BRIEFING BOOK

SCC MEETING
12 April 1979
White House Situation Room

BRIEFING NOTE

A - SCC AGENDA
B - SCC WORK PROGRAM
C - US OBJECTIVES
D - CIA THREAT/BALANCE BRIEFING
E - DIA THREAT BRIEFING
F - ARMS CONTROL ISSUES
G - SOVIET OBJECTIVES
H - DECISION/TRACK
I - BILATERALS/HLG CONCLUSIONS
J - HLG CONSENSUS
K - HLG/NPG

State Dept., DIA reviews completed

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP81B00401R001500010001-7
This SCC meeting follows the decision last Friday by the NAC to accept a proposal that a **Special Group** be established under US chairmanship to deal with Theater Nuclear Forces arms control and related matters.

The purpose of the meeting is to discuss:

-- the proposed work program for the Special Group (Tab B)

-- a State paper outlining possible US objectives and principles in **TNF** arms control (Tab C).

The main issues for discussion are marked in the SCC agenda (Tab A) and cross referenced to the text of the State paper (Tab C).

CIA has two papers in the works that are proposed for transmittal to the Special Group at the **19 April** meeting. One deals with the Soviet TNF threat and the European balance (Tab D); the other with possible Soviet objectives and approaches to TNF (being drafted).

JCS (DIA) has prepared a threat briefing (Tab E) which focuses only on principal Soviet theater nuclear delivery systems (MR/IRBMs, SLBMs, and LRA bombers), all systems with ranges in excess of 1000km. The CIA threat/balance briefing treats TNF systems more systematically, because Soviet/Pact systems with ranges of 100-1000km are capable of striking strategic targets in Europe, and includes force comparisons with US/NATO systems.

An issue requiring your decision relates to a request that CIA consider how its *clandestine service* might be employed to publicize the Soviet TNF threat in order to improve the political climate for NATO TNF deployments. We believe this proposal is out of keeping with present Agency policies and should be rejected.

*Agree - would be propaganda: ;) Americans & Allies*
MEMORANDUM FOR:

DCI's Book
SCC on TNF
12 April 79

DCI attended with
NIO/CF (Acting)

Date

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</th>
<th>DATE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO:</td>
<td>16 Apr 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROOM NO.</td>
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<td>Please insert this in DCL copy of TNF Briefing Books.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| FROM:            | McF        |
| ROOM NO.         |            |
| BUILDING         |            |
| EXTENSION        | 7/05       |
| FORM NO.         | 241        |
| REPLACES FORM   | 36-2       |
| WHICH MAY BE USED. |           |

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CONFIDENTIAL - entire text

MEMORANDUM TO:

NSC - Mr. Thomson
DOD - Mr. Woodworth
JCS - BGen. Vesser
ACDA - Mr. Clinard
EUR - Mr. Fuerté
CIA -

FROM:

PM/ISP - Eric D. Newsom

SUBJECT: Issue Paper on TNF Arms Control Objectives and Principles

April 11, 1979

The attached is a first cut at the issue paper we plan to circulate to the Allies in the Special Group to stimulate discussion of broad TNF arms control issues. It is derived from the State paper "TNF Arms Control Objectives and Principles," which will be the subject of the SCC discussion tomorrow.

This draft is circulated to give agencies a sense of how we plan to structure the paper, in order that Principals may approve presentation to the Allies of a version of it for the Special Group discussion. We would appreciate your comments on this version by COB Thursday, April 12, in order that we might circulate a new draft on Friday for interagency review.

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GDS 4/11/83

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One of the most difficult tasks for the Special Group will be to produce in a relatively short period a realistic and comprehensive stance on TNF arms control. We believe the most sensible and expeditious way to do this would be by suggesting some broad TNF arms control issues for discussion. As we shape and refine these issues in our deliberations, they should eventually emerge as basic objectives and principles which might be adopted by Ministers this fall as the basis for dealing with theater systems in arms control.

This preliminary paper does not represent US positions. It is offered as a vehicle for discussion. It could be successively revised after each meeting of the Special Group, leading to the development of a consensus on TNF arms control principles and objectives, which could be the core of the Special Group's Report to Ministers.

1. Should our objective be primarily to constrain, and if possible, reduce the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe, or should we aim for more ambitious, comprehensive objectives?

TNF arms control should have a reduction of the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe as its paramount objective. An unconstrained TNF competition in Europe could result in continued Soviet preponderance with much higher levels of TNF on both sides. Larger numbers of NATO long-range systems would imply a changed role for TNF as part of the NATO deterrent, and increased perceptions of the decoupling of US strategic forces from Europe. Limiting the Soviet long-range theater nuclear threat would deprive the Soviets of political and military leverage stemming from perceptions of unconstrained Soviet theater deployments, against which the West lacked the will to respond.

2. How can we use a TNF arms control approach to strengthen Alliance cohesion and coupling through active Allied participation in the arms control component of Alliance security?

TNF arms control enhances Allied security to the extent that it is a common policy, worked out together.
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on the basis of a common framework. No single ally can pursue that policy without the active support and participation of the others. An Allied consensus is an essential outcome. It cannot be imposed, but must be the result of thorough discussion. Such a consensus would have an ancillary benefit, allaying fears of decoupling, whether through modernization or arms control.

3. How can we manage the relationships among TNF, SALT and MBFR in ways that will improve the prospects for SALT and MBFR?

Direct relationships exist between TNF modernization and arms control on the one hand, and SALT and MBFR on the other. Recognizing these relationships in advance may help managing them with care.

There may be no way to disconnect TNF arms control from SALT. The Soviets, despite recent hints to the contrary, may insist on securing limitations on US "FBS" as a precondition for further reductions in its central systems. We have made it clear to the Soviets that any limitations on US TNF must be accompanied by appropriate limitations on related Soviet systems.

MBFR remains the negotiation with the potential for having a direct impact on the conventional threat to NATO security in Central Europe. The conventional balance is crucial and must be calibrated in careful coordination with the theater nuclear balance. Negotiations on TNF must be handled so that the MBFR process is sustained.

4. How should TNF arms control relate to TNF modernization: are they elements of an overall strategy or is it possible to pursue them independently?

Our TNF arms control effort must be serious and aim at constraining the Soviet long-range TNF threat. Yet the fundamental instrument for coping with the political and military problems posed by this threat is an evolutionary deployment by NATO of additional long-range TNF. TNF arms control should not be allowed to impede those deployments which we decide are necessary to restore confidence in the viability of NATO's spectrum of deterrence.

TNF arms control must be a complement to, not a substitute for, TNF modernization. We must avoid the dangers of making actual deployments hostage to the outcome of arms control negotiations or of choosing an arms control posture simply to camouflage modernization.
Either position would give the Soviets less incentive to negotiate in good faith over constraints in its deployments. Both positions would engender divisive political controversy in the Alliance. Development of a realistic TNF arms control posture should not lag behind decisions on a TNF modernization program. A credible Allied TNF arms control stance will be essential for improving the political climate for initial NATO deployments. If successful, it could reduce the need for still further deployments in order to sustain a credible deterrent in Europe.

5. As Allies with common interests in the security of all, how can we best share responsibility for developing a TNF arms control posture?

TNF arms control cuts to the heart of security interests in Europe. In the long run, no single country can carry the burden of developing an arms control posture on its own. While some Allies may be content to see others take the lead and others may be impatient with the indecision and confusion of reaching a common stance, all must be willing to share in decision-making.

6. Does maximum bargaining leverage require that decisions on TNF modernization be taken in a way that holds open the prospect of further deployments?

NATO's initial TNF modernization program will be "evolutionary" in character. It will satisfy intrinsic requirements of deterrence, within current policy and doctrine; it could only be cut back to the extent that the Soviet TNF threat was constrained.

Some systems currently under development probably will not be included in the initial modernization package. The size of deployments will also be modest. Yet, if we are to maximize bargaining leverage against Soviet TNF, decisions on the initial modernization program will have to be taken in a way that does not rule out additional systems or increments in the future. This has implications both for the public promulgation of the decisions and for ongoing development programs. We want to be able to link subsequent NATO restraint in deploying additional systems or larger numbers of TNF to equivalent Soviet restraint.

7. Should our TNF arms control approach stress simplicity, or is it possible to negotiate and reach comprehensive agreement on a broad range of TNF systems?
always commensurable in capabilities and numbers, make TNF arms control negotiations an exceptionally complex undertaking. Attempting to include every system in those negotiations may prevent agreed limits on the most threatening developments from being reach in a timely way.

Focusing the negotiations only on the modern long-range theater systems of both sides, which have caused the greatest political and military concerns should provide the most manageable framework for negotiations and an agreement, and would lessen perceptions of decoupling inherent in a more sweeping "Eurostrategic" negotiation.

There are some potential problems with this approach: it would leave out a lot of old long-range TNF on the Soviet side, as well as all of the short-range systems which the Soviets could move forward to increase coverage of Western Europe and which are expanding and modernizing along with long-range Soviet TNF; if the limitations applied to European-based systems only, the Soviets would have a large breakout potential in their non-European deployments of modern, mobile systems such as the SS-20.

8. Should Allied systems be excluded from theater ceilings or limits? If so, should there be any compensation for Allied systems in any negotiated ceilings?

Excluding Allied systems without compensation for them will keep TNF negotiations more manageable. Yet there are difficulties with this approach: the Soviets will likely argue that their long-range TNF are a counter to Allied nuclear systems, and that they cannot agree to limit such systems in the absence of limits on French and British systems, or at least numerical compensation for them via a larger Soviet ceiling. If Allied systems are excluded, this will raise non-circumvention and non-transfer issues, which will inevitably be more complex and difficult than in SALT II.

9. Must TNF ceilings be equal, without any de jure asymmetries?

Politically, parity of ceilings and right is essential. Yet there are difficulties with parity. For one thing, parity could be perceived as establishing a formal "Eurostrategic" balance, and therefore be decoupling. If the focus were on a narrow class of modern

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long-range systems, however, the decoupling connotations of formal parity would be smaller than in a broader negotiation. Moreover, formal parity in rights need not imply actual numerical parity in deployments. The ceilings would be on a narrow class of modern systems; older Soviet systems would be excluded (though over time, as older systems were retired, equal ceilings in modern systems could lead to actual parity). Moreover, were NATO not to exercise its right to deploy up to the permitted ceiling, that could make the exclusion of UK and French forces more palatable to the Soviets. Conversely, the existence of those excluded Allied systems could relieve political problems arising from actual inequality of deployed forces.

10. Should our aim be to negotiate a ceiling on Soviet deployments of modern long-range TNF at a realistic level?

If our goal is to be modest and realistic, while we could press for some reductions, we probably should not expect to reduce deployments of modern Soviet systems significantly below what we believe are planned levels. In any case, we will need to preserve room for carrying out our own modernization plans. Setting a ceiling would be an important achievement in enhancing NATO security. It would avoid an unlimited regional competition in which the Soviets would have many geographic and political advantages. An unconstrained Soviet build-up could undermine the strategic balance, change completely the role of theater forces in NATO's deterrent posture by necessitating deployments going beyond an "evolutionary" adjustment, and alter the character of SALT. A ceiling, perhaps with some reduction in the level of anticipated Soviet deployments, could set the stage for future, more constraining TNF limitations.

The difficulty with pursuing the modest objective of a ceiling on deployment of only certain modern Soviet long-range systems is that it might be seen by some of our Allies and by arms control supporters here as arms control tokenism, doing nothing to reduce the threat to Europe or to control the deployment of new, destabilizing systems. The Soviets, too, might see a ceiling -- combined with unconstrained UK and French forces -- as merely codifying a NATO TNF buildup of a dangerous new strategic threat to the Soviet homeland, while constraining their ability to respond through larger deployments than planned.
We will need a posture on theater systems at the opening of SALT III negotiations. The Soviets are almost certain to raise Protocol-limited cruise missiles, PBS and Allied systems. Our basic posture should be to "put into action" our formulation on theater systems ("Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems"). We would indicate that we were prepared to discuss our own theater systems (not Allied systems), but only if the Soviets were prepared to discuss their theater systems. This would establish a direct linkage between our TNF and Soviet theater systems. This posture would at least allow us to respond to a Soviet initiative.

The Soviets may be prepared to agree to our formulation at the outset and propose that negotiations begin immediately, before we had agreement in the Alliance on a negotiating approach. This tactical difficulty could be managed by focusing early discussions in SALT III on the objectives and principles for negotiations on this new class of systems, and on the structure and modalities of negotiations. Moreover, we can put the burden on the Soviets to come up with the opening proposals. But, we will also retain the option of initiating a proposal near the outset if we are ready.
Long-Range Theater Delivery Systems
(Over 1,000 Kilometers Range)
Deployed or Deployable by 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Radius/ No.</th>
<th>Missile Range (KM)</th>
<th>1978 No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US/NATO</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25X4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some ICBMs (Incl SS-11)</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bear Bomber/ASM Carrier</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bison Bomber 2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-20 IRBM</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-5 IRBM</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backfire Bomber/ASM Carrier</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some SS-N-6 SLBMs</td>
<td>411</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badger Bomber/ASM Carrier</td>
<td>168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blinder Bomber/ASM Carrier</td>
<td>394</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-4 MRBM</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-N-5 SLBM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probable New ALCM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary: 10 current systems including France: as many as 176 SLBMs, 18 IRBMs, and 271 aircraft.

Summary: At least 11 current systems: 492 H/IRBMs, at least 659 bombers (of which 253 are ASM-capable), 11 at least 30 SLBMs, and an unknown number of ICBMs.

1. Designated "central systems" in strategic arms limitations talks.
2. Approximately 48 SSBMs.
3. At one time, about 120 SS-11 variants were assessed as being targeted on Western Europe.
4. UK designates its Polaris SLBMs as its only strategic force.
5. The range of these aircraft does not take into consideration the intrinsic range of the ASMs which they carry. See Table 2 for this information.
6. French have adequate range to reach far into the USSR, however.
7. The role and range of the Backfire is subject to some disagreement. Hence the number of aircraft here represents those aircraft which would be available if all were assigned to the theater strike role.
8. These are based in the UK. The Strategic Air Command variant, the FB-111, or based in the US, "non-central" system in the SALT context, however.
9. The totals for Backfire, Badger, and Blinder include Soviet Naval Aviation aircraft.
10. This is a US carrier-based system, and as such its launch point cannot be determined.
11. The total for bombers is considerably smaller than the number of ASMs which many carry as their principal weapon. The number of ASMs is provided on Table 2.
Table 2

Medium-Range Theater Delivery Systems
(100 to 1,000 Kilometers Range)
Deployed or Deployable by 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1978 No.</th>
<th>US/NATO</th>
<th>Aircraft Radius/Missile Range (Km)</th>
<th>1978 No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25X4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fencer A Frtbmr</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-12/22 SSBM</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foxbat B Frtbmr</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fitter C/D Frtbmr</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flugger Frtbmr</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AS-5 ALCM (on Bear)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-4 SLM°</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-12 SLM°</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brewer B/C</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prob. New Anti-ship SLOM</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AS-4 ALCM (Backfire, Kindscher)</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-3 SLOM°</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fished Frtbmr</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fitter A Frtbmr²</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AS-6 ALCM (on Badger)²</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SU-25 New Frtbmr</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-1C (Scud) SSM°</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AS-5 ALCM (on Badger)²</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AS-2 ALCM (on Badger)²</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-11 SSM</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-9 SLOM</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary: 19 current systems: 685 aircraft, and 334 SSBNs, with the potential for as many as 961 ALCMs and 350 ASMs (many in secondary land strike role).

1. A carrier-based aircraft.
2. Poland is believed to operate 10 Fitter A and 10 Fitter C/D, and Czechoslovakia 25 Fitter A, in the nuclear role.
3. ALCM range is based upon launch from optimal altitude. The number of ALCMs is the maximum potential launch rail capacity of all aircraft assessed as ALCM-capable. The Soviet LRA and SRA bombers appearing on Table 2 are the only aircraft which carry the ALCMs listed here.
4. These missiles may have been withdrawn from service.
5. All but 16 SS-N-3Cs are assessed as having a primary anti-ship role.
6. Assessed as having a primary anti-ship role.
7. It is assumed that all SS-1C Scud, regardless of Pact user, will be operated in a nuclear role.
8. It is assumed for the purposes of these tables, that the longer-range AS-6 will be carried in preference to the AS-5, or AS-2, except for one model of the Badger, which can carry only AS-26. The AS-5 and additional AS-2 missiles remain in the inventory, however.
9. All ALCMs are carried as primary armament on long-range aircraft delivery systems listed on Table 1.
### Table 3

**Short-Range Nuclear Systems and Artillery**  
(Less than 100 kilometers Range)  
Deployed or deployable by 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1978 No.</th>
<th>Missile/Projectile</th>
<th>Range (km)</th>
<th>USSR/Pact No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BFY-7 Rocket</td>
<td>598</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-N-7 SLCM</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203-mm Howitzer²</td>
<td>144</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240-mm Mortar²</td>
<td>144</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary:** 3 current delivery means:

1.  
2. No Soviet nuclear capable artillery is known to be deployed outside the USSR.
3.  
4. It is assumed that all Pact 2s, regardless of Pact user will be operated in a nuclear role.

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AGENDA PAPER

SCC Meeting — TNF Arms Control
Thurs., Apr. 12, 1979, 2:30

PURPOSE

The first meeting of the new US-chaired NATO Special Group will be held April 19 and 20. This initial meeting of the NATO Group is intended to set in motion a process leading to Alliance agreement on a set of TNF arms control objectives and principles to guide the US in SALT III. (S)

The primary purpose of this SCC meeting is to have an initial discussion of possible US principles and objectives in TNF arms control. The State April 5th paper, "TNF Arms Control Objectives/Principles," forms the basis of the SCC discussion. (S)

It is not intended that the US would table the State paper in the NATO Group; rather, we would table an issues paper derived from the State paper and based on the SCC discussion. Each objective/principle would be reformulated as an issue and appropriately modified for European consumption; some might be dropped. US participants in the NATO meeting would deal with these issues at NATO on the basis of this SCC discussion. (S)

AGENDA

I. Work program for the initial Special Group meeting.

II. Objectives/Principles

For each of the following objectives and principles, two questions arise:

--- Does this reflect current US thinking?

--- How should the US deal with this issue at the initial Special Group meeting?
1. Constrain, and if possible reduce, the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe.

2. Help improve the political climate for NATO deployments.

3. Exercise US leadership and reinforce European confidence in the existing NATO security framework.

4. Strengthen Alliance cohesion and coupling through Allied participation in managing the arms control component of Alliance security.

5. Improve the prospects for SALT and MBFR.

**Principles**

1. Our goals in SALT III central–system reductions, TNF modernization and TNF arms control should be moderate in scope and mutually supportive.

2. TNF arms control should complement TNF modernization.

3. The Allies must share the responsibility for developing a TNF arms control posture.

4. Maximizing bargaining leverage requires that decisions on modernization be taken in a way that holds open the prospect of further deployments.

5. Our TNF arms control approach should stress simplicity.

6. Allied systems should be excluded from theater ceilings or limits, and there should be no compensation for Allied systems in any negotiated ceilings.

7. TNF ceilings must be equal; no de jure asymmetries.
8. The aim should be to negotiate a ceiling on Soviet deployments of modern long-range TNF at a realistic level.

9. We should be prepared to discuss our theater systems in SALT III only if the Soviets are prepared to negotiate on their theater systems.

10. We should seek to avoid negotiating linkages between central-system issues and TNF issues.

11. If the Soviets seek to link central-system issues to TNF issues, or refuse to agree to a TNF-for-TNF linkage, we should propose that TNF issues be postponed while negotiations on central systems proceed. (§)
Work Program for the Special Group

The following is a suggested work program leading to a final report to Ministers in the fall of this year. It is based on the main lines of analysis now underway in the USG. Obviously, the Special Group can agree on such other work as it deems necessary, and individual participants can present additional material for discussion.

1st Meeting of the SG (April 19)

A. Agreement on this work program and agenda.

B. US briefing on projected Soviet TNF threat and an update of NATO/Warsaw Pact nuclear forces drawing on DOD/NPG information.

C. Discussion of a preliminary US issue paper on possible objectives and principles relating to arms control involving theater nuclear systems.

D. In addition, the US will attempt to provide at this meeting, for discussion at subsequent meetings, two other papers:

1. a preliminary US paper on TNF arms control issues.

2. a preliminary US paper on possible Soviet objectives and approaches to involvement of theater systems in arms control.

E. Tasking of additional work.

2nd Meeting of the SG (Week before May Ministerials)

A. Discussion of a refined version of US paper on TNF arms control principles and objectives presented at April 19 session.

B. Discussion of an expanded US paper on TNF arms control issues which would:

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1. Consider the political, military and negotiating implications of some alternative illustrative arms control packages, in light of the work of the HLG.

2. Illuminate and support further detailed consideration of the TNF arms control issues paper presented on April 19.

C. Discussion of the US paper on possible Soviet objectives and approaches to arms control negotiations involving theater nuclear systems.

D. Discussion of tactical issues and public opinion, including the question of the Alliance's public stance on TNF arms control.

E. Tasking of additional work.

3rd and 4th Meetings of the SG (mid-June and mid-July)

A. Discussion of revised and refined paper on arms control objectives/principles. The aim would be to reach an SG agreement on a set of objectives and principles which could be recommended to Ministers for dealing with TNF issues in SALT III.

B. Discussion of a paper defining the public rationale for pursuing arms control involving theater nuclear systems, including its relationship to TNF modernization and its role in the detente process.

C. Further discussion of the US papers on arms control issues and illustrative arms control packages.

D. Consideration of the relationship between SALT, theater nuclear systems and MBFR.

E. Update SG work program, including discussion of the form and content of a draft report to Ministers.

5th Meeting of the SG (early September)

Discussion of draft report to Ministers, encompassing:

CONFIDENTIAL
A. Conclusions on objectives/principles drawn from SG's analysis and discussion, for dealing with TNF in SALT III.

B. Assessment of likely Soviet posture on involving theater systems in arms control negotiations.

6th Meeting of the SG (mid-September)

Discussion and approval of final SG report to Ministers.

December Ministerials

Discussion of SG report and objectives and principles for dealing with TNF in SALT III.
April 5, 1979

MEMORANDUM TO: NSC - Mr. Bartholomew
                - Mr. Ermarth
DOD - Mr. Slocombe
       - Dr. Davis
JCS - BGen. Vesser
ACDA - Mr. Newhouse
CIA -
EUR - Mr. Goodby

FROM: PM - David C. Gompert

SUBJECT: (S) TNF Arms Control Objectives/Principles

(S) Attached is a revision of the TNF Arms Control Objectives and Principles paper, taking into account interagency comments. The paper is still cast as an internal US document intended for discussion by the Principals. As noted in the text, it would have to be appropriately revised for use with the Allies.
TNF Arms Control Objectives/Principles

In its present form, this paper is a candid statement of US objectives and principles in pursuing TNF arms control. Most of these objectives and principles would be suitable for discussion with the Allies—though perhaps they would better be advanced as "propositions" or "issues" for discussion in the newly-formed NATO Special Group on Arms Control. In certain cases, it could be inappropriate or tactically unwise to pursue specific objectives or principles in discussions with the Allies, at least until we determine how their thinking is developing. After appropriate revision, the paper would be a major vehicle for discussions with the Allies of the elements which could form the basis of an Alliance-supported TNF arms control policy.

The paper briefly outlines the military and political components of the theater nuclear problem, and describes some basic political and negotiating objectives the US might pursue in managing the theater nuclear arms control question in the Alliance and in SALT. This is then followed by a set of substantive and tactical principles which should guide and inform the US approach to theater nuclear arms control.

TNF Military/Political Problem

The basic military problem in the theater concerns deterrence and escalation control. It stems from perceptions that in the era of strategic parity US use of its strategic forces in defense of Europe is less credible than before; NATO therefore requires more credible in-theater escalatory options to strike Soviet territory in order to deter Soviet use of its long-range theater nuclear systems and other forces. The absence of an appropriate NATO theater nuclear capability to respond might lead the Soviets to believe they could use their perceived advantage in long-range TNF to dominate a theater nuclear conflict, in which both the US and the Soviet Union were deterred from using strategic nuclear weapons. This possibility has been increased by Soviet deployment of the SS-20 and Backfire.

NATO's main means to deal with this military problem is the linked continuum of conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear forces. We are moving toward enhancing NATO's escalatory capability through a modest, evolutionary deployment of long-range TNF. This would afford greater credibility to NATO's capability to threaten effectively.
the Soviet Union with limited nuclear strikes without having only recourse to US strategic systems, whose use might be thought less credible -- and therefore less deterring.

The political problem is more complex. The principal concern in the Alliance is that the existing "gap" in NATO's theater nuclear capabilities could expose Europe to nuclear intimidation by the Soviets during a crisis. There is also concern that failure of NATO to respond to the continuing Soviet deployment of new long-range theater systems could weaken NATO's political will and solidarity. Behind these concerns lies the more fundamental political problem of the long-term health of the US-European security connection, stemming from questions about the steadiness and determination of US leadership on the one hand, and worry about the consequences of strategic parity and the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee on the other. There is also a conflicting fear expressed by some that a determined NATO military response to Soviet deployments could jeopardize détente, result in decoupling, set off an unconstrained theater nuclear arms race, and upset the political and military equilibrium among the Western European states. TNF arms control could contribute to a strategy for managing these problems, if undertaken in conjunction with an appropriate TNF modernization response, and if US leadership and Alliance unity are sustained.

The following is a discussion of broad objectives the US should pursue in developing a TNF arms control policy, and of a set of principles which could provide the initial basis for discussions with the Allies, leading ultimately to the development of an agreed Alliance TNF arms control approach.

Political and Military Objectives

1. Constrain, and if possible reduce, the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe

TNF arms control should have as its central objective to constrain, and if possible reduce, the growth of the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe. If we can limit Soviet deployments, we will have achieved an important political and military goal of setting boundaries on a significant part of the TNF threat to NATO. The net result of an unrestrained competition in Europe could be continued Soviet TNF preponderance at much higher levels on both sides, a changed role for TNF in the NATO deterrent, and, with a

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large number of NATO long-range systems, increased
pereceptions of the decoupling of US strategic forces from
Europe. Limiting the Soviet long-range theater nuclear
threat would also deprive the Soviets of political and
military leverage over our European Allies which would
arise from perceptions of unconstrained Soviet theater
nuclear deployments, against which the West lacked the will
to respond.

2. Help improve the political climate for NATO
deployments

A credible TNF arms control approach is a sine qua
non for virtually all European governments in being able to
build domestic support for TNF modernization. Nearly all
Allied leaders have told us that a TNF arms control approach
which complements -- and protects -- essential TNF moderni-
zation offers the best chance they have to convince their
Parliaments and publics that a new and destabilizing
regional nuclear arms race is not being launched.

3. Exercise US leadership and reinforce European
confidence in the existing NATO security framework

Events over the last several years--Vietnam, Water-
gate, economic problems, recognition of strategic parity,
Allied perceptions that the US accords priority to the US-
Soviet bilateral relationship over NATO, the ERW matter --
have damaged the US-European security tie. Allied unease
over perceived US indecisiveness or uncertainty about its
role as leader of the West has made positive Alliance action
in the security field -- particularly in the nuclear area --
more difficult. Many of these doubts are manifest in the TNF
issue. If this issue is not resolved successfully, which
will take US leadership, Alliance cohesion could be shaken.
European confidence in US leadership could suffer a signifi-
cant decline. The greatest danger is the FRG could begin to
question the reliability of the US and NATO as the basis of
its security.

4. Strengthen Alliance cohesion and coupling through
Allied participation in managing the arms control
component of Alliance security

Much of the European unease and concern over the
theater nuclear balance has come from the perception of
some that the US is managing its security through its own
strategic force developments and the bilateral SALT process,
without sufficient concern for Europe's security, which is deeply affected by decisions in both these areas. The FRG in particular has been concerned that negotiations on central systems in isolation from other elements of the NATO deterrent are inherently decoupling and politically divisive. The Europeans want to be active participants in this security structure, and arms control is a vital part of it. We have seen this most clearly in the last two years of SALT II, where there has been steadily growing Allied, particularly German, pressure to be consulted more clearly in the SALT process. To maintain a strong security relationship between Europe and the US, we must be prepared to accede to greater European participation in the management of the East-West arms control as it extends increasingly into areas directly affecting Allied security. We should, consistent with our own national interest in preserving a leading role in directing the overall process, aim through negotiations on TNF to bring the Europeans more directly into managing the East-West strategic relationship in SALT III.

5. **Improve the prospects for SALT and MBFR**

There are direct relationships between TNF modernization and arms control, on the one hand, and SALT and MBFR on the other. These relationships must be recognized in advance and managed carefully.

TNF connects with SALT very directly. The Soviets, despite recent hints to the contrary, may insist on securing limitations on US "PBS" as a requirement for further reductions of central systems. We have made it clear to our Allies that any limitations on US TNF should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems. However, the expansion of SALT III beyond the central-system issues dealt with in SALT II promises to complicate the negotiations. We must seek to avoid a situation in which further reductions from SALT II levels are held hostage to the very difficult issues involved in the TNF area.

MBFR Option III could place a numerical limitation at a relatively low level on US Pershing missile launchers -- a principal option for TNF modernization. Similarly, a codified Option III would place limits on US DCA and warhead levels in the NGA, while analogous Soviet systems would be unconstrained. Thus, MBFR has clear implications for TNF modernization.

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MBFR remains the core negotiation with the potential for direct impact on the conventional threat to NATO security in central Europe. In the context of the strategic and TNF situation, the conventional balance is crucial and must be codified in careful coordination with the evolution of the theater nuclear equation. Negotiations on TNF must be handled in such a manner that the basic MBFR process is sustained while reconciling the dilemma posed by the non-reciprocal nature of MBFR Option III.

TNF Arms Control Principles

1. Our goals in SALT III central-system reductions, TNF modernization and TNF arms control should be moderate in scope and mutually supportive.

Two components of our national security policy—Allied cohesion and a stable strategic balance—converge most conspicuously in the area of SALT and theater nuclear modernization. The interrelationship of these two important areas of US foreign policy bears directly on planning for SALT III and TNF modernization and arms control issues.

On the one hand, it seems that US willingness to accept some limits on our theater nuclear systems which can strike the Soviet homeland will probably be a precondition to Soviet agreement to any substantial reductions of central strategic systems. But our ability to meet this precondition is bounded by the need to respond to Soviet theater-range force improvements—especially the SS-20 and Backfire. If we fail to take adequate steps to bolster NATO's own long-range theater systems, we will stand accused of allowing one rung of the escalation ladder to weaken so unacceptably as to place the continuum of deterrence in doubt.

Yet there are doctrinal, as well as practical, limits on our freedom of action here, as well. For if we exploit our TNF modernization options to a degree which seems to point toward matching Soviet theater forces, we run the risk, at least in European perceptions, of decoupling our strategic forces from those based in Europe. Further, if in SALT III we seek sweeping reductions in central systems, Europeans may fear a different sort of decoupling; they could see the US and the Soviets as shifting the emphasis in nuclear forces from central to theater systems. This fear would be particularly acute if we accompanied deep central-system
reductions with a major build-up of long-range US systems on the continent of Europe.

The interrelationships outlined above seem to point toward moderation in the relevant aspects of US policy. Steps taken to improve the long-range component of US theater nuclear forces should be modest in scope so as to avoid creating perceptions of decoupling among our NATO Allies. (The implication is perhaps our central-system goals in SALT III ought to be moderate also to help avoid the risk of being seen to move the focus of nuclear confrontation to Europe). Finally, we should be prepared to accept some limits in SALT III on US long-range TNF, both so as to make it possible to limit Soviet theater forces such as the SS-20 and to meet the inevitable Soviet demand for some limits on US "forward based systems" as a probable condition on acceptance of meaningful central-system reductions.

2. TNF arms control should complement TNF modernization

The fundamental instrument for coping with the political and military problems caused by Soviet long-range TNF deployments must reside in an evolutionary deployment of additional long-range TNF. TNF arms control will be a complement to modernization, not a substitute. It should not be allowed to impede those deployments deemed necessary to restore confidence in the viability of NATO's deterrent continuum. However, our TNF arms control effort should be serious, and aimed at constraining the Soviet long-range TNF threat. Development of a realistic TNF arms control approach should not lag behind decision on a TNF modernization program. A credible TNF arms control position will be essential in improving the political climate for initial NATO deployments. If successful, it would prevent the need for still further deployments to sustain a credible deterrent in Europe. A danger is that some Allies, in an effort to cope with internal political debate over modernization, will seek to make actual deployments hostage to the outcome of arms control negotiations. If this course were adopted, the result could be no modernization at all. Also, there is a danger that an arms control position could be chosen only for political camouflage; such a position would probably be non-negotiable, damage or delay SALT negotiations on central systems, and engender further political controversy in the Alliance.
3. The Allies must share the responsibility for developing a TNF arms control posture

The temptation for us to cut through indecision and confusion by simply "laying it all out" for the Allies will be strong; there have been indications that some Allies would like us to do this and give them political cover. However, this question goes to the heart of European security interests, and in the long run we cannot carry the burden alone. The political risks in pursuing TNF arms control (and modernization) are too great for us to appear to have induced the Allies to go along. Even in following our lead, the Allies must clearly accept a share of the decision-making. This necessarily will entail increased Allied involvement in SALT III -- assuming TNF negotiations will take place in the SALT framework -- and in our decisions on US theater nuclear programs.
4. Maximizing bargaining leverage requires that decisions on modernization be taken in a way that holds open the prospect of further deployments.

NATO's initial modernization program will be "evolutionary" in size and character. It will be a floor, intended to satisfy intrinsic deterrent requirements, within current policy and doctrine; it could only be cut back to the extent that the Soviet threat was constrained. Some systems probably will not be included in the initial modernization package; the numbers will also be modest. If we are to have maximum bargaining leverage against Soviet TNF, the decision on the initial modernization program will have to be taken in a way that does not rule out additional systems or larger numbers in the future. We want to be able to link subsequent NATO deployments of additional systems or larger numbers to Soviet restraint. This will require a US willingness to continue at least some programs for systems which were not included in the initial program, or only in limited numbers. Since we cannot know whether TNF arms control will successfully limit Soviet deployments, or how the Soviets might react in force posture terms to NATO deployments, preserving the capability -- and the presumption of Alliance readiness -- to deploy additional long-range theater systems will be necessary in any case.

5. Our TNF arms control approach should stress simplicity.

The simpler our arms control approach, the more manageable the negotiations should be. We have no indications so far that the Allies would object to keeping negotiations bilateral and the Soviets will probably favor a bilateral negotiation as well. Moreover, the more theater systems involved in the negotiations, the less chance of success and the more likely that central-system negotiations would be delayed. Focusing the negotiations only on the modern long-range theater systems of both sides which have caused the greatest political and military concerns should provide the most manageable framework for negotiations and an agreement, and would lessen perceptions of decoupling inherent in a more sweeping "Eurostrategic" negotiation.

There are potential problems with this approach: it would leave out a lot of old long-range TNF on the Soviet
side, and all of the short-range systems which the Soviets could move forward to increase coverage of Western Europe and which are expanding and modernizing along with long-range Soviet TNF; if the limitations applied to European-based systems only, the Soviets would have a large breakout potential in their non-European deployments of modern, mobile systems such as the SS-20.

6. Allied systems should be excluded from theater ceilings or limits, and there should be no compensation for Allied systems in any negotiated ceilings.

This relates directly to the aim of keeping TNF negotiations manageable, and our desire to preserve the bilateral character of SALT. Politically, there is no present possibility of including French systems, and the price for including UK systems would be British participation in the negotiations. Moreover, we may have strong reasons for excluding Allied systems as a counterweight to excluded older Soviet systems such as the SS-4s and 5s. Formal compensation for Allied systems in the US totals is equally unacceptable.

There are difficulties with this approach: the Soviets will likely argue that their long-range TNF are a counter to Allied nuclear systems, and that they cannot agree to limit such systems in the absence of limits on French and British systems, or at least numerical compensation for them via a larger Soviet ceiling. If Allied systems are excluded, we must be able to resolve satisfactorily for ourselves and for the Allies the non-circumvention and non-transfer issues, which will inevitably be more complex and difficult than in SALT II.

7. TNF ceilings must be equal: no de jure asymmetries.

Politically, parity of ceilings and rights is essential. However, there are difficulties with parity. For one thing, parity could be perceived as establishing a formal "Euro-strategic" balance, and therefore decoupling. This has been a strong French and British fear, and the HLG itself has declared that parity in numbers should not be an objective in TNF modernization.

However, if the focus were on a narrow class of modern long-range systems, the decoupling connotations of formal parity would be smaller than in a broader negotiation. More-
over, formal parity in rights need not imply actual numerical parity in deployments. The ceilings would be on a narrow class of modern systems; older Soviet systems would be excluded (though over time, as older systems were retired, equal ceilings in modern systems could lead to actual parity). Moreover, NATO might not exercise its right to deploy up to the permitted ceiling, which could make the exclusion of UK and French forces more palatable to the Soviets. Conversely, the existence of those excluded Allied systems could relieve political problems arising from actual inequality of deployed forces.

8. The aim should be to negotiate a ceiling on Soviet deployments of modern long-range TNF at a realistic level.

Our goal should be modest and realistic, in order to promote the prospect of agreement and thus to protect negotiations on central systems from being blocked by TNF negotiations. Although we should press for some reductions, we probably should not expect to reduce deployments of modern Soviet systems significantly below what we believe are planned levels. In any case, we will need to preserve room for carrying out our own modernization plans. Setting a ceiling would be an important achievement in enhancing NATO security. It would avoid an unlimited regional competition in which the Soviets would have many geographic and political advantages. An unconstrained Soviet build-up could undermine the strategic balance, change completely the role of theater forces in NATO's deterrent posture by necessitating deployments going beyond an "evolutionary" adjustment, and alter the character of SALT. A ceiling, perhaps with some reduction in the level of anticipated Soviet deployments, could set the stage for future, more constraining TNF limitations.

The difficulty with pursuing the modest objective of a ceiling on deployment of only certain modern Soviet long-range systems is that it might be seen by some of our Allies and by arms control supporters here as arms control tokenism, doing nothing to reduce the nuclear threat to Europe or to control the deployment of new, destabilizing systems. The Soviets, too, might see a ceiling -- combined with unconstrained UK and French forces -- as merely codifying a NATO TNF buildup of a dangerous new strategic threat to the Soviet homeland, while constraining their ability to respond through larger deployments than planned.

9. We should be prepared to discuss our theater systems in SALT III only if the Soviets are prepared to negotiate on their theater systems.
We will need a posture on theater systems at the opening of SALT III negotiations. The Soviets are almost certain to raise Protocol-limited cruise missiles, PBS and Allied systems. Our basic posture should be to "put into action" our formulation on theater systems ("Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems"). We would indicate that we were prepared to discuss our own theater systems (not Allied systems), but only if the Soviets were prepared to discuss their theater systems. This would establish a direct linkage between our TNF and Soviet theater systems.

This posture would have at least three important advantages:

-- A consensus on it in the Alliance might be possible by the opening of SALT III.

-- It would afford us an Alliance-endorsed posture on TNF arms control by the beginning of SALT III even if we had not developed a detailed TNF negotiating package by that time.

-- It would put the burden on the Soviets to reply to our position, rather than leave us with no response to their opening demands.

The Soviets may be prepared to agree to our formulation at the outset and propose that negotiations begin immediately, before we had agreement in the Alliance on a negotiating approach. This tactical difficulty could be managed by focusing early discussions in SALT III on the objectives and principles for negotiations on this new class of systems, and on the structure and modalities of negotiations. Moreover, we can put the burden on the Soviets to come up with the opening proposals. But, we will also retain the option of initiating a proposal near the outset if we are ready.

10. We should seek to avoid negotiating linkages between central-system issues and TNF issues.

We do not know how to relate or make tradeoffs between central and theater systems and there are serious risks in attempting to do so. The issues inherent in further central-system limitations will be difficult and complex enough without trying to deal with negotiating linkages between central and theater systems. We have important goals for central systems that we do not want to have held hostage to limits
on theater systems, and vice versa. Separating the issues would tend to strengthen the link between our TNF and Soviet TNF. We also want to keep Allied involvement in developing negotiating approaches confined to TNF issues, and avoiding negotiating linkages between TNF and central systems will facilitate this. The Soviets may also have this concern; but it is far more likely that they will want to predicate further reductions in central systems on limits on our theater systems (and possibly Allied systems). Discussion of TNF in SALT III may be centered for some time on this question.

There are many obvious difficulties with avoiding TNF and central system negotiating linkages. Obviously, the Soviets, and we also, will relate the two aspects of the negotiation in formulating positions. The Soviets will doubtless link the timing of resolution of issues and of agreement in one area to resolution of issues in the other. Our Allies will also relate developments in these two negotiating areas. Indeed, the very idea of not linking TNF and central system issues could cause difficulties with the Allies, who would be concerned that such an agreement would codify a separate European theater balance and lead to decoupling. Avoiding TNF and central system linkages also runs directly contrary to recent German thinking about an "overall strategic balance" including long-range TNF, and the notion of using US central-system advantages, such as warheads, to negotiate limits on Soviet TNF. Despite these problems, because of the importance of protecting negotiations on central systems, and of facilitating the prospects for TNF-TNF linkage, establishing a negotiating framework which avoids TNF-central system linkages should be a US objective. But, because of the strong crosscurrents of interests involved, it is not an idea which we can thrust on the Allies and the Soviets. We should maneuver to bring this about, using Soviet interest in preserving SALT and Allied interest in achieving limits on Soviet TNF. This principle should not be included in the discussion paper for the Allies. It should be allowed to develop out of the arms control analysis in the NATO Special Group, where consideration of the practicalities of negotiations and political realism should lead to it.

11. If the Soviets seek to link central-system issues to TNF issues, or refuse to agree to a TNF-for-TNF linkage, we should propose that TNF issues be postponed while negotiations on central systems proceed.

This tactic would be driven by our interest in not allowing negotiations on central systems to be delayed while
the TNF question is sorted out. It may be difficult to put into practice, because of our own TNF objectives and because of the strong linkage we can expect the Soviets to make between further central-system limits and US FBS. It could also result in little progress on both clusters of issues for a time. Nevertheless the TNF-for-TNF linkage is of sufficient importance that we must have an answer to Soviet delaying tactics. And, we have important levers to build pressure on the Soviets not to delay resolution of these questions too long:

-- The Alliance will be making concrete modernization decisions.

-- US theater programs will be continuing (and in some cases, e.g., Pershing II) may be accelerated.

-- The Protocol clock on cruise missiles will be running.

These factors will confront the Soviets with the prospect of an unconstrained NATO deployment of long-range theater systems in Europe targeted on the Soviet Union. We will be holding out to them the opportunity of negotiating some limits on such deployments. If the Soviets have any intention of seeking to constrain NATO deployments through arms control, they cannot wait too long. But, how serious the Soviets would regard such pressures would depend critically on how the Alliance shapes decisions on modernization: if the decision is such that it is clear to the Soviets that future deployments of larger numbers or of new systems is highly unlikely for political reasons, pressure on them for early agreement to our basic TNF approach in SALT III would be far less.

There are also Alliance problems with this tactic. Offering to set aside temporarily TNF issues could heighten fears that the theater nuclear question is a peripheral one for the US, and that we accord greatest priority to progress on central-system issues. Moreover, using the prospect of growing NATO TNF deployments as a lever over the Soviets may create severe political strains for some NATO countries, who will be having difficulty enough adhering to a NATO consensus for modest deployments without having also to support such a hard-nosed, "stonewall" approach to TNF in SALT III. Therefore, this principle is not one which should be raised with the Allies at this stage, and would not be included in a "principles" paper for the Allies.
Soviet Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces

Soviet long-range nuclear forces have long constituted an important part of the Warsaw Pact's capability to execute nuclear strikes against European NATO. Ten years ago these forces--measured both in numbers of delivery systems and on-target weapons--were comparable in magnitude to Soviet intercontinental range "central systems."

Graphic I

Trends 1969-1979:

- The present mix of nuclear systems which the Soviets can bring to bear on the continental United States and European NATO, reflects the emphasis they have placed on the deployment of modern intercontinental range weapons. Dramatic growth has also taken place, however, in Pact medium-range theater nuclear forces, which have doubled since 1969.

- Growth in LRTNF over the past 10 years has been less dramatic. In fact, the number of delivery systems oriented on European NATO has actually declined since 1969 and currently stands at a level of almost 1200 missiles and medium bombers. However, the number of deliverable bombs, air-to-surface missiles and warheads has increased somewhat and currently totals nearly 2000.

* PRM-38 and subsequent working groups have employed the NATO Nuclear Planning Group usage with respect to theater nuclear forces. According, throughout this text, Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) are those theater nuclear systems with missile range or aircraft radius of over 1000 kilometers. Medium-range systems (MRTNF) are those with range or radius of between 100-1000 kilometers, and short-range systems (SRTNF) are those with ranges of less than 100 kilometers.
Pact Nuclear Forces Oriented on the US and NATO in 1969, 1979 and Projected 1985

1. Includes "central systems" plus those medium and long-range (≥ 100 km) theater nuclear forces oriented on Europe.
2. Projections are consistent with NIE 11-3/6-78 and NIE 11-6-78.
Comparison with NATO:

---The magnitude of Soviet LRNTF with respect to NATO forces has not changed significantly, since 1969 even though the Allies--notably the French--have deployed several ballistic missile submarines. The US has also deployed F-111 aircraft to bases in the UK.

Graphic II

---Currently the number of in-place Soviet LRNTF delivery systems--as well as weapons--exceeds NATO's by a ratio of about 2.6:1. The composition of the NATO and Soviet force differs greatly, however, as exemplified by the relatively large share of Soviet weapons carried by land-based ballistic missiles.

---It is this specific set of Soviet LRNTF which concern the US and NATO and will be the focus of arms control efforts. In addition, it is the NATO LRNTF set represented on this graphic which is presently being considered for enlargement and modernization.

---In addition to the in-place NATO LRNTF, the US has committed 400 Poseidon RVs to SACEUR. The missiles which carry these weapons are already SALT constrained, however, and would therefore not the subject of any LRNTF negotiations.

---Other long-range forces not represented on this graphic include the FB-111 medium bomber force, based in the US, as well as SACLANT-assigned and other US aircraft carrier nuclear strike forces.

Importance of Pact LRNTF:

---Soviet and Eastern European operated medium and short-range forces opposite NATO have recently exhibited substantial growth. They are of increasing importance in considering the numerical balance of Pact and NATO theater nuclear forces.
Comparison of Pact and NATO Theaters Nuclear Forces in Europe in 1979

NOTE: For all line items, the first figure indicates number of delivery systems, and the second ( ) the number of weapons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Soviet</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>Pact</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Long-Range</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Systems Over 1000 KM)</td>
<td>25X4</td>
<td></td>
<td>25X4</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>30(30)</td>
<td></td>
<td>SSBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR/IRBM</td>
<td>469(595)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>694(1363)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1193(1988)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1779(1839)</td>
</tr>
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|                  | Pact         | NATO        |               |
| **Medium-Range** |              |             |               |
| (Systems 100 KM to 1000 KM) | 25X4        |             |               |
| **Short-Range**  |              |             |               |
| (Systems Under 100 KM) | 25X4        |             |               |
| Rockets          | 592          |             |               |
| Tubes            | 288          |             |               |
| Other            | 72           |             |               |
| **Total**        | 952          |             |               |

1. Concept used is that of an unimproved "one-time only" exchange. Aircraft and missile launcher reloads are not included.
2. Geographic area includes the entire USSR, Eastern Europe, the eight westernmost military districts of the Soviet Union, the two western LRA commands, and the three western Soviet fleet areas. 
3. Includes French systems.
5. Excludes committed to SACEUR, but already taken account of as central systems.
6. In accordance with FRM-39, only "SACEUR nuclear-tailed aircraft are counted rather than nominally nuclear capable. For the Pact, only those aircraft for which nuclear trained pilots are currently available are counted. Counting based on nominally nuclear capable aircraft would result in Pact/NATO totals of 600/2.440 delivery systems, respectively.
7. SLCM launch rails on Soviet ships, submarines and missile fast-boats.
8. Nike-Hercules SAMs modified to be secondarily capable of surface-to-surface strikes.

Approved For Release 2002/09/01 DPAI R001500010001-7
With the recent Soviet deployment of nuclear artillery, the Pact has enhanced its short-range theater nuclear forces, which now slightly outnumber those of NATO.

Soviet and Pact MRNF now exceed the in-place medium-range forces of NATO by a ratio of nearly 1.8:1 in delivery systems, and 2:1 in weapons. In numbers, the Pact possesses nearly 2,200 delivery systems capable of delivering about 2,400 weapons. Over half the delivery systems are dual-capable tactical aircraft, most of which have been deployed within the past 10 years.

The significance of asymmetrical geographic circumstances is illustrated by the fact that, from forward bases in Eastern Europe, Pact MRNF can strike practically every target of consequence in Western Europe, while NATO MRNF can reach only a few major targets on the western fringes of the Soviet Union.

These Soviet and Pact medium-range systems will not be considered in arms negotiations which are definitionally restricted to LRNF. In addition, most of the Soviet tactical aircraft are deployed within the Soviet Union, and are hence not presently treated in the MBFR forum.

Projections in Soviet LRNF

Refocusing on Soviet LRNF... As noted earlier, the actual number of delivery systems in this category has decreased since 1969. This decrease will continue, and it is projected that by 1985 only about 900 systems will be operational opposite Europe.

These projections are based upon the moderate level of effort deployment pattern described in NIE 11-6-78. A larger 1985 force could result from a higher level of effort than anticipated, or the retention of SS-4/5's in the force for arms control bargaining purposes.
Composition of Soviet LRTNF Operational Forces by Type of Weapon, in 1969, and Projected 1985

Delivery Systems by Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>LRA</th>
<th>SRF</th>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1296</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1193</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>907</td>
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Weapons by Type

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bombs</th>
<th>ALCMs</th>
<th>Ballistic Missiles</th>
<th>RVs</th>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>1004</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Includes only those LRTNF forces oriented on European NATO.
2. Projections are consistent with NIE 11-6-78.
-- These relatively modest quantitative changes in Soviet LRTNF are overshadowed, however, by significant, concurrent qualitative changes in the Soviet force. Principal among these are continued deployments of the Backfire medium bomber and the SS-20 IRBM.

-- There are presently about 100 Backfires operational with the Soviet Northwest and Southwest bomber commands and the three Western fleet areas. Some 230 will probably be operationally deployed in these areas by 1985, and will be distributed about equally between Soviet naval and long-range aviation, largely as replacements for older aircraft.

-- The low altitude and supersonic capabilities of the Backfire, as well as its improved avionics, and its stand-off ALCM armament, render it particularly suitable in the naval strike role, or as a complement to ballistic missiles in the land attack role.

-- The first SS-20 IRBM launchers probably became operational in 1977, and about 60 are now thought to be oriented against Europe. It is projected that almost 200 will be arrayed against NATO by 1985.

-- Its three to four independently targetable warheads are significantly more accurate than the single SS-4/5 warhead, and its mobile basing mode renders it vastly more survivable. It uses solid fuel, and for this and other reasons has a faster reaction time than the SS-4/5. The system probably will ultimately be deployed with two refire missiles.

Importance of SS-20 Refires

-- Given currently planned NATO TNF modernization programs, Soviet LRTNF—even without SS-20 refire missiles—will by 1985 exceed NATO's by a factor
Comparison of Soviet & NATO LRNF in Europe in 1988, With and Without SS-20 Refires

NOTE: For all line items, the first figure indicates the number of delivery systems, and the second () the number of weapons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Without SS-20 Refires</th>
<th>With SS-20 Refires</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>SLEM</td>
<td></td>
<td>25X4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR/IRBM</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>229 (688)</td>
<td>625 (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRNF</td>
<td>675 (1406)</td>
<td>675 (1406)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplements</td>
<td>UNK5</td>
<td>1303 (3411)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>907 (2097)</td>
<td>1303 (3411)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Soviet Projections are based upon NIE 11-6-78.
2. Assumes NATO TNF modernization programs of currently forseeable character and pace.
3. Based upon a projection of 2 refires per SS-20 launcher. It is felt that about one-third of the SS-20 force will be equipped with 4-MIRV warheads.
4. Reflects projected changes in French theater nuclear inventories. In 1986 a sixth French SSBN will probably be operational, and will provide an additional 16 missiles.
5. An unknown number of Soviet ICBMs and intercontinental range SLBMs may be targeted on Europe.
of 2.8:1 in on-target weapons. When refire missiles are incorporated into the analysis, this ratio increases to 4.5:1.

The inclusion of the 400 US Poseidon RVs into this comparison is offset to a unknown degree by the "central-system" ICBMs and SS18s which the Soviets are believed to have targeted against Europe.

Graphic V

Implications

-- Improvements in Soviet and Pact theater nuclear forces at all levels are important in several ways...

-- The growth and modernization of medium-range TNF enhance the Pact's ability to wage war in Central Europe at whatever level NATO or they themselves choose, without having to resort to USSR based bomber or missile forces.

-- Once the mobile SS-20 is deployed in larger numbers, the increased survivability characteristics of this force will render it practically enable the Soviets to behave with greater confidence and restraint in a nuclear or near-nuclear conflict.

-- If USSR-based TNF are employed, the large number of SS-20 warheads--including refires--and the high accuracy characteristics of that weapon would insure a high probability of prompt destruction of targets in Western Europe.

-- In theory these developments increase substantially the Soviet/Pact ability to execute a variety of limited nuclear warfare options--in contrast to previous strategic doctrine which visualized a massive nuclear pre-emptive strike, or response to NATO's first use. In recent years, Soviet planners have been examining such nuclear options and contingencies.
- These doctrinal reviews notwithstanding, Soviet writings and other evidence indicate that Soviet planners see little prospect of containing the intensity and geographic scope of a conflict once the nuclear threshold has been crossed by either side.

- Perhaps the most significant implication of the growing Soviet and Pact nuclear superiority—at all levels—is the prospect that the military advantages to NATO of introducing nuclear weapons into combat have decreased. Consequently, the Soviets may believe—increasingly—that NATO might be reluctant to employ nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack.

- Currently programmed NATO modernization steps would probably not be viewed as altering these foreseeable and—for the Soviets—favorable nuclear force trends.

Pretty time ever since 1st Apr nuclear explosion

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My briefing will address Soviet nuclear forces opposite 

and is classified top secret. I will be discussing Soviet 
delivery systems which could be used during a nuclear conflict 
in Europe, focusing in today's presentation upon the longer 
range Soviet systems. I will highlight the qualitative and 
quantitative improvements which are underway, present our 
current estimate on the number of nuclear weapons (bombs and 
warheads) associated with these delivery systems, and provide 
some brief comments on the Soviet concepts on the employment of 
nuclear weapons in Europe.

3 IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SOVIET NUCLEAR CAPABLE FORCES FOR 
A EUROPEAN CONFLICT CAN BE DIVIDED INTO TWO CATEGORIES: 
THE FIRST IS COMPRISED OF LONG RANGE SOVIET STRATEGIC PERIPHERAL 
FORCES LOCATED WITHIN THE USSR AND THE ADJACENT SEA 
AREAS WHICH ARE INTENDED FOR USE IN A EUROPEAN THEATER OF 
WAR. THESE FORCES WOULD BE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF 
THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF, EXERCISED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE 
FORCE HEADQUARTERS, IN SUPPORT OF THEATER REQUIREMENTS. THE 
SECOND CATEGORY CONSISTS OF TACTICAL SYSTEMS WHICH ARE, 
GENERALLY, OF SHORTER RANGE AND WOULD BE UNDER THE DIRECT 
CONTROL OF A PACT FRONT OR FLEET COMMANDER. SINCE THE LATE 
1960'S, BOTH CATEGORIES OF FORCES HAVE UNDERGONE IMPORTANT 
CHANGES IN BOTH SIZE AND CAPABILITIES.

4 I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THE STRATEGIC FORCES TODAY. 
THE LONGER RANGE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS CONSIST OF THE USSR-BASED 
MEDIUM RANGE AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCE
WHICH IS DEDICATED TO NUCLEAR ATTACKS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER;

IT, THE USSR-BASED BOMBER FORCE WHICH IS INTENDED PRIMARILY
FOR THEATER EMPLOYMENT;; AND LASTLY AT THOSE NAVAL BALLISTIC
MISSILE SUBMARINES WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE A PRIMARY MISSION OF
STRIKING EUROPEAN TARGETS.

5
*90% OF THE SOVIET MR AND IRBM LAUNCHERS ARE DEPLOYED
IN THE WESTERN USSR AND ARE CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING AGAINST
WESTERN EUROPE. THE REMAINDER ARE TARGETED AGAINST EITHER
THE PRC OR OTHER PERIPHERAL TARGETS. THIS MAP SHOWS THE
GENERAL LOCATION IN WHICH MOST OF THE MR/IRBM LAUNCH COMPLEXES
ARE DEPLOYED.

THE SS-4 MRBM WAS INITIALLY DEPLOYED IN LATE 1958, AND
IS LAUNCHED FROM EITHER A SOFT OR HARDENED SITE. ITS RANGE
OF COVERAGE AGAINST NATO TARGETS IS INDICATED.

THE SS-5 IRBM BECAME OPERATIONAL IN 1961, AND, LIKE THE
SS-4, IS LAUNCHED FROM EITHER SOFT OR HARDENED LOCATIONS. IN
FACT, APPROXIMATELY 80 PERCENT OF THE SS-4S AND SS-5S ARE
DEPLOYED AT SOFT SITES, EACH OF WHICH HAS THE CAPABILITY TO
FIRE A SECOND MISSILE 2-4 HOURS AFTER THE FIRST MISSILE HAS
BEEN LAUNCHED. *A NEW MISSILE, THE SS-20, HAS BEEN DEVELOPED
AND THE FIRST BASE OPPOSITE NATO ATTAINED AN OPERATIONAL
CAPABILITY IN THE SUMMER OF 78. THIS SYSTEM HAS A GREATER
RANGE THAN THE SS-5, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY: IT IS MORE ACCURATE,
IT IS A ROAD-MOBILE SYSTEM WITH AT LEAST A LIMITED OFF-ROAD
CAPABILITY ON FIRM, REASONABLY LEVEL TERRAIN; IT HAS A
MULTIPLE REFIRE CAPABILITY, AND HAS A MIRV'ED WARHEAD WITH
FIVE REENTRY VEHICLES. WE EXPECT THAT EVENTUALLY THE SS-20
WILL REPLACE THE SS-4S AND SS-5S AND THAT, BY THE EARLY
1980'S, IT WILL BE THE MAINSTAY OF THE LAND-BASED BALLISTIC
MISSILE FORCE FOR THEATER USE.

SEVEN OPERATIONAL SS-20 MOBILE MISSILE BASES HAVE BEEN
IDENTIFIED TO DATE LOCATED IN THE WESTERN HALF OF THE USSR,
AS SHOWN. (PAUSE)

THE CURRENT NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL MR/IRBM LAUNCHERS IS
SHOWN HERE. (PAUSE)

AS CAN BE SEEN ON THIS CHART, THE CONTINUING DEPLOYMENT
OF THE SS-20 WILL RESULT IN A QUANTITATIVE INCREASE IN THE
NUMBER OF REENTRY VEHICLES WHICH CAN BE TARGETED AGAINST
EUROPE. IN THE EARLY 1980'S, WHEN THE SS-20 FORCE IS FULLY
DEPLOYED, AND THE ANTICIPATED REFIRE MISSILES ARE INCLUDED,
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF RV'S WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER THAN
THE CURRENT LEVEL OF APPROXIMATELY 1200.

HERE IS A MORE DETAILED TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER OF
REENTRY VEHICLES ASSOCIATED WITH THE MR/IRBM FORCE. THE TOTAL
INCLUDES A REFIRE MISSILE FOR EACH OF THE SOFT-SITE SS-4 AND
SS-5 LAUNCHERS AND A REFIRE MISSILE FOR EACH SS-20 LAUNCHER.
ADDITIONALLY, THE SS-20 FIGURE ACCOUNTS FOR THE THREE INDEPENDENTLY
TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES ON EACH MISSILE.

IN ADDITION TO THE THE MR/IRBM FORCE, THE SOVIETS HAVE
ABOUT 1,400 ICBMS, SOME OF WHICH COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR
AGAINST EUROPEAN TARGETS IF NECESSARY. IN THE LATE 1960s,
THEY BUILT 120 SS-11 LAUNCHERS WHICH WERE ORIENTED SO AS TO
PROVIDE BETTER COVERAGE OF WEST EUROPEAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN
TARGETS. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THESE MISSILES HAVE BEEN REPLACED
BY NEWER SYSTEMS, THE SOVIETS MAY CONTINUE TO ALLOCATE SOME
OF THE ICBM FORCE TO EUROPEAN TARGETS. ALL THE USSR'S NEW

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ICBMS HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO BE LAUNCHED IN NEARLY ANY DIRECTION IN ADDITION, ALL BUT THE SS-18 ICBM HAVE BEEN TESTED AT REDUCED RANGES.

THE LARGE SOVIET INTERMEDIATE RANGE BOMBER FLEET OF LONG RANGE AVIATION (LRA) HAS EXISTED PRIMARILY FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST NATO FORCES. INDICATIVE OF THIS IS THE FACT THAT 75% OF THIS FLEET IS DEPLOYED IN THE WESTERN USSR, WITHIN THE COMBAT RADIUS OF EUROPEAN TARGETS WITHOUT AERIAL REFUELING OR STAGING.

THE BADGER, WHICH ACCOUNTS FOR ABOUT TWO-THIRDS OF THE FORCE, ENTERED SERVICE OVER 20 YEARS AGO AND HAS NOT BEEN PRODUCED SINCE 1959. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS ARE SEEKING TO EXTEND THE USEFUL LIFE OF THESE AIRCRAFT BY EQUIPPING THEM WITH IMPROVED AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES.


THE FORCE BASED OPPOSITE NATO NOW CONSISTS OF ABOUT 139 BLINDERS AND 237 BADGERS. 168 BADGERS OPPOSITE NATO ARE EQUIPPED WITH AS-5 OR AS-6 MISSILES BUT CAN ALSO BE USED AS FREEFALL BOMBERS. THE OTHER 69 STRIKE-CONFIGURED BADGERS HAVE ONLY A FREEFALL BOMBING CAPABILITY. ABOUT 64 OF THE BLINDERS CARRY THE AS-4 AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE AND DO NOT HAVE A BOMBING CAPABILITY. 75 BLINDERS ARE CONFIGURED AS GRAVITY BOMBERS ONLY.

THE LRA FORCE IS BEING UPGRADED WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW BACKFIRE BOMBER, WHICH BECAME OPERATIONAL IN 1974; 50 CURRENTLY OPERATIONAL WITHIN LRA.
The Backfire has wings which enable it to cruise at supersonic speeds at higher altitudes and at subsonic speeds at low altitudes. It is equipped with ECM equipment to facilitate penetration of modern air defenses. The Backfire can carry either nuclear bombs or ASMs.

*Backfires, such as the ones based at Poltava in the USSR would be able to fly a high-speed, low-level penetration mission, with the flexibility to strike a greater number of more distant targets in Europe than either the Badger or Blinder.

Shown here are the respective ranges of Backfire and Badger ASM carriers. Note that the Backfire mission profile includes a 200 mile low altitude penetration while the Badger is an all high altitude profile.

*This table presents our current estimate of the number of nuclear weapons (bombs and ASMs) which might be carried by Soviet long range aviation aircraft. The representative weapons loadings used to compute the totals shown vary from one ASM on the Blinder "B" up to four nuclear bombs which could be carried by the Backfire.

Turning now to submarines: Ballistic missile submarines having missiles with ranges of up 1600 NM are probably assigned targets in Western Europe as their primary mission. The Gulf-II (Pause) and *Hotel-II class submarines initially served as part of the Soviet intercontinental attack force, but by the mid-1970s the availability of newer, more modern Yankee & Delta class submarines allowed the Soviets to begin relieving these older units of their intercontinental mission. Recent patrol
Patterns suggest that almost all operational Golf-II and Hotel-II class ballistic missile submarines have shifted to theater attack missions.

In 1976, the Soviets transferred six Golf-II class submarines from the Northern Fleet to the Liepaja Naval Base on the Baltic Sea--the first deployment of ballistic missile submarines to that operating area. From the port, itself, Golf-II class submarines fitted with their 750 nm SS-N-5 missiles could cover targets in West Germany, the Benelux countries, and Scandinavia without leaving local waters. By moving to the area off the coast of Poland, as shown, they could extend missile coverage to include much of the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. There are four Hotel-II class SSBNs based in the Soviet Northern Fleet. It would take these units some time to deploy to a position where their SS-N-5 missiles would be within range of all West European targets.

The 1600 nm range arc, shown, depicts the range of the SS-N-6 missile carried by the Golf IV SSBN assigned to the Northern Fleet. In addition to the Golf and Hotel submarines, Yankee and Delta class SSBN's could also be employed against Europe.

*Shown here is a summary of the long range Soviet weapons which we estimate could be used in a European conflict. In addition to the weapons dedicated for use in the theater, the Soviets can also employ some of their ICBMS, intercontinental range bombers, and their Yankee and Delta class submarines against European targets as they deem necessary. (pause)
I would like to turn now briefly to the question of Soviet concepts for the employment of their nuclear forces. The Soviets apparently believe that a war in Europe will probably begin with both sides using only conventional weapons; however, they are clear in stating that this should be viewed as only a phase of operations. The military objectives of defeating NATO military forces and seizing and occupying NATO territory and resources would be achieved through the execution of a rapidly advancing combined arms offensive. A primary objective of military operations, during the conventional and/or a nuclear phase of conflict, would be the destruction or neutralization of NATO's nuclear forces.

Finally, but perhaps most important for today's discussion, the Soviets believe that even if the war begins conventionally, escalation to nuclear conflict is very likely. Thus we see a major concern over the transition from conventional to nuclear operations, with a stress upon the need for forces to be constantly prepared to make the transition while retaining the initiative in offensive operations. In this regard, the Soviets believe that nuclear weapons are militarily important and advantages will accrue to the side which first uses them decisively. Thus there is considerable emphasis upon being prepared to preempt NATO in the large scale use of nuclear weapons.
*IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT LARGE-SCALE PREEMPTION DOES NOT NECESSARILY EQUATE TO INDISCRIMINATE TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE. ON THE CONTRARY, CURRENT SOVIET NUCLEAR TARGETING STRATEGY APPEARS TO BE BASED ON COUNTER-MILITARY OR COUNTER-FORCE TARGETING. SUCH A STRATEGY IS A LOGICAL OUTGROWTH OF THEIR MILITARY AND POLITICAL GOALS WHICH WOULD BE THE DESTRUCTION OF NATO MILITARY FORCES AND THE OCCUPATION OF WESTERN EUROPE. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE ACQUISITION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC-INDUSTRIAL BASE WOULD OFFER THE SOVIETS A MAJOR ADVANTAGE IN THE POST-WAR BALANCE OF POWER RELATIONSHIPS.

*ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS EMPHASIZE LARGE-SCALE PREEMPTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEY DO HAVE OTHER OPTIONS AVAILABLE. APPARENTLY BEGINNING AS EARLY AS 1971, THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZED THAT EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS OTHER THAN RELIANCE UPON A LARGE-SCALE, THEATER-WIDE STRIKE MIGHT BE NECESSARY.

THE ON-GOING IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL FLEXIBILITY ARE SUCH THAT THESE NUCLEAR OPTIONS COULD BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED IN A EUROPEAN CONFLICT. HOWEVER, PREEMPTION, DECISIVE LARGE-SCALE USE, AND DISBELIEF IN THE CONCEPT OF GRADUATED ESCALATION REMAIN AS MAJOR TENETS OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE.

*IN CONCLUSION, THE SOVIETS CLEARLY BELIEVE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE DECISIVE AND THAT THEY MUST BE PREPARED TO WAGE NUCLEAR WAR EFFECTIVELY IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY. THE LONGER RANGE SYSTEMS WHICH I HAVE ADDRESSED
TODAY (AS WELL AS THE SHORTER RANGE TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS) ARE BEING IMPROVED BOTH QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY AND THE SOVIETS ARE CONTINUING TO EXAMINE THEIR CONCEPTS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THESE FORCES.
OVERVIEW

○ SOVIET DELIVERY SYSTEMS
  ○ QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS

○ ESTIMATE OF TOTAL WEAPONS

○ EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR FORCES
NUCLEAR FORCES FOR EUROPEAN CONFLICT

- STRATEGIC FORCES
  - IN USSR OR ADJACENT WATERS

- TACTICAL FORCES
  - IN EASTERN EUROPE
  - IN WESTERN USSR
  - IN ADJACENT WATERS
STRATEGIC FORCES
IN USSR OR ADJACENT WATERS.

USSR-BASED MRBM AND IRBM FORCE

USSR-BASED INTERMEDIATE AND LONG RANGE BOMBER FORCE

NAVAL BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE FORCE
SS-20 MOBILE IRBM

RANGE: 5,000 KM
CEP: 385 M

ADVANTAGES

INCREASED SURVIVABILITY

MORE ACCURATE THAN CURRENT IRBM/MRBM FORCE

REDUCES NEED FOR DEPENDENCE ON ICBM FOR PERIPHERAL ATTACK

MULTIPLE REFIRE CAPABILITY
CURRENT SOVIET OPERATIONAL MR/IRBM DEPLOYMENT AGAINST EURASIA

2,200 NM

1,000 NM

MR/IRBM DEPLOYMENT

SS-5

SS-4

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SS-20 DEPLOYMENT AND
TARGET COVERAGE

5000 KM

5000 KT

OPERATIONAL BASE

SECRET

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<tr>
<td>SS-4</td>
<td>1,950 KM</td>
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<td>SOFT</td>
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<td>SS-5</td>
<td>4,100 KM</td>
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<td>SS-20</td>
<td>5,000 KM</td>
<td>63</td>
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ESTIMATE OF SOVIET WEAPONS
OPPOSITE NATO

MR/IRBM REENTRY VEHICLES 1,218
LRA BOMBS/ASM 1,066
SLBM REENTRY VEHICLES 34

TOTAL 2,318

ADDITIONAL: ICBMs
LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT
SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPTS
EUROPEAN CONFLICT

○ OPENING CONVENTIONAL PHASE
○ COMBINED ARMS OFFENSIVE
  ○ DEFEAT MILITARY FORCES
  ○ SEIZE AND OCCUPY TERRITORY/RESOURCES
○ DESTROY ENEMY NUCLEAR MEANS
○ ESCALATION LIKELY
  ○ CONCERN OVER TRANSITION
  ○ EMPHASIS ON PREEMPTION
TARGETING STRATEGY IS
OUTGROWTH OF
MILITARY-POLITICAL GOALS

CURRENT SOVIET TARGETING STRATEGY IS
COUNTER-FORCE

OCCUPATION OF EUROPE AND ACQUISITION OF
ECONOMIC-INDUSTRIAL BASE A MAJOR GOAL
SOVIETS SKEPTICAL OF LIMITED NUCLEAR USE

- LIMITED OPTIONS COULD BE EMPLOYED BY SOVIETS
- PREEMPTION, LARGE-SCALE USE, AND DISBELIEF IN GRADUATED ESCALATION CHARACTERIZE SOVIET DOCTRINE
MEMORANDUM

TO: See Distribution
FROM: ACDA/ISP - John Newhouse
SUBJECT: TNF Arms Control Issues Paper

(C) Attached is a draft paper entitled "Issues in Theater Nuclear Arms Control." It is intended for presentation to the Allies at the April meeting of the SG, along with the papers from State and CIA. Much of the language of this paper was taken from the interagency-cleared State/ACDA paper of last October, which was prepared for (but never presented to) the November 20 NAC.

(C) Because the paper will be discussed at this Thursday's SCC meeting, we would appreciate it if you would send your comments to Robert Nurick (Room 4494, 632-7439) by COB Wednesday, April 11.

Attachment:
as stated

Distribution

NSC - Reginald Bartholomew
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25X1A
I. Introduction

The accompanying paper outlines some preliminary US thinking about the general objectives which TFN arms control might serve, and about some principles which might guide the Alliance in considering specific negotiating approaches. The thinking in that paper reflects in part a US working-level assessment of larger political, military, and arms control considerations, but also of the underlying technical issues which would be involved in negotiations on theater nuclear systems.

This paper describes these latter issues and presents important analytical considerations bearing on them. In a few cases, tentative conclusions are suggested. These represent US working level views only. More often, our analysis has narrowed the range of plausible outcomes but has not yet led to firm judgments.

II. Major Issues

A. Systems to be Covered

This section describes the systems and forces which might be candidates for arms control negotiations on theater nuclear forces. The focus is on long-range US and Soviet theater nuclear forces in Europe. Systems limited by the SALT TWO Treaty, as well as British and French nuclear systems, are not considered.

The figures given below for long-range forces include those deployed in all of Europe, including the USSR to the Urals;
figures for shorter-range forces include only those in the three Western Military Districts (WMDs). The issue of distinguishing long-range systems from other systems is considered later.

1. Long-Range Systems

For purposes of discussion, ballistic and cruise missiles are categorized according to whether they are land- or sea-based.

**Land-Based Missiles**

The primary candidate Soviet land-based missile system is the mobile SS-20 IRBM, of which over 200 firing units (a transporter-erector-launcher, or TEL, and three missiles) may be deployed in the western USSR by the mid-1980s. Additionally, about 100 SS-20 firing units may be deployed in the eastern Soviet Union in this same period. Other candidate systems are older SS-4/SS-5 M/IRBMs deployed in the western USSR and intended for use against NATO; these systems are being retired concurrent with the introduction of the SS-20. Any future Soviet long-range GLCM would also be a candidate for limitation.

The primary US candidates for inclusion are the GLCM and the PIIXR, both with a 1983 IOC.

**Sea-Based Missiles**

Candidate Soviet systems in this category are current and future SLCMs, and older SLBMs not limited by SALT. At present, six Soviet Golf II class submarines are deployed in the Baltic, each with three SS-N-5 ballistic missiles. Candidate US systems include possible future land-attack SLCMs.
Soviet long-range theater aircraft are currently deployed with the forces of Long-Range Aviation (LRA) and Naval Aviation (SNA). Available for use in Europe are the Backfire medium bombers and the older Badgers and Blinders of the 1st (Smolensk) and 2nd (Vinnitsa) LRA Armies, and those in SNA deployed in support of the Baltic, Northern, and Black Sea fleets. Additionally, LRA bombers deployed with the Far East Bomber Corps (Irkutsk) and SNA bombers with the Pacific Ocean Fleet Air Force might be considered.

On the US side, and apart from heavy bombers limited by SALT, the system of greatest concern to the Soviets is the F-111 fighter bomber (and the FB-111, if limits are world-wide or if it is deployed in the theater); 175 F-111s (156 UE plus 19 float) are currently based in the UK, with a larger number based in the US.

2. **Other US and Soviet Theater Nuclear Systems**

Other US and Soviet theater nuclear systems which might theoretically be included in negotiations are nuclear-capable tactical aircraft, tactical ballistic missiles and rockets, and nuclear-capable artillery.

US aircraft which are considered nuclear-capable and based in Europe are the F-111 (discussed earlier), the F-4, and the carrier-based A-6 and A-7. These are the aircraft which the Soviets have explicitly identified as "forward-based systems" in the SALT context. Because Soviet practices with respect to nuclear delivery aircraft differ from those of the

SECRET
US and all contemporary tactical aircraft are judged to be nuclear-capable. These aircraft include Fishbed (Mig-21 J/K/L), Flogger B (mig 23), Flogger D (Mig 27), Fitter A (SU-7), Fitter C (SU-17), Foxbat (Mig-28), Brewer (Yak-28), and Fencer (SU-24). Approximately 2,500 of these types of aircraft are deployed with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and the Western Soviet Union. Only about one-third of these aircraft are presently nuclear-qualified and assigned, although the percentage is expected to rise steadily through the 1980s.

Both the US and the USSR have tactical missiles deployed in Europe. US nuclear-capable systems comprise 115 Pershing Ia launchers (108 UE plus 7 float) with 198 missiles (the more accurate long-range PIIXR could replace the current system on a one-for-one basis), and 40 shorter-range Lance launchers, as well as nuclear-capable Nike Hercules SAM launchers which could be used in a surface-to-surface role. Soviet forces are presently equipped with the SCUD SSM, the FROG rocket, and Scaleboard launchers. Replacements for all of these systems are expected in the 1980s. The Soviets have completed development of follow-ons for the FROG (the SS-21) and for Scaleboard (the SS-22). A possible follow-on to the SCUD is in an early stage of flight testing.

US forces presently have 155 mm and 203 mm artillery deployed in Europe, of which about 612 tubes are nuclear-certified. Soviet forces in Europe do not have...
nuclear weapons. It has been estimated that the Soviets have the technology to develop a nuclear projectile for the 152 mm artillery, but no evidence exists that they have fielded such a capability. Soviet 203 mm artillery and 240 mm mortars apparently are nuclear-capable, but these systems are presently deployed only in USSR.

3. Factors Influencing Inclusion/Exclusion of Systems

Decisions as to which systems should be included in, or excluded from, actual negotiations on theater nuclear forces will reflect both political and military considerations.

Political Factors

Political considerations could center on those longer-range and more modern systems which have been the principal source of concern in the Alliance about the dynamic trends in theater nuclear deployments, and which have acquired significant political "visibility" as a result. Immediately obvious examples include the Soviet SS-20 IRBM and Backfire bomber, and US ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles and PIIIXR. These systems are not only the focus of current political attention, but also--by virtue of their long-range and technological sophistication--represent qualitatively new factors in the overall nuclear balance. Appropriate limitations on this relatively narrow set of systems would thus be responsive to the military implications and attendant political impact of Soviet TNF modernization. Moreover,
focusing on these modern systems could directly strengthen the arms control objective of stabilizing the European nuclear balance over the long term, on the grounds that it is precisely these highly "visible" long-range systems which have the greatest potential to generate an uncontrolled action/reaction cycle. Finally, such a focus might reinforce the SALT process by seeking to control theater asymmetries which could otherwise undermine strategic parity.
Although the particular features of an arms control approach may also be determined by political criteria, fundamental to the consideration of TNF arms control approaches would be the military desirability of possible negotiated outcomes. Military criteria will play a central role in determining: (a) what limits would be acceptable on what Western systems; and (b) the overall acceptability of a negotiated outcome, especially in comparison with the outcomes expected in the absence of any negotiated limitations.

Important military factors include: (a) the adequacy of permitted US and NATO forces to fulfill the requirements of NATO doctrine; and (b) the degree of threat posed by specific Soviet/Warsaw Pact weapons systems, including those not limited in an agreement.

For instance, military effectiveness criteria (similar to those applied by the HLG to its consideration of TNF modernization) will bear on the assessment of what limits would be acceptable on what US systems. These criteria include inter alia: the maintenance of a broad range of escalation options; adequate target coverage; the suitability of permitted systems for escalation control; ability to penetrate defenses; adequacy in numbers; and survivability.

With respect to candidate Soviet systems, it will be important to evaluate the military and political significance of systems not covered by an agreement. For
example, if important limitations were placed on systems above a given range (e.g., 1,000 km), the Soviets might increase deployments in Eastern Europe of shorter-range systems, or redeploy current shorter-range systems to provide greater coverage of NATO territory. These systems could in some respects pose as great threat to targets in NATO Europe as do longer-range systems based in the USSR, even though they have so far attracted relatively little political attention.

Choices among alternative range thresholds are thus likely to be of central importance. To illustrate some of the considerations bearing on this choice, two arbitrarily-chosen range thresholds are briefly examined here:

1,000 km: A range floor (below which a nuclear delivery system would not be limited) of 1,000 km would, in the case of missiles, catch principal modern systems on both sides, and exclude current Pershings and Scaleboards. Such a threshold would probably be easier to verify than a lower threshold, and would provide greater flexibility for shorter-range systems. It would also include fewer US systems for which there are Allied analogues, thereby making it more difficult for the Soviets to argue for compensation for, or inclusion of, Allied systems. By the same token, however, it would tend to shrink the US aggregate if applied at an early date, and since the USSR can place West European targets at risk with systems of relatively short range, if they are deployed in Eastern Europe, would increase Soviet potential to circumvent the limitations. In this case, the Alliance might want to consider whether some kind
of separate ceiling on NGA deployments of sub-1,000 km missiles would be feasible or desirable.

500 km: A 500 km range floor would bring such systems as Scaleboard and current Pershing under limitations, thus increasing the US aggregate and offering greater negotiating leverage in an early negotiation. It might also somewhat reduce Soviet ability to exploit geographical asymmetries through East European deployments of shorter-range systems, although by the same token it might reduce US flexibility as well. It would also probably pose greater verification problems, however.

Other Factors

There are two major additional factors which will affect which systems are included in or excluded from potential TNF arms control negotiations. First is Soviet criteria for inclusion/exclusion; Soviet perspectives on TNF arms control are discussed in an accompanying paper. Second, negotiating approaches will have to be assessed for their verifiability. Verification questions are likely to be very complicated; they are discussed in section II-D below.

Technical Criteria

Finally, there is the question of developing appropriate criteria to identify systems for inclusion in the
limits. In theory, this could be done for both aircraft and missiles by means of a simple range criterion, by range/take-off weight or range/payload formulae, or by means of a generic listing (as for "heavy bombers" in SALT). A 1,000-km range floor would create many ambiguities: there are many systems having an assessed operational radius of close to 1,000 km, and the nominal range estimates for aircraft are very sensitive to profile and load assumptions. It is possible to eliminate these ambiguities for aircraft, and still catch major systems of interest, by raising the range floor to 2,000 km, but this could create the presentational problem of justifying different range criteria for missiles and aircraft. (If PIIs are to be used for negotiating leverage, then the range floor cannot be set higher than about 1,500 km.) In any case, explicit agreement as to what systems are to be limited would probably be necessary to avoid misunderstanding. A generic listing on the SALT precedent, with agreement on what types are covered, may thus be preferable.

B. Geographic Scope

There are several types of geographic constraints which could be applied to theater nuclear arms control limitations, e.g., Western Europe and Eastern Europe, excluding the USSR; Europe to the Urals; or constraints which encompass US and Soviet territory, either explicitly or in terms of limits on world-wide inventories. A related question is whether specific

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ocean areas should be included in any arms control approach
involving sea-based systems. Although the geographic scope of
an agreement would be linked to the types of systems that would
be covered, an important consideration would be that a
significant portion of Soviet theater nuclear forces are stationed
on Soviet territory.

Therefore, an agreement would have to include at
least Eastern Europe and most of Western Russia (by convention,
"to the Urals," though it could be defined by longitude or
distance from the western border).* For reciprocity, the
Western side would have to include at least all of Western
Europe (for forces of the type and nationality covered).
This "Europe-only" focus would not include any further geo-
graphic areas, nor impose world-wide limits on testing,
production, or deployment.

There are several possible problems with a
restricted geographic focus. First, most of the weapons under
consideration are more-or-less mobile; even if removed from
a specific area, they could rapidly be reintroduced. This is
particularly true of aircraft; long-distance movement of
mobile missile launchers would take somewhat longer. (In
addition, most such missiles are also dependent upon ground
support facilities which are both extensive and fixed).
Nevertheless, much of the effects of such an agreement would be
on peacetime deployments only (as is the case for MBFR). This

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*The SS-20 poses a particular problem, in that it can be
based somewhat east of the Urals and still strike NATO territory.

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Although world-wide inventories of either surface or submarine-based systems are reasonably verifiable, restrictions on deployments within limited areas (e.g., the North, Norwegian, and Mediterranean seas) would be hard to verify for surface systems, impossible for submarines, and circumventable in a crisis.

One possible approach to deal with these problems would be to seek global limits in combination with regional sub-limits. Such an approach might be particularly attractive if aircraft are to be limited, or if the agreement is to be of relatively long duration. For example, there could be a global limit on aircraft plus missiles, with a sub-limit on missile deployments in Europe.

C. Types of Limits

1. Possible Form of Controls

The forms of controls which might be placed on long-range theater nuclear forces include:

-- quantitative limitations, such as ceilings, freezes, and reductions. One approach would be to establish an overall numerical ceiling on the limited systems, and allow flexibility within that ceiling. Thus, the SALT I Interim Agreement set limits on the number of SLBM launchers on each side, and the SALT II aggregates are ceilings and sub-ceilings on various types of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

-- geographic deployments limitations. These would essentially be quantitative limits applied to specified areas. As noted above, they would present special problems in the case of mobile systems such as ships, aircraft, or air-transportable systems.
limitations, restrictions on testing, limits on payload and launch weight, and limits on modernization and "new types." Qualitative restrictions could apply to the characteristics of the systems (size, throw weight, fractionation, missiles-per-launcher, etc.) to the activities associated with the system, or to both. SALT experience has shown both the difficulties and the potential of defining and negotiating qualitative restraints.

-- supplemental measures to reinforce the effects of other limitations or to enhance verifiability. Such measures could include production limitations and cooperative measures to assist in verification.

2. Equal vs Asymmetrical Outcomes

An issue of great importance in formulating a negotiating approach is whether or not the Alliance should seek equal aggregate outcomes. Factors to be considered include the following:

-- An outcome which appeared to contractualize a large Soviet numerical superiority might be very difficult to sustain politically.

-- Given the numerical asymmetries between US and Soviet LRTNF, equal ceiling levels which might be both acceptable to the West and negotiable with the USSR may be difficult to set. In addition, given Soviet deployments against
China, making equal aggregate approaches especially difficult to negotiate.

--Equal aggregate outcomes at relatively high levels might create political pressures for additional and otherwise unnecessary US deployments. On the other hand, the fact that the agreement permitted this option might be an important political asset, even if the option were not exercised.

--It might be argued that equal aggregate approaches--even when applied to a limited number of systems--would risk creating perceptions of a separate "Eurostrategic" balance.

A major issue related to an equal aggregates approach is the treatment of the numerous older Soviet systems, especially SS-4/5s and Badgers. To include these systems in the limits would, in most cases, drive the ceilings to extremely high levels, while to exclude them by means of an age cut-off would appear to concede a near-term advantage to the Soviets.

However, although the near-term effect of such exclusion ("grandfathering") would be roughly equivalent to an agreement with asymmetrical ceilings, the resulting balance would move toward parity over time. (This effect can be reinforced by replacement rules, if negotiable, to contractualize the retirement and dismantling of older systems.) Thus, the lower ceilings which grandfathering allows would inhibit Soviet modernization over the long run, while focusing our negotiating leverage on limiting the modern Soviet systems of greatest concern.
In addition to the general issues noted above, a key question in determining what types of controls should be sought on LRTNF is whether the actual item limited should be the launcher (or aircraft, as appropriate), the missile, or the warhead. For reasons of verifiability, it may be desirable to limit missile launchers rather than the missiles themselves. Both SALT and MBFR have taken this approach. However, the Alliance may also wish to consider the desirability and feasibility of collateral provisions to limit reloads, MIRV fractionation, etc.

D. Problems of Verification

The verification problems raised by given limits would depend not only on the systems to which they are applied but also on the nature of the overall agreement. Nevertheless, there are a number of general observations which can be made.

Quantitative limits on land-mobile systems could pose problems of verification with national technical means, depending primarily upon how the systems are deployed. Most mobile theater missiles have thus far been deployed during peacetime in reasonably-sized units (not autonomous launchers) based at known secure locations. Such peacetime deployments provide the opportunity to monitor missile activities over time, and, if continued, would considerably enhance the verifiability of deployment limits. (Thus, for example, we have a good idea of the number of SS-20 launchers being deployed.) Verifiability
might be negotiable. However, if deceptive deployment practices were used, then quantitative limits on land-mobile missiles—both ballistic- and cruise—would present serious verification problems.

— verifying quantitative limits on Soviet theater nuclear aircraft might require agreement on definitions and a mutual database, in view of the differences between Western and Soviet approaches to aircraft nuclear capability and assumption-dependent range estimates.

— nuclear vs. non-nuclear capability cannot be distinguished for missiles, nor are there any technical requirements for nuclear-capable aircraft that produce externally observable differences. Crew training activity and storage site signatures can be indicators of nuclear mission for Soviet aircraft which in turn implies capability, but they are not necessarily reliable or consistently available indicators of such capability.

E. Participation: Forums

1. Participation

There are two broad issues involved in the choice of a forum for potential negotiations on long-range TNF: the nationalities of the forces covered, and the implications for progress in other on-going arms control negotiations.

We have assumed that only the US and the Soviet Union would negotiate on theater nuclear issues and consider limits on their forces. We recognize, of course, that Soviet pressure for either inclusion of or "compensation" for Allied
systems is likely to be costly. On the long-range French and British national systems because they are not dependent upon US warheads and are capable of striking Soviet territory. Apart from direct Soviet efforts to seek Allied negotiating participation, Soviet proposals for "compensation" for such systems could conceivably take other forms. In SALT, the US has not agreed to such compensation. For instance, the US rejected the Soviet attempt in SALT I to count increases in UK or French strategic forces against the US strategic limits.

We will also have to consider the implications of TNF negotiations for progress in other on-going arms control efforts. In general, the SG will have to consider the extent to which attempts to advance the objectives of theater nuclear arms control are likely to enhance, complicate or impede progress in SALT III or MBFR.

2. Forums

Limiting the scope of TNF arms control negotiations to US-Soviet systems argues strongly for using SALT III as the forum:

-- the issues are likely, in any case, to arise there.

-- using a separate forum could appear to isolate TNF issues from broader strategic questions.

-- using MBFR would greatly complicate the problem of limiting Soviet systems on Soviet territory, while avoiding limits on non-US Allied forces.

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SALT might make it easier to negotiate limits restricted to certain long-range US and Soviet theater systems.

However, we would have to achieve Soviet acceptance of our unilateral statement that their TNF, not just ours, must be subject to any limits. We would also have to deal with predictable Soviet arguments about circumvention/transfer, given Allied non-participation.
SOVIET OBJECTIVES

Being Drafted.
1. Following Aaron's informal consultations with Belgian, Dutch and Italian governments, an SCC meeting to assess the prospects for positive Alliance action on TNF by modernization and arms control by December 1979. Assuming a judgment that we should proceed on schedule, the track would be as follows:

2. Trilateral Consultations with British and Germans (already scheduled for March 29) to review Terms of Reference for new NATO Special Policy Group to deal with TNF arms control and related political issues. We might also air the Terms of Reference with Belgians, Dutch and Italians in advance of NAC discussion.

3. A reinforced NAC meeting (April 6) to receive reactions to US TNF arms control presentation of November 20, 1978, to review current thinking on TNF issues, and to establish the new Special Policy Group (SPG).

4. A High Level Group meeting to put the finishing touches on its report to the NFG. (April 3)

5. The NFG Ministers would discuss the long-range TNF modernization issue at their April 23–24 Ministerial meeting. The DPC and NAC Ministers will meet May 15–16 and May 30–31, respectively, and also discuss the issue.

6. The SPG would work through the spring and summer and prepare a report to be considered by the reinforced NAC in July. The aim of the SPG report would be to reach Alliance agreement on general objectives and principles of TNF arms control. A preliminary internal Alliance consensus at this point would serve two purposes: it would provide the intellectual framework for subsequent US proposals to the Alliance on TNF arms control. It would also put us in a position to respond to an aggressive Soviet TNF position in SALT III in the event this occurs before December 1979.
7. **Approved For Release 2002/09/04**

Develop an official US view on the specifics of an Alliance long-range TNF modernization program and on the contents of an Alliance statement on principles and objectives of TNF arms control. The latter would effectively provide a US mandate for TNF arms control in SALT III.

8. In the summer — after completion of the SPG report and development of a US view — the US would initiate bilateral discussions with Allied governments to discuss details of US thinking, especially on participation and basing — looking toward obtaining commitments before December 1979.

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An Alliance consensus of TNF modernization and arms control at the December 1979 NAC / DPC Ministerials. Ideally, we would obtain a statement of Alliance approval of a TNF modernization program involving long-range TNF systems, with countries prepared to state individually how they intend to participate; we would also obtain a statement of Alliance support for negotiation in SALT III on long-range TNF, with a description of common Alliance objectives and principles, to provide the US a framework to develop a specific SALT III TNF negotiating position.
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Composition of HLG and Associated Organizations

1. High Level Group (HLG). The HLG is made up of all the countries in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) plus the International Military Staff and the NATO Commands. It is conducted at the Assistant Secretary of Defense level/Assistant Minister of Defense level. Country contingents are politically determined and often include a Deputy Assistant for Foreign Affairs.

2. Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The NPG is subordinate to the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC) and is made up of four permanent and seven temporary members. The four permanent members are the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy. An additional space is reserved for France as a permanent member pending a change in French military participation in NATO.

3. The seven temporary members rotate through in 18-month intervals in two groups. The first section of the first group is made up of Belgium and Denmark. This section alternates with the second section made up of Canada, Norway, and the Netherlands. The second group is made up of Greece and Turkey in rotation. Portugal is listed in some documents as a member of the NPG, but since the coup, has not participated. The present NPG is made up as follows:

   US, UK, FRG, IT

   BEL, DEN (until Dec 78, then CAN, NOR, NETH)

   TURK (until Oct 79, then GR).

4. The rotational arrangement is for NPG Ministerial level meetings only. These are held approximately every six months. Permanent representative level meetings are held nearly every month and are attended by all NPG members plus an observer from Luxembourg.

5. Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC). NDAC is made up of any interested NATO country which provides military forces to NATO. Iceland is not, therefore, represented.