U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND INSTRUCTION 3100.6

Subj: CHARTER FOR THE JOINT TECHNICAL AUGMENTATION CELL

Ref: (a) CJCSI 3214.01, 30 June 1998, "Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations"
(b) Unified Command Plan, 29 September 1999

Encl: (1) Joint Technical Augmentation Cell (JTAC) Charter

1. Purpose. To promulgate the Charter for the Joint Technical Augmentation Cell (JTAC).

2. Background. The acquisition, development and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are within the capability of terrorist organizations and rogue states that may seek to employ these weapons within the borders of friendly or allied nations. While the primary responsibility for managing and mitigating the effects of a foreign WMD incident resides with the host-nation government, the United States is uniquely positioned to provide these nations assistance if requested. Department of State is designated the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for foreign Consequence Management (CM) operations in support of a foreign government. Department of Defense (DoD) support to foreign CM operations focuses on providing specialized assistance in response to use of WMD against U.S. military forces, installations, allies, regional friends, or vital interests.

3. Discussion. References (a) and (b) task U.S. Joint Forces Command with identifying, coordinating, exercising, and upon SECDEF approval, deploying a joint cadre of technical experts to advise and assist regional combatant commanders tasked to conduct foreign CM operations. Enclosure (1) provides guidance and defines responsibility for this joint cadre, termed the Joint Technical Augmentation Cell (JTAC). When directed, U.S. Joint Forces Command deploys the JTAC to the supported CINC's Headquarters and/or Area of Responsibility (AOR) to provide nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological technical advice and assistance for planning and executing foreign CM operations.
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4. **Effective date.** This instruction is effective upon receipt.

[Signature]
W. F. KERNAN
General, U.S. Army

Distribution: (USJFCOMINST 5605.1)
List I
List II
List III
JOINT TECHNICAL AUGMENTATION CELL (JTAC) CHARTER

15 December 2000
INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose

a. This charter provides guidance and defines responsibilities for the organization, force composition, deployment sequence, operational employment, command and control relationships, logistics requirements, and exercise and training framework for the U.S. Joint Forces Command coordinated Joint Technical Augmentation Cell (JTAC).

b. Consistent with U.S. Joint Forces Command role as Joint Force Provider, the JTAC provides a deployable joint cadre of technical experts to advise and assist geographic combatant commanders tasked to conduct weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consequence management (CM) operations on foreign soil. U.S. Joint Forces Command authority to establish the JTAC is provided in the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3214.01, "Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations" dated 30 June 1998.

2. Background

a. The acquisition, development and use of WMD are within the capability of terrorist organizations and rogue states who may seek to employ these weapons within the borders of friendly or allied nations. Such an incident is likely to impact host nation infrastructure, property and personnel. Additionally, U.S. Government (USG) personnel and installations abroad may be targeted or adversely affected. Department of Defense (DoD) support to foreign CM operations focuses on providing specialized assistance in response to use of WMD against U.S. military forces, installations, allies, regional friends, or vital interests.

b. Primary responsibility for managing and mitigating the effects of a foreign WMD incident resides with the host-nation (HN) government. The Department of State (DOS) is designated the lead Federal agency for foreign consequence management (CM) operations in support of a foreign government, and will coordinate the overall USG response. All DoD support will be coordinated through the responsible Chief of Mission (COM) and
Country Team. In the event a U.S. military installation is the target of a WMD attack, military assistance may be provided by the affected geographic Commander in Chief (CINC). All DoD support in response to the consequences of a WMD attack on a U.S. installation will be coordinated by the CINC in consultation with the responsible COM and Country Team.

c. Geographic CINC staffs tasked with conducting WMD CM operations are faced with a complex coordination challenge to provide for the wide range of potential DoD support requirements within a compressed time period. Though a number of CINC-assigned, Service, and defense agency organizations have technical expertise in WMD CM, no single organization possesses the comprehensive expertise necessary to assist the geographic CINC in addressing the complete spectrum of issues associated with managing and mitigating the effects of a WMD incident. The JTAC, which was conceived to address this deficiency, provides a single-source cadre of technical experts, dedicated to the needs of the supported geographic CINC, through which WMD CM planning advice and technical assistance can be obtained.

3. **Scope**

a. This charter describes in general terms the JTAC concept of operations, and concentrates on the actions and procedures which must be taken to identify, coordinate, exercise, and upon Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) approval deploy. Detailed operational procedures will be deferred to a comprehensive JTAC Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to be published in the near future.

b. The JTAC supports foreign CM operations, which by definition are restricted to those regions of the world beyond the territorial limits of the U.S., its territories and possessions.

c. For the purpose of this charter, a WMD event is defined as a deliberate or unintentional event involving a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) weapon or device which produces or has potential to produce catastrophic loss of life or property. Within this
context, the JTAC’s technical expertise is focussed on the CBRN aspects, and not large high-yield explosives.

d. While the impetus for establishment of the JTAC was to assist the geographic CINC’s response to a terrorist event, the JTAC can also provide advice and assistance to CINCs for incidents resulting from inadvertent release of CBRN contaminants, including release resulting from non-terrorist related accidents.

e. The JTAC is a CINC’s technical advisory group, and is neither manned nor equipped to conduct CM operations in a CBRN contaminated environment.

f. The JTAC composition and operational concepts described herein are based on an analysis of foreign CM mission requirements; coordination between CINC-assigned, Service and Defense Agency organizations; and feedback from initial exercise and operational experiences. As DoD’s role in foreign CM operations evolves, the JTAC mission and concept of operations must be periodically reviewed and modified to meet the needs and expectations of the geographic CINCs.

MISSION & CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

4. Mission. When directed, U.S. Joint Forces Command deploys the Joint Technical Augmentation Cell to the supported CINC’s Headquarter’s and/or AOR to provide nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological technical advice and assistance for planning and executing foreign CM operations.

5. Concept. A number of organizations exist in the DoD with technical expertise in the various aspects of CBRN. However, no one organization exists which possesses the comprehensive expertise necessary to provide the geographic CINC a single source for advice and assistance in planning and conducting military CM operations. The JTAC was conceived to address this deficiency, leveraging existing DoD capabilities into an on-call cadre of technical experts drawn from key CINC-assigned, Service, and defense agency organizations. While the 8-11 personnel who make up the JTAC in-and-of themselves provide a wealth of technical expertise, their experience and established
contacts enable reach-back via their parent organizations to draw upon the full resources of the DoD, Federal agencies and laboratories, and various scientific research and academic communities.

6. Composition

   a. Notional JTAC manning consists of (Chem/Bio Cell), (Nuclear/Radiological Cell), or (undetermined threat) personnel. Team composition provides resident technical knowledge in the following areas:

   (1) Biological agents, chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals, and radiological materials effects, mitigation, remediation and removal

   (2) Computer modeling of contamination hazard areas

   (3) Personnel and equipment decontamination operations

   (4) Specialized medical advice

   (5) CONUS-based DoD CM resources

   b. The following billets will be filled by the commands/agencies listed to support notional JTAC manning requirements:

   (1) U.S. Marine Corps Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF)
      - Medical Representative with WMD CM planning and operational expertise
      - Operations Representative with WMD CM planning and operational expertise

   (2) U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM)
      - NBC Officer
      - Remediation Plans Specialist
      - Industrial Hazard Specialist
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(3) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
   - CM Planner/Advisor
   - Hazard Prediction Computer Modeler
   - Radiation Health Specialist

(4) Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Safety Center
    - Radiation Physicist
    - Radiation Reconnaissance Specialist

Notes:
(1)
(2)
(3)

(c) JTAC supporting commands will identify personnel and maintain a recall roster to support notional JTAC manning requirements. Designated personnel will remain prepared to deploy from designated airports of embarkation (APOEs) within 30 days of notification.

(d) U.S. Joint Forces Command shall designate an officer in the grade of O-5/6 to serve as JTAC Commander (CDR JTAC). CDR JTAC shall be responsible for coordinating JTAC deployment and employment for operations and exercises. Additionally the CDR JTAC will be the primary point of contact between the supported CINC's staff and the JTAC, and will determine optimal placement of JTAC personnel to meet CINC requirements. The CDR JTAC shall be knowledgeable in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) process and crisis action planning (CAP) procedures. Additionally, CDR JTAC shall have a final TOP SECRET clearance, possess a valid passport, be outfitted with NBC personal protective equipment, and meet minimum medical requirements for world-wide deployability (as specified by individual Service regulations).

(e) Composition of the JTAC may be tailored based on incident specifics and level of support required.
7. **Concept of Operations**

   a. Upon detection or notification that a foreign WMD event has occurred, or a credible threat exists which warrants initiation of contingency CM planning, the affected geographic CINC shall initiate a request for deployment of the JTAC to assist in crisis action planning. The request shall be forwarded to the SECDEF via the Joint Staff. Upon approval, the Joint Staff shall issue a Deployment Order (DEPLOYORD) to U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and supporting Services and Agencies.

   b. Upon notification of SECDEF approval to deploy the JTAC, U.S. Joint Forces Command shall notify the JTAC supporting organizations to coordinate deployment. Supporting commands will be directed to verify the names of designated individuals, and provide tentative commercial travel arrangements. U.S. Joint Forces will coordinate with the TRANSCOM Mobility Control Center (MCC) on the availability of military airlift. U.S. Joint Forces Command will determine and direct the most expedient method of deployment (commercial or military air).

   c. Upon issuance of a U.S. Joint Forces Command DEPLOYORD (either verbal or message), the JTAC will deploy to the supported CINC's Headquarters to augment CINC's staff in crisis action planning. If the supported CINC directs, all or portions of the JTAC may forward deploy to augment the CINC's forward Headquarters' element (i.e. designated Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) or Joint Task Force- Consequence Management (JTF-CM)).

   d. The JTAC will assist the supported CINC in situation assessment, courses of action development, and follow-on force recommendations. The JTAC shall also provide technical information relevant to the incident to assist the CINC in determining force protection measures, assessment and targeting of intelligence collection, and development of public affairs and information operations plans.

   e. When deployed, the JTAC will maintain access to additional expertise resident in CONUS-based DoD and Federal agencies and laboratories, as well as various scientific
research and academic communities. JTAC access to these resources will be sustained primarily via the DTRA Resource Coordination Center (RCC) in Alexandria, Virginia. The RCC provides an information clearinghouse of unclassified and classified databases and information sharing resources via a network of CBRN hotlines and websites. JTAC "reach back" connectivity will be via supported CINC provided.

JTAC organic equipment to facilitate "reach back" will include modem equipped portable laptop computers, information sharing software and limited communications support equipment. DTRA personnel deployed as part of the JTAC will be thoroughly familiar with RCC "reachback" capabilities and procedures.

8. Organizational Relationships. Upon notification of JTAC activation, supporting organizations will identify and place personnel under the operational control (OPCON) of the U.S. Joint Forces Command JTAC Commander. U.S. Joint Forces Command assumes and exercises OPCON of the JTAC from activation through deployment. U.S. Joint Forces Command will transfer OPCON of the JTAC to the supported CINC upon arrival of the JTAC to the supported CINC's Headquarter's and/or AOR.

9. Operational Phasing. JTAC support will be provided in accordance with the following four phases:

   a. Phase I (Pre-Deployment): Pre-deployment and Crisis Action Planning operations begin upon receipt of a CJCS alert, warning or deployment order, or upon receipt of a request for assistance from a combatant CINC. During this phase, actions are undertaken to ensure maximum readiness for deployment and operation execution. The designated CDR JTAC establishes contact with the supported CINC and JTAC supporting commands via the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Operations Center (JOC). Actions during this phase also include verification of JTAC team members, the determination of lift availability and confirmation of Aerial Port of Embarkations (APOEs). U.S. Joint Forces Command shall coordinate with the TRANSCOM MCC for JTAC movement. As required, the notional JTAC is reconfigured based on incident type and supported CINC requirements. The JTAC shall be positioned at designated APOEs, or scheduled to move via
commercial lift, within of notification by U.S. Joint Forces Command. Pending deployment, the JTAC initiates technical assistance to the supported CINC's assessment of the situation. Phase I ends when the JTAC commences deployment. Success is defined as all pre-deployment preparations complete and the JTAC poised for deployment within of notification.

b. Phase II (Deployment): Phase II operations begin upon deployment from home station. During this phase, the JTAC deploys to the supported CINC's Headquarter's or forward Headquarter's element within the AOR. Phase II ends when deployment of the JTAC is complete and the CDR JTAC determines the JTAC is ready to execute the mission. Success is defined as JTAC deployment complete, required CONUS connectivity established, and the JTAC prepared to provide on-site support.

c. Phase III (Employment): This phase begins when JTAC initiates on-site support to the affected geographic CINC. The JTAC assists the supported CINC's staff and/or forward Headquarter's element determine CM courses of action and follow-on force requirements. Phase III ends when JTAC support to the affected geographic CINC is no longer required. Success is defined as the situation within the area of operations (AO) is stabilized, and the supported CINC has begun transition of CM mission responsibility to the HN or other appropriate authority (i.e. other USG agency, non-governmental organization (NGO) or private volunteer organization (PVO)).

d. Phase IV (Redeployment): Redeployment begins when the supported CINC no longer requires JTAC support. Phase IV ends when all JTAC personnel have safely redeployed to home station. Success is defined as all JTAC personnel have departed the AO and returned to home stations, and OPCON of attached personnel is transferred to the parent commands.

10. Responsibilities

a. Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command shall:

(1) Be responsible for identifying, coordinating, exercising, and upon SECDEF approval - deploying the JTAC to
advise and assist geographic CINC's tasked to conduct foreign CM operations.

(2) Be prepared to (BPT) designate an officer in the grade of O-5/O-6 to serve as JTAC commander (CDR JTAC).

b. Geographic CINC's shall, upon designation as the Supported CINC for foreign CM operations:

(1) Obtain the necessary rights, authorizations, and/or diplomatic clearances essential to JTAC deployment, employment and redeployment.

(2) BPT provide JTAC administrative and combat logistics support (e.g. messing, berthing, medical, force protection, etc.) within their AOR.

(3) Provide reach-back communications support to include

(4) Nominate to U.S. Joint Forces Command the biennial exercise event in which the CINC desires JTAC participation.

c. Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command (CINCSTRANSCOM) shall BPT to move selected JTAC personnel from designated APOEs to the supported CINC's Headquarter's and/or AOR to support SECDEF approved foreign CM operations.

d. Chief of Staff, U.S. Army shall:

(1) BPT provide from SBCCOM to serve as a JTAC member who has expertise in consequence management operations, weaponized chemical and biological agents, and capabilities of other DoD assets which are available to support consequence management operations.

(2) BPT provide from SBCCOM to serve as a JTAC member who has expertise in hazardous waste cleanup operations, mitigation, packaging, movement and disposal of chemical and biological contaminates.
(3) BPT provide from SBCCOM to serve as a JTAC member who has expertise in industrial hazardous material and be capable of explaining hazard prediction and protection.

(4) BPT provide chemical and biological incident technical subject matter expert support to the JTAC through the DTRA RCC via electronic reachback with the Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team (CB-RRT) located at the SBCCOM Operations Center, Edgewood Area, APG, Maryland.

(5) Provide personnel to support JTAC participation in 2-3 CINC-sponsored exercises per year.

e. Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force shall:

(1) BPT provide personnel to serve as JTAC members who have expertise in contamination reconnaissance and specialized medical assistance for nuclear/radiological incidents.

(2) Provide personnel to support JTAC participation in 2-3 CINC-sponsored exercises per year.

f. Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic (COMMARFORLANT) shall:

(1) BPT provide individual to serve as a JTAC member who has expertise in the unique medical aspects of planning and executing CM operations.

(2) BPT provide individual to serve as a JTAC member who has expertise in the unique operational aspects of planning and executing CM operations.

(3) Provide personnel to support JTAC participation in 2-3 CINC-sponsored exercises per year.

g. Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) shall:

(1) BPT provide personnel from the Consequence Management Advisory Team (CMAT) to serve as JTAC members who
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have expertise in the unique aspects of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological consequence management planning and hazard prediction computer modeling.

(2) Provide personnel to support JTAC participation in 2-3 CINC-sponsored exercises per year.

(3) Upon SECDEF approved deployment of the JTAC, provide continuous “reach-back” support via the DTRA RCC.

h. Director, Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) shall:

   (1) BPT provide to serve as a JTAC member for nuclear and radiological incidents.

   (2) Provide personnel to support JTAC participation in 2-3 CINC-sponsored exercises per year.

EXERCISES AND TRAINING

11. Exercises. There are two pre-conditions for the JTAC to successfully accomplish its stated mission: (1) the geographic CINC's' staffs must be familiar with the JTAC mission and capabilities, and (2) the JTAC must be fully integrated into the CINC's' crisis action planning process. The objective of JTAC exercise participation will be to enhance these two pre-conditions through multi-tiered WMD foreign CM exercises which facilitate integration of interagency, CINC-assigned, Service and Defense Agency assets. However, JTAC exercise requirements must be balanced against the training and exercise requirements of the parent organizations which support the JTAC. As such, JTAC participation will be limited to 2-3 CINC-sponsored exercises per year, with participation rotated among geographic CINCs on a biennial basis as coordinated through U.S. Joint Forces Command.

12. Training. Technical proficiency training for designated JTAC members remains the responsibility of the parent organization. At least annually, U.S. Joint Forces Command shall host a JTAC training workshop in which designated JTAC personnel shall be provided training specific to the
accomplishment of the JTAC mission. Training to include, but not limited to, CINC CM plans, USG interagency CM response capabilities and procedures, NGO/PVO CM capabilities, crisis action planning procedures, scenario based WMD threat analysis, and review of lessons learned from CM operations and exercises.

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

13. Personnel Requirements. Designation of JTAC personnel by the supporting commands shall be based primarily on CBRN expertise to meet billet requirements. Personnel may be active duty or reserve military, DoD civilian, or civilian contractor under DoD contract. Designated personnel must have a final SECRET clearance, possess a valid passport, be outfitted with NBC personal protective equipment, and meet minimum medical requirements for worldwide deployability (as specified by individual Service regulations). For civilian contractors under DOD contract, supporting commands must verify contract terms allowing assignment to JTAC related duties.

FUNDING AND LOGISTICS

14. Funding for Operations. Initial funding for JTAC operations shall be the responsibility of the parent organization. Commands will capture incremental and total costs of JTAC related operations and report costs through appropriate comptroller channels for possible reimbursement from the lead Federal agency. Detailed guidance regarding reimbursement will be provided in appropriate Joint Staff DEPLOYORD.

15. Funding for Exercises and Training. Primary responsibility for the funding of JTAC related exercises and training rests with the parent organization. To the maximum extent possible, U.S. Joint Forces Command will coordinate with the supported CINC and other available sources for the funding of JTAC personnel participation in CINC-sponsored exercises.

16. Logistics. To the maximum extent possible, JTAC personnel shall deploy with required equipment and supplies to be self-sufficient for at least in the accomplishment of their mission. The JTAC SOP shall provide detailed guidance on recommended personal and mission gear. U.S. Joint Forces
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Command has overall directive authority in the field of logistics to ensure effectiveness and economy of operations and the prevention or elimination of unnecessary functions among supporting organizations. JTAC administrative and combat logistics support sustainment responsibilities shift to the supported CINC upon JTAC arrival in the affected AOR.