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E.O. 12065 RDS-3 5/25/79

TAGS: TECH, IN

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR DIALOGUE WITH INDIA

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS WE EXPLORE WAYS OF BREAKING THE PRESENT IMPASSE, WE
CONTINUE TO COME BACK TO PAKISTAN'S REPEATED PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE OFFERS TO ACCEPT ANY RESTRICTIONS ON ITS NUCLEAR
ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE ALSO ACCEPTED BY INDIA. IT MAY BE
THAT PAKISTAN IS BLUFFING AND WOULD FIND SOME EXCUSE NOT TO
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PARTICIPATE MEANINGFULLY EVEN IF INDIA WERE TO ACCEPT
RESTRICTIONS. HOWEVER, WE WILL NEVER KNOW THIS UNLESS WE
CAN TEST IT. WE BELIEVE INDO-PAKISTANI NUCLEAR RESTRAINT
MAY PROVE TO BE THE ONLY WAY THE NUCLEAR ISSUE CAN BE RE-
3. WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF ALL THE INDIAN OBJECTIONS TO THE
PAKISTANI PROPOSAL, E.G. EQUATES INDIA AND PAKISTAN, NEED
TO INCLUDE CHINA, ETC., AND ARE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT THE
PROSPECTS OF CONVINCING DESAI TO CHANGE THE INDIAN POSITION.
HOWEVER, DRAWING ON VAJPAEE'S CONVERSATIONS HERE AND YOUR
DISCUSSIONS WITH VARIOUS INDIAN LEADERS IN DELHI, WE HAVE
DISCUSSIONS WITH VARIOUS INDIAN LEADERS IN DELHI, WE HAVE
COME UP WITH SEVERAL THOUGHTS WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE EXPLORED.

4. WE CONCUR WITH YOU THAT A MEETING BETWEEN DESAI AND
PRESIDENT CARTER MIGHT BE USEFUL BUT ONLY AS OUR LAST CARD
AND IF THERE IS A PRIOR INDICATION THAT A MEETING WOULD BE
FRUITFUL.

5. WE WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN BY YOUR T UP DESAI ON HIS
FEBRUARY 14 SUGGESTION OF PRIVATE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS AT
HIS HOME. SUCH DISCUSSIONS COULD LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR
SUBSEQUENT APPROACHES, SUCH AS THE SENDING OF HIGH-LEVEL
EMISSARY FROM THE PRESIDENT, PERHAPS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE
SUMMIT, AND CONCEIVABLY CULMINATING IN A MEETING BETWEEN
THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT. THIS SHOULD NOT BE
DISCUSSED WITH DESAI.

6. YOUR FIRST-STAGE CONSULTATIONS SHOULD FOLLOW THE SAME
PATTERN AS THOSE WITH VAJPAYEE, I.E. INFORMAL, EXPLORATORY
AND NON-COMMITTAL. YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT PAKISTAN'S
PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AFFECTS INDIA FIRST AND FORE-
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MOST, THAT THE U.S. WANTS TO HELP INDIA DEFLECT THIS
THREAT BUT LACKS THE LEVERAGE TO DO SO ALONE, AND THAT THE
BEST EFFORTS BY SUPPLIER COUNTRIES TO CUT OFF EXPORTS OF
SPECIAL MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT CAN ONLY SLOW DOWN BUT NOT
STOP THE PAK PROGRAM. YOU SHOULD Endeavor TO KEEP THE
CONVERSATION EXPLORATORY, AND TO DISCOURAGE THE PM FROM
STATING ANY FIRM CONCLUSIONS, PARTICULARLY IF THEY ARE
LIKELY TO BE NEGATIVE.

7. YOU MAY WISH TO INDICATE THAT INDIA IS A MAJOR
PAKISTANI CONCERN, WE HOPE THAT DESAI CAN ACCEPT THAT
INDIA IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF ANY SOLUTION AND THAT WE
WOULD WELCOME ANY ALTERNATIVES HE CAN ADVANCE TO THE
NUCLEAR FREE ZONE CONCEPT WHICH APPEARS TO CAUSE HIM SUCH
PROBLEMS.
8. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS REPRESENT IDEAS YOU MAY WISH TO WEAVE INTO THE CONVERSATION. YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT THEY ARE NOT USG POSITIONS AND HAVE NOT BEEN DISCUSSED WITH CHINA OR PAKISTAN. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN DESAI'S REACTIONS TO THEM BUT RECOMMEND YOU RAISE THEM AS THEY FLOW NATURALLY INTO YOUR DIALOGUE:

A. CHINA. INDIA REPEATEDLY HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT ANY OBLIGATIONS WHICH DO NOT APPLY TO CHINA. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, WE ASSUME INDIA ACCEPTS THAT CHINA CANNOT FORESWEAR WEAPONS BUT DESAI PRESUMABLY NEEDS CHINESE "CONCESSIONS" TO MAKE A SOUTH ASIAN ZONE CONCEPT ACCEPTABLE. WOULD A CHINESE SPECIFIC NON-USE ASSURANCE, OR EVEN SIGNATURE OF A MULTILATERAL TREATY FORESWEARING USE OR THREAT OF USE BE HELPFUL? WOULD CHINESE CONCESSIONS ON NON-NUCLEAR BILATERAL ISSUES BE SEEN AS USEFUL BY DESAI IN RESOLVING INDIA'S RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT A REGIONAL NUCLEAR SETTLEMENT? WOULD CHINESE CESSATION OF ATMOSPHERIC TESTING HAVE AN IMPACT ON INDIA'S PERCEPTIONS?

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B. PAKISTAN. WOULD THE ABSENCE OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS (TO BE REPLACED BY NATIONAL OR THIRD PARTY VERIFICATION, PERHAPS PLUS SOME SORT OF CHALLENGE SYSTEM) MAKE THE CONCEPT OF A REGIONAL AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL RESTRAINT MORE ACCEPTABLE? IS INDIA STILL PREPARED TO OFFER PAKISTAN A NON-AGGRESSION TREATY AND/OR TROOP LIMITATIONS OR OTHER CONFIDENCE BUILDING TYPE MEASURES AS A MEANS OF ENHANCING PAKISTAN'S PERCEPTION OF ITS SECURITY? DOES DESAI HAVE ANY IDEA OF HOW PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON THE KASHMIR ISSUE?

C. NUCLEAR. IN A POST-SUMMIT SETTING WITH SALT II SIGNED AND THE PROSPECT OF SALT III AND CTB, WOULD THE ATMOSPHERE IMPROVE FOR SOUTH ASIAN ACTOINS? HAS THE GOI GIVEN ANY THOUGHT TO LIMITATIONS OR AT LEAST SAFEGUARDS ON ENRICHMENT ACTIVITIES BY PAKISTAN AND INDIA? DOES DESAI THINK PAKISTAN IS SINCERE IN ITS OFFER TO MATCH INDIA IN ACCEPTANCE OF SAFEGUARDS/RESTRICTIONS? IF IT WAS, WOULD THIS NOT SUGGEST THAT PAKISTAN IS WILLING TO LIVE WITH INDIA ON THE LATTER'S TERMS, I.E. ACCEPTING INDIA'S CONVENTIONAL PREPONDERANCE?
D. OTHER. WE WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED IN DESAI’S VIEWS ON WHETHER A DISTINGUISHED INTERNATIONAL FIGURE (NOT NECESSARILY AMERICAN) MIGHT PLAY SOME USEFUL ROLE AT A LATER STAGE IN WORKING WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION IN SEEKING A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM.

9. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN YOUR VIEWS ON THE PROBABILITY OF DESAI ACCEPTING A LIMITED ARRANGEMENT (E.G. 3-5 YEARS) DURING WHICH THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES WOULD BE "CHALLENGED" TO MOVE ON VERTICAL PROLIFERATION. WE SECRET

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WOULD PREFER THIS NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH DESAI AT PRESENT.

10. YOU MAY WISH TO STATE THAT WE ARE PLEASED THAT PAKISTANI FOREIGN SECRETARY SHAHNAWAZ HAS VISITED INDIA. WE HOPE THAT THIS BILATERAL DIALOGUE WILL PROVE USEFUL.

11. IF YOU DEEM IT APPROPRIATE, YOU MAY WISH TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT INDIA WILL ACTIVELY SUPPORT PAKISTAN’S ACCEPTANCE OF THE NAM.

12. WE ARE PREPARING A REPLY TO THE DESAI LETTER OF MAY 21. IF ALL GOES WELL YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO DELIVER THIS TO DESAI. IN ANY CASE GO AHEAD AND SEEK THE APPOINTMENT, PERHAPS IN THE LATTER PART OF THE WEEK.

13. WE HAVE NOTED THE INDIAN PUBLIC REACTION TO THE MAY 27 NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE (NEW DELHI 9343). NEVERTHELESS, WE FEEL THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED ABOVE, POSSIBLY USING THE SAME APPROACH ON THE ARTICLE WHICH NEWSOM USED WITH AMBASSADOR PALKHIVALA.

CHRISTOPHER

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