SECTION 01 OF 14 USNATO 07693

EXDIS (MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT)

CORRECT COPY (ZPO REMOVED FM LINE 4)

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 11/07/99 (BENNETT, W.T.) OR-P
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MNUC
SUBJECT: (S) TNF: PERMRREPS 6 NOVEMBER DISCUSSION OF
INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENT - DETAILED REPORT

REPS: (A) STATE 286043 DTG 012151Z NOV 79, (B) STATE
286042 DTG 012149Z NOV 79

1. - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: SUMMARY FOR THE 6 NOVEMBER MEETING HAS
BEEN TRANSMITTED IN USNATO 7692. FOLLOWING IS DETAILED
REPORTING MESSAGE OF THE MEETING. END SUMMARY.

3. SYG LUNS OPENED THE 6 NOVEMBER MEETING OF PERMRREPS
(FULL TEXT PARA32) BY NOTING THAT THE SESSION WOULD AFFORD

THE FIRST INSTRUCTED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE INTEGRATED
DECISION DOCUMENT. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE US PROPOSAL
TO WITHDRAW 1000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS WHICH HAD BEEN INTEGRATED
INTO THE IDD AND REMARKED THAT ADDITIONAL WARHEADS WOULD
BE WITHDRAWN AS NEW LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR WARHEADS ARE
DEPLOYED BEGINNING IN 1983. LUNS WELCOMED REMARKS ON THE
IDD AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A SIMPLIFIED MBFR PHASE I BUT
COMMENTED THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE ANOTHER NAC TO DISCUSS
THE ISSUE IN DETAIL.

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4. PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE AARON EXPRESSED HIS
APPRECIATION AT ADDRESSING THE NAC (FULL TEXT OF AARON'S
REMARKS PARA 33) NOTING THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS FACED
"FEW, IF ANY, MORE CRUCIAL CHALLENGES" THAN THOSE ON TNF
MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. NOTING THE CHALLENGE
OF SOVIET TNF DEPLOYMENTS, HE SUGGESTED THAT IF LEFT
UNANSWERED, THE SOVIETS MIGHT COME TO BELIEVE THEY HAD
ACHIEVED MILITARY PREPONDERANCE AND DECOUPLED EUROPEAN
DEFENSE FROM THAT OF NORTH AMERICA.

5. AARON NOTED THAT THE SS-20 BUILD-UP HAS CONTINUED
WITH ANOTHER SS-20 BASE OBSERVED UNDER INITIAL CONSTRUCTION
IN RECENT WEEKS. MOREOVER, THERE MAY BE A NEW, MORE WIDELY
DISPERSED SS-20 DEPLOYMENT CONFIGURATION WHICH WOULD MAKE
TRACKING SS-20'S EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. AT THE SAME TIME
THERE IS MORE EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT RETIRING
THE SS 4/5'S WE EXPECTED AND MAY PLAN AN EVEN LARGER
MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILE CAPABILITY OPPOSITE
WESTERN EUROPE THAN THE 600 WARHEADS EARLIER PROJECTED.

. AARON SUGGESTED WE COULD WELCOME THE BREZHNEV
SPEECH AS AN OFFER TO NEGOTIATE BUT NOT AS A PROPOSAL
FOR NATO TO DO NOTHING IN LRTNF EXCEPT MEET WITH THE

SOVIETS TO RATIFY THEIR SUPERIORITY. CONSEQUENTLY,
HE CONCLUDED, THE MAIN MOTIVATION OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECH WAS
TO PREVENT ALLIANCE TNF MODERNIZATION.

. NOTING THESE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, AARON STATED THEY
HAD STRENGTHENED US RESOLVE TO MOVE FORWARD TO DECISIONS
IN DECEMBER ON BOTH TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL.
DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND GLCM "WILL CLOSE THE GAP
IN THE LADDER OF DETERRENCE" AND "INSURE THE FIRM
LINKAGE OF US STRATEGIC FORCES TO EUROPE DEFENSE".
ON TNF ARMS CONTROL, THE US SUPPORTED THE SG'S PROPOSAL
TO NEGOTIATE A SALT III AGREEMENT FOR EQUAL CEILINGS
ON LONG-RANGE MISSILES. WE SHOULD TRY TO CUT THE SOVIET
LONG-RANGE MISSILE THREAT TO EUROPE AND WHILE SUCCESS
COULD LEAD TO DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT OF OUR DEPLOYMENT
NEEDS, IT DOES NOT MEAN WE CAN POSTPONE A DEPLOYMENT
DECISION.

. AARON EMPHASIZED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER FULLY
SUPPORTED THE HLG & SG PROGRAM AND SHARED THE BELIEF
THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD TAKE DECISIONS IN DECEMBER.
WHEN APPROVED BY THE ALLIANCE, THE PRESIDENT WAS READY
TO SEEK FUNDS FOR THE PROGRAM AND TO MOVE QUICKLY
IN THE SALT III FRAMEWORK TO DEAL WITH TNF ISSUES.
RECALLING THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL, AARON STAZNĐ THAT THE IDD WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICIES OF "MOST OF THE GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED" SINCE IT WAS THE CONSEQUENCE OF AN INTENSIVE, PERHAPS UNIQUE ALLIANCE CONSULTATION PROCESS. A BROAD POLITICAL CONSENSUS WITHIN AND AMONG GOVERNMENTS HAS DEVELOPED AND IS CAPTURED IN THE IDD.

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. TURNING TO THE ISSUE OF WITHDRAWING 1000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS, AARON SUGGESTED THE PROPOSAL IS

. --FEASIBLE AND DESIRABLE MILITARILY IN CONNECTION WITH A DECISION TO MODERNIZE LRTNF;

. --APPROPRIATE, AS A WITHDRAWAL WOULD EMPHASIZE TNF MODERNIZATION IS NOT PART OF A NUCLEAR BUILDUP OR A SIGNAL OF GREATER NATO RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS;

. --A REPOSE WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF BREZHEV'S SPEECH

. --A MOVE, WHICH JUXTAPOSED WITH THE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT OF UNILATERAL MILITARY WITHDRAWALS, COULD PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A SIMPLIFIED MBFR PHASE I PROPOSAL.

. AARON SUGGESTED THAT A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I APPROACH
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE NAC "ON A PRIORITY BASIS" AND STATED IT WOULD BE "DESIERABLE, BUT NOT IMPERATIVE" IF SUCH A PROPOSAL COULD BE AGREED IN THE ALLIANCE IN DECEMBER. HE SUGGESTED THE NAC TAKE A "FIRM HAND" IN CONSIDERING ANY SIMPLIFIED PHASE I PROPOSALS AIDED BY THE SPC AT DCM LEVEL.

5. AFTER THANKING AARON, SYG LUNS NOTED THAT HE HAD ASKED THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND SACEUR TO PROVIDE THEIR VIEWS ON THE PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW 1000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS DIRECTLY TO NPG MINISTERS.

. CMC ZEIHER GUNDERSEN NOTED THAT HE COULD SEE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE IN THE OFFER AND THAT IT SEEMED MILITARILY SUPPORTABLE. HE STATED HE WOULD GIVE THE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL FURTHER THOUGHT FOR PRESENTATION AT THE 13 NOVEMBER NPG MINISTERIAL.

6. ROSE (UK) AFTER EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR AARON'S COMMENTS, CHARACTERIZED THE IDD AS AN EXCELLENT BASIS FOR MINISTERIAL DECISION AND FULLY REFLECTING THE HLG/SG REPORTS.

. CONCERNING THE 1000 NUCLEAR WARHEAD OFFER, ROSE DESCRIBED IT AS A "CONSTRUCTIVE NEW PROPOSAL WITH A NUMBER OF ADVANTAGES" WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN URGENT STUDY IN THE ALLIANCE TO DETERMINE ITS EFFECT ON MBFR'S OPTION III. THE MOVE COULD GIVE A POSITIVE DIRECTION TO MBFR IF MINISTERS WERE ABLE TO AGREE ON IT.

. ROSE ALSO STATED THAT WORK ON AMS WAS WELL ADVANCED AND THE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD BEFORE THE END OF THE ROUND TO REINFORCE THE OTHER INITIATIVES. LIKewise
ABLE TO TAKE AND HOLD THE ADVANTAGE ON THE FULL RANGE OF
ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE BREZHEN Speech. A COHERENT
APPROACH OF THIS NATURE, ROSE CONCLUDED, WOULD INCREASE
PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR TNF DEPLOYMENTS.

. IN A SECOND INTERVENTION, ROSE NOTED THAT PARAGRAPH 21
OF THE IDD WOULD NOT BE CORRECT IN DECEMBER, AS HE
EXPECTED THE NPG MINISTERIAL TO SET THE MENTIONED
EXAMINATION IN MOTION.

. TURNING TO PARAGRAPH 18, HE SAID HE WOULD CONSULT WITH
THE CANADIANS AND ATTEMPT TO OFFER A MODIFICATION TO THE
INFRASTRUCTURE PASSAGE WHICH WOULD MEET WITH BOTH US AND
CANADIAN APPROVAL (SEE DISCUSSION BELOW).

. ROSE ALSO VOICED RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT THE DUTCH
SUGGESTION TO ADD THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH E OF THE
DISCUSSION OF PRINCIPLE 1 IN THE SPECIAL GROUP REPORT, TO
IDD PARAGRAPH 11, AS THAT LEFT TOO NEGATIVE AN IMPRESSION.
HE SUGGESTED ADDING ALSO THE REMAINING SENTENCE OF
PARAGRAPH E IN ORDER TO PRESENT A MORE BALANCED ARGUMENT.

. REFERRING TO THE GERMAN SUGGESTIONS ON PARAGRAPH 20
OF THE IDD, HE ASKED IF THE PURPOSE OF THE SUGGESTIONS WAS
TO STATE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE 1000 WARHEADS WOULD
BE STUDIED. THE GERMANS NODDED ASSENT.

. FOLLOWING THE MEETING, THE UK DELEGATION
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING CLARIFICATIONS:
THE UK SUGGESTS BEGINNING THE FIRST SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH 21 AS FOLLOWS: "MINISTERS

NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE NPG HAD SET IN HAND A STUDY OF THE ALLIANCE’S THEATER NUCLEAR WARHEAD STOCKPILE WHICH WOULD, INTER ALIA, EXAMINE THE PRECISE NATURE..."
(CONTINUE REMAINDER OF SENTENCE AS CURRENTLY DRAFTED).

IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE COMMUNIQUE, THE UK SUGGESTS THE TERM "EQUIVALENT ROLE" IN REFERRING TO THE BACKFIRE, RATHER THAN "PERIPHERAL ROLE" AS IN THE CURRENT VERSION, OR THE ITALIANS’ SUGGESTED "THEATER ROLE."
IN THE SAME PARAGRAPH, THE UK WOULD MODIFY THE LAST SENTENCE TO READ: "INDEED THESE WESTERN FORCES..."


THE FRG IS FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH INCLUDING THE

1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL IN THE IDD, AND SEES ADVANTAGES TO THE IDEA AS EXPRESSED BY AARON.

PAULS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE HLG AND SG CHAIRMEN AND THE QUALITY OF THEIR CONTRIBUTION. PAULS UNDERLINED THAT AGREEMENT ON THE IDD AND THE TWO REPORTS WAS DUE TO A BROAD MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING THE GROUPS HAVE SHOWN FOR EACH OTHER, AND APPEALED TO ALL TO...
AVOID RISKING WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET CHALLENGE WAS A TEST OF THE ALLIANCE'S COHESION AND ABILITY TO ACT.

. HE UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR SOLIDARITY. HE COMMENTED THAT IF JOINTLY DEVELOPED WORK WERE CHALLENGED AT THIS POINT, THE ALLIANCE'S ABILITY TO ACT AND TO TAKE DECISIONS WOULD BE QUESTIONED.

. HE NOTED THAT THE VEHEMENCE AND MEANS BY WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WAS REACTING INDICATED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES, AND CITED SPECIFICALLY THE BREZHNEV SPEECH ON OCTOBER 6 AND THE NEARLY IDENTICAL LETTERS BREZHNEV SENT ALLIED HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS. HE CONTINUED THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES HAD STARTED A CAMPAIGN TO INFLUENCE ALLIANCE DECISIONS. HE CAUTIONED AGAINST GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN WAS INFLUENCING THE DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL POLICIES OF THE ALLIANCE, OR THAT IT COULD THREATEN OR INTIMIDATE THE ALLIANCE IN ITS DECISION-MAKING, OR THAT THE SOVIET UNION CAN ACHIEVE RESULTS OUTSIDE NEGOTIATIONS SO THAT IT WOULD HAVE NO REAL PRICE TO PAY IN NEGOTIATIONS. HE CAUTIONED EVERYONE TO ABSTAIN FROM ANY IDEA OF REDUCING THE MEASURES

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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
ALL NATO CAPITALS
USNORPAC NORFOLK VA
USNMR SHAPE BE
USCINCEUR VAISHINGEN GER

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TO BE TAKEN.

. PAULS CONTINUED THAT THE NPG MINISTERIAL WOULD DEAL WITH AND ENDORSE THE HLG REPORT AND NOTE THE SG REPORT AND THE IDD. THEN PERMMREPS OF INTERESTED NATIONS, AS INSTRUCTED BY THEIR GOVERNMENTS, WOULD PUT THE FINISHING
TOUCHES ON THE IDD AT THE 28 NOVEMBER MEETING. THIS ACTION WOULD NOT AT ALL CURTAIL THE MINISTERIAL PREROGATIVE WHICH SHOULD BE EXERCISED AT THE 12 DECEMBER AFTERNOON MINISTERIAL SESSION.

. IN RELATION TO THE INFLUENCE THE US PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE ON MBFR, PAULS NOTED THE FRG HAD BEEN CONSIDERING THE IDEA OF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT FOR SOME TIME AND INTENDED TO PRESENT A PROPOSAL BEFORE THE END OF THE WEEK. HE NOTED THAT THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AT A LOWER OVERALL LEVEL ON THE BASIS OF AGREED US-SOVIET DATA. THIS BILATERAL AGREEMENT WOULD BE COUPLED WITH AGREEMENTS OF INTENT BY ALL TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS, STATEMENTS BY THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE LINKAGE BETWEEN PHASES, AND AN AGREEMENT ON ASSOCIATED MEASURES.

. PAULS SUBSEQUENTLY INTRODUCED RUTH (FRG) WHO MADE SOME DETAILED COMMENTS. HE SUGGESTED, IN PARAGRAPH 1 INTRODUCTION OF THE IDD, ADDING A SENTENCE AT THE END INDICATING THAT TOGETHER WITH THE IDD, THE HLG AND SG REPORTS FORM THE BASIS OF ALLIANCE DECISIONS. HE SAID HE WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY PRESENT IN WRITING OTHER SUGGESTIONS.

. HE FURTHER SUGGESTED (A) THE HEADING "LRTNF MODERNIZATION" BE PLACED AFTER PARAGRAPH 14, RATHER THAN BEFORE IT AS AT PRESENT.

. (B) ADDING THE WORD "LIKELY" AT THE BEGINNING OF THE LAST SENTENCE, PARAGRAPH 16.

. (C) THE READER MIGHT CONFUSE THE IDEAS IN PARAGRAPHS 20 AND 21. TO CLARIFY THE DIFFERENCE, HE SUGGESTED ADDING AT THE END OF THE THIRD SENTENCE THE PHRASE "BASED ON ALLIANCE ANALYSIS," AND BEGINNING PARAGRAPH 21 WITH THE WORD "FURTHER".

. (D) MODIFYING THE COMMUNIQUE, PARAGRAPH 7, SENTENCE FOUR, TO READ "IN THIS CONNECTION, MINISTERS AGREED, BASED ON ALLIANCE ANALYSIS, THAT AS AN INTEGRAL..."

. (E) IN PARAGRAPH 7 SHOULD BE SPelled out, and the number "572" added to the fifth sentence reference to LRTNF WARHEADS. FINALLY, HE RECOMMENDED BEGINNING THE SIXTH SENTENCE OF
THIS PARAGRAPH WITH "IN ADDITION, THEY NOTED...".

. (F) SUBPARAGRAPH 9E OF THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE DIVIDED, WITH THE SECOND SENTENCE BECOMING SUBPARAGRAPH 9F.

. 8. CATALANO (ITALY) ECHOED HIS COLLEAGUES IN EXPRESSING APPRECIATION TO AARON AND COMMENDED THE HLG/SG CHAIRMEN FOR THEIR WORK ON THE IDD.

.  CATALANO NOTED THAT ITALY WAS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE STRUCTURE OF THE IDD BUT REGARDED THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE AS LONG AND AT TIMES REPETITIOUS. NEVERTHELESS IT WAS ACCEPTABLE AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. CATALANO ALSO SUGGESTED THAT CLOSE ATTENTION BE PAID TO THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE EVEN THOUGH IT WAS NOT TO BE ISSUED TIL MID-DECEMBER AS WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT THE COMMUNIQUE WILL BE THE ONLY OFFICIAL ALLIANCE DOCUMENT ON TNF ARMS CONTROL AND MODERNIZATION TO BE ISSUED FOR THE PUBLIC.

.  CONCERNING THE PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW 1000 WARHEADS, CATALANO STATED IT WAS BEING GIVEN ACTIVE STUDY IN ALL ASPECTS BUT PRELIMINARY STUDY FOUND MERIT IN THE IDEA. HE NOTED THE PROPOSAL SHOULD TAKE THE PRESENT STATUS OF MBFR INTO ACCOUNT AND, EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY, BE RELATED TO THE PROBLEM OF AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO THE BREZHNEV INITIATIVES.

.  SUBSEQUENTLY CATALANO OFFERED THE FOLLOWING REMARKS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3645
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
ALL NATO CAPITALS
USOSACLANT NORFOLK VA
USNMR SHAPE BE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

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DIRECTED AT THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE:

PARAGRAPH 3: HE NOTED THE TERM "PERIPHERAL ROLE" IS
RATHER OBSCURE AND DIFFICULT TO RENDER IN A TRANSLATION
AND WONDERED IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO SAY, "THEATRE ROLE"
INSTEAD.

PARAGRAPH 7: INSTEAD OF:  
HE SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO SAY: 

PARAGRAPH 9: HE STATED THAT THE CONCEPT UNDERLYING THE
PHRASE: "FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE"
COULD BE BETTER RENDERED WITH THE PHRASE: "TAKEN IN
CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE ALLIES". THE PHRASE:
"IN A TIMELY WAY" DOES NOT SEEM FORCEFUL ENOUGH: IT
WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO SAY: "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE".

9. SCHUURMANS (BELGIUM) OFFERED HIS CONGRATULATIONS TO
THE SG/HLG CHAIRMEN FOR THE QUICK AND EXCELLENT WORK DONE
ON THE IDD. HE STATED THAT THE PROCESS OF MOVING TOWARD A
"DOUBLE DECISION" ON TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL
WAS GOING WELL AND THAT THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE
ITS DECISION OFFICIAL IN THE FIRST WEEK OF DECEMBER IN DUE
TIME FOR THE MINISTERIAL. HE COMMENTED THAT THE IDD WILL
BE OF GREAT ASSISTANCE IN MAKING THIS DECISION.

10. VAN VOORST TOT VOORST (CHARGE NETHERLANDS),
EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S THANKS TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE HLG AND SG. HE NOTED THAT THE ISSUES OF
LRTNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNF
WERE MOVING FROM THE SENIOR EXPERTS FORA, WHERE
THEY HAVE BEEN STUDIED UNTIL NOW, INTO THE
POLITICAL ARENA. THE DECISION THE ALLIANCE WILL
TAKE IN DECEMBER IS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE.
THE IDD, IN ITS FINAL FORM, WILL CONSTITUTE THE
TEXT OF THE FINAL DECISION. IN THIS CONTEXT,
THE TWIN ISSUES OF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS
CONTROL ARE STILL A MATTER OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION
WITHIN THE NETHERLANDS. CONSEQUENTLY, HE STATED
HE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THE
SUBSTANCE OF THE IDD, BUT WOULD ONLY RAISE ONE
ASPECT OF THE ARMS CONTROL PORTION OF THAT
DOCUMENT.

11. VAN VOORST TO VOORST ELABORATED, SAYING THE
SPECIAL GROUP'S REPORT DEVOTES ATTENTION TO THE
POSSIBILITY OF AN ARMS CONTROL SO SUCCESSFUL AS
TO PERMIT NATO TO CONSIDER SUSPENDING ITS OWN
LRTNF MODERNIZATION PLANS. ALTHOUGH THIS "ZERO
DEPLOYMENT" IS UNLIKELY TO PROVE PRACTICAL,
IT REMAINS AT LEAST A THEORETICAL OPTION WHICH
WOULD LEAD TO REMOVAL OF THE SOVIET LONG-RANGE
THREAT. HIS AUTHORITIES BELIEVE IT ADVANTAGEOUS
TO RECALL, IN THE IDD, THIS POSSIBILITY WHICH
COULD BE DONE BY INSERTING ONE SENTENCE IN
PARAGRAPH II 11. AFTER THE SECOND
SENTENCE IN THAT PARAGRAPH, INSERT THE FIRST
SENTENCE FROM PRINCIPAL 1E OF THE SG REPORT
("ONE COULD POSTULATE...SUSPENDING ITS OWN
LRTNF MODERNIZATION PLANS.") BY MAKING THIS
ADDITION, THE IDD WOULD CONTAIN BOTH THE THEORETICAL
NATURE AND THE UNREALISTIC ASPECT OF THE "ZERO
DEPLOYMENT" POSSIBILITY.

12. DUTCH REP THEN TURNED TO THE US "1000 WARHEAD"
SUGGESTION. IN GENERAL, THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT
WELCOMES THIS STEP. IT WOULD FIT IN WELL WITH THE
DECEMBER ANNOUNCEMENT OF PARALLEL DECISIONS ON
MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. OF COURSE, NATO
MUST BE PREPARED TO MAKE THE APPROPRIATE MBFR
CONNECTION. THE IDEA OF A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I
PROPOSAL TOGETHER WITH APPROPRIATE ASSOCIATED
MEASURES SEEMS ATTRACTIVE AT FIRST GLANCE. HIS
AUTHORITIES ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO THE FRG
MBFR PROPOSAL. NATO WILL NEED MORE DETAILS BEFORE
MAKING SUBSTANTIVE JUDGMENTS AND HE WONDERED

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13. Van Voorst tot Voorst concluded by stating that the Netherlands attaches great importance to the study of the "shift" in the nuclear stockpile which will be caused by the assignment of a greater part of that stockpile to longer-range roles. Mod Scholten will have more to say about that at the NPG Ministerial. The Netherlands particularly appreciates the IDD's reference to timing of the study, where it calls for a report to ministers in the autumn of 1980. Finally, in considering wording for the Communiqué, the Netherlands would prefer wording closer to that in the IDD rather than the draft Communiqué.

14. Svart (Denmark) stated that new Danish government has initiated an intensive review of this subject, which is particularly difficult, especially for the Danish public. The government will take the issue to the parliament. On 27 November and expects a broad debate. The 27 November debate will not result in a motion put before the parliament. The government's position will be decided subsequently, and will be based, in part, on the assumption that those states slated for basing LRTMF will be
IN A POSITION TO APPROVE THE BASING AND THAT AN ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL WILL BE PUT FORWARD BY THE ALLIANCE.

15. SVART STATED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES ARE WELL SATISFIED WITH THE US PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS FROM EUROPE. THIS PROPOSAL FALLS NICELY IN LINE WITH NATO’S DESIRE NOT TO INCREASE DEPENDENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. DANISH AUTHORITIES ALSO WELCOME THE POSITIVE EFFECT OF THIS PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO HAVE ON MBFR. WITH RESPECT TO THE ARMS CONTROL PORTIONS, THE DANISH GOVERNMENTS BELIEVES THE IDD COULD BE MORE SPECIFIC, PERHAPS BY POINTING TO THE IDEA THAT SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS FROM

ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES COULD LEAD TO REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBERS OF NEW WARHEADS WHICH ARE TO BEGIN DEPLOYMENT IN 1983. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS IN THE IDD THE EFFECT THE DECEMBER DECISION WILL HAVE ON DETENTE.

16. SVART CONTINUED BY OBSERVING THAT THE IDD SHOULD BE MADE AN ANNEX TO A COVER NOTE FROM THE SYG IN ORDER NOT TO BE SEEN AS PRESENTING MINISTERS WITH A DECISION ALREADY TAKEN, WHICH THEY ARE ONLY ASKED TO RATIFY. TURNING TO THE RELATIONSHIP OF TNF DECISIONS WITH SALT II, SVART SAID THAT THE DANISH GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE FATE OF SALT II WILL HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DECEMBER DECISION. IF SALT II IS NOT RATIFIED, WE WILL HAVE A NEW SET OF ISSUES TO CONSIDER AND WILL BE FACED WITH A NEW SITUATION.

17. TURNING TO SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE IDD, SVART CIRCULATED TWO PROPOSED CHANGES TO PARAGRAPHS 11 AND 12 OF SECTION II (TEXT BELOW). HE ALSO SUGGESTED AMENDING PARAGRAPH 23 IN SECTION III, WHERE IT SAYS "TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS IN A TIMELY WAY" TO READ, INSTEAD, "TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." SVART ASKED THAT THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE BE BROUGHT INTO CONFORMITY WITH THESE CHANGES. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE MINISTERS, IN DECEMBER, WILL WISH TO PROVIDE CLEAR POLITICAL, PUBLIC AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT. THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE AT PRESENT SEEMS TO REFER ONLY TO HOSTING AND IT COULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE ALL THESE POINTS.

18. BEGIN TEXT OF DANISH REVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 11 AND 12 OF SECTION II OF THE IDD:
NEW FORMULATION:

11. SUCCESS OF ARMS CONTROL IN CONSTRANING THE SOVIET BUILDUP WILL ENHANCE ALLIANCE SECURITY AND REDUCE THE SCALE OF NATO’S TNF MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS. THUS, CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL RESULTS WILL LEAD TO A DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT IN THE SCALE OF NATO’S TNF REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, ANY ACHIEVABLE ARMS CONTROL OUTCOME INVOLVING TNF WOULD NOT, IN THE FIRST STEP, ELIMINATE ENTIRELY THE SOVIET LRRTNF THREAT AND WOULD NOT OBVIA TE THE NEED FOR SOME LRRTNF MODERNIZATION TO MEET THE ALLIANCE’S OWN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT CAN ADJUST THE SCALE OF CONCRETE MEASURES AIMED AT MEETING THE CONTINUOUS ARMAMENT EFFORT OF THE WARSZAW PACT WILL THEREFORE DEPEND ON THE DEGREE OF SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE AND BALANCED LIMITATIONS ON LRRTNF OF BOTH SIDES THROUGH ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

12. THUS BOTH TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNF ARE IN LINE WITH NATO’S BASIC POLICY OF DETERRENCE, DEFENSE AND DETENTE, AS ENUNCIATED IN THE HARMEL REPORT. IN MAKING PARALLEL DECISIONS ON TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL THE ALLIANCE HAS TAKEN STEPS TO ENSURE THAT ALGITEME MILITARY SECURITY REQUIREMENTS SHOULD NOT IMPEDE THE CONTINUOUS EFFORTS
OF THE ALLIANCE IN THE FIELD OF DETENTE. THE OVERALL
PURPOSE OF SEEKING STABILITY IN THE RELATIONS WITH THE
WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AND OF ACHIEVING A MORE CONFIDENT
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST COULD BE STRENGTHENED
BY SUCCESSFUL ARMS CONTROL AND THUS GIVE FURTHER
MOMENTUM TO THE PROCESS OF DETENTE.

AS TO BREZHKIEV'S OCTOBER 6 SPEECH AND HIS OFFER TO
REDUCE THE NUMBER OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN
THE WESTERN SOVIET UNION IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS
OFFER IS GIVEN UNDER THE CONDITION THAT NO ADDITIONAL
MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS ARE DEPLOYED IN WESTERN EUROPE.
A POSITIVE ELEMENT IN BREZHKIEV'S SPEECH IS THAT THE
SOVIET UNION FOR THE FIRST TIME IMPLIES THAT TNF ON
BOTH SIDES COULD BE INCLUDED IN SALT III.

THESE CONSIDERATIONS, COUPLED WITH BREZHKIEV'S PRESUMED
COMMITMENT TO DETENTE, AMOUNT TO A STRONG INDICATION
THAT, IN THE LAST RESORT, DETENTE WOULD NOT SUFFER
SERIOUSLY OR PERMANENTLY THROUGH REALIZATION OF NATO'S
PLANS, WHICH BEAR, AFTER ALL, ONLY ON ONE ASPECT OF
EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

END TEXT.

19. HARDY (CANADA) STATED THAT IT IS THE OPINION OF HIS
AUTHORITIES THAT THE IDD FAITHFULLY REFLECTS THE CON-

CLUSIONS OF THE HLG AND THE SG. FURTHER, THEY WELCOME
THE US PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW 1000 WARHEADS AS AN INTEGRAL
PART OF THE MODERNIZATION DECISION COUPLED WITH THE ONE-
FOR-ONE REPLACEMENT WITHIN THE REMAINING STOCKPILE AS
NEW LRTPF WARHEADS ARE DEPLOYED. THIS PROPOSAL WILL ALSO
BE USEFUL IN THE MBFR CONTEXT. HARDY SUPPORTED THE DANISH
PROPOSAL FOR ANNEXING THE IDD TO AN SYG COVER NOTE. HE
OBSERVED THAT THE CONCEPT FOR THE IDD WAS A SET OF
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APPROVAL. THE PRESENT FORM OF THE IDD
SOUNDS AS IF THE DECISION HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE,
AND MINISTERS ARE ONLY TO RUBBER STAMP IT.

20. HARDY THEN REFERRED TO PARAGRAPH 18 OF THE IDD,
ASKING THAT THE SECOND SENTENCE BE AMENDED TO READ "THE
(INFRASTRUCTURE) CEILING WILL BE INCREASED, IF
NECESSARY, TO ACCOUNT ...." HARDY SAID THAT IT WOULD BE
POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER "AS MAY BE NECESSARY" IN PLACE OF
ADDING "IF NECESSARY." HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS CHANGE
WOLD IN NO WAY AFFECT THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM OR
DETRACT FROM THE PROPOSAL THAT NATO'S INFRASTRUCTURE
BE THE VEHICLE FOR FUNDING THE NECESSARY CONSTRUCTION
FOR THE MODERNIZATION. CANADA WILL PAY ITS SHARE. FUNDS
WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE WHEN REQUIRED. THE CHANGE IN
WORDING IS DESIGNED SOLELY TO LEAVE THE INFRASTRUCTURE
DECISIONS TO THE PROPER FORUM. IN HIS GENERAL RESPONSE,
LATER IN THE MEETING, AARON OBSERVED THAT THE CANADIAN
FORMULA "AS MAY BE NECESSARY" MIGHT BE ADEQUATE, BUT HE
EMPHASIZED THAT THE TOTAL COST OF THE LRTNF MODERNIZATION
PROGRAM TO THE US WOULD BE 4-5 BILLION DOLLARS -- A LARGE
SUM EVEN WHEN COMPARED TO THE US CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
MATTER.

21. COMMENT: AFTER THE MEETING, ROSE APPROACHED HARDY WITH THE FOLLOWING "COMPROMISE" LANGUAGE FOR PARAGRAPH 18 OF THE IDD:

"SO THAT THE LRTNP PROGRAM WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE NATO FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, THE MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM IN 1982-83 WILL EXAMINE WHAT INCREASE, IF ANY, IS NEEDED IN THE FIVE-YEAR CEILING TO ACCOUNT FOR THE REQUIREMENTS STEMMING FROM LRTNP MODERNIZATION."

HARDY AGREED TO CONSIDER THE COMPROMISE, WITH THE WORDS "IF ANY" INSERTED BETWEEN "INCREASE" AND "IS NEEDED."

ROSE THEN APPROACHED BENNETT, WHO POINTED OUT THAT THE INCLUSION OF "IF ANY" HAD THE SAME DEFECT AS THE ORIGINAL CANADIAN WORDING. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER THIS VERSION IF IT READ "WHAT INCREASE MAY BE NECESSARY IN THE FIVE-YEAR CEILING." ROSE AGREED AND SAID HE WOULD APPROACH HARDY WITH THIS REVISION. END COMMENT.

22. VIBE (NORWAY) STATED THAT THE IDD WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR DECISIONS AND THAT HE WOULD OFFER NO SPECIFIC AMENDMENTS. HE STATED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES SUPPORTED THE DANISH AMENDMENTS ON IDD SECTION II. THEY ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORT THE WITHDRAWAL OF 1000 WARHEADS AND THINK THAT THIS WOULD CONSIDERABLY IMPROVE THE WESTERN POSITION. HE ADDED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE MADE IN DECEMBER, THIS WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC BEFORE THE DECEMBER MEETINGS. (RUTH (FRG) SUBSEQUENTLY SUPPORTED THIS POSITION.)

23. VIBE OFFERED THAT AN IMPROVED ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL WOULD RESULT IF THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL WERE A PART OF A BROADER INITIATIVE ON ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE AND THUS A BETTER MATCH FOR THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL. HE STATED THAT THE ALLIANCE NEEDED A MORE "OFFENSIVE" ARMS CONTROL PLATFORM. HE SUGGESTED A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I PROPOSAL WITH ASSOCIATED MEASURES TO BE INCLUDED IN A COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL PACKAGE WHICH MIGHT EMANATE FROM THE DECEMBER
MEETINGS. HE ADDED THAT THE ALLIANCE COULD
AGREE BY DECEMBER ON AT LEAST A STATEMENT
OF PRINCIPLES LISTING THE KIND OF ADDITIONAL
CBMS TO BE RAISED AT THE MADRID OR IN
SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. VIBE SAW CONSIDERABLE
MERIT IN COMBINING ALL ARMS CONTROL ITEMS INTO
A SINGLE DECLARATION.

24. COMMENTING ON THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE, VIBE
SUGGESTED BEGINNING PARAGRAPH 8 WITH THE TERM
"MINISTERS ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE" INSTEAD
OF THE PRESENT "MINISTERS RECOGNIZE." IN
PARAGRAPH 9, HE SUGGESTED SUBSTITUTING "TO
BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE"
INSTEAD OF THE PRESENT "TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS
IN A TIMELY WAY." AND IN THE LAST SENTENCE
OF PARAGRAPH 10, HE SUGGESTED SUBSTITUTING

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"SUCCESS OF ARMS CONTROL...CAN...REDUCE THE
SCALE" INSTEAD OF THE PRESENT "SUCCESS OF
ARMS CONTROL...CAN...MODIFY THE SCALE." LATER
IN THE MEETING, VIBE CLARIFIED HIS EARLIER
REMARK BY SUGGESTING THAT THE 1000 WARHEAD
WITHDRAWAL BE CONFIRMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN
ORDER TO CONVINCE WAVERERS.

25. DE VILLAS-BOAS (PORTUGAL) APPLAUDED THE
EXCELLENT QUALITY OF THE IDD. HE STATED THAT
PORTUGAL WAS IN A SPECIAL POSITION IN TERMS OF
PARTICIPATION. HE NOTED THAT DUE TO THE
INTERNAL SITUATION IN PORTUGAL, IT HAD
ABSTAINED FROM NPG WORK AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT
PARTICIPATE AT THE 1977 MEETING IN BARI AT
WHICH THE HLG HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. BUT, THAT
PORTUGAL HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE WORK OF
THE SPECIAL GROUP. HE SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THE

HLG HAD MADE AN IN-DEPTH STUDY, AND EMPHASIZED
THE IDD WAS CONSISTENT WITH PORTUGAL’S POLICY
ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.
ASSERTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT
DISARM UNILATERALLY, DE VILLAS-BOAS NOTED THAT
IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE ALLIANCE TO
BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS FIRST, IN ADVANCE OF A
MODERNIZATION DECISION. THUS, THE MODERNIZATION
DECISION SHOULD BE PHRASED IN SUCH A WAY TO
ENSURE ADAPTABILITY TO THE ARMS CONTROL
NEGOTIATION PROCESS. SUCH A DECISION SHOULD
ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY OF DETERRENCE. HE
SPECIFICALLY SUPPORTED THE IDD STATEMENT ON
THE ALLIANCE’S NEED TO CONVINCE THE SOVIET
UNION OF ITS ABILITY TO RESPOND FLEXIBLY ON
ALL LEVELS. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
POLITICAL COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE WHICH WOULD
BE THREATENED IF NATO WERE NOT TO TAKE A
MODERNIZATION DECISION, NOTING THAT THIS WAS
MORE IMPORTANT TODAY THAN EVER.

26. ATHANASSIOU (GREECE) CONGRATULATED THE
HLG AND SG CHAIRMEN, COMMENTING THAT THEIRS
HAD NOT BEEN AN EASY TASK. HE SAID HIS GOVERN-
MENT HAD BEEN AMONG THE FIRST TO AGREE TO THE
PARALLEL APPROACH ON MODERNIZATION AND ARMS
CONTROL. HE ASSERTED THAT ARMS CONTROL
NEGOTIATIONS WOULD ENHANCE THE OVERALL
LEVEL OF SECURITY, AND THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE
SHOULD BE TO ACHIEVE EQUALITY OR PARITY AT
THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVELS. HE AGREED WITH THE
CONTENT OF THE IDD AS REVISED AND TRANSMITTED
TO HIM ON NOVEMBER 2, AND SPECIFICALLY ON THE

INCLUSION OF THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL.
ATHANASSIOU SAID HE EXPECTED THE FINDINGS OF
THE NPG TO ADDRESS ADJUSTMENTS IN THE
NUCLEAR STOCKPILE, ACCORDING TO IDD PARAGRAPH 21.
HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE GREEK POSITION ON COST
SHARING, PER IDD PARAGRAPH 17, HAD BEEN STATED DURING THE COURSE OF THE HLG WORK. FOR THE RECORD, HE REITERATED THAT GREECE WOULD BE UNABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO LRNTNF UNTIL THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF REINTEGRATION OF THE GREEK FORCES.

27. OLCAY (TURKEY) REMARKED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE IDEAL MOMENT FOR HIS GOVERNMENT TO BE TAKING SUCH MOMENTOUS DECISIONS. NONETHELESS, HIS AUTHORITIES WISHED TO STRESS THAT NATO MUST REACT TO SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS AND STRENGTHEN THE LINK BETWEEN THE STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE. HE ADDED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WELCOMED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE 1000 WARHEADS, WHILE COMMENTING THAT THEY WOULD LOOK WITH INTEREST ON THE EFFECT OF THE WITHDRAWAL ON THE FUTURE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE CONSULTATIONS THE US HAD WITH THE ALLIANCE DURING THE SALT II NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND NOTED THE NEED FOR SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS ON TNF ISSUES IN THE SALT III FRAMEWORK. HE SUGGESTED COMBINING THE SEPARATE SUBPARAGRAPHS IN PARAGRAPH 23 IN ORDER TO REDUCE REPETITION AND SUPPORTED NORWAY’S POSITION ON PARAGRAPH 8.

28. WURTH (LUXEMBOURG) STATED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES COULD ADHERE FULLY TO THE IDD. HE COMMENTED THAT

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EXDIS (MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT)

THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL WAS A "CLEVER"
PROPOSAL AND MIGHT UNBLOCK THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. WURTH EMPHASIZED THAT A POSITIVE LRNF DECISION IN DECEMBER WAS VITAL TO THE ALLIANCE. HE STATED HE WAS ABLE TO AGREE TO ALL PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, BUT SPECIFICALLY SUPPORTED THE DANISH SUGGESTIONS TO AMEND THE IDD, ESPECIALLY THOSE ON PARAGRAPH 11.

29. BJORNSSON (ICELAND) EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR US PREPARATIONS TO WITHDRAW 1000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS. HE REMINDED OTHERS THAT ICELAND HAD A SEPARATE POSITION ON PARTICIPATION IN THE NATO INTEGRATED DEFENSE STRUCTURE AND INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING. 30. AS WELL AS HIS COMMENTS ON THE CANADIAN POSITION ON INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING RECOUNTED EARLIER, AARON STATED THAT THE US WOULD ENDEAVOR TO INCORPORATE AS WELL AS POSSIBLE THE SUBSTANTIVE AND EDITORIAL COMMENTS ON THE IDD WHICH HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS IN RESPONSE TO REMARKS RAISED DURING THE MEETING.

- A. HE WELCOMED THE FRG SUGGESTIONS ON A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I APPROACH AND LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THE PROPOSAL IN GREATER DETAIL;

- B. IN RESPONSE TO THE DUTCH SUGGESTION ON THE "ZERO OPTION", HE ACCEPTED THE COMMENTS OF THE SYG AND UK TO BRING SUCH AN ADDITION INTO APPROPRIATE BALANCE. IN ASSESSING THE SOVIET THREAT, AARON REMARKED, IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE FULL RANGE OF SOVIET ABILITY TO STRIKE WESTERN EUROPE (AS DID THE HLG REPORT) AND NOT TO LOSE SIGHT OF THIS FACT.

- C. IN REACTION TO THE DANISH PARAGRAPH 11 SUGGESTIONS, AARON EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT TRYING TO BE TOO CATEGORIC IN PREDICTING THE FUTURE. HE SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO RECALL THE SALT I EXAMPLE WHERE IN TERMS OF POSSIBLE LIMITS ON SOVIET OFFENSIVE FORCES, IT WAS NOT CLEAR THAT WE HAD CONTROLLED THEM BELOW THE LIMITS THEY COULD HAVE ACHIEVED. WE HAVE DONE BETTER IN SALT II. SUCH MIGHT ALSO BE THE CASE FOR SOVIET THEATER FORCES. WHILE WE WANT TO REDUCE SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS BELOW THE CURRENT ANTICIPATED LEVELS, WE CANNOT BE SURE WE WILL BE ABLE TO DO SO BECAUSE WE DO NOT KNOW THEIR ANTICIPATED DEPLOYMENTS BUT ONLY HAVE OUR PROJECTIONS OF THESE DEPLOYMENTS. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSURE A REDUCTION OF THE THREAT BUT WE
COULD MAKE OUR POSITION MORE CERTAIN.

D. AARON STATED THE US WOULD ALSO REVIEW PARAGRAPH 12 TO SEE IF COMMENTS COULD BE ACCOMMODATED. PERHAPS THE DANISH REDRAFT IS TOO DEFENSIVE IN TONE.

E. CONCERNING CBMS, AARON NOTED THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS WANTED TO SEE ACTION IN THIS AREA.

F. AARON EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ALLIANCE SUPPORT ON THE US PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW 1000 WARHEADS. HE STATED THAT PUBLIC CONFIRMATION COULD COME IN CONNECTION WITH THE 13-14 NOVEMBER NPG MINISTERIAL.

G. CONCERNING A STUDY OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE ALLIANCE TNF POSTURE AND THE ISSUE OF TRADE OFFS ON SHORT AND LONG RANGE SYSTEMS, AARON STATED THAT IT WAS THE US POSITION THAT ANY STUDY SHOULD FOCUS ON THE POSTURE AFTER THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL. THIS 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL CAN PROCEED ON THE BASIS PREVIOUSLY SEEN IN MBFR. AARON MODIFIED, HOWEVER, THE INITIAL US SUGGESTION THAT THE WITHDRAWAL TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR AND STATED THAT IT MIGHT BE STRETCHED OUT OVER A LONGER PERIOD. WITHDRAWALS MIGHT BE LINKED WITH THE TIME OF IMPLEMENTING MODERNIZATION AND WILL NEED TO BE CONSIDERED FURTHER.

31. FOLLOWING GUIDANCE WAS USED BY THE NATO PRESS SPOKESMAN IN RESPONSE TO MEDIA QUESTIONS.
BEGIN TEXT:

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE MEMBERS CONCERNED,
REINFORCED BY SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS, MET ON 
NOVEMBER 6 TO CONSIDER FURTHER THE QUESTIONS OF THEATER 
NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. THEY 
REVIEWED THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP 
AND THE SPECIAL GROUP, IN PARTICULAR THE INTEGRATION OF 
THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TWO GROUPS. 
END TEXT.

32. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SYG LUNS’ INTRODUCTORY 
REMARKS.

BEGIN TEXT:

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
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"TODAY WE WILL HAVE OUR FIRST EXCHANGE OF VIEWS 
ON THE PAPER THAT WILL SERVE AS THE BASIC DOCUMENT FOR 
MINISTERS MEETING IN DECEMBER IN ORDER TO DECIDE ON NATO’S 

REQUIREMENTS FOR LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE MODER- 
IZATION AND A PARALLEL ARMS CONTROL APPROACH. THIS 
PAPER IS CALLED THE DRAFT INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENT 
AND IS THE RESULT OF WORK UNDERTAKEN BY THE CHAIRMEN OF 
THE NPG HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND THE SPECIAL GROUP ON ARMS 
CONTROL, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SEVERAL COMMENTS MADE BY 
ALLIES. YOU WILL RECALL THAT IN THE PROCEDURAL TRACK I 
PROPOSED IN PO 105, I ASKED THAT YOU BE PREPARED TODAY TO 
COMMENT ON THE PAPER ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR GOVERNMENTS. 
IN THE LATEST VERSION CIRCULATED LAST FRIDAY, YOU WILL SEE 
THERE ARE SOME NEW FEATURES. YOU WILL ALL HAVE SEEN THE 
PROPOSAL OF THE US TO WITHDRAW 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS 
WHICH IS ALREADY REFLECTED IN THE REVISED DRAFT INTEGRATED 
DECISION DOCUMENT ITSELF. (I REFER TO PARA- 
GRAPHS 6 AND 20 OF THE DRAFT AND TO PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE 
ATTACHED DRAFT DECEMBER COMMUNIQUE.) FURTHERMORE, AS A 
CONSEQUENCE, IT IS ALSO SUGGESTED IN THE UNITED STATES 
DRAFT MATERIAL THAT ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS WOULD BE 
WITHDRAWN AS NEW LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR WARHEADS WOULD 
BE DEPLOYED BEGINNING 1983.

"YOUR INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE ADDED PROPOSAL WOULD 
BE WELCOME. I WOULD EXPECT THAT OUR DISCUSSION TODAY
UNCLASSIFIED

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WOULD COVER THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES WHICH ARE SUMMARIZED IN THE DOCUMENT. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO COMMENT BRIEFLY ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I APPROACH TO MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, ALTHOUGH I ASSUME WE WILL WANT TO HAVE AN EARLY NUCLEAR COUNCIL MEETING TO DISCUSS THE POINT IN DETAIL AS SOON AS NATIONAL CONTRIBU-

TIONS ARE AVAILABLE SO THE MBFR ITEM IS NOT ON THE AGENDA TODAY. I WOULD URGE THAT THIS BE DONE EXPEDITIOUSLY.
END TEXT.

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33. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY DAVID AARON.

PRESENTATION TO THE NATO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES

BY DAVID AARON, 6 NOVEMBER 1979

MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL AND MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE TO COME TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT CARTER. I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS FACED FEW, IF ANY, MORE CRUCIAL CHALLENGES THAN IT FACES TODAY -- A CHALLENGE TO ITS POLITICAL COHESION AND ITS ABILITY TO MAKE DIFFICULT DEFENSE AND POLITICAL DECISIONS. BASED ON THE EXCELLENT PREPARATIONS OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND THE SPECIAL GROUP, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THIS CHALLENGE CAN BE MET.

BEFORE THIS GROUP, I DON'T NEED TO BELABOR THE DETAILS OF THE CHALLENGE POSED BY SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE DEPLOYMENTS. IF THE SOVIET CHALLENGE WERE TO REMAIN UNANSWERED, THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT COME TO BELIEVE THAT THROUGH THEIR MILITARY EFFORTS THEY HAVE ACHIEVED WHAT THEY HAVE LONG SOUGHT -- PREPONDERANCE ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND DECOUPLING THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE FROM US STRATEGIC FORCES AND THE DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA.

THE QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER THE US STRATEGIC DETERRENT IS FIRMLY COUPLED WITH THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THIS, AS THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR MANY TIMES. THE PROBLEM IS RATHER THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT COME TO BELIEVE THAT THEY HAD IN FACT

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ACHIEVED THEIR GOAL OF DECOUPLING AND BEGIN TO ACT
ACCORDINGLY.

. BOTH THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL NATURE OF THE
SOVIET CHALLENGE HAVE TAKEN ON GREATER URGENCY IN RECENT
WEEKS. THE SS-20 BUILD-UP CONTINUES. WE HAVE RECENTLY
NOTED THE ADDITION OF A NEW SS-20 BASE UNDER INITIAL
CONSTRUCTION IN RECENT WEEKS. AND WE HAVE ALSO SEEN
WHAT MAY BE A NEW, MORE WIDELY DISPERSED, CONFIGURATION
OF SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS WHICH COULD MAKE OUR TASK OF
KEEPING TRACK OF THE SS-20S EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. THESE
DEVELOPMENTS BRING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SS-20 BASES OPERA-
TIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION TO AT LEAST 21; AND AT LEAST
13 OF THESE ARE WITHIN RANGE OF WESTERN EUROPE.

. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE CONTINUING TO GATHER MORE
DISTURBING EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT RETIRING
THE SS-4 AND 5 SYSTEMS AS WE HAD EXPECTED THEY WOULD

WHEN THE SS-20S ENTERED THE FORCE. AS A RESULT THE
SOVIETS MAY PLAN AN EVEN LARGER MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE
RANGE LAND-BASED MISSILE CAPABILITY THAN THE ROUGHLY
600 WARHEADS OPPOSITE WESTERN EUROPE WE HAD PROJECTED
EARLIER.

. WHILE THESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS GO FORWARD, THE
POLITICAL NATURE OF THE SOVIET CHALLENGE HAS BECOME
INCREASINGLY CLEAR. WE CAN WELCOME PRESIDENT BREZHNEV’S
ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF 20,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS
AND 1,000 TANKS AS A SMALL STEP TOWARD ELIMINATION OF
THE DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN
CENTRAL EUROPE. WE CAN WELCOME THE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE
BUT NOT THE PROPOSAL THAT IN ESSENCE IF NATO DOES
NOTHING WE CAN MEET WITH THE SOVIETS TO RATIFY THEIR
SUPERIORITY IN LRTPN. MOREOVER, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT
THE MAIN MOTIVATION OF PRESIDENT BREZHNEV’S SPEECH AND
SUBSEQUENT SOVIET ACTIVITIES IS TO PREVENT ALLIANCE TNF
MODERNIZATION. THE SPEECH HAS RAISED THE POLITICAL
STAKES FOR THE ALLIANCE.

IF ANYTHING, THESE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS STRENGTHEN
OUR RESOLVE TO MOVE FORWARD TO ALLIANCE TNF DECISIONS
IN DECEMBER -- THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW LONG-RANGE THEATER
NUCLEAR FORCES ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE, AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP, AND UNDERTAKING
PRACTICAL ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES INVOLVING TNF, AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE SPECIAL GROUP.

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PERSHING II AND GROUND- LAUNCHED
CRUISE MISSILES WILL CLOSE THE GAP IN THE LADDER OF
DETERRENCE. THIS STEP WILL ENSURE THE NECESSARY
MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DETER ATTACK, DEMONSTRATE TO THE

SOVIETS OUR INTENT TO PRESERVE OUR SECURITY, AND PROVIDE
INCENTIVES FOR MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.
MOST IMPORTANTLY, IT WILL ENSURE THE FIRM LINKAGE OF
US STRATEGIC FORCES TO EUROPE’S DEFENSE.

EQUALLY IMPORTANT, WHILE WE PROCEED WITH DEPLOYMENTS
WE MUST MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BRING LONG-RANGE THEATER
NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER CONTROL. IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE
ALLIANCE’S INTEREST TO BE DRAWN INTO AN UNRESTRICTED
THEATER NUCLEAR ARMS COMPETITION WITH THE SOVIET
UNION. THAT IS WHY THE US SUPPORTS THE RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE SPECIAL GROUP TO MOVE RAPIDLY IN THE SALT 3
FRAMEWORK TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET
UNION THAT WOULD SET EQUAL CEILINGS ON THE LAND-BASED
LONG-RANGE MISSILE CAPABILITY OF BOTH SIDES.

IT IS PRESIDENT CARTER’S BELIEF THAT
WE SHOULD NOT BE TIMID IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. WE SHOULD
TRY TO CUT THE SOVIET LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR MISSILE
THREAT TO EUROPE. THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT THIS COULD LEAD
TO A DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT IN OUR OWN DEPLOYMENT NEEDS
DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE CAN POSTPONE A DEPLOYMENT DECISION
WHILE AWAITING THE RESULTS OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.
ONLY IF THE SOVIET UNION IS FACED WITH CONCRETE ACTION
IN THE DEPLOYMENT AREA WILL THEY AGREE TO REDUCE AND
LIMIT THEIR OWN FORCES.

THE PROGRAM OF THE HLG AND SG IS FULLY SUPPORTED
BY THE PRESIDENT. I WANT TO STRESS THAT THE PRESIDENT
SHARES THE BELIEF OF OTHER ALLIANCE LEADERS THAT WE

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SHOULD TAKE THE ALLIANCE TNF DECISIONS IN DECEMBER. ONCE
THE LRTNF PROGRAM IS APPROVED BY NATO MINISTERS IN
DECEMBER, HE IS READY TO MOVE FORWARD TO SEEK THE NECESSARY
FUNDS FROM CONGRESS FOR THIS PROGRAM, WHICH I HARDLY
NEED UNDERLINE WILL BE A COSTLY ONE. THE PRESIDENT IS ALSO
READY TO MOVE QUICKLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SALT THREE
TO DEAL WITH THEATER NUCLEAR ISSUES, AS RECOMMENDED BY
THE SPECIAL GROUP. HE LOOKS FORWARD TO CLOSE CONSULTA-
TION AMONG THE NATO ALLIES AS WE MOVE TOGETHER INTO THESE
DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS. GIVEN THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS
IN SALT TWO ESPECIALLY THE RATIFICATION PROCESS WHICH
IS NOW MOVING FORWARD AGAIN AS A RESULT OF GREAT POLITICAL
EFFORT ON HIS PART THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION ABOUT THE
COMMITMENT OF THE US AND ESPECIALLY PRESIDENT CARTER
TO ARMS CONTROL.

THESE COMMITMENTS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE DOCUMENTS
BEFORE US TODAY, IT IS NO ACCIDENT THAT THESE DOCUMENTS

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ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICIES OF MOST OF THE GOVERN-
MENTS REPRESENTED AROUND THIS TABLE, FOR THEY ARE THE
RESULT OF AN INTENSIVE CONSULTATION PROCESS THAT
MAY BE UNIQUE IN THE ALLIANCE’S HISTORY.

UNDER DAVE MCGIFFERT’S CHAIRMANSHIP THE HIGH LEVEL
GROUP HAS BEEN WORKING ON THE TNF MODERNIZATION QUESTION FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS. WITH REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW AT THE HELM, THE SPECIAL GROUP HAS BEEN EXAMINING TNF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES SINCE EARLY THIS YEAR. THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE GROUPS EXEMPLIFY THE BEST OF THE CONSULTATIVE NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE CONSULTING GENUINELY AMONG OURSELVES TO REACH JOINT POSITIONS. AS THESE GROUPS PROCEEDED STEP-BY-STEP IN THEIR WORK, BEGINNING WITH GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND MOVING TO THE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WE HAVE BEFORE US NOW, WE IN THE US PROCEEDED FORWARD WITH OUR OWN INTERNAL POLICY DELIBERATIONS, AS DID OTHER ALLIANCE GOVERNMENTS. A BROAD POLITICAL CONSENSUS WITHIN AND AMONG OUR GOVERNMENTS HAS DEVELOPED AND IS CAPTURED IN THE INTEGRATED DOCUMENT AND DRAFT COMMUNIQUE.

. IN THOSE DOCUMENTS, I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS ONE PARTICULAR ASPECT WHICH WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED IN THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND SPECIAL GROUP WORK. THIS IS THE MATTER OF THE 1,000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL. ON REVIEWING THE WORK OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP IN WASHINGTON, WE SAW THAT AN ALLIANCE DECISION TO DEPLOY 572 PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE WARHEADS PRESENTED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR RATIONALIZATION OF THE THEATER NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN EUROPE. CONSEQUENTLY, WE FELT THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE DECEMBER TNF DECISIONS THE ALLIANCE COULD AGREE TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM EUROPE. FOR THIS REASON WE HAVE INCLUDED

IN PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 20 OF THE DECISION DOCUMENT AND IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE COMMUNIQUE NEW LANGUAGE.

. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS STEP WOULD HAVE A NUMBER OF ADVANTAGES:

. --IN CONNECTION WITH A DECISION TO MODERNIZE LONG-RANGE TNF, THIS STEP IS MILITARILY FEASIBLE. IN FACT, IT IS MILITARILY DESIRABLE SINCE BY THE END OF THE YEAR WE WILL HAVE OVER 1,000 WARHEADS WHICH HAVE BEEN KEPT IN EUROPE FOR SOME TIME PENDING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO AN OFFER TO WITHDRAW THESE 1,000 WARHEADS IN MBFR.

. --MOVING FORWARD NOW WITH THIS WITHDRAWAL WOULD UNDERLINE THAT NATO’S TNF DECISION IS NOT PART OF A NUCLEAR BUILD-UP AND DOES NOT ENTAIL AN INCREASE IN NATO’S RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS SUCH, IT IMPROVES THE POLITICAL CLIMATE FOR TNF DECISIONS.

. --IN ADDITION, THIS STEP WOULD UNDERMINE THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF BREZHNEV’S SPEECH AND OTHER SOVIET
ATTEMPTS TO DEPICT NATO AS AN EXPANDING NUCLEAR THREAT WHICH RISKS UPSETTING THE NUCLEAR BALANCE. IN ESSENCE, IT WOULD BE A RESPONSE TO BREZHNEV'S PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE.

-- IT WOULD ALSO OPEN THE WAY FOR MOVEMENT IN MBFR BASED ON A SIMPLIFIED PROPOSAL. SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT OF A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF UP TO 20,000 TROOPS AND 1,000 TANKS, AND A NATO AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW THE 1,000 NUCLEAR

WARHEADS PREVIOUSLY OFFERED IN MBFR, WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF APPROPRIATE NEXT STEPS IN MBFR. THESE SEPARATE STEPS BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ALLIANCE PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I PROPOSAL. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I APPROACH TO MBFR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON A PRIORITY BASIS IN ORDER TO GIVE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE, BUT NOT IMPERATIVE, IF SUCH A PROPOSAL COULD BE AGREED IN THE ALLIANCE IN DECEMBER. WE WOULD WELCOME THE CONTRIBUTION OF OTHER ALLIES ABOUT SUCH AN APPROACH AND WILL BE MAKING OUR OWN CONTRIBUTIONS AS WELL. TO ENSURE SPEEDY CONSIDERATION, WE HOPE THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL WILL TAKE A FIRM HAND, AIDED PERHAPS BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE IN ITS DEPUTY PERMEPS CONFIGURATION.

MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL, WE ARE NOW PREPARED TO DISCUSS SECRET
THE DRAFT INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENTS AND LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE VIEWS OF OUR ALLIES.

END TEXT.
BENNETT

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