OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

6 November 1962

MEMO FOR Mr. Gilpatric

Subject: Cuban Crisis -- Record of Events

In response to your recent instructions to Captain Houser and myself for a Record of Events relating to the Cuban Crisis, attached hereto are:

- A revision of Section I -- Political Developments.

- A completed submission for Section II -- Military Steps

- A partial submission for Section III -- National Decision Making. This section will be re-drafted when records of Sec Def/JCS meetings have been transcribed and notes become available. (??)

FRANCIS J. ROBERTS
Colonel, USA

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
CUBAN CRISIS -- RECORD OF EVENTS

I. Political Developments

4 September

- Salinger issues statement by President that Soviets have provided Cuba with anti-aircraft defense missiles, with motor torpedo boats, and have 3500 technicians in or enroute to Cuba. No evidence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles.

12 September

- President, at news conference, announces that because of ever-increasing movement of Soviet personnel to Cuba, we are maintaining careful surveillance. Re-affirms conclusion that shipments do not constitute serious threat to hemisphere; however, if Cuba should become an offensive military base of significant capacity for Soviets, United States will protect its own security and that of other allies.

21 October

- State alerts Diplomatic Posts worldwide that President will make speech. Conveys instructions regarding advising Chiefs of State.

22 October

- President addresses nation. Announces unmistakable evidence of offensive missile sites on Cuba, the purpose of which can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. Advises of steps being taken immediately, to include the quarantine of offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba. Calls upon Khrushchev to eliminate this threat.

- McNamara provides background briefing for Press, elaborating on extent of Soviet installations on Cuba.
CUBAN CRISIS -- RECORD OF EVENTS

I. Political Developments - starting with Kennedy's public statements on Cuba of September 5 and 12, speech of October 22 and subsequent exchanges with Khrushchev and U Thant and significant press statements October 23 through 28.

II. Military Steps - starting with stepped up U-2 recce on October 15 and continuing with all major preparatory steps that were made or became public, then call up of Air Reserve Transport Squadrons on night of October 27, recce schedule October 15-28, log of USSR ships moving to Cuba October 22-28.

III. National Decision Making - all sessions at State, JCS or White House starting with October 15 and significant decisions reached at each - RLG will go thru own notes; H and R to review memos of Exec Com of NSC and records of joint Sec Def/JCS sessions and major JCS papers re Cuba from October 15 to 28, also Sec Def log.
- President, in a letter to Khrushchev, forwards copy of his address to the nation. Tells Chairman the U.S. is determined Cuban threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere must be removed. Points out action being taken is the minimum to remove this threat. Asks USSR to refrain from any action which would widen or deepen the already grave crisis. Expresses hope both leaders can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiation.

- Stevenson, in letter to Zorin, President of the Security Council, requests urgent meeting of the Council to discuss the Cuban situation. Encloses Draft Resolution calling for immediate dismantling and withdrawal of offensive weapons and dispatch of U.S. observer corps to Cuba.

23 October

- Council, Organization of American States, acting provisionally as Organ Consultation under Rio Treaty, approves resolution calling for immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of weapons with any offensive capabilities.

- Proclamation by President that U.S. forces, beginning 2 p.m. Greenwich time, 24 October, will interdict delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to Cuba.

- McNamara, in a press conference, indicates that in furtherance of the Proclamation signed by the President at 7 p.m., U.S. forces will be in position to effect the quarantine at 2 p.m. Greenwich time, 24 October. Announces Admiral Anderson’s appointment as Executive Agent for the quarantine, with Admiral Dennison as responsible Unified Commander. Announces signing of Executive Order 11058 authorizing Sec Def to call members of the reserve under terms of Congressional Resolution dated October 3, Public Law 87-36. Announces Secretary Korth instructed to extend enlistments, appointments and periods of active duty of both Navy and Marine personnel.
-Khrushchev, in letter to President, states USSR cannot recognize right of U.S. to establish control over armaments essential to Republic of Cuba for strengthening of its defensive capability. Confirms that armaments on Cuba are exclusively for defensive purposes.

-President, in letter to Khrushchev, expresses concern that both show prudence and asks that Chairman issue instructions immediately for Soviet ships to observe terms of the quarantine.

24 October

-Khrushchev, in letter to the President, rejects arbitrary demands of the USA. Advises Soviet Government cannot give instructions to Soviet vessels to observe instructions of American Naval forces blockading island.

-U Thant, in letter to President, states time should be given to enable parties concerned to resolve present crisis peacefully. Expresses belief voluntary suspension of quarantine for two to three weeks would greatly ease the situation. Identical message sent to Khrushchev.

25 October

-Khrushchev, in letter to U Thant, expresses agreement in proposal of SYG.

-President responds to U Thant's appeal. Agrees to have U.S. representatives meet with SYG to discuss appropriate measures. Restates essence of problem as seen by the United States.

-U Thant, in letter to Khrushchev, asks that Soviet ships be instructed to stay away from interception area for limited time.

-President, in letter to Khrushchev, refers to falseness of earlier Taas statements that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba and asks Soviets to take necessary action to permit restoration of earlier situation.
26 October

- U Thant, in message to President, states he has requested Khrushchev to have Soviet ships enroute to Cuba instructed to stay away from interception area for limited time. Asks President do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in next few days.

- President, in message to U Thant, states if Soviet ships stay away from the interception area for the limited time required for preliminary discussions, U.S. vessels will do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days.

- Khrushchev, in letter to the President, reassures him weapons have been placed on Cuba solely for the purposes of defense and were sent there at the request of the Cuban Government. States no weapons are aboard ships bound for Cuba but that all weapons necessary for defense of island are already there. Asks that relations be normalized. Referring to exchange with U Thant, Chairman indicates his proposals are reasonable and provide way out of the situation. Proposes Soviets declare ships bound for Cuba will not carry any kind of armaments if U.S. will not invade Cuba or support forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Concludes with expression of sincere desire to relieve situation and remove threat of war.

- Salinger issues White House statement confirming evidence of continuing improvement of ballistic missile sites in Cuba. States there is no evidence to indicate any intention to dismantle or discontinue work on the missile sites.

- Khrushchev, in letter to U Thant, accepts SYG proposal and indicates Soviet vessels will stay out of interception area.

- U Thant, in letter to Castro, indicates he has received encouraging responses from Kennedy and Khrushchev and asks Castro to suspend construction and development of major military installations in Cuba during period of negotiations.
27 October

- In publicly announced message to the President, Khrushchev expresses satisfaction with Presidential response to U Thant. Proposes Soviets remove from Cuba means regarded by U.S. as offensive if U.S. will remove its analogous means. Proposes subsequent inspection by personnel enjoying confidence of UN Security Council as well as of the United States, the Soviet Union, Cuba and [b][1][b].

- President, in letter to Khrushchev, welcomes desire to seek prompt solution. Restates key elements of Khrushchev proposal as Soviet agreement to remove weapons systems from Cuba under UN observation and supervision, to halt further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba, to remove U.S. quarantine measures, and to give U.S. assurances against invasion of Cuba. States that linking of Cuba problems to broader questions of European and world security would lead to intensification of Cuban crisis.

- Salinger issues White House statement regarding "several inconsistent and conflicting proposals" made by USSR. States position of the U.S. that as an urgent preliminary to consideration of any Soviet proposals, work on Cuban bases must stop. Offensive weapons must be rendered inoperative and further shipment must cease.

- Castro, in message to U Thant, indicates Cuba would accept compromises requested provided U.S. desists from aggressive actions, including the naval blockade. Indicates willingness to receive U Thant in Cuba.

28 October

- In publicly announced message to the President, Khrushchev indicates he has issued order to dismantle offensive weapons and return them to the Soviet Union. Refers to U-2 overflight incidents to include the case of 28 October. Announces Kuznetsov has been sent to New York to assist U Thant in current negotiations.
- The President, in letter to Khrushchev, expresses consideration that previous exchanges of correspondence bind both governments to firm undertakings. Expresses regret for recent U-2 incident. Urges that, for the future, both work hard to achieve wider measures of disarmament.

- U Thant, in message for President, encloses his response to Castro and comments favorably on contents of President's 27 October letter to Khrushchev.

- Ambassador, in letter to U Thant, authorized SYG to convey to Castro, President's assurances as expressed in 27 October letter to Khrushchev.

- U Thant informs Castro of acceptance of invitation to visit Cuba.

- Castro announces conditions for acceptance of a Soviet understanding with the U.S.; eliminate naval blockade, end economic blockade, end all subversive activities, end pirate attacks, end violations of air and naval space, and withdraw from Guantanamo.
II. Military Steps Taken During the Cuban Crisis

The following documents are attached:

- Military Actions Taken in Connection with the Cuban Crisis.

- Summary of Reconnaissance Flights During Cuban Crisis.

- Movements of Soviet, Other Soviet Bloc, and Free World Merchant Ships Enroute to Cuba.
MILITARY ACTIONS TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE CUBAN CRISIS

DATE          EVENT

8 October  
1. Twelve F4H all-weather fighter aircraft ordered to deploy to NAS, Key West, under CINCONAD control.

2. CINCLANT informed that the British Government has agreed that US may proceed with prepositioning of supplies and equipment.

18 October
1. CINCONAD authorized to:

   a. Deploy 14 F-102 aircraft from Seymour Johnson AFB to Homestead AFB (brings total to 18).

   b. Deploy six F-106 aircraft from Langley AFB to Patrick AFB (brings total to 12).

   c. Deploy six RC-121 AEW&C aircraft to McCoy AFB (brings total to 12).

   d. Alert CINCONAD aircraft in place at Tyndall AFB for use as augmentation forces.

   e. Retain detachment of naval all-weather fighters (VFAW-3) at Key West NAS (10 F4D).

2. CINCPAC directed to transfer operational control of reinforced infantry battalion from 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) to CINCLANT.

3. MSTS transport held in the vicinity of Guantanamo, prepared to evacuate dependents.

19 October
1. CINCARIB and CINCLANT alerted (for information, passed to CINCSAC and CINCONAD) against possible air attack Panama Canal, Ramey AFB, Naval Station Roosevelt Roads and recommendations requested for augmentation of air defenses.
2. Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) directed to expedite readiness of a HAWK Battalion at Fort Meade, Maryland. CINCONAD authorized to move unit to Key West at his discretion.

3. Transfer of Marine HAWK Battalion (LAAM) from PACOM to LANTCOM authorized.

4. Admiral Dennison informed that, at this time, mobilization on D-Day had been approved for reserve troop carrier units only.

5. CINCARIB directed to transfer operational control of two LSTs to CINCLANT.

6. CINCPAC directed to assemble shipping for sea echelon only of 5th MEB on West Coast — no loading until further notice.

7. Marine attack squadron of 19 A4D2N attack aircraft directed to embark on CVA Enterprise.

8. Ten F-8U-P (photographic airplanes) of Photo Squadron 62 transferred from NAS, Cecil Field, Florida, to NAS, Key West.

20 October

1. CINCs advised that state of tension with Cuba could lead to military action.

21 October

1. CINCLANT directed movement of the one Marine Battalion reinforced from the 5th MEB to Guantanamo.

2. One Marine Air Group began movement from Cherry Point to NAS, Key West by MATS.

3. CINCLANT directed to execute movement of Battalion Landing Team from Camp Lejuene to Guantanamo.

4. CSA directed to alert Third Army Headquarters of possible requirement for execution of Joint Defense Plans for Southeastern United States and for Florida Keys. No action to be taken prior to P-Hour.
5. AFLANT strike aircraft commenced move into southern bases in increments.

22 October

1. Four TACAN-equipped destroyers were positioned on station between Cuba and southern tip of Florida.

2. CINCLANT directed to assume operational control of Army and Air Force forces assigned to CINCLANT OPLANS 312/314/316, from CINCSTRIKE.

3. CINCARIB instructed to be prepared to furnish Riot Control Support to Panama and other Latin American Countries as required.

4. Joint Battle Staff activated.

5. SAC alert aircraft directed to depart Homestead AFB.

6. CINCLANT directed to prepare for protection of US shipping in Florida Straits, Windward Passage, and Yucatan Channel.

7. JCS issued to CINCLANT a planning directive for the quarantine of Cuba containing:
   
   b. Instructions for quarantine of ships.
   c. Instructions for quarantine of aircraft.
   d. A concept of operations.
   e. Defense of Guantanamo.
   f. Control of American shipping.
   g. Coordination with friendly forces.

8. CONAD nuclear armed interceptors authorized phased dispersal at P-Hour - 12.

9. CINCSAC authorized to implement 1/8 airborne alert and execute force dispersal plan.

10. CINCPAC directed to load 5th MEB (less one BLT already enroute) as soon as possible and to change temporary operational control to CINCLANT.
11. CINCLANT authorized to obtain approval Dade County officials to use Opa Locka Airfield, Florida, and to move units in on P+1 Day (23 October).

12. DEFCON 3 established for US forces worldwide.

13. MINIMIZE (pass only essential communication traffic) directed world-wide.

23 October

1. CONAD assigned temporary operational control of one Army HAWK Battalion and one Army NIKE HERCULES Battalion for deployment to priority targets in Southeast United States.

2. CINCLANT directed to implement maritime quarantine according to rules of engagement provided.

3. CINCSAC directed to initiate generation of SAC forces effective 1000 EDT, 24 October 1962.

24 October

1. National Military Command Center (NMCC) authorized to notify the Canadian Joint Chiefs of any change of DEFCON in any of the following commands: LANT, PAC, CONAD, and AL.

2. The Director for Operations (J-3) was directed to provide a daily briefing on the Cuban situation to Admiral Piers, Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington.

3. CINCLANT authorized to organize and activate Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Headquarters.

4. CINCLANT directed to move 326th Army Security Agency (ASA) CO from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to Homestead AFB, Florida, immediately.

25 October

1. CINCLANT advised that prohibition of surface-to-surface missiles included prohibition of missile propellants and chemical compounds capable of being used to power missiles.
2. CINCPAC directed to embark and sail 5th MEB as soon as possible and transfer operational control to CINCLANT. A temporary cover story was provided.

26 October

1. The revised Troop List for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-61 was approved as requested by CINCLANT.

2. The JCS recommended that Secretary of Defense authorize requisitioning of 29 commercial ships and the diversion and positioning of 10 MSTS ships, which would permit the selection of a D-Day for OPLAN 316-61 seven days subsequent to S-Day and the reduction in closure time from D + 11 to D + 8.

3. CINCLANT and CINCARIB advised that quarantine action would not be taken in Canal Zone.

4. CINCLANT advised that further planning for OPLAN 314-61 would be discontinued in favor of OPLAN 316-61.

5. CINCLANT advised that approved text for leaflet drop has been dispatched to Fort Bragg for reproduction. Dissemination will be made when ordered.

(b)(1),(b)(3); 42 USC § 2168 (a) (1) (C)

27 October

1. USCINCEUR authorized to load two-stage nuclear weapons not to exceed blank land based alert strike aircraft.

2. CINCSAC directed to provide assistance in sea surveillance to CINCLANT.

3. One NIKE-HERC battery and one Arty Gp Hq ordered deployed to the Miami-Homestead area.

4. CINCLANT advised that the circular areas of 500 NM radius centered on Havana and Cape Maysi had been designated as the "Interception Area" for the quarantine of Cuba.
28 October

1. CINCLANT directed to suspend leaflet operations.

2. CINCLANT requested to review OPLAN 316 in view of recent intelligence. Include consideration of tactical nuclear weapons both air and ground.

3. CINCLANT directed to take no forceful action and not to board any ships until further orders.

4. COMSTS directed to hold Atlantic transports in East Coast port as they arrive.

5. CINCLANT directed to maintain careful lookout for ALPHA 66 units and prevent any operations against Cuba.

6. CINCARIB advised of augmented US national telephone communications capability with 21 Latin American countries.
III. National Decision Making

9 October
5412 Group Augmented approved NRO recommendations for expanded Cuban reconnaissance consisting of U-2 overflights, C-97 peripheral flights with oblique photography, preparation of firefly drones as backup for U-2's, and deferral of low-level flights.

15 October
President authorized:
- Complete and continuous U-2 reconnaissance of Cuba.
- F8U's on standby alert for low-altitude reconnaissance.
- Preparations for air defense of southeast United States.
- Contingency planning for military actions, possible mobilization and worldwide force alerting.

17 October
1. Alternative courses of action on Cuba discussed at State.

a. Dep Sec Def's preferred courses of action:

(1) Letters to Khrushchev and Castro protesting MRBM's and declaring that unless removed at once (with satisfactory proof) U.S. will act to protect against threat to its security.

(2) Lacking satisfactory response to letters by a certain day, the U.S. Government:
- Declares state of war with Cuba, acting under existing Congressional resolution.
- Establishes blockade against all vessels entering Cuban ports.

- Calls upon OAS to take complementary action in defense of western hemisphere under Rio Treaty.

- Notifies UN of action taken in self defense.

- Asks NATO allies for cooperation in blockade.

(3) Concurrently with (2) above, USA:

- Announces open and comprehensive air and sea surveillance of Cuba.

- Alerts forces for air strikes against Cuban military targets in event Cuba moves militarily versus U.S. and prepares ground forces for possible invasion.

- Establishes air and sea defenses for southeast U.S.

- Evacuates dependents from Guantanamo and strengthens latter's defensive position.

- Alerts overseas forces against possible Soviet or Chi Com aggressive acts.

b. Sec State's preferred courses of action:

- U.S. cannot accept MRBM's in Cuba.

- No profit from preliminary exchange with Khrushchev and Castro.

- Hold until middle of next week,
18 October

1. Three alternative courses of action on Cuba discussed at meeting at State:
   - Political action accompanied by intensified surveillance and military preparations.
   - Air strike against known MRBM and IRBM sites in Cuba.
   - Full-scale invasion and blockade.

2. White House meeting at which were discussed, inter alia — the continuation of air surveillance of Cuba, approaches to Khrushchev/U.S. allies, handling of UN and OAS, blockade arrangements, and military preparations including defense of Guantanamo and southeast Florida.

19 October

1. Meeting at State at which blockade concept was discussed, including legality aspects and related OAS procedure.

2. JCS forwarded "Rules for Engagement of Cuban/Sino-Soviet Tactical Aircraft" which were subsequently approved by Dep Sec Def.

20 October

1. The President tentatively decided in favor of limited blockade or quarantine instead of air strike or invasion or a program of political action. Various work projects assigned.

Dep Sec Def reasons for favoring blockade:


- Course of action most likely to lead to negotiations with USSR with some prospect of peaceful settlement with U.S. in position to keep pressure on during negotiations and ultimate USSR breakdown in western hemisphere.

- Course of action likely to do least damage to U.S. alliances and world leadership position.
Top Secret

- Course of action involving lowest price for removal of offensive weapons from Cuba.

- Only course of military action compatible with U.S. principles, traditions, and standing in Free World, and with U.S. future leadership.

- Possible attrition of USSR/Castro position in Cuba through further military action.

Disadvantages of blockade:

- Prolonged, difficult courses of action likely to divide our civilian and military leadership and strain U.S. patience and Allied good will.

- May give appearance of U.S. lack of determination to stand firm on vital issues and hence weaken alliances and U.S. leadership.

- Offers no absolute assurance of getting rid of Soviet base in Cuba without heavy price (b)(1)

- Will not necessarily lead to downfall of Castro regime.

2. JCS outlined courses of contemplated action and timing by responsible agencies.

3. JCS provided Sec Def with general estimate of Latin American reaction. Also gave estimation of detailed country reactions, statement of nature of country internal problems and requirements, and brief of CINCARIB's readiness and capabilities.

4. Joint Staff issued military scenario for military blockade of Cuba.

21 October

1. At 11:30 a.m. meeting, subsequent to receiving information on missile sites and advice on tactics of air attack, the President directed that Defense be prepared to carry out an air strike on Monday morning or at any time thereafter for the remainder of the week.
2. At the afternoon meeting at the White House, final
Presidential decisions were taken relative to the blockade.
Defense assigned responsibility for preparation of appropriate
documents, i.e., Proclamation, Executive Order, etc.

3. JCS expressed opposition to the issuing of a proposed
statement [(b)(1)]

4. JCS outlined military measures to support U.S.
objectives in Cuba.

22 October

1. At 9:30 a.m. staff meeting, Service Secretaries and
certain Assistant Secretaries of Defense were informed of
Presidential decisions and were assigned responsibility for
various military preparations.

2. In afternoon meeting with JCS, Sec Def informed Chiefs
of President's decision. Assignments for various military
preparations and other actions were made.

3. In afternoon meeting at White House, draft of President's
statement for that evening was reviewed. Alternative ways of
handling questions regarding blockade actions, precautionary
military moves, etc. were discussed.

4. Executive Committee of the NSC established:

   Chairman - President Kennedy.

   Members - Vice President, Sec State, Sec Def,
   Sec Treas, Atty Gen, Dir CIA,
   Under Sec State, Dep Sec Def, Ch JCS,
   Ambassador at Large, Spec Counsel and
   Spec Assistant to President for NSA.

5. Sec Def ordered Sec Army to expand and accelerate
induction and training of Cuban Nationals.

6. General Taylor instructed Norstad to make certain that
7. JCS provided Sec Def with proposed rules of engagement for blockade, attack on armed merchant shipping, Guantanamo, and interference with surveillance flights.

23 October

1. Executive Committee Meeting Nr. 1

a. President approved:

- Issuance of Proclamation of Interdiction at 6:00 p.m., to be effective at dawn, 24 October.

- Executive Order authorizing extension of tours of duty of certain members of the Armed Forces.

- Contingency plan for action in event of an incident affecting U-2 overflights.

- Six low-level recce flights.

b. President directed photographing U.S. airfields in southeast USA to check current deployment.

c. President designated Mr. Nitze to be Chairman of Subcommittee for Berlin Contingency and Dr. Weisner to be leader of interdepartmental review of communications problems.

d. President decided to cancel trip to Brazil.

2. Executive Committee Meeting Nr. 2

- President approved and later signed a revised Proclamation of Interdiction.

- Sec Def was requested to make appropriate recommendations regarding continuation of General Norstad as SACEUR during crisis.

- ASD (CD) was directed to produce recommendations for special Civil Defense plan covering southeast USA during possible Cuban invasion period.

- Counselor Rostow was confirmed as Chairman of Subcommittee on Advance Planning.
24 October

1. ASD (Comptroller) provided military departments and agencies with guidelines and requirements to serve as basis for planning budget and financial actions related to current activities incident to Cuba.

2. ASD (CD) forwarded to the President thru McGeorge Bundy two plans designed to increase Civil Defense preparations during period of possible military engagement with Cuba.

3. ASD (PA) announced categories of information which would be considered as vital to national security and hence not releasable by Defense.

4. State transmitted to Moscow regulations to be followed on submarine surfaceing and identification procedures.

5. **Executive Committee Meeting Nr. 3**

   a. President directed:

      - Sec Treas and Director CIA take immediate action to obtain more "Black Boxes".

      - Most urgent action by State, Defense and CIA to improve communications world-wide.

      - Senior representative of USIA to attend Executive Committee meetings on regular basis.

   b. Based upon timely report, President also directed no interception of any target for at least another hour while determination on whether Russian ships were, in fact, turning around was being sought.

25 October

1. JCS provided Sec Def with planning factors showing reaction times from receipt of implementation order to initiation of actions on or over Cuba.
2. Executive Committee Meeting Nr. 4
   
   a. President authorized Sec Def to issue instructions for selective investigation and boarding of non-bloc ships, excluding tankers.
   
   b. President approved:
      
      - Immediate daylight mission of low-level reconnaissance aircraft.
      
      - Adding missile fuel to list of contraband goods.
   
   c. President directed:
      
      - That Bucharest not be intercepted.
      
      - Defense be prepared to intercept appropriate bloc ship on Friday, 26 October, in daylight.

3. Executive Committee Meeting Nr. 5
   
   a. President approved:
      
      - Low-level recce plans for daylight and night, 26 October.
      
      - Permitting East German passenger ship, Volker Freundschaft, to enter Cuban waters.
   
   b. President stated any incident should be avoided until after Khrushchev had either accepted or rejected U Thant's latest proposal.

26 October

1. JCS outlined for Sec Def ship requirements for sealift movement in support of plan. Recommended diverting ten MSTS troop ships and chartering or requisitioning 29 cargo ships.

2. JCS provided Sec Def with advice regarding the proposition of "nuclear-free" or "missile-free" zones in Latin America and Africa.
3. Subcommittee on Communications, under direction of the Executive Committee, was assigned responsibility of insuring the establishment of a national communications system which will make the world-wide communications available to the USG as prompt, reliable, and secure as possible.

4. **Executive Committee Meeting Nr. 6**

   a. President approved:

   - Releasing of information on boarding of the Marucla.

   - Preparation of leaflets to be dropped in Cuba.

   b. President directed:

   - Preparation of announcement that missile development work was continuing in Cuba.

   - That no crash program would be undertaken on Civil Defense although preliminary measures would be initiated.

27 October

1. JCS presented to Sec Def program for introduction of psychological leaflets, text of which had been approved by the President on 26 October.

2. President advised Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Macmillan of his desire that Norstad remain SACEUR until about 1 January with General Lemnitzer becoming USCINCEUR.

3. **Executive Committee Meeting Nr. 7**

   a. President approved:

   - Informing Russians privately of the extent of our quarantine zone area.

   - Releasing of White House statement announcing that as an urgent preliminary to consideration of any proposals, work on Cuban bases must stop; offensive weapons rendered inoperable; and further shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba must cease -- all under effective international verification.
4. Executive Committee Meeting Nr. 8

a. President directed:

- Holding up planned reconnaissance mission.

- Message dispatched to U Thant requesting he ascertain whether USSR was willing to cease work on bases in Cuba and render weapons inoperable under UN verification.

5. Executive Committee Meeting Nr. 9

a. President approved:

- Call-up of 24 air reserve squadrons involving 14,000 personnel.

- Guidance for Ambassador Finletter to use in presentation to NATO Perm Reps.

28 October

1. JCS advised Sec Def of Alternative Actions if Build-up in Cuba Continued Despite Russian Acceptance of the Quarantine. The Chiefs concluded that some form of direct action to eliminate the offensive weapons threat in Cuba provided greatest promise of achieving U.S. objectives. Further, the only direct action which would surely eliminate the offensive weapons threat was described as air attack followed by invasion.

2. JCS provided Sec Def with:

- Outline Operation Plan for an Air Quarantine of Cuba.

- Draft DoD directive which would cause the plan to be implemented.

- Draft memorandum which would request cooperation of the Secretary of the Treasury.
3. JCS recommended to Sec Def that:
   - Current national command arrangements be continued.
   - OAS members be encouraged to order their forces to report to CINCLANT for operational control.

4. JCS recommended to the President through Sec Def that:
   - CINCLANT OPLAN 312 be executed no later than Monday, 29 October, unless there is irrefutable evidence in meantime that offensive weapons are being dismantled or rendered inoperable.
   - Execution of OPLAN 312 be followed by the execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 316 on S + 7 day.

5. General Taylor conveyed to Sec Def his personal views that:
   - We should maintain continuous readiness to execute OPLAN 312 on 12 hour notice and similarly,
   - We should be prepared to execute OPLAN 316 within 7 days after strike.
   - A decision to execute not be made at this time.

6. Executive Committee Meeting Nr. 10
   a. President directed:
      - No recce missions would be flown today.
      - No action would be taken against bloc ships today.
      - Every effort be made to get the UN to fly recce mission on Monday, 29 October.
b. President approved:

- Release to UN officials of classified information on Soviet armaments in Cuba.

- A public statement welcoming Soviet decision to withdraw offensive weapons from Cuba.

c. President granted qualified approval to DoD plan which outlines steps to be taken to prepare for possible nuclear attack in regions within MRBM range of Cuba.

d. President advised caution, indicating we are under no illusions nor can we reach any general conclusions about how the Russians will react in the future in areas other than Cuba.

7. NSAM published conveying Presidential approval of plan for acceleration of current Civil Defense programs as recommended by Defense on 25 October.
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23 October - Council, Organization of American States, acting provisionally as Organ Consultation under Rio Treaty, approves resolution calling for immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of weapons with any offensive capabilities.
23 October - Proclamation by President that U.S. forces, beginning 2 p.m. Greenwich time, 24 October, will interdict delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to Cuba.

23 October - McNamara, in a press conference, indicates that in furtherance of the Proclamation signed by the President at 7 p.m., U.S. forces will be in position to effect the quarantine at 2 p.m. Greenwich time, 24 October. Announces Admiral Anderson's appointment as Executive Agent for the quarantine, with Admiral Dennison as responsible Unified Commander. Announces signing of Executive Order 11058 authorizing Sec Def to call members of the reserve under terms of Congressional Resolution dated October 3, Public Law 87-36. Announces Secretary Korth instructed to extend enlistments, appointments and periods of active duty of both Navy and Marine personnel.

23 October - President, in letter to Khrushchev, expresses concern that both show prudence and asks that Chairman issue instructions immediately for Soviet ships to observe terms of the quarantine.

24 October - Khrushchev, in letter to the President, rejects arbitrary demands of the USA. Advises Soviet Government cannot give instructions to Soviet vessels to observe instructions of American Naval forces blockading island.

24 October - U Thant, in letter to President, states time should be given to enable parties concerned to resolve present crisis peacefully. Expresses belief voluntary suspension of quarantine for two to three weeks would greatly ease the situation. Identical message sent to Khrushchev.

25 October - Khrushchev, in letter to U Thant, expresses agreement in proposal of SYG.

25 October - President responds to U Thant's appeal. Agrees to have U.S. representatives meet with SYG to discuss appropriate measures. Restates essence of problem as seen by the United States.

25 October - U Thant, in letter to Khrushchev, asks that Soviet ships be instructed to stay away from interception area for limited time.

25 October - President, in letter to Khrushchev, refers to falseness of earlier Tass statements that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba and asks Soviets to take necessary action to permit restoration of earlier situation.
26 October - U Thant, in message to President, states he has requested Khrushchev to have Soviet ships enroute to Cuba instructed to stay away from interception area for limited time. Asks President do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in next few days.

26 October - President, in message to U Thant, states if Soviet ships stay away from the interception area for the limited time required for preliminary discussions, U.S. vessels will do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days.

26 October - Khrushchev, in letter to the President, reassures him weapons have been placed on Cuba solely for the purposes of defense and were sent there at the request of the Cuban Government. States no weapons are aboard ships bound for Cuba but that all weapons necessary for defense of island are already there. Asks that relations be normalized. Referring to exchange with U Thant, Chairman indicates his proposals are reasonable and provide way out of the situation. Proposes Soviets declare ships bound for Cuba will not carry any kind of armaments if U.S. will not invade Cuba or support forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Concludes with expression of sincere desire to relieve situation and remove threat of war.

26 October - Salinger issues White House statement confirming evidence of continuing improvement of ballistic missile sites in Cuba. States there is no evidence to indicate any intention to dismantle or discontinue work on the missile sites.

26 October - Khrushchev, in letter to U Thant, accepts SYG proposal and indicates Soviet vessels will stay out of interception area.

27 October - In publicly announced message to the President, Khrushchev expresses satisfaction with Presidential response to U Thant. Proposes Soviets remove from Cuba means regarded by U.S. as offensive if U.S. will remove its analogous means. Proposes subsequent inspection by personnel enjoying confidence of UN Security Council as well as of the United States, the Soviet Union, Cuba.  

27 October - President, in letter to Khrushchev, welcomes desire to seek prompt solution. Restates key elements of Khrushchev proposal as Soviet agreement to remove weapons systems from Cuba under UN observation and supervision, to halt further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba, to remove U.S. quarantine measures, and to give U.S. assurances against invasion of Cuba. States that linking of Cuba problems to broader questions of European and world security would lead to intensification of Cuban crisis.
27 October - Salinger issues White House statement regarding "several inconsistent and conflicting proposals" made by USSR. States position of the US that as an urgent preliminary to consideration of any Soviet proposals, work on Cuban bases must stop. Offensive weapons must be rendered inoperative and further shipment must cease.

28 October - In publicly announced message to the President, Khrushchev indicates he has issued order to dismantle offensive weapons and return them to the Soviet Union. Refers to U-2 over-flight incidents to include the case of 28 October. Announces Kuznetsov has been sent to New York to assist U Thant in current negotiations.

28 October - The President, in letter to Khrushchev, expresses consideration that previous exchanges of correspondence bind both governments to firm undertakings. Expresses regret for recent U-2 incident. Urges that, for the future, both work hard to achieve wider measures of disarmament.

28 October - U Thant, in message for President, encloses his response to Castro and comments favorably on contents of President's 27 October letter to Khrushchev.

28 October - Ambassador, in letter to U Thant, authorized SYG to convey to Castro, President's assurances as expressed in 27 October letter to Khrushchev.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 October</td>
<td>No event</td>
<td>SAC authorized to fly one U-2 mission over Cuba on the first available date beginning with 14 October.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 October</td>
<td>U-2</td>
<td>Mission 3101. Resulted in initial detection of MRBM/IRBM sites at San Cristobal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 October</td>
<td>Two U-2</td>
<td>Missions 3102 and 3103. The objective of these flights was to make a general sweep of the entire island of Cuba. Results were initial detection of San Cristobal MRBM site #4 and Guanajay IRBM complex. Initial location of IL-28 crates at San Julian airfield.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 October</td>
<td>Six U-2</td>
<td>Missions 3104 - 3109. These missions called for the complete coverage of the entire island of Cuba. Significant results were the initial detection of Sagua la Grande MRBM sites and Remedios IRBM site. CINCLANT requested to be prepared to conduct low-level reconnaissance missions against specified targets in Cuba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 October</td>
<td>Two U-2</td>
<td>Missions 3110 and 3111. These missions confirmed that MIG-21 aircraft were operational.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 October</td>
<td>Three U-2</td>
<td>Missions 3112 - 3114. Provided the first indications of concrete launch pads at Guanajay IRBM sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 October</td>
<td>Ten F8U-1P</td>
<td>Deployed to NAS, Key West, Florida.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Aircraft/Count</td>
<td>Missions/Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>20 October</td>
<td>Three U-2</td>
<td>Missions 3115 - 3117. Four KOMAR boats were detected at Banes, the first dispersal outside of Mariel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 October</td>
<td>Three U-2</td>
<td>Missions 3118 - 3120. First evidence of double security protection at Remedios military camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 October</td>
<td>Six F8U-1P</td>
<td>Missions 5001 - 5006. First large scale photography providing confirmation of details of missile sites. Also, first confirmation of camouflage in use. These photographs provided information suitable for public understanding of the missile problem in Cuba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 October</td>
<td>Three U-2</td>
<td>Missions 3121 - 3123. Confirmation of camouflage in use.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 October</td>
<td>Ten RF-101</td>
<td>Mission Plans 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Initial detection of hard surfacing of pads at MRBM sites. Confirmation of readiness of selected SA-2 sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 October</td>
<td>U-2</td>
<td>Mission 3128. Aircraft crashed in vicinity of Banes. Mission was scheduled against Banes SSM and Santa Clara airfield.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 October</td>
<td>Eight F8U-1P and Six F8U-1P</td>
<td>Missions 5017 - 5030. Eight aircraft were launched in the morning and six in the afternoon. Provided first intelligence of installations of engines on IL-28's. Remedios military camp was evacuated. Punta Gerarda evaluated as propellant storage instead of nuclear storage. Flights covering San Cristobal targets and Sagua la Grande were fired on.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
29 October  
Six RF-101 and 
Two F8U-1P  
Mission Plans 271 and 272. 
Missions 5031 and 5032. 
Confirmed continued construction at 
nuclear storage sites and continuation 
of concealment and dispersal. Evidence 
of other construction was inconclusive. 
RF-101s covering San Julian target 
complex were fired on.

1 November  
Four RF-101 and 
Two F8U-1P  
Missions 12-71A, 12-71B, 12-72A, 12-72B. 
Missions 5033 and 5034. 
Definite indication of dismantling of 
MRBM and IRBM sites. First evidence 
of IL-28's complete and operationally 
ready.

The foregoing provide a summary of reconnaissance flights for the period 
12 October - 1 November 1962. Complete details, including flight tracks 
for each mission, are available in Joint Reconnaissance Center Pamphlets 
"Brass Knob" and "Blue Moon."