SECRET  NOD301  RELEASED IN FULL

Page 1

Bon 20685  0812047

ACTION NODS-90

INFO OCT-81 ISO-00 /901 W

0 0811427 NOV 78

FM AMBASSASY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3386

S E C R E T  BONN 20685

NODIS

DECAPIOTED

ACTION COPY

E. O. 11652: GOS

TASS: MNUC, TECH, PK

SUBJECT: US DEMARCHE ON PAKISTANI REPROCESSING PLANT

REF: STATE 281962

1. WE MADE DEMARCHE REQUESTED IN REFTEL TO ASSISTANT
SECRETARY LAUTENSCHLAGER, HIGHEST POLICY LEVEL OFFICIAL
IN FONOFF WITH RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS FIELD IMMEDIATELY
AVAILABLE TO US. WE MADE POINTS PARA 2 REFTEL AND LEFT
NON-PAPER.

2. LAUTENSCHLAGER SAID AT OUTSET THAT HE WOULD MAKE
CERTAIN THAT USG REQUEST WAS REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO
CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE, ECONOMICS MINISTRY AND POSSIBLY
SCIENCE MINISTRY, AT A LEVEL AND IN A FASHION THAT WOULD
RESPECT CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION. HE MADE POINT
AND REPEATED IT LATER THAT IT COULD DO SERIOUS DAMAGE TO
WEST'S RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN, WERE NEWS OF USG APPROACH
TO LEAK. HEADLINE "U.S. AND FRG IN NUCLEAR BOYCOTT OF
PAKISTAN" WAS LAST THING HE WANTED TO SEE AT THIS JUNCTU
RE IN RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND ITS NEIGHBORS. WE
HEARTILY CONCURRED.

3. LAUTENSCHLAGER WENT ON TO EXPRESS SOME SURPRISE AT
SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: ROBERT O HOMME
DATE/CASE ID: 28 DEC 2010  201000057

UNCLASSIFIED
USG CONVICTION THAT PAKISTAN SEEKING TO MOVE TOWARDS COMPLETION OF REPROCESSING FACILITY. HE STATED, AND ROUGET (FONOFF) CONFIRMED, THAT MOST RECENT REPORTING FROM FRG EMBASSY IN PAKISTAN TENDED TO DISCOUNT THIS POSSIBILITY.

4. NONETHELESS, IN A PRELIMINARY WAY, HE COULD ASSURE US THAT FRG WOULD TAKE OUR APPROACH FULLY INTO ACCOUNT SHOULD THERE BE ANY ATTEMPT BY PAKISTAN TO ACQUIRE REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY OR EQUIPMENT IN FRG. IN THIS CONNECTION HE RECALLED FRG'S OWN PLEDGE IN JUNE, 1977, NOT TO PERMIT FURTHER EXPORT OF SUCH SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY OR EQUIPMENT. THIS, ALONG WITH IAEA AND SUPPLIER'S CLUB RULES, AND US APPROACH, WOULD BE PRINCIPAL CRITERIA AGAINST WHICH ANY PAKISTAN REQUEST FOR EXPORT LICENSE WOULD BE JUDGED.

5. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, HE BELIEVED THAT FRG HAD MORE THAN ADEQUATE CONTROL OVER EXPORTS. HE STATED AND ROUGET CONFIRMED THAT FRG EXPORT CONTROL LIST COVERED ALL NUCLEAR SENSITIVE ITEMS. ANY APPLICATION FOR SUCH EQUIPMENT REQUIRED SPECIFIC LICENSE FROM ECONOMICS MINISTRY. ALL SUCH LICENSES WERE COPIED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY WHICH SCREENED THEM PRIOR TO LICENSE ISSUANCE. HE, THEREFORE, DOUBTED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SUCH AN ITEM TO BE LICENSED INADVERTENTLY.

6. ROUGET ASKED FOR LATEST US READOUT ON HOW MUCH IN WAY OF REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY FRENCH MAY HAVE ALREADY SUPPLIED PAKISTAN, AND WHETHER ANY EQUIPMENT FOR REPROCESSING PLANT MAY HAVE ALREADY BEEN EXPORTED BY FRENCH. HE SAID WE WERE NOT CERTAIN, BUT WOULD RAISE THIS WITH WASHINGTON.

ACTION REQUESTED: ANY INFORMATION BEARING ON THIS POINT.
SECRET
7. Finally Lautenschlager promised keep in close touch with us since, as he indicated, FRG shared USG non-proliferation objectives and would be concerned over possible acquisition by Pakistan of nuclear explosive capability.

8. Embassy comment: Lautenschlager's views were of course preliminary and labeled as such. Might be useful, if we have additional evidence bearing directly on Pakistan's attempt to complete Chasma plant and build Pinstech facility, to supply that to FRG. This would be helpful in dispelling any lingering doubts FRG might harbor over seriousness of Pakistani intentions.

Stoessel