Appropriate proposals by the Soviet Union on questions of disarmament were submitted for the consideration of the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on 18 March, 30 April and 14 June 1957.

The problem of disarmament still remains unsolved. It is essential that we should move from idle discussion to action. It is important that we should make a first step in regard to disarmament, in order to clear the way to the gradual settlement of the problem as a whole, a problem which, given good-will, can undoubtedly be solved. It would do much to serve that purpose if disarmament questions could be publicly discussed in the United Nations not by five countries alone, but also by other States having a vital interest in the settlement of the problem of disarmament.

The Soviet Government, for its part, will continue to concentrate all its efforts on reaching an early solution of this most important problem of the present day.


I. The Limitation and Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments

A. Within one year from the entry into force of the convention, the following States will restrict or reduce their armed forces respectively to the maximum limits indicated below:

- France: 750,000
- United Kingdom: 750,000
- Soviet Union: 2,000,000
- United States: 2,000,000

The definition of the armed forces will be annexed to the convention.

B. During this same period, these States will place in storage depots, within their own territories, and under the supervision of an International Control Organization, specific quantities of designated types of armaments to be agreed upon and set forth in lists annexed to the convention.

C. The relation of other States to the convention, including the agreed levels of their armed forces, will be determined later.

D. The States listed in paragraph I A will be prepared to negotiate on a further limitation of their armed forces and armaments upon condition that:

1. Compliance with the provisions of the convention has been verified to their satisfaction.
2. There has been progress toward the solution of political issues.
3. Other essential States have become parties to the convention and have accepted levels for their armed forces and armaments, fixed in relation to the limits set out in paragraphs A and B above.

E. Upon the conditions cited above, negotiations could be undertaken by France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States on a further limitation of their armed forces which would involve agreed reductions for the United States and the Soviet Union to not less than 2.1 million men each. The agreed level of forces for France and the United Kingdom, corresponding to this figure, would be 700,000 men each. The levels of other essential States would be specified at the same time through negotiation with them.

F. Thereafter, and subject to the same conditions, negotiations could be undertaken on further limitations to not less than 1.7 million men each for the United States and the Soviet Union. The agreed level corresponding to this figure for France and the United Kingdom would be 650,000 men each. The levels of other essential States would be specified at the same time through negotiation with them.

G. Upon the conditions cited in D above, these States will also be prepared to negotiate on further limitations of armaments. The calculation of any such armament limitations will be in agreed relation to the armed forces determined in paragraphs E and F above and will be completed prior to the application of the further limitations in armed forces. The parties must be satisfied before such further limitations of armaments are undertaken and at all times thereafter that the armaments at the disposal of any party to the convention do not exceed the quantities thus allowed in each category.

H. No measures for the reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments beyond those provided for in paragraph A and B above will be put into effect until the system of control is appropriately expanded and is able to verify such measures.

II. Military Expenditure

In order to assist in verifying compliance with the provisions of paragraph I, and looking forward to the reduction of military expenditures, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States agree to make available to the International Control
Organization information about their military budgets and expenditures for the year preceding entry of the convention into force and for each year thereafter. The categories of information to be supplied will be agreed in advance and annexed to the convention.

III. Nuclear Weapons

Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defence.

IV. The Control of Fissile Material

A. The parties to the convention further undertake:

1. That all future production of fissile materials will be used at home or abroad, under international supervision, exclusively for non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling, beginning one month after the International Board of Control described in paragraph VIII has certified that the installation of an effective inspection system to verify the commitment has been completed.
2. That they will co-operate in the prompt installation and in the maintenance of such an inspection system.
3. That for the purpose of accomplishing the above undertakings, the five Governments represented on the Sub-Committee will appoint a group of technical experts to meet as soon as possible to design the required inspection system, and to submit a progress report for their approval within the first ten months after the entry into force of the convention.

B. The parties which are producers of fissile material for weapons purposes at the time of cessation of production for weapons purposes undertake to provide, under international supervision, for equitable transfers, in successive increments, of fissile materials from previous production to non-weapons purposes, at home or abroad, including stockpiling; and, in this connexion

1. To fix the specific ratios of quantities of fissile materials of comparable analysis to be transferred by each of them, and
2. To commence such transfers at agreed dates and in agreed quantities at the fixed ratios following the cut-off date for production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.

C. From the date of the cessation of production of fissile material for weapons purposes provided in paragraph IV A 1:

1. Each party undertakes not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons, except where, under arrangements between transferor and transferee, their use will be in conformity with paragraph III.

2. Each party undertakes not otherwise to transfer out of its control any fissile material or to accept transfer to it of such material, except for non-weapons purposes.

V. Nuclear Weapons Testing

A. All parties to the convention undertake to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for a period of twelve months from the date of entry into force of the convention, provided that agreement has been reached on the installation and maintenance of the necessary controls, including inspection posts with scientific instruments, located within the territories of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, the area of the Pacific Ocean and at such other places as may be necessary, with the consent of the Governments concerned.

B. A group of technical experts appointed by the five Governments represented on the Sub-Committee will meet as soon as possible to design the inspection system to verify the suspension of testing.

C. Upon termination of the twelve months period, the parties will be free to conduct tests unless they have agreed to continue the suspension for a further period under effective international inspection.

D. If the inspection system referred to in paragraph V A is operating to the satisfaction of each party concerned and if progress satisfactory to each party concerned is being achieved in the preparation of an inspection system for the cessation of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes agreed to under Paragraph IV A 1 above, all parties to the convention undertake to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for a further period of twelve months.

Such an extension will be made only with the understanding that testing may at the discretion of each party be conducted twenty-four months after the entry into force of the convention if the inspection system for the cessation of production for weapons purposes has not been installed to the satisfaction of each party concerned before the end of the twenty-four months and if the cessation of production for weapons purposes has not been put into effect.

E. If tests are resumed, each party undertakes to announce and register in advance the dates of each series and the range of total energy to be released therein; to provide for limited observation of them; and to limit the amount of radioactive material to be released into the atmosphere.

VI. The Control of Objects Entering Outer Space

All parties to the convention agree that within three months after the entry into effect of the convention they will co-operate in the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.
VII. Safeguards Against the Possibility of Surprise Attack

A. From the entry into force of the convention the parties concerned will co-operate in the establishment and maintenance of systems of inspection to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack.

B. The establishment of such systems will be subject to agreement on the details of its installation, maintenance and operation. It is proposed as a matter of urgency that a working group of experts appointed by the five Governments represented on the Sub-Committee be set up at once to examine the technical problems and to report their conclusions which could form the basis for an annex to the agreement.

C. With regard to inspection in the Western Hemisphere and in the Soviet Union the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States propose the following:

1. That all the territory of the continental United States, all Alaska including the Aleutian Islands, all the territory of Canada and all the territory of the Soviet Union will be open to inspection.

2. If the Government of the Soviet Union rejects this broad proposal, to which is related the proposal for inspection in Europe, referred to in paragraph D below, the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (with the consent of the Governments of Denmark and Norway) propose that:

All the territory north of the Arctic Circle of the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland), and Norway; all the territory of Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union west of 140 degrees West longitude, east of 160 degrees East longitude and north of 50 degrees North latitude; all the remainder of Alaska; all the remainder of the Kamchatka peninsula; and all of the Aleutian and Kurile Islands will be open to inspection.

D. With regard to inspection in Europe, provided there is commitment on the part of the Soviet Union to one of the two foregoing proposals, the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the concurrence in principle of their European allies and in continuing consultation with them, subject to the indispensable consent of the countries concerned and to any mutually agreed exceptions, propose that an area including all of Europe, bounded in the south by latitude 40 degrees North and in the west by 10 degrees West longitude and in the east by 60 degrees East longitude will be open to inspection.

E. If the Government of the Soviet Union rejects this broad proposal, then, under the same proviso expressed above, a more limited zone of inspection in Europe could be discussed but only on the under-standing that this would include a significant part of the territory of the Soviet Union, as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe.

F. The system of inspection to guard against surprise attack will include in all cases aerial inspection, with ground observation posts at principal ports, railway junctions, main highways, and important airfields, etc., as agreed. There would also, as agreed, be mobile ground teams with specifically defined authority.

G. Ground posts may be established by agreement at points in the territories of the States concerned without being restricted to the limits of the zones described in paragraphs C 1 and 2, but the areas open to ground inspection will not be less than the areas of aerial inspection. The mobility of ground inspection would be specifically defined in the agreement with in all cases the concurrence of the countries directly concerned. There would also be all necessary means of communication.

H. Within three months of the entry into force of the convention, the parties will provide to the Board of Control inventories of their fixed military installations, and numbers and locations of their military forces and designated armaments, including the means of delivering nuclear weapons located within an agreed inspection zone or zones, and within such additional area or areas as may be agreed.

I. Any initial system of inspection designed to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack may be extended by agreement of all concerned to the end that ultimately the system will deal with the danger of surprise attack from anywhere.

VIII. The International Control Organization

A. All the obligations contained in the convention will be conditional upon the continued operation of an effective international control and inspection system to verify compliance with its terms by all parties.

B. All the control and inspection services described in the convention and those which may be created in the course of its implementation will be within the framework of an International Control Organization established under the aegis of the Security Council, which will include, as its executive organ, a Board of Control in which the affirmative vote of the representatives of the Governments represented on the Sub-Committee and of such other parties as may be agreed will be required for important decisions.

C. All parties to the convention undertake to make available information freely and currently to the Board of Control to assist it in verifying compliance with the obligations of the convention and in categories which will be set forth in an annex to it.

D. The functions of the International Control Organization will be expanded by agreement between the parties concerned as the measures provided for in the convention are progressively applied.
E. Other matters relating to the Organization will be defined in annexes to the convention. These matters will include the duties which the Organization is to carry out, the method by which it shall function, its composition, its relationship to the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, its voting procedures, its working conditions, jurisdiction, immunities, and prerogatives.

IX. Movement of Armaments

In addition to other rights and responsibilities, the Board of Control will have authority to study a system for regulating the export and import of designated armaments.

X. Suspension of the Convention

A. Each party will have the right to suspend its obligations, partially or completely, by written notice to the International Control Organization, in the event of an important violation by another party, or other action by any state which so prejudices the security of the notifying party as to require partial or complete suspension.

B. At its option a party may give advance notice of intention to suspend its obligations, in order to afford opportunity for correction of the violations or prejudicial action.

XI. This working paper is offered for negotiation on the understanding that its provisions are inseparable. Failure to fulfil any of the provisions of the convention would create a situation calling for examination at the request of any party.

220. Memorandum by the Soviet Government on Partial Measures in the Field of Disarmament, September 20, 1957

1. The problem of disarmament is the most urgent and vital international problem, for unless it is solved in a positive manner, the peoples of the world cannot feel free of the threat of a new war, in which weapons of mass destruction would be used. The solution of the disarmament problem would be a most important factor in alleviating international tension and ensuring the peace and security of States. An agreement on disarmament would not only remove the danger of a new war, but would also greatly reduce the burden of taxation and economic hardship borne by the peoples as a result of the armaments race, and would help to increase their well-being.

2. That is why the peoples are demanding with increasing insistence that measures should be taken without delay to stop the armaments race, to reduce the armed forces and armaments of States and to prohibit atomic and hydrogen weapons.

3. In its approach to the solution of the disarmament problem, the Soviet Government is guided primarily by the principle of the peaceful coexistence of States, irrespective of differences in their social systems, and by a desire to alleviate international tension and to develop friendly co-operation with all peoples.

4. The Soviet Government is in favour of a radical solution of the disarmament problem, which would result in a substantial reduction of armaments and armed forces and in the absolute prohibition of atomic weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States. However, in view of the refusal of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to agree to take broad measures on disarmament, the Soviet Union, being desirous of taking practical steps towards disarmament without delay, even before agreement is reached on a comprehensive programme, proposes that agreement should be reached on partial measures in the field of disarmament, on the basis of the following provisions.

A. Reduction of armed forces

5. The Soviet Government considers that the security requirements of all States would be largely met by an agreement to reduce armed forces to a level of 1 to 1.5 million men for the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China and to a level of 650,000 for the United Kingdom and France.

6. However, in its desire to facilitate agreement on this matter on a mutually acceptable basis, the Soviet Government would consent to carry out the reduction of armed forces in three stages, as proposed by the United States Government. For the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, this would mean reduction to a level of 2.5 million men at the first stage, 2.1 million at the second stage and 1.7 million at the third stage. With regard to the United Kingdom and France, it is proposed to establish the levels of armed forces for these States at 750,000 men for each country at the first stage, 700,000 at the second stage and 650,000 at the third stage.

7. It is understood that the strength of the armed forces of all States parties to the agreement would include personnel employed by the armed forces in a civilian capacity, but engaged in servicing military equipment and installations.

8. The Soviet Government considers it essential that the appropriate disarmament agreement between the Powers should cover all the above stages and that the transition from one stage of the reduction of armed
forces to the next should not be dependent on any conditions which are not stipulated in the agreement itself.

9. The reduction of the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States only to the level of 2.5 million men, without a simultaneous agreement on subsequent reductions of the armed forces of the contracting Powers, cannot be justified. This would give one party the advantage and prejudice the interests of the other, for the positions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States with regard to security needs differ in many respects.

10. It is impossible to disregard the fact that the territory of the Soviet Union is much larger than that of the United States and that the security of its longer frontiers calls for a corresponding strength of armed forces. In particular, it would be wrong to ignore the fact that the security of the Soviet Union is threatened by the North Atlantic bloc in the west, by the Baghdad Pact group in the south, and by both the Baghdad Pact group and the SEATO military bloc in Asia and the Far East.¹ The United States, whose territory and frontiers are considerably less than those of the Soviet Union, is in quite a different position, and no danger threatens its frontiers.

11. Thus, while the reduction of the armed forces of the United States to 2.5 million men would not only ensure the security of that country but would also enable it to maintain considerable forces beyond its frontiers and in foreign territory, the reduction of Soviet armed forces to the same level would prejudice the security of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, whose frontiers have no such natural protections as those of the United States and which, moreover, has long stretches of common frontiers with States participating in the above-mentioned military blocs.

12. The position would be different if the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could agree on the reduction of their armed forces to 2.1 million men at the second stage and to 1.7 million men at the third stage, since that would mean a radical change in the whole international situation and the creation of circumstances in which the security of States would not be threatened by the maintenance of large armed forces by any Power.

B. Reduction of armaments and military budgets

13. The Soviet Government considers that it would be most expedient to reduce conventional armaments by 15 per cent during the first stage of the reduction of armed forces. At the same time, the Soviet Government, taking into account the position of the United States and other Western Powers on this subject, agrees in principle

with the United States proposal for the reduction of armaments through the mutual submission of specific lists of the armaments to be reduced.¹

14. With regard to the reduction of military budgets, the Soviet Government persists in its view that budgets for the first stage of the reduction of armed forces and armaments could be reduced by 15 per cent.

15. At the same time, it should be stipulated that agreement on the reduction of armaments in accordance with lists should not delay the implementation of the provisions of the agreement which relate to the reduction of armed forces and military budgets.

C. Prohibition of atomic weapons

16. The Soviet Government proceeds from the premise that agreement on the question of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which present a particular danger owing to their enormous destructive power, should be reached simultaneously with the conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of armed forces, armaments and military budgets.

17. The Soviet Union is in favour of a radical solution of the question of atomic weapons and considers that the cause of ensuring a stable peace and removing the threat of an atomic war would be served by the absolute prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the cessation of their production, their elimination from armaments and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons, in accordance with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic[s] proposals of 10 May 1955, 17 November 1956 and 18 March 1957.²

18. In view of the fact that the Western Powers are at present unwilling to agree to the absolute and unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the Soviet Government proposes that States should take at least the first step in this direction and should assume, in the eyes of the peoples of the whole world, the solemn obligation to renounce the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons in any form, including air bombs, rockets of any range with atomic or hydrogen warheads, atomic artillery and so forth. This obligation should come into force at the beginning of the first stage of measures for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments.

19. Pending the reaching of agreement on this subject, the Soviet Government considers that it would be advisable for States possessing nuclear weapons to assume the solemn obligation not to use these weapons; this obligation should initially be assumed for a period of five years. The Soviet Government presumes that the question will be reconsidered by the United Nations on the expiry of this five-year

¹ Ante, doc. 196.
² Ante, docs. 112, 183, and 195.
period. Such temporary agreement on the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons by States would create favourable conditions for a broader agreement on disarmament questions, including the question of the final prohibition of nuclear weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States.

20. The Soviet Government considers that such a temporary agreement should be considered as a separate and independent question, the settlement of which should not be made conditional on the reaching of agreement on other aspects of the disarmament problem.

21. The Soviet Government cannot agree with contentions that the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons is lawful and that the discussion should relate not to renunciation of their use, but merely to the establishment of certain limitations of such use. This would mean that the aggressor himself would be the judge of his own actions and that he could use nuclear weapons at will, under cover of the alleged right of self-defence. It stands to reason that the Soviet Union cannot become a party to any such chicanery, since the interests of the peoples will be served, not by the legalization of nuclear weapons, but by their absolute and unconditional prohibition and, as an important step along that course, by the renunciation of their use on the part of States.

22. The Soviet Government draws attention to the fact that the handing over of atomic weapons to States which do not manufacture such weapons at the present time and the stationing of foreign atomic military units in various parts of the world are intensifying the threat of atomic war and creating an atmosphere which is dangerous to the cause of peace. Such actions may provoke measures of retaliation on the part of the States whose security is thus threatened. The Soviet Government therefore considers it necessary for States possessing nuclear weapons to assume the obligation, under an appropriate agreement, not to allow the installation of any atomic military units or any types of atomic or hydrogen weapons beyond their national frontiers and not to place these weapons at the disposal of any other States or commands of military blocs.

23. The United States and other Western Powers propose that the cessation of manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes in the future should be provided for in a partial agreement on disarmament. However, the United States proposals do not in any way relate to the absolute cessation of the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Apart from the fact that the United States and other Western Powers refuse to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, to eliminate them from the armaments of States and to destroy stockpiles of these weapons, the United States insists on reserving the right to manufacture and perfect atomic weapons from fissionable materials already stockpiled.

24. The Soviet Government maintains its view that it is essential to achieve the absolute cessation of the manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons. However, as the Soviet Government has repeatedly pointed out, these measures can have a real significance in removing the threat of atomic war only if the question of the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the absolute elimination of these weapons from the armaments of States is settled simultaneously.

**D. Discontinuance of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons**

25. The Soviet Government continues to insist on the necessity of reaching an agreement on the discontinuance of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons, without making agreement on this subject conditional on the reaching of agreement on other aspects of disarmament. The need for such an agreement is dictated not only by the fact that continuance of test explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs greatly endangers the health of human beings and that such tests promote the manufacture of still more terrible and destructive types of atomic and hydrogen weapons, but also by the fact that a positive solution of this problem would lead to a considerable improvement of the international situation and would greatly enhance the prospects of reaching agreement on other aspects of disarmament and of putting an end to the current armaments race.

26. The Soviet Government feels obliged to stress that other States, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, which possess nuclear weapons should be no less interested than the Soviet Union in discontinuing tests of these weapons. The States which are placing obstacles in the way of an agreement on this important question are assuming a heavy burden of responsibility before the peoples, who are ever more insistently demanding the cessation of test explosions of atom and hydrogen bombs. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, it is high time to put an end to a situation in which a given country or group of countries which are hindering the reaching of agreement on the discontinuance of tests of nuclear weapons can regard a large part of the earth's surface, containing the overwhelming majority of its population, as a chessboard on which they can play with the destinies of nations behind the backs of the peoples concerned.

27. In view of the importance of the discontinuance of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to bring this question before the twelfth session of the General Assembly as a separate and independent agenda item.
E. International control

28. The implementation of the measures provided for in the agreement on partial disarmament should be placed under appropriate international control.

29. As the Soviet Government has already proposed, control functions could be performed, by agreement between the parties, by a control organ to be established for this purpose within the framework of the Security Council.

30. The Soviet Government reiterates its proposal that, at the first stage, control posts should be set up in the territory of States, on a basis of reciprocity at large ports, railway junctions and motor highways, to see to it that no dangerous concentrations of armed forces and armaments occur.\(^1\) The list of places where control posts are to be established should be drawn up in a supplementary agreement. However, since we are now concerned only with partial measures, the question of control posts should be settled in an appropriate manner. Accordingly, at the first stage, control posts should be set up only in the western frontier areas of the Soviet Union, in the territory of France, the United Kingdom and other States participating in the North Atlantic Alliance and in the Warsaw Treaty, and also in the eastern part of the United States.

31. Control posts may also be established in the territory of other States in the aerial photography zone by agreement with these States.

32. It is proposed that control posts at airfields should be set up at the second and third stages of the reduction of armed forces and armaments. The question of the establishment of control posts at airfields also requires correlation with the relevant measures for the final prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States.

F. Aerial photography

33. The Soviet Government maintains its view that aerial photography can neither prevent surprise attacks nor ensure the necessary control over disarmament. Taking into account, however, the fact that as a result of the position taken by the United States and other Western Powers, the question of aerial photography has become one of the serious obstacles to agreement on disarmament, the Soviet Government has expressed its willingness to consider the question of establishing aerial photography zones in Europe and the Far East. The establishment of such zones was provided for in the Soviet Union's disarmament proposals of 17 November 1956, 18 March 1957 and 30 April 1957\(^2\) and in other documents which the Soviet Government submitted for the consideration of members of the Sub-Committee. The Soviet Government continues to maintain these proposals.

34. However, these Soviet Union proposals were not supported by the United States and the other Western Powers, which in this case also showed no willingness to co-operate in achieving agreement on disarmament.

35. The United States and the other Western Powers now propose aerial inspection of the whole territory of the United States, Canada and the Soviet Union.

36. The Soviet Government considers that in the present circumstances, when mistrust and suspicion prevail among the great Powers, when such tension exists in international relations and when an armaments race and preparations for atomic war are being conducted by the States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], such a proposal is unrealistic and artificial. No peace-loving State can agree to the aerial photography of the whole of its territory without jeopardizing its security. Accordingly, the only possible appraisal of the Western Powers' proposal on aerial photography is that it is designed to obtain intelligence information, that it can lead, not to an improvement, but only to an aggravation of the international situation, and that it is directed towards promoting preparations for an aggressive war.

37. Furthermore, the Western Powers' proposal does not provide for the aerial photography of the territory of certain NATO countries and of a number of countries where the military bases of States participating in the aggressive military NATO bloc are situated. The exemption from aerial inspection of certain NATO countries and countries which, although not members of NATO, have foreign military bases in their territory, would place the Soviet Union and its allies under the Warsaw Treaty, whose territories it is proposed to open to aerial inspection, in a disadvantageous position.

38. It is doubtful whether the other United States proposal\(^1\) concerning aerial photography of Arctic regions can be considered seriously, since aerial inspection of the empty, sparsely-populated Arctic wastes can serve no useful purpose, either for the cause of disarmament or for the prevention of a surprise attack by one State against another.

39. The Soviet Government wishes to stress once again that no aerial photography can prevent a surprise attack by an aggressor who possesses weapons of mass destruction, the means of delivering such weapons to their target and an army of many millions. A different course must be followed.

40. A highly important part in relaxing international tension and creating an atmosphere of trust among States could be played by the

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\(^1\) See ante, doc. 112.

\(^2\) Ante, docs. 185, 195, and 203.
prohibition of nuclear weapons, a considerable reduction of the armed forces and armaments of States, and the abolition of foreign military bases in the territories of States.

41. Attention should now be paid to measures which would promote the alleviation of tension in international relations, the expansion of international economic and cultural contacts and the elimination of discrimination in trade.

42. If such measures were taken, the present tension and mistrust in the relations between the Powers would give way to friendly cooperation, expansion of international contacts, and exchanges of experience between States and peoples. Under those conditions, the obstacles to the aerial photography of the whole territory of the USSR, the United States, the other countries participating in NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact and the other Warsaw Treaty countries would automatically disappear.

G. Foreign military bases

43. In view of the fact that the existence of foreign military bases in the territories of certain States has considerably increased suspicion and tension in recent years, especially because the stationing or proposed stationing of atomic military units at many of these bases provide grounds for regarding these activities as preparations for war in which atomic and hydrogen weapons will be used, the Soviet Government proposes that the question of dismantling foreign military bases in the territory of certain States should be considered and that agreement should first be reached on the bases which could be dismantled at the first stage of the disarmament measures.

H. Reduction of armed forces of the four Powers in the territory of Germany and of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries

44. The Soviet Government continues to hold the view that the reduction of the armed forces of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and France which are stationed in the territory of Germany by one-third or by some other agreed figure would play a considerable part in improving the situation in Europe and in the whole world and in solving the German problem as a whole.

45. The Soviet Government also considers that international tension would be greatly alleviated by agreement to reduce the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France which are stationed in the territory of the NATO countries and the armed forces of the USSR which are stationed in the territory of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The extent of the reduction of the armed forces of these countries might be specified at subsequent talks.

I. Prohibition of war propaganda

46. In the Soviet Government's proposals for partial measures in the field of disarmament submitted for the consideration of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, it was stated that the war propaganda and incitement to war conducted in certain countries, especially propaganda for the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons against any given State, plays an important part in aggravating international relations and spreading hostility and hatred among nations. In those proposals, the attention of countries represented in the Sub-Committee was drawn to the non-observance by certain States of the General Assembly resolution of 1947 on the prohibition of war propaganda and also to the fact that the absence of legislation against war propaganda in many countries creates favourable conditions for the fomenting of militaristic attitudes and a war psychosis.

47. Unfortunately, the countries represented in the Sub-Committee disregarded the Soviet Government's proposals on this subject, and unbridled war propaganda is still being conducted in those countries and in a number of others.

48. And yet the cessation of war propaganda, including propaganda for atomic war, might play a considerable part in improving relations between States and relaxing international tension.

49. The Soviet Government considers that war propaganda must be brought to an end, by the enactment of appropriate legislation in certain States, as has been done in the Soviet Union and other countries, and by adopting other measures for the prevention of such propaganda.

J. Composition of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee

50. The Soviet Government considers that the time has come to discuss the question of inviting a larger number of States to participate in disarmament talks and of accordingly increasing the membership of both the United Nations Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. The reason for such a decision is that the present composition of these organs does not allow the overwhelming majority of States to take part in talks on disarmament questions. Whole continents, such as Asia, Africa and Latin America, are being left out of these discussions. Consequently, a relatively small group of participants have an opportunity to discuss the urgent problem of disarmament, especially in the Sub-Committee, where only five States are represented. Moreover, four of these States are leading participants of the NATO military bloc.

1 Ane, Doc. 206.
51. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, the participation of new States in the disarmament talks, through an increase in the membership of these United Nations organs, can yield only positive results. It will allow for a more objective and many-sided approach to the discussion of the urgent problems of the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments.

52. It has also become necessary to make public all talks on disarmament within the framework of the United Nations. Experience has shown that there is no justification for the secret and private working procedure of the Sub-Committee, for example, and the fact that public opinion has frequently been misinformed on the course of the Sub-Committee's talks proves that this procedure can only be harmful.

53. These considerations concerning the composition of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee and their working procedures show the necessity of adopting a decision on these questions at the twelfth session of the General Assembly.

54. The Soviet Government expresses the hope that its proposals on partial measures in the field of disarmament, which have been prepared with due consideration of the proposals of other States, will be carefully considered by the General Assembly and that other Members of the United Nations, for their part, will co-operate in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on disarmament.


The General Assembly,
Taking into account the deep concern felt by all the peoples of the world at continued tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons,
Considering that the discontinuance of tests of nuclear weapons would be an important practical first step towards the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and would constitute an obstacle to the development and production of new and even more destructive types of such weapons of mass destruction,


The General Assembly,
Bear in mind that the use of nuclear weapons for military purposes would bring untold misery to mankind and would entail the mass slaughter of civilians and also the destruction of large towns and centres of material and intellectual culture,