MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 24, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: WILLIAM E. ODOM

SUBJECT: Targeting PD Briefing for the President

I am attaching the original PD (Tab A) and cover memo (Tab I), plus a short refresher memo for the President's pre-meeting use today (Tab II). It will also help you recall the issues. (S)

You should also know that the Republican platform includes a lot of nuclear war-fighting doctrine. The issue may or may not come up in the campaign, but from a national security and foreign policy viewpoint, the PD is needed to clarify our policy and leave no room for confusion. This is a point you might raise in the discussion today. (TS)

I did not emphasize in the memorandum to the President that you dragged Brown along on this PD. You once mentioned that I should. There is a hint -- on exercises -- and you can add orally that the "flexibility" section, "targeting categories" section, and the "acquisition policy" section, are our innovations, not Defense's. (TS)

RECOMMENDATION:

Sign the memorandum at Tab II. (U)

[Signature]

[Handwritten note: 7/24/80 Hand carried to Pres.]

TOP SECRET

Review on July 24, 2000
Extended by Z. Brzezinski
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

July 24, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Nuclear Targeting Policy

Today you are meeting with Harold Brown, the Vice President, and me to respond to the request you made at Tab I, page 2, for a briefing on the proposed Presidential Directive on Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy. You asked to know:

-- what is changed in targeting, etc.;
-- how we propose to brief the allies;
-- what public statements are to be made? (TS)

Harold will answer these questions for you. (U)

With the new directive, you will make rather significant and important innovations in improving control and management of our nuclear forces. At the same time, it is not a totally new departure. The basic direction toward more flexibility was set by the Schlesinger effort in 1974 which led to NSDM-242. That directive, however, only initiated the process, and it was not very specific about the need for a better staffing capability. Nor did it tie theater forces and other military operations into planning effectively. I have added the emphasis on exercises in the new PD as a result of your own involvement in IVORY ITEM exercises in 1978. They had an enormous educational impact and helped my staff and Harold's design parts of the new PD. That learning process must continue if this new PD is to have its best effect and you are to guide the evolution of the policy. (TS)