ERRANT FOE  (U)
(ELLIPSE BRAVO-98)
AFTER-ACTION
REPORT

Classified By: William McNally
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EXERCISE ERRANT FOE

AFTER-ACTION REPORT

December 3, 1998
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INTRODUCTION

This interagency exercise served to test and validate agencies' ability to respond effectively to international terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. This event evaluated agency efforts to improve their crisis response and consequence management capabilities and coordination since a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff no-notice exercise in Europe in 1995.

The purpose of this After-Action Report is to document DOE operational performance during participation in ERRANT FOE. In particular, this report presents the key issues DOE emergency response elements raised in the course of performing technical operations. This report provides the DOE Office of Emergency Response with information to help assess the readiness and capabilities of operational elements to respond to international weapons of mass destruction terrorist incidents and assign corrective actions as appropriate.

The report also addresses DOE exercise planning and management issues to ensure the exercise program properly tests and evaluates the capabilities of DOE's emergency response elements. Results of this exercise can be used in assessing the readiness of DOE's emergency response elements over time and in adjusting the DOE emergency response training program to ensure that DOE emergency responders meet operational requirements.
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(U) The After-Action Report is organized as follows:

♦ The BACKGROUND Section outlines the scope and broad objectives of the overall exercise and then focuses on the specific DOE exercise objectives. Also, it describes the DOE exercise participation, and exercise control structure and process.

♦ The FLOW OF THE EXERCISE Section presents the nature of the weapons of mass destruction terrorist situation that confronted U.S. authorities. It briefly traces the general response to this situation.

♦ The SUMMARY EVALUATION Section presents a judgment regarding the success of the exercise and assesses the overall performance of DOE emergency response elements in meeting their operational requirements. This section also highlights key findings during the exercise. It also outlines the emergency response elements' reactions to the alert, deployment, employment and redeployment phases of the exercise.

♦ The FINDINGS Section provides the basis for the overall evaluation of DOE operational element performance. It summarizes the issues that emerged during the course of the exercise. Exercise planning and management issues are discussed, followed by operational issues. It organizes the highlighted operational issues in the order the operations unfolded by alert, deployment, employment and redeployment phases.

(U) A Reference Book accompanying this report presents the supporting documents associated with the planning and execution of the exercise. The index of the Reference Book is at Tab D.

(U) BACKGROUND

(b)(1)

The DOE component was the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team, supported by a DOE Consequence Management Response Team member. (b)(1) Considering these reports, the National Command Authorities alerted and deployed a (b)(1) The military unit requested and received assistance from DOE. Following this request, DOE

Unclassified
authorized the deployment of LINCOLN GOLD and the Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II. (b)(1)

A DOE Consequence Management Planning Team, composed of a federal official and four scientists, supported the Joint Task Force for Consequence Management. The technical teams provided support to the Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase III did not conduct technical operations during this exercise. (b)(1)

On the night of 6 September, sufficient intelligence enabled the military to assault the nuclear target. This done, the Joint Technical Operations Team conducted safety diagnostics and packaging as required to move the device to Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase III did not conduct technical operations during this exercise. (b)(1)

(U) The interagency exercise objectives were as follows:

- Conduct crisis action planning
- Conduct crisis response
- Solicit Host Nation participation

(U) DOE provided technical support to both crisis response and consequence management planning and operations. DOE specific objectives for ERRANT FOE are outlined below:

- Support the Foreign Emergency Support Team with Nuclear Radiological Advisory and Consequence Management Response Teams
- Support DoD with LINCOLN GOLD, Joint Technical Operations Team II, a Liaison Officer package and Consequence Management Planners
- Assist the Foreign Emergency Support Team and the Joint Task Force for Consequence Management in the development of a Consequence Management Plan

The response elements included the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team, LINCOLN GOLD Augmentation Team, LINCOLN GOLD Home Team, Joint Technical Operations Team II, and Consequence Management Planning Team. Additionally, DOE provided Liaison Officers to other agency locations. A description of DOE's emergency response capabilities is at TAB A. The DOE Exercise Force List is at Tab B.

(S) The DOE exercise control structure consisted of a Joint Exercise Control Group and a Field Control Cell. (b)(1)

These recorded observations
served as the basis for an evaluation of the overall performance of the DOE emergency response elements.

(U) FLOW OF THE EXERCISE

(S) The scenario that guided the major elements of the exercise was straightforward. Due to the United States' continued presence in the Arab world, international terrorist financier Osama bin Laden had called upon the Muslim community to strike back at the United States. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(S) Following the deployment of the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team, DP-23 prepositioned the LINCOLN GOLD Augmentation Team to Fayetteville, N.C. to be in place in the event a significantly enhanced response became necessary. This proved to be the case and, when called for, LINCOLN GOLD was minutes, instead of hours, away. During their deployment, the team suffered aircraft maintenance delays and finally completed deployment on-board the aircraft transporting the Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II. LINCOLN GOLD provided technical assistance in accordance with their standard operating procedures and, when needed, provided augmentation support to the Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II.

(b)(1)

Once DoD forces rendered safe the nuclear device, the Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II conducted diagnostic and packaging of the device for movement. DoD assets transported the packaged device to (b)(1) where members of Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase III accepted it for custody, thus terminating the nuclear portion of ERRANT FOE. Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase III did not conduct storage or disassembly operations. All DOE elements successfully redeployed by 11 September 1998, thus completing DOE participation in Exercise ERRANT FOE.

Unclassified
(U) During the exercise Consequence Management Planners provided expert support to the Joint Task Force for Consequence Management.

(U) SUMMARY EVALUATION

(U) DOE emergency response elements accomplished their stated exercise objectives, and in so doing, several communication and operational shortcomings were identified. In ERRANT FOE, DOE demonstrated the operational soundness of the technical support it now provides to agencies in both domestic and international crisis response and consequence management areas.

(U) Particularly noteworthy are:

- The briefings given and data provided to a United States Ambassador and his staff by the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team were excellent and the experience gained was invaluable.
- The DOE Consequence Management Response Team planning was effective in operating alongside the team's counterparts in other U.S. government agencies and the host country.
- DOE consequence management planners provided significant data to the Joint Task Force for Consequence Management in the assembly of a consequence management plan.

(U) Key findings (discussed within the FINDINGS Section below) that require timely addressal are:

- The Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II did not have a straightforward means to resolve conflicts and issues between the DOE Phase II element leader and the DoD 52nd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Phase II element leader. This raised the question of who is responsible for final arbitration and the process for escalating the conflict or issue to a higher authority.
- There is no standard operating procedure, Memorandum of Understanding, or Memorandum of Agreement, agreed upon by DOE and DoD, for sizing, tailoring, or coordinating the composition of the Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II. For example, is there a "minimum/core composition" that can be identified?

(U) The following outlines the activities of the DOE emergency response elements during the various phases of operations in ERRANT FOE:
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(S) Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team

A. ALERT: Formally notified and alerted by the Nuclear Incident Team
   (simulated by the Joint Exercise Control Group).
B. DEPLOYMENT: (b)(2)

C. EMPLOYMENT: (b)(1)

- Maintained command and control of deployed DOE assets and coordinated
  the activities with members of the interagency team.
D. REDEPLOYMENT: At the end of the exercise, the team redeployed to home
  station.

(U) (S) LINCOLN GOLD

A. ALERT: Initially, DOE Headquarters pre-positioned the team. DoD then
   alerted the team per standard operating procedures through the DOE
   Emergency Operations Center that the Joint Exercise Control Group
   simulated.
B. DEPLOYMENT: The team deployed by DoD-provided strategic military air.
C. EMPLOYMENT: This team conducted real-time interface with headquarters
   and tactical elements of DoD and other DOE response elements.
D. REDEPLOYMENT: The team redeployed by military air at the end of the
   exercise.

(U) (S) Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II

A. ALERT: The Joint Exercise Control Group, simulating the Nuclear Incident
   Team, alerted the team.
B. DEPLOYMENT: The team deployed on a strategic military aircraft.
C. EMPLOYMENT: This element conducted advanced technical operations in
   support of DoD in accordance with its standard operating procedures.
D. REDEPLOYMENT: Accomplished by strategic military aircraft.

(U) (S) Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase III

A. ALERT: Simulated in the Joint Exercise Control Cell.
B. DEPLOYMENT: There was no deployment.
C. EMPLOYMENT: Three team members conducted device turnover at
   Kirtland Air Force Base.
D. REDEPLOYMENT: There was no redeployment.

Unclassified
Consequence Management Planning Team

A. ALERT: The team was notified by the Nuclear Incident Team simulated by the Joint Exercise Control Group.
B. DEPLOYMENT: The team conducted an administrative deployment and traveled by commercial air to the event location.
C. EMPLOYMENT: The team conducted exchanges with consequence management officials from DoD. The DOE team organized and assisted the interagency effort in resolving issues of agency responsibility to develop a consequence plan for their supported agencies.
D. REDEPLOYMENT: The team redeployed by commercial air at the end of the exercise.

Consequence Management Response Team

A. ALERT: (b)(1)
B. DEPLOYMENT: The team conducted an administrative deployment and traveled by commercial air to the event location.
C. EMPLOYMENT: (b)(1)
D. REDEPLOYMENT: The team returned to home station by commercial air.

Commander-in-Chief Liaison Officer

A. ALERT: (b)(1)

B. DEPLOYMENT: The individual conducted an administrative deployment and traveled by commercial air to the event location.
C. EMPLOYMENT: Officer conducted exchanges with members of Commander-in-Chief staff, DOE and other agencies providing liaison to the staff.
D. REDEPLOYMENT: At the end of the event, the individual returned to home station via commercial air.

FINDINGS

ERRANT FOE highlighted several important operational events. For the first time since 1995, the DOE emergency response elements conducted a major deployment to an overseas operational area. The Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team deployed as a complete element with the DOS leading the Foreign Emergency Support Team. Experience gained in briefing and providing data to a United States Ambassador and his staff was invaluable. An element of the DOE Consequence Management Response Team
was able to plan along side his counterparts of other U.S. government agencies and the host country. LINCOLN GOLD pre-positioned to Fayetteville, N.C. in the event (which proved to be the case) they were needed for in-extremis planning and deployment with DoD elements. The Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II conducted team development, deployment overseas by military aircraft, deliberate planning, and advanced technical operations against a device in support of the interagency effort. Although it was not a major exercise objective, DOE consequence management planners were able to provide the Joint Task Force for Consequence Management significant data in the assembly of a consequence management plan. Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase III, while not an active participant, was able to conduct plans for device turnover through members of the team who simulated their activities at the Joint Exercise Control Group and:

(U) A DOE conference addressed and reviewed the Exercise ERRANT FOE after action comments of all participating DOE activities. Based on the discussion of these after action comments, the following paragraphs address both the important exercise planning and management issues as well as operational issues that warrant follow-up actions. The operational issues are presented and organized under the headings of alert, deployment, employment and redeployment activities of the DOE emergency response elements.

(U) Exercise Planning and Management Issues:

(U) Need for a Joint Exercise Control Group (JECG) to Manage a Single Coherent Interagency Exercise. Exercise ERRANT FOE follows Exercise GAUGED STRENGTH in June 98 as the second interagency counter-terrorist exercise of FY 98. A contracting firm responsible to a single DoD agency operated and managed the Joint Exercise Control Group for both exercises. Consequently, this contractor managed the exercise more as a “single-agency” exercise than as an “interagency” exercise. This resulted in the perception that DoD exercise objectives are of greater importance than those of the Intergency.

(U) DOE Administrative Process does not Support Realistic Exercise Execution. Deployable DOE personnel and contractor support require blanket travel orders that allow for immediate deployment within established timelines. These orders should address travel and communication security, and eliminate the lengthy process of seeking foreign travel clearance prior to departure. DOE emergency response element personnel require quick procedures (now in place) for security plan approval for classified communications material when deploying during an exercise or real-world contingency.

(U) Alert Issues:

(U) Need for Standard DOE Terminology When Alerting DOE Emergency Response Elements. Execution of the exercise indicated a misunderstanding among the
DOE and DoD operational assets with regard to the terminology used for alert and warning notifications. At this mature stage in program development, there was a lack of understanding of the term “Stand-Up” for the LINCOLN GOLD Home Team. The team believed placing members on a recall such that they could be back on duty within 45 minutes was sufficient. However, the DoD customer expected the team to be at its workplace on a 24-hour basis. Additionally, this sensitive national security issue requires a secure call-out/alert of DOE assets.

(u) Resolution of Joint Technical Operation Team Issues Prior to Deployment. A situation developed in the tailoring and formulation of the Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II during the team composition process. The DoD element leader decided to take select members of his (DoD) staff at the expense of the DOE scientific personnel. The DOE team leader, a DOE scientist, was in conflict with the DoD element leader on this issue. This raised the question of who is responsible for final arbitration in reference to pre-deployment issues involving team leadership. DOE did not have a straightforward means to resolve conflicts between the DOE Phase II Leader and the DoD 52nd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Phase II element leader. There is no standard operating procedure, Memorandum of Understanding, or Memorandum of Agreement, agreed upon by DOE and DoD, for sizing, tailoring, or coordinating the composition of the Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II. For example, is there a “minimum/core composition” that can be identified? Also, the responsible party and process to activate the 52nd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Phase II element is unclear.

(u) Composition of Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II. In a terrorist incident involving a permissive environment where the nuclear device is rendered safe and secured by DoD personnel and then given to the technical team, is there a requirement to deploy with a military component of the team? Consider the case of an airfield turnover in which the team size becomes a driving factor. Technical arguments can lead to the conclusion that a Phase II team comprised entirely of DOE personnel may make sense. Is such a team feasible?

(U) Deployment Issues:

(u) Lack of Reliable Communications Links Between DOE Emergency Response Elements. While deployed overseas, reliable, effective, and secure communications between DOE elements was almost non-existent. Better communications links would improve overall effectiveness among the DOE emergency response elements. Therefore, DOE teams must include their communications personnel and equipment on all deployments. Dependency on other agency communications assets proved not to be in the best interest of deployed DOE elements. DOE does not have a robust communications link between the Nuclear Incident Team, Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team, all deployed teams and all home teams. The Nuclear Incident Team and Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team have a requirement to track all itineraries.
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and locations of DOE elements.

\(\text{(S)}\) Authority to Deploy DOE Emergency Response Elements. As in Joint Readiness Exercise 2-98, conducted in March 1998 and Exercise GAUGED STRENGTH conducted in June 1998, significant discussion relevant to DOE’s authorities in deploying assets took place.

\(\text{(S)}\) The scenario for ERRANT FOE developed in such a fashion that the Director, Office of Emergency Response felt it prudent to pre-position LINCOLN GOLD in Fayetteville, N.C. in the event an in-extremis response was required. When briefed by the Nuclear Incident Team simulated in the Joint Exercise Control Group, \(\text{\text{(b)(t)}}\) initially agreed; but, following internal staff coordination, they disagreed. Nonetheless, based on intelligence information and the fact that the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team had already been deployed, the Director of DR-23 pre-positioned LINCOLN GOLD Augmentation Team in Fayetteville, N.C.

\(\text{(S)}\) Later, elements of the Task Force staff insisted they never asked for the team and that “exercise planning was to have them picked up in New Mexico”. This pre-positioning caused a reduction in the effectiveness of LINCOLN GOLD since the team never felt welcome at the Command throughout the rest of the exercise. \(\text{\text{(b)(t)}}\)

\(\text{(S)}\) Employment plans forced the technical team into a compromising position that limited team members who could go forward, thus reducing capabilities. Once briefed on the concept, \(\text{\text{(b)(t)}}\) allowed the team to respond as the scientists felt the situation dictated. While this resolved the immediate technical issue, the larger one of perception of utility of the team remained.

\(\text{(U)}\) DOE response to a nuclear/radiological incident would require deployment of DOE assets and liaison personnel to other agencies. DOE can deploy assets and liaisons both before other agencies request them, and without other agencies’ approval. This includes the Lincoln Gold Augmentation Team, Lincoln Gold Hold Team and Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II. The Lincoln Gold Home Team is not a substitute for the Lincoln Gold Augmentation Team. DoD and DOE users of the Lincoln Gold Home Team did not have a clear understanding of the stand up/stand down procedures for the Lincoln Gold Home Team.

\(\text{(U)}\) If the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team deploys, then the DOE element of the CMRT is required for the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team to provide the full DOE
capability to the Foreign Emergency Support Team in support of the Chief of Mission.

(U) Employment Issues:

(S) **DOE Consequence Management Planners Integrated with the Interagency Consequence Management Planning Cell.** The DOE Consequence Management Planning Team again proved to be very flexible in providing support to the interagency effort. DOS and DoD conducted a limited consequence management planning effort. However, as a result of limited planning, the Consequence Management Response Team reduced its participation in scope and effort. DOD had insisted during exercise planning that the development of a consequence management plan not be an objective. However, once the DOE consequence management planners arrived at the Joint Exercise Control Group where everyone thought they would act as controllers, they took on the role of players operating with the Joint Task Force for Consequence Management. This changed the complexion of their participation.

Thus, they were required to support 24-hour operations without the appropriate staffing. Except for limited military staff, the DOE participants were the only members of the consequence team. The Master Scenario Event List did not contain consequence management injects, and there were no participants at the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters to drive consequence issues.

(U) **Effects Modeling.** Several agencies were conducting effects modeling. This could lead to confusion in the interagency concerning the effects of a release of radiological/nuclear material. There was no apparent effort to coordinate the results of the various modeling efforts in order to provide a single answer to the customer (e.g., Chief of Mission, Foreign Emergency Support Team Leader).

(S) **Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II Operational Flexibility to Changes in Course of Action.** Initially, only one hour for Phase II technical operations on the device. Based on this one-hour timeline, the Phase II team leader task organized and moved team members not needed at the forward area to another location. Following a course of action briefing, the
Unclassified

Commanding General dismissed the recommended course of action of one hour and allowed the DOE scientific team the time they felt the situation dictated. As a result, the DOE Phase II team leader needed to reorganize the composition of his response team. However, the aircraft on which the DOE team was to deploy was scheduled for departure. The Phase II team leader did not have enough time to readjust his team composition and recall the team members previously moved out of the area. (S)(G)

(S) The DOE Phase II team leader did not include an operations advisor in his team composition as required by the Exercise Letter of Instruction. The lack of an operations advisor impacted the DOE team leader's ability to recognize operational requirements during execution of the operation. Until (G)(I) selects his course of action, the DOE team leader needs to maintain immediate operational flexibility of his response assets.

(U) Redeployment Issues: There were no redeployment issues.

Unclassified
TAB A. DOE Emergency Response Capabilities

(U) **Nuclear Incident Team (NIT)**

(U) Mission: Responsible for preparing courses-of-action briefings for senior DOE officials -- Coordinating Sub-Group (CSG) member/Secretary of Energy -- and coordinating interagency actions for alerted and deploying DOE elements.

(U) Capability: Coordination with interagency counterparts, anticipating and acting on requirements of DOE emergency response elements.

(U) Deployment Trigger: The NIT will assemble in the DOE HQ Emergency Operations Center upon notification of the CSG member following the initial round of CSG meetings.

(U) Team Size: 8-12 personnel per shift.

(U) **Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team (NRAT)**

(U) Mission: To provide expert advice to the responsible US Government Lead Federal Agency during acts of terrorism that may include the use of nuclear or radiological material. The Lead Federal Agency responsibility rests with the Chief of Mission for an overseas response and the FBI Special Agent-in-Charge for a domestic response to terrorism. The NRAT Leader is the senior Department of Energy official deployed and is responsible for command and control of all DOE assets in the field.

(U) Capability: Limited search; identification of materials through Gamma Spectroscopy; technical analysis of intelligence and data collected through technical means; communicating with DOE laboratories and deployed DOE assets.

(U) Deployment Trigger: The NRAT will deploy within 4 hours of notification as part of the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) or Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST). The Lead Federal Agency (DOS or FBI) should request NRAT support as a result of a Coordinating Sub-Group (CSG) meeting.

(U) Team Size: 5-8 personnel.
Unclassified

(U) LINCOLN GOLD (LG)

(U) Mission: To provide expert technical advice to the Department of Defense (DoD) special mission unit commander responding to nuclear or radiological terrorism. A LINCOLN GOLD Augmentation Team deploys in support of DoD and a LINCOLN GOLD Home Team provides data to DoD personnel while the LINCOLN GOLD Augmentation Team is en-route.

(U) Capability: Rapid and continual weapons intelligence, diagnostics, disablement and render safe assistance.

(U) Deployment Trigger: The LINCOLN GOLD Home Team will provide support within 2 hours of notification and the LINCOLN GOLD Augmentation Team will deploy within 4 hours of a DoD request for assistance or unilaterally deployed by DP-23 upon notification of a nuclear WMD terrorist incident.

(U) Team Size: 5 (1 Federal Official and 4 Scientists) personnel.

(U) Joint Technical Operations Team (Phase II) (JTOT II)

(U) Mission: To provide advanced technical advice and assistance to DoD EOD in render safe procedures and to package the device or weapon for movement to a final disposition site.

(U) Capability: Assist's DoD in rendering a device safe through advanced techniques of diagnostics, design, access and packaging.

(U) Deployment Trigger: JTOT II maintains a 6-hour alert posture to respond at the request of DoD special mission units or unilateral deployment by DP-23.

(U) Team Size: 21 DoD personnel, augmented by 10-12 DoD Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians.
(U) **Joint Technical Operations Team (Phase III) (JTOT III)**

(U) **Mission:** To maintain custody of the recovered device and conduct technical operations at the final disposition site.

(U) **Capability:** Conducts demilitarization of the device by segregating the fissile, high explosives and physics package.

(U) **Deployment Trigger:** JTOT III maintains a 12-hour alert posture to respond to the request of DoD special mission units or unilateral deployment by DP-23.

(U) **Team Size:** 1 Federal official, 21 DOE scientific personnel, and additional DOE support personnel as needed.

(U) **Consequence Management Planning Team**

(U) **Mission:** To provide the DoD regional US Commander-in-Chief (CINC) immediate consequence models and plots and to assist in the development of consequence management plans.

(U) **Capability:** Enables connectivity between DoD and DOE large-scale response capabilities of the ARG/RAP/REAC/TS/ARAC.

(U) **Deployment Trigger:** The Consequence Management Planning Team deploys within 6 hours of a request by the DoD regional CINC to provide consequence management planning.

(U) **Team Size:** 2 Federal officials, 10 scientists.
Unclassified

(U) **Consequence Management Response Team (CMRT)**

(U) **Mission:** To assist the US Chief-of-Mission and Host Nation officials in the long-term mitigation of consequences resulting from the functioning of a nuclear device.

(U) **Capability:** Provides briefings relevant to Other Government and Non-Governmental agencies' abilities to provide long-term care and site restoration.

(U) **Deployment Trigger:** The CMRT will deploy at the request of the Department of State as a follow-on element of the Foreign Emergency Support Team (There is no domestic equivalent.).

(U) **Team Size:** 2 Federal officials.

(U) **Search Response Team (SRT) This team was not employed in this event**

(U) **Search Augmentation Team (SAT) This team was not employed in this event**

(U) **Mission:** To provide a limited search support augmentation to the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team and Domestic and Foreign Emergency Support Team.

(U) **Capability:** The Search Augmentation Team provides the capability of rapidly instructing local emergency searchers as well as a limited unilateral search capability. The Search Augmentation Team provides a Nuclear Emergency Search Team augmentation to the Search Response Team.

(U) **Deployment Trigger:** The SRT and/or SAT deploy at the request of the Lead Federal Agency as a follow-on element of the Domestic or Foreign Emergency Support Teams.

(U) **Team Size:** The Search Response Team: 7 personnel. The Search Augmentation Team: 28 personnel.
(U) DOE Operational Structure
TAB B - DOE Exercise ELLIPSE BRAVO Force List

(OU) NUCLEAR INCIDENT TEAM

(OU) NUCLEAR RADIOLOGICAL ADVISORY TEAM
   Deployed as an element of the Interagency Foreign
   Emergency Support Team.

(OU) LINCOLN GOLD AUGMENTATION TEAM

(U) LINCOLN GOLD HOME TEAM
   Watch personnel at Los Alamos National Laboratory provided technical advice to
   special military unit explosive ordnance technicians while LINCOLN GOLD
   Augmentation Team deployed.

(OU) JOINT TECHNICAL OPERATIONS TEAM II

(OU) JOINT TECHNICAL OPERATIONS TEAM III

(U) CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT PLANNING TEAM

(U) COMMANDER IN CHIEF’S LIAISON OFFICER

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TAB C - Exercise Major Events

(S) Below is a synopsis of the planned and actual sequence of major events. It is followed by a detailed description of the major events as they actually unfolded during the exercise.

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<th>Planned Events</th>
<th>Actual Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>28-29 August</td>
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Coordinating Sub-Group Meeting

30 August
Approval of USG Assistance

Heads-up and Deployment of Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team

Heads-up and Deployment of LINCOLN GOLD

1 September
LINCOLN GOLD pre-positioned to Fayetteville N.C.

2 September:
Heads-up, Alert to DOE Elements

CJCS WARNORD 020100Z

2 September
CJCS Modified WARNORD 020100Z

LINCOLN GOLD directed to report to DoD

Request for Airlift

3 September
Joint Technical Operations Team II Deploys

FRMAC Deploys (Notional)
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<th>Planned Events</th>
<th>Actual Event</th>
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<td>4 September</td>
<td>Joint Technical Operations Team III Advance Party Deploys (Sim-Celled)</td>
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<td>3 September</td>
<td>5 September</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD Turnover Procedures Published</td>
<td>WMD Turnover Procedures Published</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 September</td>
<td>Joint Technical Operations Team III Main Body Deploys (Sim-Celled)</td>
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<td>7 September</td>
<td>Request for Use of Betatron X-ray Sent to POTUS</td>
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<td>9 September</td>
<td>7 September</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assault night (moved to 7 September)</td>
<td>Joint Technical Operations Team II Conducts Advanced Technical Operations</td>
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<td>Joint Technical Operations Team II and</td>
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<td>(9)(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 September</td>
<td>Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team Releases Consequence Management Planners</td>
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<td></td>
<td>and CINC LNO for Redeployment</td>
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The detailed events are presented on the following pages as follows:
Saturday, August 29

(b)(1)

Sunday, August 30

(b)(1)

The Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team received its alert, assembled and waited for transportation at Andrews Air Force Base. This included telephonic notification as well as the passage of up-to-the minute data by facsimile machine. At 301205Z Aug, the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team received the deployment order. The team arrived with the interagency team at 310411Z Aug.

Monday, August 31

(b)(1)

The National Command Authorities, while not objecting to the deployment, held employment in abeyance. However, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did approve the conduct of reconnaissance and surveillance against suspected terrorist locations.

The day ended with concentration on the hostage barricade situation.

Tuesday, September 1

(S) As the situation deteriorated, the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team leader asked that the DOE liaison officer report to the Commander-in-Chiefs' headquarters. The individual reported that afternoon. The Director of Emergency Response in Washington decided to pre-position LINCOLN GOLD to Fayetteville, N.C. This move took place in the early morning hours of September 2.

At this time, a Joint Task Force for Consequence Management formed at direction of the Commander-in-Chief. DOE technicians and
Unclassified

scientists joined this team. (b)(1)

Wednesday, September 2

(5). An early morning Counterterrorism Security Group meeting led to the modification of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff warning order. That modification identified the weapon of mass destruction target. Immediately, the staffing process to deploy a...

Upon receipt of the Chairman's order, DOE immediately requested airlift for the Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II. This contained a requirement for the deployment of the 52nd Ordnance Group to assemble with the technical team at (b)(1)

The joint team assembled at (b)(1) and formed a composite team based on mission requirements of diagnostics, packaging and assisting in the movement of the device to its final disposition site. LINCOLN GOLD departed on the second aircraft carrying members of (b)(1). Their aircraft developed mechanical difficulties and they spent two days on the ground in Maine. During this period, DoD and the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team extensively employed the LINCOLN GOLD Home Team for support.

Thursday, September 3

(b)(1)

Friday, September 4

(b)(1)

As a result of personnel restrictions, it was determined that the communications equipment and personnel would remain behind and DoD elements would provide this function. Departure from (b)(1)

Unclassified

C-4
moved to 041920Z. Discussions between the FBI and Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase III (simulated by the Joint Exercise Control Group) concentrated on chain of custody of the device for evidence collection. Stranded in Maine as a result of aircraft problems, DoD insisted LINCOLN GOLD would not arrive in time to be of assistance and should not deploy further. The Nuclear Incident Team (replicated in the Joint Exercise Control Group) convinced DoD staff planners that LINCOLN GOLD maintains abilities to augment the technical team. After departure from the aircraft transporting the Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II landed in Maine and picked up LINCOLN GOLD and proceeded to the Initial Staging Base.

Saturday, September 5

Upon arrival of LINCOLN GOLD and Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II in theater, the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team leader assumed control of these elements. This led the scientific team leader to release members of his element. After receiving a brief on the plan, the Commanding General disapproved it and instructed the scientific team to take the necessary steps to accomplish their tasks. By this time, several members of the team had left the staging base. Members of LINCOLN GOLD replaced these scientists on the mission.

During this time, the Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team leader requested from Washington (replicated in the Joint Exercise Control Group) approval to conduct Bevatron X-rays of the device. This request, which requires Presidential approval, was produced by the Nuclear Incident Team for the Secretary of Energy to send to the National Security Advisor. The Joint Exercise Control Group simulated this Washington action and staffed the paper for approval (for the first time in an exercise of this type). The Advisory Team leader also approved the course of action against the device as developed between the special operations team and the technical team.
Unclassified

Sunday, September 6

(S) For the majority of this day, the technical team and DoD rehearsed actions on the objective and otherwise prepared for the target assault. Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase III reported (unclassified) to (U) and prepared to receive the device. (U)(I)

Monday, September 7

(S) Following an early morning assault by DoD forces, DoD explosive ordnance technicians rendered the nuclear device safe and moved it to the Forward Support Base. At that site, the Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II conducted diagnostics, including x-ray, and packaged the device for shipment. Once completed, the technical team and LINCOLN GOLD boarded a military aircraft and flew with the device to (U)(I) At this site, a formal turnover of the device between DoD and DOE representatives took place. No further operations were conducted.

Wednesday, September 9

(U) The Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team released the Consequence Management Planning Team and the Commander-in-Chief's Liaison Officer. These teams all immediately returned to their home stations.
TAB D - Reference Book

A. QUICKLOOK REPORT
B. LETTER OF INSTRUCTION
C. CONTROLLER GUIDANCE
D. PRE-EXERCISE MASTER SCENARIO EVENTS LIST
E. EXERCISE MASTER SCENARIO EVENTS LIST
F. NUCLEAR RADIological ADVISory TEAM SITUATION REPORTS
G. NUCLEAR INCIDENT TEAM POWER POINT BRIEFINGS
H. CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TEAM SITUATION REPORT
I. CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT BRIEFING
J. CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT PLANNING TEAM SITUATION REPORT
K. JOINT EXERCISE CONTROL GROUP TELEPHONE LOG
L. JOINT EXERCISE CONTROL GROUP HARD COPY MESSAGES
M. JTOT II / JTOT III RECEIPT TRANSFER CHECK FORM
N. JOINT EXERCISE CONTROL GROUP DAILY EVENT LOG
O. AFTER ACTION TRACKING SYSTEM (AATS) INPUTS
P. DOE PARTICIPANT AFTER-ACTION COMMENTS

Appendix 1 Nuclear Radiological Advisory Team
Appendix 2 LINCOLN GOLD AUGMENTATION TEAM
Appendix 3 Joint Technical Operations Team, Phase II
Appendix 4 Consequence Management Planning Support Team