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DECAPTIONED

MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 11/29/99 (BENNETT, W. TAPLEY) OR-M
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MNUC, NPG, MPOL
SUBJECT: (S) TFN MODERNIZATION -- DETAILED REPORT OF DISCUSSIONS ON IDD AT 28 NOVEMBER SESSION OF REINFORCED PERMRREPS

REFS: (A) STATE 305363, DTG 242225Z NOV 79
(B) COPENHAGEN 7201, DTG 271601Z NOV 79
(C) USNATO 8275, DTG 281914Z NOV 79

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THERE FOLLOWS BELOW A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE 28 NOVEMBER 1979 MEETING OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES

OF THE NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE WORK OF THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP'S HIGH LEVEL GROUP, WHICH DEALT WITH LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE (LRTNF) MODERNIZATION, AND THE SPECIAL GROUP ON ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TFN. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENT, REF A. A SUMMARY OF THE MEETING WAS TRANSMITTED IN REF C. THE FULL TEXTS OF STATEMENTS BY AARON, ROSE AND HOLST ARE CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 25-27.
3. SYG LUNS OPENED THE MEETING STATING THAT HE HOPED AT THE CONCLUSION TO BE ABLE TO SEND THE IDD/COMMUNIQUE WITH THE SUPPORTING HLG AND SG REPORTS TO MINISTERS VIA A PO. THESE WOULD INFORM MINISTERS OF ALL RELEVANT FACTS.

LUNS ALSO STATED HE WOULD CIRCULATE A PO OUTLINING THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE COMBINED MEETING OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS ON 12 DECEMBER.

4. SVART (DENMARK) OPENED BY RECALLING HIS COMMENTS ON 6 NOVEMBER ON THE INTERNAL AND PARLIAMENTARY REVIEW THAT DENMARK WOULD BE GIVING LRNTF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THE ALLIANCE HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE IN THE DANISH POSITION. HE THEN EXPLAINED THE DANISH PROPOSAL AND, ON INSTRUCTIONS, REQUESTED ITS CONSIDERATION. THE PROPOSAL WAS OUTLINED ON FAMILIAR GROUNDS, I.E., THAT NATO SHOULD POSTPONE ITS TNF DECISION FOR SIX MONTHS DURING WHICH TIME THE SOVIETS SHOULD "INSTANTLY" STOP SS-20 AND BACKFIRE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS MUST DECLARE THEMSELVES READY TO ENTER INTO TALKS ON A FREEZE ON SOVIET LRNTF AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR FURTHER REDUCTION OF WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES. IF THE SOVIETS DID NOT PROVE RESPONSIVE TO THE NATO MOVE, A TNF DECISION SHOULD BE TAKEN ALONG THE LINES OF THE CURRENT ALLIANCE PROPOSAL. ANY ALLIANCE PROPOSAL SHOULD, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS.

SVART FURTHER COMMENDED THE DANISH PROPOSAL AS TIME-LIMITED AND STATED THAT IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE ALLIANCE STRENGTH BY ITS WILLINGNESS TO STRIVE FOR DETENTE. OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS, THIS PROPOSAL COMBINED WITH MOVES IN MBFR, PREPARATIONS FOR MADRID AND CDE WOULD POSITIVELY AFFECT ARMS CONTROL.

AFTER REVIEWING THE RESULTS OF THE DANISH PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON 27 NOVEMBER ALONG THE LINES OF REF B, SVART CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT HE COULD NOT ADDRESS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE IDD/COMMUNIQUE.

5. PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE AARON EXPRESSED HIS PLEASURE AT RETURNING TO BRUSSELS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF LRNTF MODERNIZATION AND NOTED PRESIDENT CARTER'S ASSESSMENT THAT THE ALLIANCE WOULD SOON BE TAKING A CRUCIAL AND HISTORIC STEP. AARON STATED THAT THE COMBINED DECISIONS TO MODERNIZE TNF AND TO INCLUDE TNF IN OUR ARMS CONTROL AGENDA WILL SHOW THAT THE ALLIANCE REMAINS A VITAL, COURAGEOUS INSTITUTION.
AFTER BRIEFLY REVIEWING THE PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND
OF THE IDD, AARON REPEATED THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF
MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL: THERE CAN BE NO ARMS
CONTROL WITHOUT A MODERNIZATION DECISION BUT WITH SUCH
A DECISION, CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL ACHIEVEMENTS WHICH
REDUCE THE SOVIET THREAT CAN REDUCE ALLIANCE TNF

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REQUIREMENTS.
AARON STATED THAT "TWO DAYS AFTER THE DECEMBER 12
TNF DECISIONS," THE NAC WILL PROBABLY PRESENT A
COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL PROGRAM WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL
INCLUDE THE THRUST OF THE NEW MBFR PROPOSAL. SUCH A
PRESENTATION IN COMBINATION WITH A DECISION TO WITHDRAW
1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS WOULD DEMONSTRATE A MAJOR EFFORT
TO ENGAGE THE EAST IN SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL. THIS WILL
PROVIDE THE ALLIANCE RESPONSE TO RECENT EASTERN PROPOSALS.
AARON NOTED THAT WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE SOVIETS
ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. STILL,
THEM HAVE ATTEMPTED TO INTERFERE IN ALLIANCE DECISIONS
ON STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE NECESSARY BY SOVIET
DEPLOYMENT ACTIONS.

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REPORTING ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET
SS-20 FORCE, AARON STATED THAT ANOTHER BASE HAD BEEN
DISCOVERED BRINGING THE TOTAL OF SS-20 BASES EITHER
OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION TO 23. THIS WOULD
EQUATE TO A SOVIET SS-20 FORCE OF 621 WARHEADS -- A
NUMBER EXCEEDING THE TOTAL NATO-PROPOSED LRTNF FORCE
WITHOUT COUNTING THE HUNDREDS OF SOVIET SS-4/5'S AND
MEDIUM BOMBERS.

FIRMLY REJECTING THE DANISH PROPOSAL, AARON STATED
THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE ALLIANCE TO TAKE DECISIONS
DEMONSTRATING THAT NATO WILL NOT BOW TO THREATS OR BE
TEMMPTED BY VAGUE INEQUITABLE PROPOSALS. HE CONCLUDED
BY CITING THE HARMEL REPORT WHICH DEDICATED THE
ALLIANCE TO PURSUING DEFENSE AND DETENTE AND HOPED THAT
NATO WOULD HAVE THE COURAGE TO MATCH ITS WISDOM IN
TAKING A DECISION ON TNF MODERNIZATION/ARMS CONTROL
WHICH EMBRACES BOTH PRINCIPLES.

(FULL TEXT OF AARON’S REMARKS ARE AT PARAGRAPH 25.)

SEPARATELY LUNS SUGGESTED THAT THE INFORMATION CONCERNING
THE 621 SOVIET SS-20 WARHEADS WOULD BE USEFUL IF IT COULD
BE MADE PUBLIC AND REQUESTED AARON’S COMMENT. AARON
PROMISED TO RESPOND TO THE REQUEST AND HOPED HE WOULD
BE ABLE TO REPLY BEFORE THE FIGURE WAS LEAKED.

6. ROSE (UK) STATED STRONGLY THAT POSITIVE DECISIONS
ON LRTNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL SHOULD BE TAKEN
IN DECEMBER. IT IS OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY THAT
MODERNIZATION BEGIN WITHOUT DELAY AND THAT IN PARALLEL
THE SOVIETS BE ENGAGED IN SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIA-
TIONS. THE SOVIETS HOWEVER WILL NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY
ONLY IF FACED BY REAL DETERMINATION BY THE ALLIANCE.
WITHOUT MODERNIZATION, ROSE ASKED "WHAT ARE WE GOING TO

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BARGAIN WITH?"

COMMENTING ON THE DUTCH POSITION OF A LIMITED
PRODUCTION DECISION LEAVING A DEPLOYMENT DECISION UNTIL
LATER, HE LABELED SUCH A POSTURE "WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE"
IN PROVIDING THE NECESSARY EVIDENCE OF DETERMINATION.
INSTEAD, THE SOVIETS WOULD DRAG OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS,
CONTINUE THEIR BUILD-UP AND INCREASE THE IMBALANCE.

REGARDING THE DANISH PROPOSAL, ROSE CHARACTERIZED
IT AS "IMPractical" WITH MAJOR DISADVANTAGES FOR THE
ALLIANCE IN MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ARMS CONTROL TERMS.
HE SUGGESTED THAT PUTTING OFF DECISIONS FOR SIX MONTHS
WOULD CAST DOUBT ON THE ALLIANCE’S ABILITY TO TAKE
DIFFICULT DECISIONS AND GIVE THE IMPRESSION WE WERE NOT
PREPARED TO MEET OUR MUCH PUBLICIZED, SELF-SET MILITARY
TARGETS. MOREOVER, NATO’S FAILURE TO TAKE THESE
DECISIONS WOULD BE CREDITED TO SOVIET PRESSURE/PROPAGANDA.
ROSE ALSO BELIEVED THAT DELAY WOULD DAMAGE PROSPECTS 
FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTRODUCE A NEW ELEMENT OF 
UNCERTAINTY INTO THE SALT II RATIFICATION DEBATE. HE 
COMMENTED THAT INDECISION NOW WOULD SUGGEST TO THE US 
THAT EUROPEANS WERE RELUCTANT TO TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES 
FOR SELF DEFENSE AND THIS COULD ONLY BE HARMFUL TO INTRA-
ALLIANCE RELATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, HOWEVER, DELAY 
WOULD COST THE ALLIANCE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEIZE THE 
ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE BY PRESENTING A PACKAGE OF 
PROPOSALS IN PARALLEL WITH THE MODERNIZATION. DELAY 
WOULD PRESUMABLY AFFECT THE US PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW 
1,000 WARHEADS AND RADICALLY CHANGE THE CONTEXT FOR 
CONSIDERING AN INTERIM PHASE I PROPOSAL IN MBFR. 
EXAMINING THE NEGOTIABILITY OF THE DANISH

UNCLASSIFIED
EXPERIENCE SUGGEST THAT SUCH COMPLICATED ISSUES COULDN'T BE SOLVED IN SIX MONTHS.
Consequently, Rose concluded that there is no satisfactory substitute for parallel December decisions on TNR modernization and arms control and that the IDD provides a satisfactory basis for ministerial decision. (Full text of Rose's statement is at paragraph 26.)

7. Pauls (FRG) recalled his willingness to accept the IDD at the 6 November meeting and stated that the present version reflects the 6 November discussions. He went on to note with approval the new element -- the American willingness to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe in connection with December decisions, but only if there are positive December decisions. Pauls agreed without reservation to the IDD, together with the HLG and SG reports as the basis for decision by ministers on 12 December.

Speaking on instructions, Pauls noted that the December decision on TNR modernization and arms control is of "fundamental importance" for Alliance positions on defense and deterrence and an "essential expression" of NATO's coherence, solidarity and ability to act. Likewise, the absence of a decision would illustrate less coherence, weakened solidarity and inability to act. Pauls noted that the December decisions have been preceded by extensive consultations which have ended in far-reaching consensus. Consequently, hesitations or attempts to modify/cancel the consensus would do very serious damage to Alliance cohesion and security. To make such moves at the height of Soviet propaganda pressure would create the impression that the Alliance is sensitive to such pressure if the interference is massive enough.

In an extended review of the recent talks with

Gromyko, Pauls cited one element of the FRG/USSR joint communiqué as follows:

"The talks about topical problems were concentrated on the need to strengthen peace and security in Europe and in the world. Both sides reaffirm that they see no reasonable alternative to the policy of détente. They expressed their
Determination to expand and to intensify the process of detente and to make it permanent.
In this context, both sides expressed the unanimous view that the preparation of concrete steps in the field of disarmament and arms control should be speeded up."

Pauls noted expected differences of opinion during the talks on TF modernization and assumed that the Soviets will continue to criticize the planned alliance decision but also expect that the decision will be taken. In regard to Gromyko's statement that there would be no negotiations on the matter once the Allies had adopted the decision on LRTNF modernization, Pauls commented that:

- Such a statement was not made in the official talks with the FRG;

- An interpretation that there would be no possibility of negotiations after a December decision on LRTNF would be unjustified as the joint communique (confirmed

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After the Gromyko press conference) explicitly underlines the continuation of detente and disarmament negotiations;
-- SUCH AN INTERPRETATION WOULD CONFLICT WITH OTHER
SOVIET STATEMENTS WHICH APPARENTLY ASSUME THAT
NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE POSSIBLE AFTER THE DECEMBER
DECISION;

-- IN HIS BONN DISCUSSIONS, GROMYKO REFERRED TO THE
BREZHNEV SPEECH PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTIONS IN MEDIUM
RANGE SYSTEMS IF NATO DID NOT MAKE A TNF MODERNIZATION
DECISION. AS CONFIRMED BY SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION
WITH GROMYKO, THE FRG CONCLUDED THAT IT IS THIS
SPECIFIC SOVIET PROPOSAL WHICH WILL BE TERMINATED
BY AN ALLIANCE TNF DECISION RATHER THAN THE
POSSIBILITY OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS FOR TNF ARMS CONTROL.

PAULS CONSEQUENTLY JUDGED THAT THE ALLIANCE'S
CURRENT EFFORTS OF INTENSIFICATION OF ARMS CONTROL
POLICY IS ALONG THE RIGHT LINES AND THAT WE CAN ASSUME
THAT THERE WILL BE NEGOTIATIONS IN ALL FIELDS EVEN AFTER
THE ALLIANCE HAS TAKEN DECISIONS IN DECEMBER.

WITH CONSIDERABLE PASSION, PAULS STATED THAT
MODIFICATION OR POSTPONEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE TNF
DECISION WOULD HARM TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION. HE
NOTED THAT IF THE ALLIANCE DID NOT MAKE THE TNF
MODERNIZATION DECISION, AMERICANS COULD CONCLUDE THAT
EUROPEANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN DEFENDING EUROPE.
CONSEQUENTLY, PAULS CONCLUDED THE ALLIANCE WAS
APPROACHING AN HISTORIC MOMENT WITH MUCH MORE AT STAKE
THAN MODERNIZING WARHEADS BUT RATHER ITS VERY EXISTENCE.

8. CATALANO (ITALY) STATED THAT ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
MALFATI HAS EMPHASIZED THAT A BALANCE OF FORCES IS A
NECESSARY CONDITION FOR REAL ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
PROGRESS. HISTORICALLY, MILITARY ASYMMETRIES HAVE
LED TO ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT THE IMBALANCE AND THUS HAVE
BEEN DESTABILIZING. THE CURRENT EMERGING IMBALANCE
THUS PROVIDES THE BACKGROUND FOR NATO'S DECISIONS, AND
UNDERScores THE NEED FOR REAL PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT. CATALANO PRAISED THE WORK OF THE
HLG AND THE SG IN PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE BASIS FOR THE
DECISION, AND AS REFLECTING AN EXPRESSION OF A COMMON
ALLIANCE EFFORT. THE IDD ADEQUATELY TAKES INTO ACCOUNT
THIS COMMON WORK AND STRIKES A SOUND BALANCE BETWEEN
TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO FORM A SUITABLE BASIS FOR MINISTERIAL DECISION. HE ADDED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO IS ADEQUATE FOR INFORMING PUBLICS. CATALANO THEN STATED THAT, SINCE THE COMMUNIQUE CONVEYS SUCH A SENSITIVE MESSAGE, HIS AUTHORITIES DID NOT YET CONSIDER THE TEXT TO BE FINAL. CATALANO THEN CIRCULATED SEVERAL MINOR CHANGES FOR CONSIDERATION. SUBSEQUENTLY, TWO MINOR WORDING CHANGES WERE ACCEPTED, AS RECOUNTED IN SUMMARY MESSAGE (REF C).

. CATALANO THEN TURNED TO THE DANISH PROPOSAL, REMINDING THE GROUP THAT HIS GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS SEVERAL OTHERS, HAS FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED TO THE SOVIET UNION A CLEAR DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE ON NUCLEAR MATTERS. THE SOVIET UNION HAS NEVER ACCEPTED THESE PROPOSALS IN ANY SATISFACTORY WAY. THEREFORE, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHY NATO NOW SHOULD POSTPONE ITS DECISION, WHEN TO PROCEED WOULD PROVIDE TO THE SOVIETS A POSITIVE INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE. IN ANY CASE, IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE, DURING A SIX-MONTH POSTPONEMENT, TO NEGOTIATE SUFFICIENTLY MEANINGFUL RESULTS AS TO PRECLUDE THE NEED TO MODERNIZE THE LRTNF. FINALLY, IT WOULD NOT BE ANY EASIER TO REACH A MODERNIZATION DECISION AFTER A POSTPONEMENT. RATHER, A MODERNIZATION DECISION THEN WOULD TAKE ON A NEW CHARACTER AND MEANING, PERHAPS FORECLOSING ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

9. SCHUURMANS (BELGIUM), IN A BRIEF INTERVENTION, STATED THAT HE WAS AUTHORIZED, "ON A TECHNICAL PLANE," TO ACCEPT THE IDD FOR FORWARDING TO MINISTERS. HE
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Said that the Belgian government has not yet taken a firm decision, so acceptance of the IDD should not be interpreted as a firm government position on basing. Schuurmans expressed regret that the Danish government had not consulted others before publicly announcing its proposal, and said the Danish position will cause problems for other allies. Schuurmans concluded by supporting the Italian view that the IDD communique's text not yet be considered as final.

10. State Secretary Holst spoke for Norway, emphasizing that Norway's basic policy of not stationing nuclear weapons was not affected. During final review of its position, his government would give particular weight to the positions taken by those nations most directly concerned, i.e., those which will base the LRTNF. Norway places particular importance on negotiations, which should begin as soon as possible. The purpose of such negotiations should be the establishment of an equilibrium at the lowest possible force level.

The urgency of establishing an equilibrium is underscored by the announcement by the US that the projected number of SS-20 warheads exceeds the NATO program under consideration. Norway believes it important to include in an alliance arms control package the unilateral withdrawal of 1,000 US nuclear warheads, again, the sooner the better. Norway also hopes that agreement can be reached speedily on a new first-phase MBFR offer, so that it may become part of a vigorous and broad alliance declaration on arms control in December.

Norway will reach its final decision through constitutional processes, probably during the first week of December. Consequently, Holst said, he would restrict his comments today to general observations. The IDD's communique should be assessed in political terms, since it will be the most authoritative presentation by the alliance on modernization and the offer to negotiate about continental weapons. The present draft is too technical, designed more for experts than for the public, yet the public is the real target. The communique should be a political "platform", from
WHICH GOVERNMENTS MAY EXPLAIN THE ALLIANCE DECISION, AND THEREFORE MUST EXPLAIN FULLY THE ALLIANCE'S POLITICAL RATIONALE. HOLST DID NOT PROPOSE ANY CHANGES TO THE COMMUNIQUE, BUT STATED THAT THERE IS A NEED FOR A

CREDIBLE ALIGNMENT OF THE DECISION TO MODERNIZE AND THE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE. TO BE SPECIFIC, HE SAID, THE IDEA THAT THE SCALE OF THE EVENTUAL DEPLOYMENT WILL NEED TO BE CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF THE RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN A SALIENT PRESENTATION IN THE COMMUNIQUE. ALLIES ALSO SHOULD PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THIS POINT IN THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THE DECISIONS AFTER THE MEETING ON 12 DECEMBER.

11. BARKMAN (NETHERLANDS), NOTING THAT THE NETHERLANDS HAS NOT YET TAKEN A DECISION, STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT SHARE DENMARK'S VIEW OF POSTPONING A DECISION IN DECEMBER. BARKMAN STATED THAT THE DUTCH DECISION WILL DEPEND ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON THE NEED TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF AND THE ALLIANCE'S DEPENDENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE AGAIN ADVANCED THE NETHERLANDS' DESIRE TO SEPARATE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS, WITH THE DEPLOYMENT DECISION COMING AFTER REVIEWING THE RESULTS OF ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES. HE SAID THAT IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR DESIRE TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HIS GOVERNMENT HAD "GREAT DIFFICULTY" WITH THE NUMBER OF 572 WARHEADS. EVERYONE AGREES THAT THE NUMBER IS A JUDGMENT RATHER THAN A PRECISE CALCULATION. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT START INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON A "WORST CASE" BASIS -- THE POINT OF DEPARTURE SHOULD BE A NUMBER LOWER THAN THE RECOMMENDED 572, TO SIGNAL EXPLICITLY THE POSSIBILITY OF REDUCTIONS, WHILE RETAINING THE OPTION TO GO HIGHER IF A SUITABLE RESPONSE IS NOT RECEIVED. ONE ADVANTAGE TO A LOWER LRTNF NUMBER IS THAT PERSHING 1A WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4445
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA
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REPLACED ON A ONE-TO-ONE BASIS AND OPTION III WOULD REMAIN. HE SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE NETHERLANDS THAT OPTION III NOT BE UNILATERALLY WITHDRAWN FROM MBFR.

. BARKMAN THEN CIRCULATED THE FOLLOWING REVISION TO PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE IDD, AND REQUESTED THAT IT BE PLACED IN BRACKETS. SYG LUNS REJECTED PUTTING THE PROPOSAL INTO THE IDD IN BRACKETS, BUT AGREED TO CIRCULATE THE REWORDING FORMALLY BUT SEPARATELY SO THAT IT WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSIDERATION IN DECEMBER.

. NETHERLANDS’ PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO PARAGRAPH 15 OF INTEGRATIVE DECISION DOCUMENT.

"MINISTERS AGREED THAT NATO’S LRTNF MODERNIZATION GOALS CAN BEST BE MET BY A DECISION ON THE PRODUCTION OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF LAND-BASED PERSHING TWO BALLISTIC MISSILES AND GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (GLCM) RESPECTIVELY; THE DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE MADE DEPENDENT ON THE RESULTS OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THE ACTUAL NUMBER TO BE DEPLOYED WILL HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS OF A COMMON ALLIED EVALUATION OF THE OUTCOME OF ARMS CONTROL."

. BARKMAN SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF MAKING PUBLIC THE NEW PROJECTION OF A TOTAL OF 621 SS-20 WARHEADS. HE ALSO REFERRED TO PARAGRAPH 21 OF THE IDD, SUGGESTING THAT THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP SHOULD UNDERTAKE THE "SHIFT STUDY" WHEN DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN DECEMBER. BARKMAN CONCLUDED BY SUPPORTING NORWAY’S CALL FOR A MORE COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT OF NATO’S NUMBER.

12. SYG LUNS SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS A CONTRADICTION IN THE NETHERLANDS’ POSITION. IF IN THE FUTURE, ARMS
CONTROL RESULTS MAKE POSSIBLE A REDUCTION IN THE
ALLIANCE'S PLANNED DEPLOYMENT, CERTAINLY ALL ALLIES WILL
PARTICIPATE IN THE DECISION TO DO SO. WHY, THEN, SHOULD
THE ALLIANCE NOT WAIT UNTIL THEN TO DECIDE ON A REDUCED
PROGRAM, RATHER THAN NOW, WHEN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT SUCH A DECISION.

13. ZEINER GUNDERSEN (CMC) STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE
APPROACH SET OUT IN THE IDD, AND REITERATED THAT, FROM
THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, THE MODERNIZATION DECISION
SHOULD BE TAKEN THIS YEAR. ZEINER GUNDERSEN STATED HIS
OPPOSITION TO ANY REDUCTION IN THE PROPOSED MODERNIZATION

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PACKAGE.
14. HARDY (CANADA) AGREED THAT THE IDD FORMS A
SUITABLE BASIS FOR DECEMBER DECISIONS. THE CANADIAN
GOVERNMENT CAN ACCEPT THE IDD AND ITS COMMUNIQUE FOR
REFERRAL TO MINISTERS. CANADA, HE SAID, SUPPORTS THE
NEED TO DECIDE ON BOTH PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT IN
DECEMBER. WITH RESPECT TO THE DANISH PROPOSAL, HARDY
STATED HE UNDERSTOOD THE PREDICAMENT FACING DANISH
LEADERS, BUT FOR THE ALLIANCE TO DELAY DECISION NOW
WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY THE EAST AND BY FRIENDS ALIKE
AS WEAKNESS, UNDERMINING THE COHESIVENESS OF THE ALLIANCE.

15. WURTH (LUXEMBOURG) AND DE VILLAS-BOAS (PORTUGAL)
SPOKE BRIEFLY IN SUPPORT OF THE IDD.

16. ATHANASSIOU (GREECE), REFERRING TO HIS STATEMENT
AT THE 6 NOVEMBER PERREDS MEETING, STATED THAT HIS
GOVERNMENT FINDS THE IDD A PERFECTLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS
FOR THE ALLIANCE TO TAKE DECISIONS IN TWO WEEKS ON
MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID
THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL JOIN THE ALLIANCE DECISION
WITHOUT RESERVATION. HOWEVER, HE ADDED, HE AGREED
WITH ITALY AND BELGIUM IN LEAVING OPEN THE COMMUNIQUE
LANGUAGE UNTIL A TIME CLOSER TO THE ACTUAL DECISION.
ATHANASSIOU CIRCULATED A RECOMMENDATION TO CHANGE
PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE COMMUNIQUE TO DELETE THE LAST
PHRASE "WHICH MINISTERS ALL PLEDGED THEIR
GOVERNMENTS TO SUPPORT." ENCOUNTERING NO SUPPORT AND
US AND TURKISH RESISTANCE, HE SUBSEQUENTLY WITHDREW HIS
RECOMMENDATION.

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17. OLCAY (TURKEY) STATED THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO DIFFICULTY WITH THE IDD, FINAL DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN ON DECEMBER 12. HE ADDED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE WORDING SHOULD BE LEFT OPEN UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT AND SHARED THE NORWEGIAN VIEW THAT THE STYLE WAS TOO "HIGH-BROW," TOO EXPERTLY WORDED FOR THE LAYMAN.

18. BJORNSSON (ICELAND) SAID THAT THE ICELANDIC POSITION WAS AS STATED AT THE NOVEMBER 6 MEETING. HE ACCEPTED THE IDD AS A BASIS FOR FINAL ACTION BY MINISTERS NEXT MONTH.

19. SYG LUNS, SUMMING UP BEFORE A SHORT BREAK,

EMPHATICALLY ASSERTED THAT IT WAS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE THAT THERE BE A CONSENSUS ON THE MESSAGE THE OTHER ALLIES CONVEY TO THE US ABOUT LRTNF PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT; THAT THE US HAD ASKED THAT THERE BE SUCH A CONSENSUS. HOWEVER, HE STRONGLY EMPHASIZED, THE DECISION ON PRODUCTION REMAINS AN AMERICAN DECISION. LUNS ADDED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM RELIABLE SOURCES THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON LRTNF ARMS CONTROL EVEN IF THE ALLIANCE DECIDES ON MODERNIZATION.

20. THE MEETING RESUMED WITH AARON RESPONDING TO ALLIES' COMMENTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO THE IDD. HE SAID IT WAS VERY GRATIFYING TO GET SUCH WIDESPREAD AND GENERAL SUPPORT. HE STATED THAT WHILE THE US SAW NO NEED FOR CHANGES TO THE IDD AFTER THIS MEETING, OF COURSE IT WAS THE PREROGATIVE OF MINISTERS TO DO SO IF THEY SO DECIDED ON DECEMBER 12. AARON ACCEPTED WITH APPRECIATION THE SYG'S SUGGESTION ON HANDLING THE NETHERLANDS RECOMMENDED CHANGE TO PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE IDD.

AARON WENT ON TO MAKE A STRONG STATEMENT IN REBUTTAL TO THE NETHERLANDS POSITION:

-- THE EMERGING ALLIANCE CONSENSUS IN FACT MEETS THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NETHERLANDS' POSITION. THE ULTIMATE SCALE OF DEPLOYMENTS WILL DEPEND ON ARMS CONTROL RESULTS. IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT IF WE SUCCEED IN REDUCING THE SOVIET THREAT WE CAN REDUCE OUR REQUIREMENTS.

-- THE FORMULA CHOSEN BY THE DUTCH TO GIVE EFFECT TO THEIR POSITION, THAT ONE CAN AND SHOULD SEPARATE PRODUCTION FROM DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS IS ARTIFICIAL AND SIMPLY NOT FEASIBLE.

-- THE US HAS BEEN AS RESPONSIVE AS POSSIBLE TO ALL ITS ALLIES' POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS.

-- THE US ALSO IS A DEMOCRACY AND HAS POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS. WE CANNOT ASK CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS FOR PRODUCTION WITHOUT A DECISION TO DEPLOY -- IT'S SIMPLY A NONSTARTER.

-- IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANY PARLIAMENT IN THE ALLIANCE, CERTAINLY NOT THE US CONGRESS, WOULD TAKE SUCH AN ACTION.


22. CATALANO (ITALY), SUPPORTED AARON'S REBUTTAL TO THE DUTCH. PAULS (FRG) ALSO COMMENTED ON THE DUTCH PROPOSAL. HE SAID THE NUMBER 572 WAS KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC, AS WAS NATO'S PROPOSAL TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY
MODERNIZED LRTNF WEAPONS. IF NOW THE ALLIANCE RECOMMENDED THE NUMBERS AND DECIDED ON PRODUCTION AND NOT DEPLOYMENT,

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USMR SHAPE BE
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IT WOULD CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ALLIANCE HAD MODIFIED ITS POSITION UNDER THE IMPACT OF SOVIET PRESSURE WHICH IN TURN WOULD WEAKEN THE ALLIANCE'S POSITION IN THE FORTHCOMING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. PAULS ADDED THAT THE KREMLIN COULD PLAY ON TIME IF THE NATO DECISION WERE CURTAILED; THEREFORE, THE DUTCH PROPOSAL IN FACT WEAKENED THE ALLIANCE POSITION.

23. SYG LUNS REMINDED THE PERMREPS THAT SECRETARY BROWN HAD CLEARLY SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THE SENATE AND HOUSE TO VOTE FUNDS FOR LRTNF WITHOUT EUROPEAN ACCEPTANCE OF DEPLOYMENTS. HOLST (NORWAY) THEN RECAPITULATED WHAT HE SAW AS THE FOUR MOST

SALIENT ISSUES IN THE LRTNF DECISION PROCESS:

(1) IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE STRUCTURE THE DECISION PROCESS SO THAT IT WILL CONTAIN BUT ONE SALIENT DECISION POINT. IF WE CREATE MORE WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN
THE POLITICAL QUIET AND CONSENSUS WE NEED IN ORDER TO PURSUE CREDIBLE NEGOTIATIONS.

(2) WE MUST ACCEPT THAT THE DECISION ON PRODUCTION IS ESSENTIALLY AN AMERICAN DECISION.

(3) AN AMERICAN DECISION ON PRODUCTION DOES, WE ARE TOLD, PRESUPPOSE AN EXPRESSED EUROPEAN WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT DEPLOYMENT.

(4) WITH A DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT, NEGOTIATIONS COULD PRODUCE AN OUTCOME WHEREUNDER THE SCALE OF NATO'S TNF DEPLOYMENT COULD BE RECONSIDERED. IT IS OUR OBJECTIVE TO BRING ABOUT THAT SITUATION. THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED WITH RESPECT TO ABM UNDER SALT I. WE HAVE TO PRODUCE OUR DECISIONS IN A MANNER WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE SOVIET UNION WITH THE MAXIMUM INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON AN EQUILIBRIUM OF FORCES AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL.

24. SYG LUNS READ A PROPOSED PARAGRAPH TO BE USED AS PRESS GUIDANCE RELATING TO THE MEETING. AFTER A SHORT DISCUSSION, THE FOLLOWING TWO PASSAGES WERE APPROVED AS Press GUIDANCE:

- A. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE MEMBERS CONCERNED, REINFORCED BY SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS, MET ON NOVEMBER 28 TO CONSIDER FURTHER THE QUESTIONS

OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. THEY REVIEWED THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND THE SPECIAL GROUP, IN PARTICULAR THE INTEGRATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TWO GROUPS, IN PREPARATION FOR THE DECEMBER 12 MEETING OF MINISTERS.

- B. THE DANISH DELEGATION PRESENTED TO THE ALLIES ITS GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS ON THE TNF ISSUE AND TOOK NOTE OF THEIR REACTIONS.

25. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY AARON'S REMARKS:

I AM PLEASED TO COME TO BRUSSELS AGAIN ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT CARTER TO CONCLUDE AT OUR LEVEL THE ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION OF THE MODERNIZATION OF OUR LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES. DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES OF RECENT WEEKS, THE PRESIDENT HAS CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE ALLIANCE'S WORK ON TNF. I'M SURE YOU AGREE WITH HIS ASSESSMENT THAT IN TWO WEEKS, THE ALLIANCE WILL TAKE A CRUCIAL
AND HISTORIC STEP. THE DECISION TO MODERNIZE TNF WILL DEMONSTRATE OUR RESOLVE, OUR COHESION, AND OUR DETERM-
NATION TO PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY OF OUR NATIONS. THE DECISION TO EXPAND OUR ARMS CONTROL AGENDA TO INCLUDE TNF WILL DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMITMENT TO PURSUE WITH VIGOR AND VISION AGREEMENTS WITH THE EAST AIMED AT ENHANCING SECURITY AND STABILITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS. TOGETHER, THESE DECISIONS WILL SHOW THAT THE ALLIANCE REMAINS A VITAL, COURAGEOUS INSTITUTION, CAPABLE OF ADAPTING TO NEW TIMES AND MEETING NEW CHALLENGES.

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OUR PURPOSE TODAY IS TO REACH AGREEMENT THAT THE DOCUMENT BEFORE US IS A SUITABLE VEHICLE FOR THE DECISIONS OF OUR MINISTERS. WE WILL CULMINATE THE LONG, INTENSIVE, AND PRODUCTIVE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION AND PREPARATION THAT WAS NEEDED TO BRING THE ALLIANCE TO NEXT MONTH’S CRUCIAL MOMENT. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT TODAY’S MEETING WILL PRO-
DUCE AGREEMENT ON THE IDD, SO THAT THE MINISTERS CAN MAKE THE APPROPRIATE DECISION TWO WEEKS FROM NOW.


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UNCLASSIFIED
CONTROL WITHOUT A MODERNIZATION DECISION, BUT WITH A
MODERNIZATION DECISION, CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL ACHIEVEMENTS
WHICH REDUCE THE SOVIET THREAT CAN REDUCE OUR TNF RE-
QUIREMENTS.

THE ALLIES HAVE HAD SIX WEEKS TO REVIEW DRAFTS OF THE IDD.
IN THIS EXTENSIVE REVIEW PROCESS, WE HAVE INCORPORATED A
NUMBER OF USEFUL CHANGES SUGGESTED BY ALLIES. IN OUR
VIEW, THE DRAFTING AND EDITING PROCESS IS NOW FINISHED.

IF, NONETHELESS, ANY ALLIES HAVE SPECIFIC CHANGES IN THE
IDD TO SUGGEST TODAY, WE ARE READY TO CONTINUE THIS
MEETING UNTIL WE ALL AGREE THAT WE HAVE PRODUCED A SUIT-
ABLE DECISION DOCUMENT.

IN THAT CONNECTION, IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT
TWO DAYS AFTER THE DECEMBER 12 TNF DECISIONS, THE NAC
WILL, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, COME FORWARD WITH AN AGGRESSIVE,
COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL PROGRAM. WE HOPE THAT IT WILL
BE POSSIBLE AT THAT TIME TO REVEAL THE THRUST OF THE
ALLIANCE'S NEW MBFR APPROACH. IN COMBINATION WITH A
DECISION TO WITHDRAW 1000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM EUROPE
AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF TNF MODERNIZATION, THE ALLIANCE
WILL HAVE MUCH TO BE PROUD OF IN ITS EFFORTS TO ENGAGE
THE EAST IN SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL. THIS WILL BE OUR RE-
SPONSE TO RECENT EASTERN PROPOSALS. THERE WILL BE NO
MISTAKE ABOUT NATO'S DETERMINATION TO PURSUE GENUINE ARMS
CONTROL ACROSS A BROAD FRONT.

WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE
IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. BUT WE MUST GIVE NO GROUNDS FOR
THE SOVIETS TO QUESTION THE DEPTH OF THE ALLIANCE'S COM-
MITMENT TO TNF MODERNIZATION. WE MUST BE CLEAR-EYED

ABOUT CURRENT SOVIET INTENTIONS. WE HAVE WITNESSED AN
UNMISTAKEABLE POLITICAL ATTEMPT BY MOSCOW TO INTERFERE
IN OUR DECISIONS AND TO PREVENT US FROM TAKING STEPS THAT
THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES ARE TAKING -- STEPS WHICH HAVE
BEEN MADE NECESSARY BY SOVIET DEPLOYMENT ACTIONS.

AT THE SAME TIME, SOVIET ACTIONS UNDERSCORE THE SERIOUS-
NESS OF THE CHALLENGE BEFORE US. I REPORTED TO YOU ON
NOVEMBER 6TH RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SS-20 FORCE.
AGAIN, JUST LAST WEEK, WE DISCOVERED YET ANOTHER SS-20
BASE UNDER CONSTRUCTION, BRINGING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
SS-20 BASES OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION TO 23, AND
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SS-20 WARHEADS WHICH ARE BEING DEPLOYED TO 621 -- A NUMBER WHICH ALONE NOW EXCEEDS THE NATO-PROPOSED PROGRAM OF LRINF -- EVEN WITHOUT COUNTING THE HUNDREDS OF SS 4’S AND 5’S AND MEDIUM BOMBERS.

BY THEIR RECENT ACTIONS AND WORDS, THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT WE MAKE PIRM DECISIONS. THESE DECISIONS WILL SHOW THE SOVIET UNION THAT NATO WILL NOT BOW TO THREATS NOR BE TEMPTED BY VAGUE AND INEQUITABLE PROPOSALS. NATO’S DECISION MUST MAKE CLEAR THAT THE BEST PATH FOR THE SOVIET UNION IS THAT OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. FOR THIS REASON THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL OF THE DANISH GOVERNMENT.

TWELVE YEARS AGO, THE ALLIANCE MADE A FUNDAMENTAL DECISION -- THAT NATO WOULD DEDICATE ITSELF BOTH TO DETENTE AND DEFENSE. FOR PERHAPS THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE HARMEL REPORT WAS ADOPTED, THE ALLIANCE IS BEING ASKED TO TAKE

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A DECISION WHICH DIRECTLY EMBODIES BOTH PRINCIPLES SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE ESSENCE OF THE CHOICE THE ALLIANCE FACES IN DECEMBER, AND WHICH IS EMBODIED IN THIS DOCUMENT, IS WHETHER WE HAVE THE COURAGE TO MATCH THAT WISDOM.

WE STAND ON THE THRESHOLD OF WHAT MAY BE THE MOST IMPORTANT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION EVER UNDERTAKEN AFFECT-
ING EUROPE -- ONE THAT HOLDS OUT THE PROMISE OF LIFTING
FOR THE FIRST TIME THE CLOUD OF NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION THAT
HANGS OVER THIS CONTINENT. BUT THIS OPPORTUNITY WILL BE
REALIZED ONLY IF WE ARE STRONG, ONLY IF WE ARE UNITED,
AND ONLY IF WE MARK WELL THE ADVICE OF THE NATO WISEMEN
OF A DOZEN YEARS AGO -- DETENTE AND DEFENSE ARE IN-
DIVISIBLE.

END TEXT OF AARON'S REMARKS.

26. THERE FOLLOWS BELOW SIR CLIVE ROSE'S REMARKS.
BEGIN TEXT:

1. ONCE AGAIN I SHOULD LIKE TO WELCOME MR. AARON TO OUR
MEETING. I HAVE LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO HIS STATEMENT.
WHAT HE HAD TO SAY IS VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH THE VIEWS
OF MY OWN AUTHORITIES.

2. WE REMAIN CONVINCED OF THE NEED TO TAKE POSITIVE
DECISIONS IN DECEMBER BOTH ON LRNTF MODERNISATION AND
ON PROPOSALS FOR LTNF ARMS CONTROL. WE REGARD IT AS OF THE
HIGHEST PRIORITY THAT THESE DECISIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN
IN PARALLEL SO THAT THE PRODUCTION AND IN DUE COURSE
DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW SYSTEMS CAN GO AHEAD WITHOUT DELAY
AND THAT WE CAN, ALONGSIDE THIS, ENGAGE THE SOVIET
UNION IN SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

3. WE DO NOT BELIEVE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE PRODUCTIVE
UNLESS THE ALLIANCE HAS FIRST DEMONSTRATED ITS RESOLVE
TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES OF ITS OWN.
ALL OUR EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE ONLY
LIKELY TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IF THEY ARE FACED WITH
EVIDENCE OF REAL DETERMINATION ON THE PART OF THE
ALLIANCE. FROM THIS WE DRAW THE FIRM CONCLUSION THAT
NATO MUST DECIDE ON ITS MODERNISATION PROGRAMME AND
HOW IT IS TO BE ACHIEVED BEFORE WE ATTEMPT TO BARGAIN
ABOUT LIMITATIONS. IF WE DO NOT DO THIS WHAT ARE WE
GOING TO BARGAIN WITH?

4. I HAVE LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO WHAT THE DANISH
REPRESENTATIVE HAS SAID TODAY. MY AUTHORITIES ARE

CONCERNED AT THE IDEAS WHICH ARE BEING DISCUSSED FOR
DELAYING DECISIONS. WE BELIEVE THE SUGGESTION IN OTHER
QUARTERS THAT WE SHOULD DECIDE IN DECEMBER ONLY TO GO
AHEAD WITH LIMITED PRODUCTION, LEAVING A DECISION
ON DEPLOYMENT UNTIL LATER, WOULD BE WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE. IT WOULD NOT PROVIDE THE EVIDENCE OF DETERMINATION WHICH IS NEEDED IF WE ARE TO GET THE RUSSIANS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ABOUT LIMITATIONS. INDEED IT WOULD GIVE THEM AMPLEx SCOPE FOR DRAGGING OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE OBJECT OF DEFERRING NATO DECISIONS ABOUT DEPLOYMENT. MEANWHILE THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE THEIR OWN BUILD-UP. SO THE IMBALANCE WOULD BE INCREASED.

5. WE ARE EQUALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROPOSAL OF THE DANISH GOVERNMENT THAT DECISIONS ON BOTH PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT SHOULD BE DEFERRED FOR SIX MONTHS IN RETURN FOR A FREEZE ON SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS AT THEIR CURRENT LEVELS. I HAVE TO SAY FRANKLY THAT WE REGARD THIS NOT ONLY AS IMPrACTICAL BUT ALSO AS HAVING MAJOR DISADVANTAGES FOR THE ALLIANCE IN MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ARMS CONTROL TERMS.

6. TO PUT OFF DECISIONS NOW FOR SIX MONTHS WOULD CAST DOUBT ON THE ALLIANCE'S ABILITY TO TAKE DIFFICULT DECISIONS. IT WOULD GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO MEET THE MILITARY TARGETS WHICH WE HAVE SET OURSELVES AND WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN SO MUCH PUBLISHED. AND OUR FAILURE TO DO THIS WOULD BE WIDELY INTERPRETED AS BEING THE RESULT OF SOVIET PRESSURE AND PROPAGANDA. THIS COULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE

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ALL NATO CAPITALS
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
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USNMR SHAPE BE
USCINCEUR VAHingen GERM

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NATO'S CREDIBILITY. IT WOULD SHOW A LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN OURSELVES WHICH WOULD BODE ILL FOR THE FUTURE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE.

7. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT POSTPONEMENT WOULD DAMAGE THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL. WHAT WOULD BE THE EFFECT ON THE SALT II RATIFICATION DEBATE? AT THE LEAST IT WOULD INTRODUCE A NEW ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY INTO THE SITUATION. INDECISION AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY MANY PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES AS SHOWING THAT EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE WERE RELUCTANT TO TAKE THE MEASURES NECESSARY FOR THEIR DEFENCE. THIS COULD ONLY BE HARMFUL TO RELATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

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8. BUT MORE THAN THIS, WE WOULD LOSE THE OPPORTUNITY - TO WHICH I REFERRED IN MY REMARKS ON 6 NOVEMBER - TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL BY PUTTING FORWARD A NUMBER OF MEASURES WHICH, TAKEN TOGETHER, WOULD ADD UP TO A SIGNIFICANT PACKAGE IN PARALLEL WITH THE MODERNIZATION DECISION. IT WOULD PRESUMABLY NO LONGER BE POSSIBLE TO GO AHEAD WITH THE PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWING WARHEADS FROM THE STOCKPILE IN EUROPE. AND THE CONTEXT IN WHICH WE WERE CONSIDERING NEW INITIATIVES IN MBFR WOULD BE RADICALLY CHANGED. IN THE NEW SITUATION WE SHOULD HAVE TO RE-EXAMINE THE BASIS FOR CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR SIMPLIFIED PHASE I. AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE IMPACT OF ANY PROPOSALS ON WHICH WE WERE ABLE TO AGREE WOULD BE MUCH REDUCED.

9. IN ANY CASE, WE SEE LITTLE POSSIBILITY WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF ACHIEVING ANY POSITIVE RESULTS ON TNF ARMS CONTROL. EVEN IF WE COULD ACHIEVE A FREEZE, THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE FROZEN IN ITS EXISTING POSITION OF INFERIORITY. THAT WOULD BE THE BASIS ON WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE TO EMBARK ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND IT IS NOT IN OUR VIEW A SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR SECURING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO LIMITATION OR REDUCTIONS. MOREOVER WHAT ASSURANCE WOULD WE HAVE THAT A FREEZE WOULD BE OBSERVED BY THE RUSSIANS? AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THE PROPOSAL IS THAT IT WOULD BE BASED ON A UNILATERAL SOVIET DECLARATION. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO US AT WHAT POINT WITHIN THE PROPOSED SIX MONTH PERIOD THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE EXPECTED TO GIVE ANY SUCH COMMITMENT. BUT IN ANY CASE IS IT SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE VERIFICATION MEASURES AND AN AGREED DATA BASE BEFORE IT STARTS? THERE WOULD BE LITTLE VALUE IN A SOVIET COMMITMENT TO A FREEZE WITHOUT
AGREEMENT ON THESE TWO POINTS. BUT HAVING IN MIND THE
EXPERIENCE OF SALT II AND MBFR - CAN WE CONTEMPLATE
THAT AGREEMENT ON THESE POINTS ALONE WOULD BE REACHED
EVEN WITHIN THE PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS?

10. MY AUTHORITIES REMAIN CONvinCED THAT THERE CAN BE
NO SATISFACTORY SUBSTITUTE FOR PARALLEL DECISIONS IN
DECEMBER ON THE MODERNISATION AND ARMS CONTROL. THEY
CONSIDER THE REVISED VERSION OF THE IDD PROVIDES A
SUITABLE BASIS FOR SUCH DECISIONS.

27. FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT BY NORWEGIAN STATE SECRETARY FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JOHAN HOLST

BEGIN TEXT OF FIRST STATEMENT:

. I WANT FIRST OF ALL TO ASSOCIATE MYSELF WITH THOSE WHO
HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR APPRECIATION FOR THE SUCCINCT AND
IMPORTANT STATEMENT MADE BY MR. AARON AT THIS MEETING.

. ALLOW ME TO INFORM YOU ABOUT THE POSITION AND TIME
SCHEDULE OF MY GOVERNMENT IN THIS MATTER. THE NORWEGIAN
POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE NON-STATIONING AND NON-STOCK-
PILING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE NATO
DECISIONS ON MODERNIZATION. THEREFORE, MY GOVERNMENT WILL
GIVE PARTICULAR WEIGHT TO THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY THOSE
COUNTRIES THAT ARE MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE
DECISIONS. THIS ATTITUDE HAS IMPLICATIONS ALSO FOR THE
TIMING OF DECISIONS. NORWAY CANNOT BE UP FRONT IN
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

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MAKING HER DECISIONS SINCE WE SHALL HAVE TO AWAIT THE CLARIFICATION OF POSITIONS IN THE MOST AFFECTED CAPITALS.

NORWAY ATTRIBUTES PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE PRESENTATION OF A CREDIBLE AND PERSUASIVE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CONTINENTAL WEAPONS. NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD START AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE PURPOSE OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE TO ESTABLISH EQUILIBRIUM AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE FORCE LEVEL. THE URGENCY OF THIS OBJECTIVE IS UNDERSCORED BY THE DISTURBING FACT REPORTED BY MR. AARON THIS MORNING, THAT THE NUMBER OF SS-20 WARHEADS OPERATIONAL OR UNDER DEPLOYMENT ALREADY EXCEEDS THE PROJECTED LEVEL OF NATO TFN-DEPLOYMENTS.

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IT IS THE NORWEGIAN VIEWTHAT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO INCLUDE AS PART OF THE TNF DECISION PACKAGE THE UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF 1000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR DETERMINATION TO PURSUE ARMS CONTROL IN A VIGOROUS MANNER, THE SOONER THIS INITIATIVE BE PLACED ON THE PUBLIC RECORD THE BETTER. IN THE SAME VEIN WE HOPE THE OBSTACLES TO THE PRESENTATION OF THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM FIRST PHASE MBFR-AGREEMENT CAN BE SPEEDILY REMOVED. THAT PROPOSAL OUGHT TO BE PART OF WHAT WILL IN FACT AMOUNT TO A VIGOROUS AND COMPREHENSIVE NATO DECLARATION ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE MINISTERIAL MEETINGS IN DECEMBER.


THEREFORE, MR. CHAIRMAN, I SHALL LIMIT MYSELF AT THIS POINT TO A FEW GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE COMMUNIQUE.

THE COMMUNIQUE WE ARE DISCUSSING TODAY SHOULD BE ASSESSED IN POLITICAL TERMS SINCE IT WILL BE THE MOST
AUTHORITATIVE PRESENTATION OF THE COLLECTIVE DECISION OF
THIS ALLIANCE WITH RESPECT TO MODERNIZATION AND THE OFFER
TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE EAST ABOUT CONTINENTAL WEAPONS.

. FURTHERMORE, THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD AND DOES
REFLECT THE CONSENSUS OF VIEWS AND CONSIDERATIONS CONTAINED

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IN THE INTEGRATED DOCUMENT BASED ON THE REPORTS OF THE HLG
AND THE SG.

. ALTHOUGH I RECOGNIZE THE COMPLEX NATURE OF THE MATTER
INVOLVED, THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE WE ARE DISCUSSING TODAY IS
PERHAPS SOMEWHAT TECHNICAL IN CHARACTER, SEEMINGLY
ADDRESSED MORE TO THE EXPERT THAN THE GENERAL PUBLIC. IT
IS NOT EASY TO PENETRATE FOR THE ATTENTIVE LAYMAN. IT
SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE
ADDRESSED TO OUR PUBLICS. HOWEVER, WE SHALL NOT PROPOSE
A REWRITING OF THE COMMUNIQUE AT THIS LATE POINT IN TIME.

. IN POLITICAL TERMS THE COMMUNIQUE MUST CONSTITUTE A
PLATFORM FROM WHICH GOVERNMENTS CAN DRAW IN PRESENTING
AND EXPLAINING THE COLLECTIVE DECISIONS TO THEIR PUBLICS.
IT IS IMPORTANT, THEREFORE, THAT THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT
OF THE COMMUNIQUE AMPLY REFLECT THE POLITICAL RATIONALE
COLLECTIVELY DEVELOPED AND THE ARGUMENTS DEPLOYED IN
NATIONAL DEBATES. IN THIS CONNECTION I WANT TO DRAW
ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR A CREDIBLE ALIGNMENT OF
THE DECISION ON MODERNIZATION AND THE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE.
MOST PARTICULARLY, THE POINT THAT THE SCALE OF THE
EVENTUAL DEPLOYMENT WILL NEED TO BE CONSIDERED IN LIGHT
OF THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN A
SALIENT PRESENTATION IN THE COMMUNIQUE. WE SHOULD PAY
ATTENTION ALSO TO THIS POINT IN THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF
THE DECISIONS AFTER THE MEETING ON DECEMBER 12TH.
END TEXT. BENNETT

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