CEILINGS ON MISSILE LAUNCHERS AND AIRCRAFT; OR ELSE THERE COULD, IN ADDITION, BE QUALITATIVE CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS RANGE LIMITS, MIRV CEILINGS, RESTRICTIONS ON MODERNIZATION, AND THE LIKE), GEOGRAPHIC DEPLOYMENT CONSTRAINTS WITHIN WIDER AGREEMENTS, SUPPLEMENTAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

THE TIMING OF NEGOTIATIONS COULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT EFFECT ON THE LEVEL OF NUMERICAL CEILINGS WHICH COULD BE NEGOTIATED, I.E., IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON SOMETHING LOWER CEILINGS IF DONE BEFORE DEPLOYMENTS OF SYSTEMS ARE WELL ADVANCED.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION WITH RESPECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS WOULD BE WHETHER A PARITY OUTCOME WAS NEEDED, OR WHETHER SOME ASYMMETRIES COULD BE ACCEPTED IN SPECIFIC COMPARABLE SYSTEMS. AN AGREEMENT WHICH APPEARED TO CODIFY SOVIET NUMERICAL ADVANTAGES MIGHT BE POLITICALLY DIFFICULT TO DEFEND IN THE WEST, ON THE OTHER HAND, IF PARITY WERE THE GOAL, AND ESPECIALLY IF THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO COVER A RELATIVELY WIDE RANGE OF SYSTEMS THE ALLIANCE MIGHT APPEAR TO BE SINGLING OUT AS A TARGET FOR ARMS CONTROL THE NOTION OF A DISCRETE NUMERICAL BALANCE, SOMETHING WE HAVE TRIED TO AVOID IN ALLIANCE FORCE PLANNING FOR DOCTRINAL REASONS. AND WE MAY NOT WANT -- EVEN ON PURELY MILITARY GROUNDS -- TO
MATCH SOVIET TNF LEVELS EXACTLY.

THE ISSUE OF COMPENSATION FOR ALLIED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, TO WHICH I ALLUDED EARLIER, ALSO RAISES ANOTHER QUESTION. IN ADDITION TO SEEKING A DIRECT NUMERICAL OFFSET AS THE PRICE FOR EXCLUDING ALLIED FORCES, THE SOVIETS WOULD ALSO PROBABLY SEEK RIGOROUS NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER OBLIGATIONS, IN AN ATTEMPT TO INDIRECTLY CONSTRAIN SUBSEQUENT IMPROVEMENTS OR INCREASES IN ALLIED CAPABILITIES.

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A CRITICAL ISSUE WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A NEGOTIATING APPROACH IS VERIFICATION. THE TASK OF VERIFYING THE NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WOULD BE DIFFICULT, DEPENDING UPON THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT.

FORUM

IN ADDITION TO POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL FACTORS, THERE IS THE QUESTION OF THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR NEGOTIATING OF TNFS -- SALT, MBFR, OR A NEW FORUM BEING THE THREE ALTERNATIVES. THE ISSUE IS MOST LIKELY TO ARISE IN SALT BECAUSE OF SOVIET INTEREST IN LIMITING US "FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS" AND CRUISE MISSILES. A BENEFIT OF USING THE SALT FORUM WOULD BE THAT IT WOULD BE BILATERAL, AND THEREBY PERMIT US TO ARGUE MOST CREDIBLY THAT ALLIED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED.

IF NEGOTIATIONS ON THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES WERE CONDUCTED BILATERALLY IN SALT, THEY WOULD DIRECTLY AFFECT THE INTERESTS OF ALL ALLIANCE MEMBERS. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE IMPORTANT TO ASSURE THAT THERE WERE APPROPRIATE CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURES.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL

AS THE ALLIANCE BEGINS TO EXAMINE IN GREATER DETAIL THE ISSUES WHICH I HAVE JUST DESCRIBED, IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER HOW THEATER NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL MIGHT AFFECT TNF MODERNIZATION, AND VICE VERSA. THE ISSUE IS HOW WE SHOULD RELATE OUR MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL GOALS SO THAT THEY WOULD REINFORCE ONE ANOTHER.
IF THE ALLIANCE DECIDES TO PURSUE ARMS CONTROL FOR
TNF IN CONJUNCTION WITH A PROGRAM TO MODERNIZE ITS
THEATER NUCLEAR Capabilities, THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT
DEPLOYMENTS OF NEW LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS WOULD BECOME HOSTAGE TO PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL, WITH THE SOVIETS SEEKING TO

USE NEGOTIATIONS TO DELAY WESTERN PROGRAMS WHILE MOSCOW CONTINUED DEPLOYMENTS. NATO COULD DECIDE ON ITS MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY TO MEET ITS ESSENTIAL SECURITY NEEDS, WHICH OUR ARMS CONTROL POSTURE WOULD BE DESIGNED TO PROTECT. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT BARGAINING LEVERAGE, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CREDIBLY CONVEY TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO MAKE ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENTS, AND THAT DECISIONS ON FURTHER MODERNIZATION WOULD DEPEND ON THE EXTENT (OR LACK) OF SOVIET RESTRAINT.

IF ARMS CONTROL WERE SUCCESSFUL AND SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS WERE contained OR REDUCED, THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL NATO DEPLOYMENTS COULD BE REDUCED CORRESPONDINGLY. MOREOVER, EVEN IF SOVIET DEMANDS PROVED UNACCEPTABLE AND NEGOTIATIONS FAILED, WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS ARMS CONTROL COULD IMPROVE THE POLITICAL CONTEXT FOR NEW NATO DEPLOYMENTS, AND WEAKEN THE IMPACT OF THE INEVITABLE SOVIET PROPAGANDA AGAINST THOSE DEPLOYMENTS.

WHATEVER THE EVENTUAL ALLIANCE DECISION ON THEATER NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, WHAT SHOULD BE ANTICIPATED IS THAT THE ALLIANCE WILL NEED TO BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH THEATER NUCLEAR ISSUES WHICH ARE LIKELY TO ARISE IN SALT III. THE UNITED STATES HAS REACHED NO DECISION ON WHETHER A REACTIVE POSTURE IS ALL WE NEED, OR WHETHER IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE WITH THE SOVIETS.

FURTHER CONSULTATIONS

THE ALLIANCE HAS JUST BEGUN TO ADDRESS THE ARMS CONTROL ISSUE. FURTHER, MORE DETAILED CONSULTATIONS WILL BE NECESSARY FOR THE ALLIANCE TO DEVELOP VIEWS ON THEATER ARMS CONTROL, AND HOW IT MIGHT RELATE TO TNF MODERNIZATION.

THE US IS PREPARED TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION OF THE ARMS CONTROL QUESTION. WE WOULD ENVISAGE FURTHER COUNCIL DISCUSSION OF THE
QUESTION EARLY NEXT YEAR. VANCE

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