relocating the CINCPAC (or an Alternate Command Authority for exercise purposes) to an Airborne Command Post by means of helicopter as specified in the CINCPAC instruction on continuity of operations. There were two exercises conducted in this series in 1980, one in February and the other in May.

(U) On 3 June a technical problem in a computer at the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) caused erroneous data to be transmitted. As a result, displays at the National Military Command Center and SAC headquarters indicated multiple ICBM and SLBM missile launches against the United States. Other information available directly from the warning sensor system, however, failed to confirm that any missile had been launched. As a precaution, and in accordance with standard procedures, certain SAC aircraft and command and control aircraft were brought to a higher state of readiness. In response to that national directive, CINCPAC's Airborne Command Post conducted an emergency alert scramble and launch. The aircraft was airborne in 7 minutes. The emergency launch requirement was cancelled 7 minutes after initiation. The aircraft, however, completed about 3½ hours of routine airborne alert and then returned to a ground alert position.¹

(U) A similar alarm was triggered on 6 June, but BLUE EAGLE was not launched that time. It was subsequently learned that a 46c circuit in the NORAD computer system the size of a "nickel or dime" had failed, not from faulty maintenance but because it simply wore out.²

(U) Procedures to preclude such incidents remained under study throughout the year. On both 12 and 27 June the JCS provided missile warning procedures designed to confirm such threat warnings and directing that force posture not be increased or actions taken to cause the movement of forces in response to NORAD-generated threat data unless the threat was confirmed by direct sensor data.³

(U) On 15 July the JCS advised that it was essential that the tactical warning and attack assessment systems be fully capable of providing decision-making information to the National Command Authorities that was not only timely, but of unquestioned validity and reliability. Extensive reviews and analyses of segments of the systems had been accomplished and were continuing. The Chairman of the JCS, however, directed that an "umbrella" study

¹ JCS 2219/072050Z Jun 80 (S)(EX), DECL 7 Jun 86.
² Current News, Part 1, 18 Jun 80 (U).
³ JCS 3939/122022Z Jun 80 (TS), REV 12 Jun 90 REAS 6; JCS 4665/272359Z Jun 80 (TS); REV 27 Jun 90 REAS 6.
be made by the House of Defense, and Communications Systems agency in the office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The system from sensor input to the decision making in the National Command Authority. He asked for the assistance and support of CINCPAC, the other unified and specified commanders, and the Services.\(^1\)

\(^5\) The battle of Operations Security (OBSEC) was of continuing interest. The OBSEC J-1 of the 1964 Airborne Command Post had been ongoing in scope and by 1970 still held promise to continue as an open-ended project. This was primarily a result of evolving changes in its mission and operating procedures, enhanced by the pending deployment of the Trident submarine.

\(^6\) Other efforts, especially in relation to developments were the planned replacement of the current Navy Commandoms (NCAMS) with...