Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: JUNE 23, 1964

SUBJECT: British Comments on US Cutoff Verification Paper

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Richard Faber, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Samuel DePalma, ACDA/IR
Mr. Richard S. Thompson, ACDA/IR

COPIES TO: ACDA (12)
US Mission GENEVA DISDEL (3)
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy PARIS for USRO
INR (8)

Mr. Faber supplied an aide memoire (attachment A) setting forth British comments on the US paper on "Inspection of a Fissionable Material Cutoff". Although he had no specific instructions as to whether or not to request specific changes in the US paper prior to tabling, his remarks implied that the British comments are not intended to constitute such a request, and the British reservations on any particular point could be given effect at such time as detailed negotiations on a cutoff take place.

Mr. DePalma undertook to obtain at least preliminary US views on the British comments as soon as possible, and indicated that the US Delegation intends to go ahead with plans to table the paper in Geneva on June 25.

(At 12 noon on June 24, preliminary comments on the British aide memoire (attachment B) were passed to Mr. Faber by Mr. DePalma and Mr. Thompson, and it was again indicated to him that we intend to table the verification paper in Geneva June 25.)

ACDA-1 GP-3 Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified
CONFIDENTIAL

June 24, 1964

PRELIMINARY US COMMENTS ON AIDE MEMOIRE
FROM BRITISH EMBASSY OF JUNE 23, 1964 CONTAINING
COMMENTS ON US PAPER ON "INSPECTION OF A FISSIONABLE
MATERIAL CUTOFF"

The following comments are keyed to the lettered paragraphs in the British aide mémoire.

(a) We are in agreement on this point.

(b) While recognizing that in practice it might be difficult for the inspection procedures of the agreement to be made more stringent at some future date, a possibility contemplated in paragraph III.B., we feel that provision must be made for reviewing inspection procedures in the light of changing circumstances.

(c) The British understanding of our concept of the use of the IAEA is correct. It should be noted we are not definitely committed to an IAEA role.

(d) We agree with the British view that there is some risk that others in the IAEA might use the proposed inspection procedures for the cutoff as a basis for proposing changes in the Agency's safeguards. We hope this problem can be met by making clear that the purpose of inspection of nuclear powers under a cutoff agreement is to prevent diversion or clandestine production which is significant relative to the existing stockpiles, while IAEA procedures are intended to assure against any diversion to military use.

(e) The verification procedures adequate for nuclear powers would not be sufficient to prevent a non-nuclear country with a large nuclear energy program from diverting some fissionable material to weapons use. Consequently, the verification procedures would need to be different for non-nuclear powers, and in presenting the inspection paper we intend to make clear that the verification procedures described therein are applicable only to nuclear powers. We recognize
the problem involved in asking non-nuclear powers to accept an additional degree of verification beyond that for nuclear powers, and will consult further with the United Kingdom and other allies before tabling any proposed inspection plan for non-nuclear powers.

(f) It seems likely that, in view of steady production rates and fluctuating demand, at times the U-235 stockpiles could be sufficiently large so that application of safeguards to these stockpiles would be desirable. Since these storage sites are at fixed locations it does not appear that this aspect of the inspection plan would cause any serious difficulty for the host country.

(g) We feel that the inspection provisions as stated in the paper are the minimum necessary to give adequate assurance that significant diversion is not taking place. It is difficult to see how one would ascertain the enrichment of the end product without at least measuring the plant output. Once the output is subject to measurement the additional inspection requirements for U-235 plants would not add much to the burden of the inspection upon the host country. While we see some difficulties with this suggestion, we will consider this matter further and would be pleased to have any additional ideas on the subject that the British may have when they have had the opportunity to examine the implications fully.

(h) Reworking of weapons material would be permitted and we do not believe that this would involve using any of the facilities that would be inspected.

(i) It seems necessary to provide for the situation in which one country would question the declaration of another country, particularly with regard to the quantity of fissionable material required for allowed uses. In practice there would probably need to be informal negotiations on this point, and these are more likely to succeed if the party which feels that another party is submitting incorrect declarations had the right to withdraw.