I received Ambassador Dobrynin this morning at his request.

The Ambassador read to me the following oral statement in reply to my representations to him on January 14, with regard to the venting of nuclear tests:

"The underground nuclear explosion taking place in the Soviet Union on December 18, 1966, was conducted according to data of the competent Soviet organizations in conditions entirely excluding the appearance outside the borders of the Soviet Union of radioactive debris.

"As regards the proposal of the American side concerning discussions between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. on the question of eliminating differences in the interpretation of the understanding of radioactive debris which is contained in the Moscow Treaty on Nuclear Tests in the three environments, this, in our view, deserves attention. We will be prepared to return to
this at a later date. The Soviet Government would also like to avoid further mutual inquiries so long as they are not based on serious considerations with regard to whether an underground nuclear explosion should be consistent with the conditions of the Moscow treaty on the banning of nuclear tests since such inquiries to a degree can be exploited for the purpose of undermining the significance of this treaty."

The Ambassador left with me the Russian text of his oral remarks, attached.

Attachment:

As stated.
The underground nuclear explosion that took place in the Soviet Union on December 18, 1966, was carried out, according to the competent Soviet organizations, under conditions that completely excluded the appearance of radioactive particles outside the limits of the Soviet Union.

With regard to the proposal of the American side concerning negotiations between the USSR and the USA on the question of eliminating differences in the interpretation of the meaning of radioactive "particles" [sic]* contained in the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the three environments, we consider it deserves study. We shall be prepared to return to this later. The Soviet Government would also like to avoid future reciprocal inquiries, if they are not based on serious reasons, as to whether any given underground nuclear explosion corresponds to the conditions of the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests, since such inquiries may, to some extent, be used to undermine the importance of this Treaty.

*Translator's note: The Russian word for "particles" used in this note does not appear in the Moscow Treaty. The terms used in the treaty are "substances" (in the Preamble) and "débris" in Art. I, par. 1 (b).