DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

3/30/79

TO : P - David D. Newsom
FROM : S/P - Paul H. Kreisberg

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Western Leaders on Pakistan Nuclear Program

Attached is a revised draft Presidential letter for Giscard, Callaghan, Schmidt and Trudeau as directed by the PRC. It has been cleared with Jane Coon and Tom Pickering.

We recommend that it be forwarded to the NSC.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment
Revised Letter to Western Leaders

Drafted: S/P:RGallucci 3/30/79;x28664

Clearance: OES - Mr. Pickering
NEA - Ms. Coon
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Letter to Western Leaders on Pakistan Nuclear Program

Attached is a revised draft Presidential letter for Giscard, Callaghan, Schmidt and Trudeau as directed by the PRC.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Draft Presidential Letter to Western Leaders
SECRET

Dear Helmut [Jim, Giscard, Pierre]:

I am very concerned about the mounting evidence that the Pakistani nuclear program is aimed at developing a nuclear weapons option. There is very good evidence that the Pakistanis have a well-financed, highly secret program to build a gas centrifuge enrichment plant, and that they are continuing efforts at a reprocessing capability as well. Either technology could begin to yield bomb quantities of fissile material in just a few years.

If Pakistan succeeds in its effort to develop nuclear weapons, the stability of South Asia will be imperiled, directly affecting our own interests and security. A nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India is in no one's interest, but that is the threat we are facing. The potential implications for the Middle East are important. I would add, moreover, that our mutual efforts to establish an international non-proliferation regime would be seriously undercut if others were encouraged to follow Pakistan's example.

His Excellency,
Helmut Schmidt,
Chancellor,
Federal Republic of Germany.

SECRET
Your government and mine have been working closely and effectively sharing information to block exports destined for sensitive Pakistani nuclear programs. Although we must continue this cooperation so that we will have as much time as possible to take other steps to prevent successful completion of the Pakistani program, export controls are ultimately only a delaying measure.

As you may know, United States law requires me to stop most of our aid programs in Pakistan now that we know the character of their secret enrichment activities. We have not made this action public.

It is indeed regrettable that at a time when there is a possibility of increasing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, and when political instability persists in Iran, that Pakistan is following a course that will make it difficult for the United States to offer increased assistance to enable it to address legitimate security concerns. I have nevertheless reaffirmed to President Zia our commitment to the security of Pakistan under our 1959 Bilateral Agreement should it be threatened by a country under communist control.

At the same time, I firmly believe that if Pakistan acquires a nuclear weapons capability, it will disturb
the stability of the sub-continent and the region, and ultimately jeopardize Pakistan's real security. If we are to avoid this outcome, you and I, and other world leaders who share these concerns, should turn our attention to this problem now. We are putting together a number of ideas and thoughts here and should be in a position soon to share these with you. I am sending this same message to Jim Callaghan, Giscard, and Trudeau. I welcome your own thoughts on how we should respond to this challenge to peace.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

SECRET