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Department of Defense

DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5210.41
November 1, 2004

USD(AT&L)

SUBJECT: Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons

(b) DoD 5210.41-M, "Nuclear Weapon Security Manual (U)," April 1994
(e) through (h), see enclosure E1

1. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

This Directive:

1.1. Reissues reference (a) to update security policy and to assign responsibilities for protecting U.S. nuclear weapons.

1.2. Continues to authorize the publication of DoD 5210.41-M, "Nuclear Weapon Security Manual (U)," reference (b).

2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").

¹ The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) is the DoD release authority for this document. All requests for copies will be made through the OUSD(AT&L) to the National Security Council staff.

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3. DEFINITIONS

Terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure 2.

4. POLICY

It is DoD policy that:

4.1. Nuclear weapons require special protection because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the consequences of an unauthorized deliberate or inadvertent pre-arming, launching, firing, or detonation (conventional or nuclear). Furthermore, any incident involving unauthorized access to a U.S. nuclear weapon, even a nondestructive event, has the possibility of reducing the credibility of the national deterrent. Nuclear weapons shall not be subjected to adverse physical environments except when operational requirements dictate such exposure. The safety of the public, operating personnel and property, and protection of nuclear weapons from capture, theft, damage, and unauthorized use or loss are essential during all phases of operations (storage, transport, maintenance, on alert) involving nuclear weapons.

4.2. The central and overriding objective for nuclear weapons security is the denial of unauthorized access as outlined in National Security Presidential Directive-23, United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and Security (reference (c)). This is accomplished through implementing of the Nuclear Weapons Security Standard:

4.2.1. Deny unauthorized access to nuclear weapons; prevent damage or sabotage to nuclear weapons; prevent loss of custody; and prevent, to the maximum extent possible, radiological contamination caused by unauthorized acts. Two fundamental tenets of nuclear security are to:

4.2.1.1. Deny unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. There shall be no plausible scenario that may result in the unauthorized access to a nuclear weapon. Security configurations shall be designed to counter the most likely scenarios as promulgated in the Nuclear Weapons Threat Matrix.

4.2.1.2. Failing denial of access, commanders shall take any and all actions necessary, including the use of deadly force in accordance with DoDD 5210.56 (reference (d)), to regain control of nuclear weapons immediately.

4.3. The protection required for nuclear weapons shall consist of a comprehensive, integrated, layered system of administrative, operational, and technical measures to ensure the security of nuclear weapons. Therefore, policy, procedures, and systems shall be in place to

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deny unauthorized individuals access to nuclear weapons and the means to launch or release them.

4.4. Nuclear weapons shall be protected from loss, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access or use, and unauthorized or accidental damage or destruction. Although adhering to prescribed security procedures during wartime may be impractical, particularly in a combat theater, the peacetime philosophy for protecting nuclear weapons remains in effect during wartime. In times of transition to and during wartime, commanders shall use all resources available to secure and ensure the survivability of weapons in their custody.

4.5. Internal and external inspections, vulnerability analyses, realistic training and evaluations, and force-on-force exercises against existing and emerging threats at all levels using performance-based standards shall be conducted, where possible. These actions, together with other capabilities measurements (e.g., personnel, logistics), shall be integrated to provide a balanced evaluation of readiness and to ensure that design capabilities meet established performance standards (reference (c)).

4.6. Positive measures shall be taken that ensure the complete physical control of nuclear weapons in DoD custody. To ensure a balanced security system, physical security procedures, forces, and facilities shall be combined in an integrated protection system. Physical security systems shall incorporate denial as the primary approach in the development process. Additionally, survivability shall be a significant consideration in the design of a security system.

4.7. Security shall be considered early during researching, developing, and acquiring nuclear weapon systems and when modernizing and updating existing systems.

4.8. The physical security requirements associated with nuclear weapons shall take into consideration the affordability and life-cycle costs of a nuclear weapon system. Similarly, modernizing or improving products on existing systems shall include reevaluating system security provisions early in the process to assess the impact of new technology and to determine evolving security requirements due to changes in deployment modes, location of the systems, or other factors.

4.9. Whenever there is an indication of an increased threat beyond that stated in reference (b) and The Postulated Threat to U.S. Nuclear Weapon Facilities and Other Selected Strategic Facilities (reference (c)), in an area where nuclear weapons are located, local commanders shall take additional security measures appropriate to the threat to ensure adequate protection.

4.10. Access to nuclear weapons shall be restricted to authorized persons, and the number of persons afforded such access shall be kept to a minimum and controlled by the two-person policy measures described in reference (b).

5. RESPONSIBILITIES
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5.1. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD (NCB)), under the authority, direction and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), shall:

5.1.1. Develop and promulgate nuclear weapon security policy and establish minimum standards and procedures for protecting nuclear weapons in reference (b). Coordinate draft documents with the appropriate DoD Components, consistent with DoD 5025.1-M (reference (f)). Review and update, as necessary, the Nuclear Weapons Threat Matrixes contained in reference (b).

5.1.2. Provide management oversight of the nuclear weapon security program, and shall:

5.1.2.1. Conduct oversight visits to assess the adequacy of nuclear weapon security programs and standards.

5.1.2.2. Maintain and monitor prescribed nuclear security management processes.

5.1.2.3. Review the DoD Component implementation guidance for consistency and compliance with policy.

5.1.2.4. Conduct programmatic reviews and management audits of nuclear weapons security processes.

5.1.2.5. Provide oversight of research and analysis of the nuclear weapons security protection systems.

5.1.2.6. Administer and provide oversight of the DoD annual nuclear security force-on-force exercise program, ensuring at least one force-on-force exercise is conducted each calendar year.

5.1.2.7. Ensure, in conjunction with the Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, that adequate funding is provided for conducting robust DoD-sponsored nuclear security force-on-force exercises.

5.1.3. Control the release of DoD-sponsored nuclear security force-on-force exercise reports. The ATSD(NCB) and/or the Sponsoring Command(s) shall have release authority. The Military Department shall control Military Department unique exercise reports.

5.1.4. Compile and issue, as appropriate, lessons learned from DoD exercises to the Heads of the DoD Components.

5.1.5. Update the charter for the Security Policy Verification Committee (SPVC).

5.1.6. Appoint the chair of the SPVC, who shall:

5.1.6.1. Convene a SPVC meeting each quarter, at a minimum.

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5.1.6.2. Represent the SPVC at all DoD Physical Security Review Board meetings in accordance with DoD Directive 5100.76 (reference (g)).

5.1.6.3. Develop a robust schedule for rotating DoD-sponsored nuclear security force-on-force exercises among the Military Departments to ensure a DoD-sponsored exercise involving the DoD Components is conducted at least every 12 months.

5.1.6.4. Research, provide recommendations, and resolve nuclear security related issues as directed by the ATSD(NCB).

5.1.7. Oversee development of Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection policy.

5.1.8. Maintain liaison activities with the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies on areas of mutual interest.

5.1.9. Prepare and update a Departmental nuclear security roadmap to ensure effective stewardship of resources and to synchronize required capabilities development and integration.

5.2. The Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), shall:

5.2.1. Provide subject matter expertise and technical writing support to the ATSD(NCB) for the updating of reference (b).

5.2.2. Execute the DoD-sponsored nuclear security force-on-force exercise program, as directed by the ATSD(NCB).

5.2.3. Provide adequate funding, in conjunction with the ATSD(NCB), for conducting DoD-sponsored nuclear security force-on-force exercises.

5.2.4. Conduct Defense Nuclear Surety Inspections for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.3. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, shall update annually the Postulated Threat to U.S. Nuclear Weapon Facilities and Other Selected Strategic Facilities (reference (c)) in accordance with reference (c).

5.4. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense shall review nuclear weapon security policy and guidelines for legal sufficiency.

5.5. The Heads of the DoD Components, who are involved with nuclear weapons in DoD custody as well as associated systems or components or provide nuclear weapons support to designated Combatant Commanders or other DoD Components, shall:
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5.5.1. Implement this Directive and make it a part of their normal assurance and assessment process, including DoD Component Inspector General assessments.

5.5.2. Recommend policy and procedural changes, consistent with reference (g), and submit requests for review and approval to the ATSD(NCB).

5.5.3. Use (reference (b), (e), and the Nuclear Weapons Threat Matrixes (contained in reference (b)) as the primary nuclear weapon security planning references.

5.5.4. Conduct realistic nuclear weapons system security training, nuclear security force-on-force exercises, and evaluations.

5.5.5. Nominate locations annually to the SPVC for inclusion in the DoD-sponsored nuclear security force-on-force exercise schedule.

5.5.6. Ensure commanders at locations with nuclear weapons conduct annual vulnerability and risk analyses, using the procedures outlined in reference (b), which shall address all relevant factors, including:

5.5.6.1. Weapon(s) location.

5.5.6.2. The configuration in which the weapons are maintained (storage, transport, maintenance, on alert).

5.5.6.3. The nature and capabilities of potentially hostile forces.

5.5.6.4. The reliability and capabilities of personnel responsible for working with or protecting nuclear weapons.

5.5.6.5. Consideration of existing positive control features in the weapon or weapons system.

5.5.7. Conduct inspections assessing policy compliance and performance capabilities.

5.5.8. Control the release of DoD-sponsored nuclear security exercise reports. The ATSD(NCB) and/or the Sponsoring Command(s) shall have release authority. The Military Department(s) shall control the Military Department unique exercise reports.

5.5.9. Develop and maintain nuclear security roadmaps that detail physical security vulnerabilities, mitigators, and processes to correct deficiencies as part of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process.

5.5.10. Ensure emerging requirements identified in the nuclear security roadmaps are submitted to the appropriate Combatant Commanders for inclusion in the Commander's
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Integrated Priority List and included in the Military Department’s Program Objective Memorandum.

5.5.11. Brief the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Nuclear Weapons Council (reference (h)) on the status of their nuclear security roadmaps on an annual basis.

5.5.12. Provide a security concept of operations for new or modernized systems to the ATSD(NCB) for approval.

5.5.13. Consider measures during planning and development that incorporate new, as well as existing internal use control capabilities that interface directly with external denial systems in all designs and/or updates.

5.5.14. Adhere to the minimum security criteria and standards for denying access to nuclear weapons prescribed in reference (b).

5.5.15. Comply with the concepts and procedures for denying access to nuclear weapons that are described in detail in reference (b).

5.5.16. Provide an annual report, prior to December 31 each year, to the ATSD(NCB), recommending nuclear security policy changes based on pertinent activities throughout the year (e.g., significant findings from nuclear security force-on-force exercises, engineering studies, inspections, and vulnerability assessments).

5.5.17. This Directive does not abolish or abridge the authority or responsibility of a commander to apply different but equal, or more stringent criteria and standards during emergencies. Such a change in standards does not abolish the requirement for maintaining U.S. custody of nuclear weapons and components.

5.6. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

5.6.1. Provide for internal and external inspections pursuant to reference (c).

5.6.2. Prescribe procedures for the conduct of the Defense Nuclear Surety Inspections.

5.6.3. Provide nuclear weapon recapture and recovery guidance for lost, stolen, or missing nuclear weapons or nuclear components.

5.7. The Combatant Commanders through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who control or support nuclear weapons shall:

5.7.1. Support the full, applicable range of nuclear weapon security policy.

5.7.2. Ensure physical security and protection against physical damage, misuse, and theft of nuclear weapons and nuclear components under their control.
5.7.3. Assist in the development of local plans, procedures, and capabilities, and provide resources to work with other organizations to recover lost, stolen, or missing nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components.

5.7.4. Act as the proponent of emerging nuclear security requirements submitted by DoD organizations by including these requirements in their Integrated Priority Lists.

6. **EFFECTIVE DATE**

This Directive is effective immediately.

Paul Wolfowitz  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosures – 2

E1. References continued  
E2. Definitions
(e) The Postulated Threat to U.S. Nuclear Weapon Facilities and Other Selected Strategic Facilities, January 2003
(h) Section 179 of title 10, United States Code
E2. ENCLOSURE 2

DEFINITIONS

E2.1.1. **Access.** Close physical proximity to a nuclear weapon in such a manner as to allow the opportunity to tamper with or damage a nuclear weapon.

E2.1.2. **Delay.** The effect achieved by physical features, technical devices, or security measures and forces that impede an adversary from gaining access to a nuclear weapon or component. Normally expressed as a function of time, it is a major consideration in the design and development of nuclear weapon physical security systems.

E2.1.3. **Denial.** The effect achieved by security systems or devices that prevent a potential intruder or adversary, as described in the postulated threat, from gaining access to a nuclear weapon.

E2.1.4. **Exclusion Area.** A designated area immediately surrounding one or more nuclear weapon(s)/systems. Normally, the boundaries of the area are the walls, floors, and ceiling of a structure or delineated by a permanent or temporary barrier. In the absence of positive preventive measures, access to the exclusion area constitutes access to the nuclear weapon(s)/systems.

E2.1.5. **Limited Area.** A designated area immediately surrounding one or more exclusion areas. Normally, the area is between the boundaries of the exclusion area(s) and the outer or inner barrier or boundary of the perimeter security system.

E2.1.6. **Nuclear Weapon Security Standard (NWSS).** Deny unauthorized access to nuclear weapons; prevent loss of custody; and prevent, to the maximum extent possible, radiological contamination caused by unauthorized acts. Two fundamental tenets of nuclear security are to:

   E2.1.6.1. Deny unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. There shall be no plausible scenario that would result in the unauthorized access to a nuclear weapon. Security configurations should be designed to counter the most likely scenarios as promulgated in the Nuclear Weapon Threat Matrix.

   E2.1.6.2. Failing denial of access, commanders shall take any and all actions necessary, including the use of deadly force in accordance with DoDD 5210.56 (reference (i)), to regain control of nuclear weapons immediately.

E2.1.7. **Postulated Threat to Nuclear Weapons.** An annual estimate, completed by the Defense Intelligence Agency, under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, of the potential adversary types, acts, capabilities, and combinations thereof that could constitute a risk to nuclear weapons, components, facilities, and personnel.

E2.1.8. **Sponsoring Command(s).** A command that requests, and therefore sponsors, a nuclear security force-on-force exercise.