Department of State

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM

ISLAMA 02768 070821Z
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /801 W

D 070715Z MAR 79
FM AM EMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1839

SECRET ISLAMABAD 2768

EXODIS HANDLE AS NODIS

E.O. 12065: XOS 1 3/6/2009 (SHERMAN R) DR-P
TAGS: MNUC, TCHM, PEPR, PK, US

SUBJECT: (S) NUCLEAR ASPECT OF DEPSEC VISIT DISCUSSED WITH UK AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS

REF: STATE 53819

1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WITH REFTEL AUTHORIZATION, I CALLED ON UK AMBASSADOR BUSHHELL AND FRENCH AMBASSADOR LE GOURRIEREC MARCH 6 AND PASSED SUBSTANCE OF NUCLEAR SITUATION AS IT DEVELOPED DURING DEPSEC CHRISTOPHER VISIT.

3. BUSHHELL, HIS HEAD OF CHANCERY, ROBIN FEARN, AND POLOFF SHERMAN WERE PRESENT IN UK MEETING, POLOFF AND I SAW FRENCH AMBASSADOR ALONE. I MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS TO BOTH:

- IN ALL THREE SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS WITH GOP SUBJECT OF PAK NUCLEAR INTENTIONS AND ACTIVITIES WERE DISCUSSED.

- PAKS DID NOT DENY THAT BOTH REPROCESSING AND ENRICHMENT PROGRAMS ARE ABUILDING -- NOR WOULD THEY AGREE TO DISCONTINUE THEIR MOVEMENT TOWARD WEAPONS-SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET

PAGE 02   ISLAM0 82768   070821Z

GRADE MATERIAL PRODUCTION.

-- DEPSEC POINTED OUT TO GOP IN CLEAR UNAMBIGUOUS
TERMS SUBSTANCE OF US LEGISLATION ON THESE MATTERS
AND STATED HIS BELIEF THAT GLENN AND/OR
SYMINGTON AMENDMENTS WOULD BE TRIGGERED, CONSEQUENCES
THEREOF INCLUDE AID DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE CUT-OFF,
DISCONTINUANCE OF MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM (IMET),
AND PROBABLE SUSPENSION OF COMMERCIAL MILITARY SALES.
PL-480 WHEAT LEVELS MIGHT ALSO BE CURTAILED.

-- US ACTION WILL BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND MAY
WELL AFFECT RELATIONS OF OTHER (EUROPEAN) COUNTRIES' RELATIONS WITH GOP.

-- THE ENRICHMENT PROGRAM DIFFERS FROM THE FRENCH
REPROCESSING CONTRACT IN THAT IT HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN
SUB-ROSA RATHER THAN THROUGH PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGE
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP.

-- I SPECULATED ON POSSIBILITY THAT US "SANCTIONS"
MIGHT WELL FORCE GOP TO MOVE TO INSURE ITS ECONOMIC
SECURITY THROUGH CONSIDERABLE INCREASE IN ASSISTANCE
FROM ISLAMIC STATES.

-- I ALSO SPECULATED EFFECT MAY BE TO ENCOURAGE
SOME PAK MOVES TOWARD AN ACCOMMODATION WITH SOVIETS
ON PERCEIVED SECURITY NEEDS.

-- I TOLD BOTH AMBASSADORS NEXT STEPS WOULD BE
DISCUSSED WITH THEIR GOVERNMENTS IN LONDON AND PARIS.

1. I EMPHASIZED TO BOTH AMBASSADORS THE SENSITIVITY
SECRET
We place on these developments and both agreed to hold details closely.

5. Bushell inquired whether we foresaw tradeoff with Islamic nations being the product of the nuclear development (as opposed to the technology) in exchange for the economic support. I replied in the affirmative. He also asked if this tradeoff resurrected the old bugaboo of a Pak-Libyan nuclear cooperation program. I told him I thought it might include Libya, Saudi Arabia and, perhaps, others.

6. Bushell brought up subject of Desai letter to Zia on Pak nuclear intentions. I said we had not seen letter but were aware that Gopal furred with Desai's action. I also emphasized that we did not share any of our knowledge on these matters with the GOI during DEPSEC visit to Delhi.

7. Regarding option, Bushell said there is a certain 'honesty' about the Soviets in their non-proliferation policy. They would be, he thinks, hesitant to support actively any Pak weapons program. I replied, that may be so, but that they could not forego the opportunity to make political gains.

8. Bushell asked what preconditions the Pak's demand for giving up their weapons program -- would subscription to full scope safeguards and NPT by India be enough. I suggested such mutual (Indian & Pak) action would probably be the quid for discontinuance, but pointed out the near impossibility of such action ever taking place.

9. Le Gouhrier's reaction much less substantive.

SECRET

Not to be reproduced without the authorization of the Executive Secretary
HE AGREED TO PASS SUBSTANCE TO QUAI AND TO HOLD INFO
CLOSERLY. HE WAS APPRECIATIVE OF MY SHARING WITH
HIM BUT HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO OFFER.

HUMMEL