Subject: Public and Private Official Papers Relating to the Case of the 
Fukuryu Maru No. 5: Documentation March 17 - April 23, 1954

1. There are transmitted copies of the public and private official papers 
which have thus far been exchanged with the Japanese Government, in the case 
of the Fukuryu Maru No. 5, between March 17 and April 23, 1954. These papers, 
without exception, have been previously summarized and discussed in the Embassy's 
telegraphic reports of the events of this unfortunate incident.

2. A despatch now in preparation will provide a chronological record of 
the negotiations of this period and an evaluation of the status of offers of 
assistance by the United States Government, as accepted or declined by the 
Japanese Government, following the return to Japan of the Fukuryu Maru No. 5 
on March 14, 1954. The Department may nonetheless find useful to its own 
investigations and to those of other interested United States agencies the 
record of this collection of official documents. It is therefore submitted 
in advance of the Embassy's analytical despatches. The Embassy plans to trans-
mit further collections of the official record at bi-weekly intervals.

3. To assist in document analysis, the following identifications are 
submitted:

Maru No. 5 Accident, March 17, 1954.'" This report was handed to the drafting 
oficer at the Foreign Office on March 17 by Mr. Harumi Takeuchi, Chief of 
the First Section, European and American Affairs Bureau. Its substance had 
been previously communicated to the Embassy by telephone and was reported 
in the Embassy's Telegram No. 2224 of March 16.

Enclosure No. 2 is six copies of the Embassy's Press Release of March 17 
announcing the arrival of Senator J. O. Pastore and answering insistent press 
inquiries as to whether the Senator had come to Japan because of the Fukuryu 
Maru accident. (Embassy's Telegram No. 2231 of March 17).

Enclosure No. 3 is six copies of an Embassy Press Release of March 17 
announcing the call at the Foreign Office of the Ambassador to express the 
concern of the United States Government regarding the incident, to offer 
official assistance in the treatment of the injured fishermen and in the 
decontamination of the vessel, and to propose a cooperative investigation of
the incident. The Ambassador also announced that a group of six American and Japanese physicians from the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) would come to Tokyo to offer their services as consultants in the treatment of the injured crew members. The circumstances of this call were reported in the Embassy's Telegram No. 2234 of March 17.

Enclosure No. 4 is six copies of an Embassy Press Release of March 18 announcing the arrival of the ABCC physicians and releasing a statement by Dr. J. J. Morton, the Director of the ABCC, that he and his associates had come to Tokyo on the invitation of the Tokyo University Hospital and would consult with appropriate Japanese Government authorities to determine how the ABCC services could be most useful. Dr. Morton also referred to the offer by General J. E. Hull, CINCFFE, of the medical facilities of the Far East Command in behalf of the injured fishermen. The FEC offer had been concurred in by the Embassy and reported in its Telegram No. 2228 of March 17.

Enclosure No. 5 is six copies of an Embassy Press Release of March 19 announcing a statement by the Ambassador renewing assurances already given of the availability of United States personnel and facilities for whatever assistance might be desired by the Japanese authorities and making clear that the United States was prepared to offer fair and just compensation for the accident if the facts so warrant (Embassy's Telegram No. 2250 of March 19).

Enclosure No. 6 is a copy of a telegram received by the Ambassador from the Director of the Division of Biology and Medicine of the Atomic Energy Commission informing him that Mr. Merrill Eisenbud was being sent to Tokyo to assist Dr. Morton. The Embassy did not communicate the message to Doctor Tsuzuki as requested, because the latter had just held a personal press conference to announce the receipt of a similar message from the AEC.

Enclosure No. 7 is a copy of an Embassy memorandum dated March 21 prepared as a brief of developments to date for the Ambassador's discussion with the Foreign Minister reported in Embassy's Telegrams No. 2261 of March 21 and No. 2264 of March 22.

Enclosure No. 8 is a copy of an Embassy memorandum dated March 22 itemizing a number of unresolved intelligence questions concerning the incident. Copies of this memorandum were made available to CAS. The questions themselves were communicated orally to the Foreign Office, and assurances were received that a confidential investigation would be made and that its results would be reported to the Embassy as soon as possible (Embassy's Telegram No. 2346 of March 29).

Enclosure No. 9 is six copies of an Embassy Press Release of March 23 reporting the arrival in Tokyo of Mr. Merrill Eisenbud, Director of the Health and Safety Laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission (Embassy's Telegram No. 2279 of March 23).

Enclosure No. 10 is a list of the members of the Atomic Bomb Injury Investigation Committee (ABJIC), which was constituted by the Japanese Government to ensure the coordination and representation of the interested
Japanese Government Ministries and agencies concerned with the Fukuryu Maru incident. Its members participated in the meetings at the Foreign Office on March 24, reported in the Embassy's Telegram No. 2294 of that date.

Enclosure No. 11 is a summary of the oral statements made by the Ambassador to the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs on March 24 (Embassy's Telegrams No. 2289, No. 2290, and No. 2293, all of March 24).

Enclosure No. 12 is six copies of an Embassy Press Release of March 24 releasing to the local press statements by the AEC with reference to the possibility of atmospheric and ocean contamination, to the expansion of the danger area around the Pacific Proving Grounds, and to the intensification of safety measures in the area (Embassy's Telegram No. 2290 of March 24).

Enclosure No. 13 is six copies of an Embassy Press Release of March 25 stating that the Ambassador had informed the Foreign Office that the United States Government is prepared to reimburse the Japanese Government, as an interim measure, for such financial assistance as it and the Embassy may jointly find necessary to accord the hospitalized patients for their current medical expenses and for the relief of their families (Embassy's Telegram No. 2297 of March 25).

Enclosure No. 14 is a copy of an undated Aide Memoire delivered by the Foreign Office to the Ambassador on March 27 summarizing results of preliminary investigations by the Japanese Government with regard to the Fukuryu Maru No. 5 (Embassy's Telegram No. 2334 of March 28).

Enclosure No. 15 is six copies of an Embassy Press Release announcing to the Japanese public the response the Ambassador had received from the United States Food and Drug Commissioner with regard to United States inspections of Japanese tuna exports. The Commissioner reported that no instance of radioactivity had been found and that there was no occasion for public apprehension about this type of contamination.

Enclosure No. 16 is a copy of a personal letter from Mr. Takeuchi of the Foreign Office, dated March 29, to an officer of the Embassy. The Foreign Office subsequently appeared to prefer this quasi-official style of communication for most of its communications on the incident. This letter transmitted the document identified at Enclosure No. 17.

Enclosure No. 17 is a Foreign Office memorandum, undated, entitled "Steps Being Taken in Regard to the Accident of the Fukuryu Maru No. 5". Its contents which proved optimistic, were reported to the Department in the Embassy's Telegram No. 2346 of March 29.

Enclosure No. 18 is a copy of a letter from the Foreign Minister dated March 30 to the Ambassador expressing appreciation for the assistance extended in transferring, by United States military aircraft, the twenty-one patients at Yaizu to Tokyo. The Foreign Minister asked that his expressions be conveyed to the aircraft personnel and to other United States authorities concerned.
Enclosure No. 19 is a copy of a letter from the Ambassador dated March 31 to the Foreign Minister thanking the latter for his letter of the day before and assuring him that his sentiments would be communicated as requested.

Enclosure No. 20 is a copy of a letter from the Ambassador dated March 31 to General J. E. Hull, enclosing a copy of the Foreign Minister's letter of March 30 and extending the Ambassador's personal appreciation for the prompt and efficient cooperation the Command had given.

The Far East Command telephoned the Embassy on April 3 that it would like to make public this exchange of letters. The Embassy undertook to clear the request with the Foreign Office and was advised informally that no objection was perceived. Some hours later, with haste and urgency, the Foreign Office telephoned to say that the Foreign Minister believed "the situation" was "too delicate" for the letters to be published and requested that their release be withheld. The letters have not been published.

Enclosure No. 21 is a copy of an undated Aide Memoire from the Foreign Office which was handed to an Embassy Counselor on March 31. Its substance dealt with the additional burdens imposed on the Japanese fishing industry by virtue of the expansion of the Pacific danger area and made a number of specific proposals for the relief of these burdens (Embassy's Telegram No. 2372 of March 31).

Enclosure No. 22 is a copy of a letter from the Ambassador dated March 31 to the Foreign Minister reporting the breakdown of arrangements confirmed by the Foreign Minister the day before and reported in the Embassy's Telegram No. 2360 of March 30. The Ambassador's letter informed the Foreign Minister that unless the Japanese authorities concerned desired the assistance of Dr. Norton and his staff the latter would be compelled to depart from Tokyo. The circumstances surrounding this communication were reported in the Embassy's Telegram No. 2373 of March 31.

Enclosure No. 23 is six copies of an Embassy Press Release of April 1 giving the text of a statement issued by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission at the President's news conference of that day (Embassy's Telegram No. 2367 of April 1).

Enclosure No. 24 is a copy of a letter from the Ambassador dated April 2 to the Foreign Minister enclosing a letter to the Prime Minister, with a copy attached for the information of the Foreign Minister.

Enclosure No. 25 is a copy of the letter from the Ambassador dated April 2 to the Prime Minister sent under cover of the letter identified in the preceding enclosure. This letter recapitulated for the Prime Minister the unsatisfactory status of efforts by the United States Government to be of assistance to the Japanese authorities concerned in their treatment of the hospitalized fishermen and in their resolution of the problems which had arisen in the aftermath of the incident. The letter was necessitated by the failure of arrangements which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had underwritten.
the previous day in its own attempts to bring the incident under control. These circumstances were reported in the Embassy's Telegram No. 2367 of April 1 and No. 2402 of April 2.

Enclosure No. 26 is a copy of a letter from Mr. Takeuchi of the Foreign Office dated April 3 to an Embassy officer enclosing available answers to the questions transmitted orally to the Foreign Office and identified in Enclosure No. 8 (Embassy's Telegram No. 2423 of April 5).

Enclosure No. 27 is a copy of a letter from the Ambassador dated April 7 to the Foreign Minister informing the latter of the circumstances which made necessary the departure of Mr. Eisenbud and Dr. Morton from Tokyo. The letter expressed the Ambassador's willingness to arrange for an ABC physician to be left in Tokyo for liaison if the Japanese physicians so desired, and reiterated the Embassy's offer to have Dr. Morton and his colleagues return to Tokyo if the Japanese physicians and their patients desired and requested their services. The background to this communication was reported in the Embassy's Telegram No. 2444 of April 7.

Enclosure No. 28 is a copy of a letter from the Foreign Minister dated April 7 to the Ambassador acknowledging the letter transmitted in the preceding enclosure.

Enclosure No. 29 is an unaddressed and unsigned memorandum dated April 8, entitled "Radioactive Fishing Boats" and sent, under cover of a Foreign Office envelope, to an Embassy officer. The memorandum reported that seven radioactive ships had returned to Japanese ports in the period between March 20 and April 5 and implied a basis under which compensation would be claimed in behalf of investigative agencies of the Japanese Government (Embassy's Telegram No. 2463 of April 9).

Enclosure No. 30 is a communication similar to that at Enclosure No. 28, also unaddressed and unsigned, which reported navigation courses of other Japanese vessels presumably radioactive (Embassy's Telegram No. 2466 of April 10).

Enclosure No. 31 is a copy of a letter from the Ambassador dated April 9, to the Foreign Minister enclosing the draft text of a public statement to be issued on the occasion of the departure of Mr. Eisenbud and Dr. Morton from Tokyo (Embassy's Telegram No. 2463 of April 9).

Enclosure No. 32 is two copies of an Embassy Press Release of April 9 announcing the departure of Mr. Eisenbud and Dr. Morton and explaining some of the circumstances involved (Embassy's Telegram No. 2471 of April 10).

On April 10 the Embassy delivered to the Foreign Office an Aide Memoire in reply to the communication of the Japanese Government transmitted as Enclosure No. 21. The text of the Embassy's Aide Memoire was forwarded to the Department in Telegram No. 2462 of April 9.
On April 10 the Foreign Office handed to an Embassy Counselor a document entitled "Interim Compensation for Damages Relative to Accident of Fukuryu Maru No. 5". This document was transmitted to the Department by Embassy's Despatch No. 1428 of April 16 after summary and analyses in the Embassy's Telegram No. 2476 of April 11 and No. 2497 of April 13.

Enclosure No. 33 is a copy of a letter from Mr. Takeuchi dated April 15 to an Embassy officer communicating certain conditions under which the Clinic Sub-Committee of the ABIIIC proposed to deliver urine samples of the hospitalized fishermen to the United States Government (Embassy's Telegram No. 2543 of April 16).

Enclosure No. 34 is a communication, identical in style and delivery to the document transmitted as Enclosure No. 30. This memorandum reported that in the period between April 6 and April 12 five other Japanese vessels had returned to their home ports in a radioactive condition.

Enclosure No. 35 is a copy of a letter from Mr. Takeuchi dated April 16 to an Embassy officer requesting the loan of an additional Geiger counter to assist in the monitoring of frozen tuna exports to the United States (Embassy's Telegram No. 2543 of April 16).

Enclosure No. 36 is a copy of the original full text of the announcement by the "Clinical Subcommittee of the A-Bomb Sickness Research Council" reviewing the conditions of the patients and alleging that the Japanese doctors in charge of their cases had frequently called upon United States physicians for assistance and had received no reply. The statement contained further inaccuracies (Embassy's Telegram No. 2574 of April 21). The "Atomic Bomb Sickness Research Council", the "Atomic Disaster Investigation and Research Council", and the "Atomic Bomb Injury Investigation Committee" are variant forms of the name of the same official agency.

Enclosure No. 37 is a copy of a letter from an Embassy officer dated April 22 to Mr. Takeuchi of the Foreign Office inquiring whether answers to questions not included in Mr. Takeuchi's letter of April 3 (Enclosure No. 26) were available and submitting certain additional questions. The presentation of these questions had been delayed pending a reply to the first group of intelligence questions submitted to the Foreign Office.

Enclosure No. 38 is a copy of a letter from Mr. Takeuchi to an Embassy officer transmitting copies of the summaries of press releases made on April 20 by the Environmental Sanitation and Food Sanitation Subcommittees of the ABIIIC (Embassy's Telegram No. 2592 of April 22).

Enclosure No. 39 is a copy of a letter from Mr. Takeuchi dated April 22 to an Embassy officer transmitting an announcement of the disavowal of the ABIIIC Clinic Sub-Committee's April 20 statement (Enclosure No. 36) and transmitting also a revised version of the earlier statement. The circumstances attending this disavowal and revision were reported in Embassy's Telegram No. 2574 of April 21 and No. 2612 of April 24. (The Embassy has been unable
to find a single instance of the publication, in a Japanese newspaper, of the
revised statement as a further news item without reference to the earlier April 20 release).

Enclosure No. 40 is a letter from the Ambassador dated April 23 to the
Foreign Minister enclosing the text of the USIA Press Release concerning the
Acting Secretary's conversation with the Japanese Ambassador and the Depart-
mental background press conference held immediately thereafter (Embassy's
Telegram No. 2602 of April 23).

4. A number of these papers, as received from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs or as sent by the Embassy to the Ministries, agencies, or officials
of the Japanese Government are not classified. Nevertheless, because of the
sensitivity of the incident, all of these papers, except those identified as
Press Releases, should receive the protection of limited distribution, and
the Embassy would suggest that none of them be published without prior reference

to the Embassy.

For the Ambassador:

Samuel D. Berger
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosures: As specified in paragraph 3 above.
Interim Report on the Fukuryu Maru No.5 Accident

Maritime Safety Agency
March 17, 1954.

1. Type and Name of the Boat: Fukuryu Maru No.5 fishing boat, 99.9 tons.
3. Captain of the Boat: Hisakichi Tsutsumi (22), same address.
4. Number of Crew: 23
5. Cargo: Tuna, 2,000 kan (16,534 lbs.)
6. Outline of the course of navigation of the ship:
   The ship left Yaizu port at 11:30 a.m. on January 22, for the fishing grounds around the Midway Island, but, failing sizeable catch, headed southward continuing operation and arrived in the area in question on March 1. It met the disaster at about 3:41 a.m. of the day, the position of the boat set by astronomical observation at 11 degrees 52 minutes north latitude and 166 degrees 30 minutes east longitude. Later, at noon (12:00) of the same day, the boat headed north with the intention of keeping away from area in question, and returned to Yaizu port at 6:00 a.m. of March 14.

Note: 1. The time indicated show Japan time with approximately 2 hours and 10 minutes difference with the local time.
2. The point of the accident is calculated on the basis of the investigations effected as of 4:00 p.m., March 17. The position of the boat between 3:41 a.m. and 12:00 a.m., March 1, is considered to have remained unchanged since the boat kept drifting during that time. (See 6, below).

6. General observation of the disaster:
   The boat began casting nets at about 1:00 a.m., March 1, finished it by 3:17 a.m. and started drifting around 3:30 a.m.
   The sky was clear with east-north-east winds, wind velocity 2*.
   Around 3:40 a.m., reddish flash was recognized to the west-south-west of the boat which gradually turned into white-yellowish and then regained red tint and faded. Seven or eight minutes later, an explosion was heard, but no blast wind was recognized. It was before day-break and the explosion was heard twice. Following the flash, a mushroom shaped cloud was recognized in the same direction which went spreading over the sky and clouded the sky.
   About three hours later, dust resembling white sand came falling and continued until around noon. Two or three days later the whole crew felt slight headache and some of them felt nausea. Seven or eight days later, the parts of the body where the ashes covered - neck, face, ears, and part of head around the towel turban - began to look burned and sore.

* According to the information gathered by the Central Meteorological Station, the wind at the altitude of 2,000 feet blew from the opposite direction, i.e., west-south-west at the speed of 15 knots p.h.
MEMORANDUM
March 21, 1954

1. Removal of Patients

a. Dr. Morton and the ABCC physicians who visited the Yaizu believe it desirable for the patients there to be removed to Tokyo. Their opinion was concurred in by the local physicians at the Yaizu Hospital. Dr. Morton confirmed this morning, with Dr. Tsurumi of the Tokyo University Hospital, that the hospital would like to receive these patients and has facilities for their care.

b. At the Ambassador's request, General Hull has agreed to make available hospital aircraft to remove the patients from Yaizu to Tokyo whenever the competent Japanese authorities inform us that they wish the transfer to be made.

c. This morning we informed the Foreign Office through Mr. Tsurumi of these arrangements and suggested that in the opinion of our medical experts the removal should be made as quickly as possible. We are waiting word as to the desires of the Japanese authorities.

2. Compensation

The Ambassador may wish to inform the Foreign Minister in confidence that he has requested authorization to announce that medical expenses and compensation to the injured sailors will be authorized immediately and without prejudice to subsequent determinations of responsibility and the facts in the case. The Ambassador is also looking into the question of providing forms of relief for the families of the sailors.

3. Fish Exports

Officers of the Embassy and representatives of the United States fishing industry have been working with officials of the Japanese Government to ensure that there will be no harmful effect on Japanese fish exports. The Far East Command has lent its experts and equipment to assist in the examination of fish now being loaded on Japanese vessels for the United States. Agreement was reached last night at the Embassy that no fish showing any signs of radio-activity will be shipped. With these inspection facilities and this assurance the Embassy has asked that full publicity be given in the United States to the fact that fish imports from Japan are completely safe.

4. Publicity

a. Arrangements are being made on the American side to coordinate and centralize in the Embassy all public statements regarding the incident. This will cover military, civilian, and diplomatic officials of the United States Government in Japan.
b. An unfortunate incident was reported in the press two days ago in which a young Army captain, who had participated in a meeting with Japanese Government officials at which Japanese reporters were present, was quoted as saying that he would undertake to give to the Japanese side full details concerning the radioactive materials used in the explosion, and power, duration, and so forth. Mr. Tsurumi of the Foreign Office called the Embassy four times yesterday, in behalf of the Ministry of Welfare, to complain that the information promised by this Army captain had not yet been supplied. Even if the young captain had been correctly quoted, and we are satisfied that he was not, it would be ridiculous to suppose that the Foreign Office or Ministry of Welfare seriously believes that a junior Army officer would possess such knowledge or the authority to transmit it. The point of the incident is that in the future all American officers, civilian or military, are being instructed not to participate in any negotiations or discussions with Japanese officials concerning this incident at which the Japanese side has invited members of the press to participate.

5. Security

It is obvious that technical information of a highly sensitive nature could have been obtained from the Fukuryu Maru and that Japanese officials and technicians had full access to the vessel for six days before American officials had an opportunity to visit the vessel (March 14-20). There is no reason to minimize the importance of the information that may have been ascertained or its potential value to hostile powers. The disclosures now being published in the Japanese press by Japanese scientists might easily result in bringing materially closer to Japan the horrors of a thermonuclear attack by the Soviet Union. We are not in a position to appraise the accuracy of these published reports and have no wish to do so. We do expect, however, that the Japanese Government will take prompt and effective measures to restrict access to this information to those of its nationals in whom it has full confidence. Failure to do so would, in all candor, impose the greatest strain on our future cooperation in nuclear and other fields.

6. Custody of the Fukuryu Maru

The Ambassador has learned, through Admiral Briscoe, that as of noon today the Maritime Safety Board has still not officially communicated with the U.S. Navy regarding the contaminated vessel nor has it authorized the Navy to remove the ship to Yokosuka for decontamination. (The Navy Section of SAGJ has, on its own initiative, discussed the matter at a low level with the MBB but no official communication has yet been made.) The Foreign Office assured us several days ago that this action would be taken and yesterday at Yaizu it was apparent that local authorities expected removal of the ship. We know of no reason to account for the delay.
7. Dr. Merrill Eisenbud

The Ambassador has been informed by Dr. Bugher of the Atomic Energy Commission that Dr. Merrill Eisenbud, director of the Health and Safety Division of the AEC, will arrive in Tokyo tomorrow to assist in every way that he can. Dr. Eisenbud is a senior officer of the AEC and will undoubtedly head the technical aspects of our work in connection with the incident. He will be staying at the Sanno Hotel and we desire as little publicity as possible concerning his presence and movements.

8. Liaison

a. At the Ambassador's suggestion General Hull has appointed Rear Admiral Hanlon as his personal deputy to coordinate all arrangements with the Command.

b. In the Embassy arrangements are being handled under the direct supervision of the Ambassador.

c. The Embassy would be most appreciative if the Foreign Minister could designate a more senior official of the Geimushe, with authority to act for the Foreign Minister, in all liaison arrangements in connection with the incident. (If the Ambassador has an occasion to do so, at some point in the conversation he might find it possible to remark on the helpfulness of Mr. Furuuchi at Taizu yesterday.)
MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Parsons
From: William Leonhart

March 22, 1954

QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE FUKURYU MARU INCIDENT

1. Location: Was this a normal fishing area for the vessel? Had it fished there before? Have other Japanese boats?

2. Catch: Had the boat completed its catch or was it still fishing? (Size of catch relative to ship capacity). If it had completed its catch, how long before March 1? What was it doing in the area on March 1?

3. Course: Preliminary data, derived from COMNAVFE, indicates that on March 1, the vessel was proceeding south westward on a course which might have taken it directly to the explosion zone. At the probable time of the explosion it was 14 miles outside the danger zone, proceeding in. Why?

4. Solitary Position: No other Japanese vessel apparently was in this area at the time. Is it customary for fishing craft of this size to go off alone? Does the Fukuryu Maru normally operate by itself away from all other vessels from its home port of Yaizu? Did it make any attempt to contact any other Japanese vessels after the explosion and the illness of the crew or did it know that it was so far away from any other fishing craft that its best chance of relief was a 14-day journey back to Japan? (Note: when the fishing craft 300 miles away from the site returned "slightly radioactive" they came back in groups.)

5. Radio Contact: The Fukuryu Maru had a radio aboard and was in contact with the mainland twice a day, according to the press. It did not mention the explosion or the ash that had fallen on the ship. Why?

6. Master and Crew: Were these the normal complement of the vessel? For how long? Were there any changes or new crewmen? What is known about their personal backgrounds, and political activity, if any? Anything unusual in educational background, military service, police records? What instructions were given to the master prior to his departure?

7. Notifications on Arrival: Who were notified when the ship arrived? Were any special precautions requested or taken in docking the boat? Was there any unusual activity in the port - special police, Tokyo visitors, etc. - before the boat arrived?

8. Japanese Investigations: How soon after arrival did Japanese scientific and medical examinations begin? Who requested them? Who made them? What sort of samples were taken? How soon was police protection given to the vessel and access to it restricted? When was the catch sold?
Anything unusual in the marketing of the catch? How soon was the clothing of the sailors sequestered? Whose order? Are other shipping boats at Yaizu customarily docked close to the Fukuryu Maru? Was this done after its arrival? Did the men go to their homes directly after arrival? If not, why not? If so, what stories did they tell? Was the return on schedule? The Japanese police must have made reports on the affair. Will the U.S. have access to these reports? (Interesting to see how complete they are.)

9. Hospitalization: Dr. Kaki of the ABCO visited Yaizu on March 17 at Japanese request. Why was he shown only 10 of the 12 patients? Why was he not told of the others who were more severely burned? Why were they separated in two locations? Dr. Morton on March 20 was shown all of them. Other than the Yaizu Hospital staffs who had access to the patients? What kind of de-briefing? By whom?

10. Political Activity: How soon did JCP activity in Yaizu begin? Was it organized or led by outsiders or by villagers? Anything unusual in the pattern of communist response: delay, propaganda line, special participants? Any known relation between any of the Yaizu communist demonstrators and members of the crew or their relatives? Any suspicious monitorings of communist clandestine radio stations since the Fukuryu Maru sailed from Yaizu which may possibly bear on this incident?

11. Documentation: Will the Japanese Government be willing to furnish copies of the ship's log and of all radio messages sent or received by the vessel during the course of its voyage?
SUMMARY OF ORAL STATEMENTS BY THE
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR

March 24, 1954.

1. Ambassador Allison gave to the Foreign Minister for publication statements from the Atomic Energy Commission on precautionary measures being taken in the Pacific Testing Area and on the effects of radiation on fish and ocean currents. He authorized Mr. Okazaki to make this information public but said that if the Minister preferred, he would release it from the Embassy.

2. Mr. Allison stated that pending conclusion of cooperative investigation into the Fukuryu Maru accident the United States Government is prepared to agree to reimburse the Japanese Government for such financial assistance as the Government and the Embassy jointly may find necessary, as an interim measure, to accord to the persons involved for current medical care and family relief including wages. He asked how much the Japanese Government expected to pay the injured fishermen per month and what amount did the Japanese Government estimate was required for total compensation to the crew and to the owner of the Fukuryu Maru (depreciated value of boat less the catch).

3. Mr. Allison informed Mr. Okazaki that in the normal course of investigation of a matter of such importance, the United States authorities were required to establish beyond all possible doubt the bona fides of the crew and the reason for its presence in the vicinity of the test operations. He had therefore authorized Mr. Leonhart to request from Mr. Takeuchi the answers to certain questions and to emphasize the need for complete secrecy both of the information and of the fact that it had been requested. The Ambassador emphasized that these questions were necessary not because suspicions had arisen but to prevent them from arising. He urged that the Foreign Minister instruct Mr. Takeuchi to obtain the answers to these questions promptly for the confidential use of the United States Government.

4. Finally, Mr. Allison stated that he was seriously disturbed at the apparent failure of the Japanese Government to take action commensurate with the gravity of the security questions related to the Fukuryu Maru incident. While he recognized that the legal basis for taking security measures was perhaps inadequate, nevertheless information and material of extreme sensitivity was now in the hands of numerous persons in Japan. To the extent that this information and material reached unfriendly countries with a record of aggression, the security of Japan was adversely affected. The Japanese Government bore a heavy responsibility towards all free countries in this regard. Any failure to sequester material in safe hands and to censor adequately other than medical information on the one hand increased the difficulties of the free world and on the other hand facilitated the efforts of those who would overthrow it. The Ambassador noted that apart from this consideration the control which the Japanese Government exercised over this sensitive material and information would doubtless be closely observed by
nations which wished to cooperate with Japan. So far as the United States was concerned, future cooperation under NSA and other programs could easily be affected if the authorities in the United States should conclude that the Japanese Government could not protect information and materials available to it.

Concrete steps desired:

1. Allow Navy to decontaminate vessel. As alternative Japanese Government sink the vessel at sea, or prevent access to it.

2. Give full access to patients for U.S. technicians. The medical histories are of perhaps vital importance to any future sufferers, Japanese or others, from radiation sickness. This will also be of value to the doctors in charge of the patients themselves.

3. Take an inventory of all radioactive ash, clothing, wood or other material from vessel and assure custody by responsible government officials.

4. Develop a central authority for review and censorship of reports to be published.
The Gaimusho

Aide Memoire

The following data has been obtained as a result of investigations conducted by the Japanese Government with regard to the Fukuryu Maru No. 5.

The course of the Fukuryu Maru No. 5, its movement and circumstances of the accident as described hereunder are conclusions drawn from (1) statements made by the vessel's skipper, fishing master and other members of the crew; (2) entries in the ship's log-book and fishing records and (3) meteorological conditions at the time of the accident as revealed from the investigation by the Central Meteorological Observatory. All dates and hours given here are Japan Standard Time.

I. Stricken Vessel:-

Name: Fukuryu Maru No. 5
Type: Fishing boat, 99.9 ton
Registration No.: 30-2873
Owner's name and address: Kakuichi Nishikawa
13-724, Taizu, Taizu-shi,
Shizuoka Prefecture.

Skipper's name and address: Hisakichi Tsutsui
50, Ryoyashiki, Sakushima-Mura,
Nagano-Gun, Aichi Prefecture.

Number and names of crew: 23 persons (Names are given in the attached list)

Content and kind of cargo: Tuna and other fish. Total 2,299.3 kan

II. Course and Movement of the Fukuryu Maru No. 5:-

1. The Fukuryu Maru No. 5 left the port of Taizu, Shizuoka Prefecture, at 1130 hours on January 22 and headed south-eastward. On or about January 27, and from a position in the neighbourhood of Lat. 27°36'N. and Long. 148°37'E, it shifted its course eastward. It started fishing on February 3, at Lat. 26°17'N. and Long. 171°30'E. Fishing operation was made several times until February 12. Later, in order to fish in the neighbourhood of the Marshall Islands, the vessel changed its course and, while fishing on the way, it reached on February 23, a position in the proximity of Lat. 11°01.3'N. and Long. 173°33'E.

2. After February 23, the vessel directed its course toward the west and engaged in fishing operations. On March 1, at approximately 015 hours it arrived at the position of Lat. 12°03'N. and Long 166°56'1'E.
and started to set lines. It completed setting lines at 0342 hours at Lat. 11°52'1"N. and Long. 166°35'1"E. Afterward it cruised for ten (10) minutes toward the north-east (estimated cruising distance: 1 1/2 nautical miles), and drifted with its engine stopped. About 0412 hours, after it had drifted about twenty (20) minutes (estimated westward tideway, about one half (1/2) nautical mile), a streak of light which seemed to have resulted from an atomic bomb explosion was seen. The vessel's position at that time was approximately Lat. 11°53'1"N. and Long. 166°35'1"E.

3. About seven or eight minutes after the light had been seen, a detonation apparently resulting from an atomic bomb explosion was heard and the vessel immediately started hauling in its lines. This operation ended at 0430 hours and the vessel headed toward the north to get out of the area.

4. After 0440 hours, March 2 the vessel shifted its course toward the north-west and headed for Yaizu. It entered the port of Yaizu at 0600 hours on March 14.

III. Circumstances of the accident:-

1. About 0430 hours on March 1, a reddish brilliant light was seen in the direction of west-southwest of the vessel. The color of this light gradually turned to white-yellow and again back to red and faded away.

2. No wind resulting from the explosion was felt within the next seven or eight minutes but two blasts were heard in succession. A cloud having the shape of a mushroom was seen in the direction where the light was first seen and this cloud started to expand covering the sky with dark clouds.

3. As the crew saw the light, some of them realized that probably an atomic test, about which they remembered having read in the newspapers, might have occurred. Anticipating danger, they started hauling in the lines at about 0430 hours, from the position where they had previously finished setting the lines, progressing in the opposite direction toward the northeast. The lines were hauled in by machine using what is called a line-hauler. While hauling in the lines the vessels engine repeated the process of "go slow ahead" and "stop" and the same again. In the present instance all hands with the exception of a few engineers on watch were working on the upper deck and in the wheel house.

4. In the midst of the operation of hauling lines, about three (3) hours later than the moment the light had been seen, and at the estimated position of Lat. 11°56'3/4"N. and Long. 166°42'1"E. ashes started to fall on the deck, which was turned white. As the hauling operation ended about 0430 hours in the vicinity of the estimated position of Lat. 12°03'N. and Long. 166°53'1"E. the vessel headed for north in the direction where ashes were not falling and cruised with a speed of seven (?) nautical miles trying to evacuate the area.
5. The crew, after having hauled in the lines, worked on the upper deck engaging in processing the catch. The ashes kept falling until about noon, when the vessel reached the estimated position of Lat. 12°14'N. and Long. 166°53'W.

6. In the following two or three days all the crew suffered from a slight headache and some of them felt nausea.

7. Seven or eight days after the accident, the crew began to feel painful irritations, from what looked like burns in the neck, face, ears and places where they wore "hachimaki" (a cotton towel wrapped around the head) which were exposed to the ashes.

IV. Miscellaneous:

1. There is no evidence that the Fukuryu Maru No. 5 received warnings, by radio message or any other means, while being in the area before the accident occurred.
   Investigation conducted so far showed no evidence of any receipt of any kind of warning by vessels other than the Fukuryu Maru No. 5.

2. The crew of the vessel did not hear any sound of aircraft at the time of the accident.

3. Matters Relating to Communications:
   a. The communication log is found to have been duly and properly entered.
   b. The vessel had one (1) Licensed Radio Operator, Second Class, who has a slight knowledge of English.
   c. The condition of the radio equipment was good.
   d. Listening hours of the vessel's radio were unfixed.
   e. The communication waves were 2091 kc and 3251.5 kc.

V. Degree of the Damage:

The amount of damage suffered by the Fukuryu Maru No. 5 is now under investigation.
Aide Memoire

In view of the serious effect, both physical and psychological, of the accident of the Fukuryu-maru No.5 and the expansion of the danger area as announced by the U.S. Government on March 19, 1954, upon Japanese fishing industry, the Japanese Government wishes to submit the following to the United States Government for prompt and favorable consideration:

1. About 150 Japanese fishing vessels with tonnage around 100 each are engaged in tuna fishing in the sea area in and around the newly proclaimed danger zone. The catch from the area is not very great, accounting for about one percent of the total catch of tuna by Japanese fishing industry. The fishing season in this area is from November to the end of March. The biggest fishing areas of tuna lie south and southeast of the danger zone: around the Solomons, the Gilberts, and the Samoas. About 300 vessels, ranging from 100 to 600 tons are operating in these areas, their catch accounting for approximately sixty-five percent of the total catch of tuna. These vessels usually pass through the newly proclaimed danger zone both on their way to and back from the fishing grounds. The expansion of the danger area not only makes well-nigh impossible the fishing operation in the area but also forces the Japanese fishing boats operating in the area south and southeast of the expanded danger area to make in their outgoing and incoming voyages, a detour which involves an extra sailing of two and a half or three days.

2. With a view to mitigating such additional burdens on the Japanese fishing industry, the United States Government is desired:
   a. To shorten the proclaimed period of danger area as much as is possible under radiation hazards which may remain in the area after a test;
   b. To designate, even during the proclaimed period of danger, certain intervals for safe passage of Japanese fishing vessels;
   c. To limit the scope of danger area as small as possible and, in particular, to exclude the sector between bearing 240° and 290° and outside the danger area announced on May 23, 1953;
   d. To furnish confidential information in advance to the Japanese Government regarding the approximate date of a test;
   e. To take effective and appropriate steps including proper warnings (for instance in Japanese language) to allow time for vessels to evacuate from the danger area, prior to the test;
   f. Not to conduct further tests during the period from November to the end of March which is the tuna fishing season in the area.

3. It is also desired that the Japanese Government will be furnished with the results of investigation into the effects of radiation on fish in the danger area as well as on the vessel navigating in the proximity thereof, its crew and its catch.
April 3, 1954

Dear Mr. Leonhart:

Please find enclosed two copies of the answers to queries you made on March 25. The informations lacking in them will be made available to you upon my receipt. I trust you will treat the encloses in strict confidence.

Sincerely,

Harumi Takeuchi
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

1. Movement and Position of the Boat

(1) The area in which Fukuryu Maru No. 5 was at the time of explosion is one of the fishing grounds for tuna boats with tonnage of 100 to 150.

(2) In its previous voyage, the Fukuryu Maru No. 5 left Yaizu Port on November 21, 1953, operated in the fishing ground near Lat. 4°-6°10'N. and Long. 130°E, and returned to Yaizu at 10:30 P.M., on January 13, 1954.

(3) No other fishing boat was recognized.

(4) The boat was operating alone.

(5) a. Fishing boats of this type usually operate alone, customarily keep their fishing grounds secret to others, and would not tell their position to others until they are home-coming after the operation.

b. Even the fishing boats belonging to the same owner do not contact with each other and seldom operate jointly in order not to disclose their fishing grounds to outsiders.

c. It is admitted that tuna boats, searching for a good fishing ground, may concentrate on a particular ground, but, even in such case they keep certain distance from each other so that the lines, extending over 20 to 30 sea miles, may not be entangled.

d. Therefore it is up to each boat whether it would operate on a good fishing ground together with others or to operate alone on comparatively inferior ground.

e. The Fukuryu Maru No. 5 was the only boat owned by Nishikawa (owner), and has always operated alone.

(6) The boat is a wooden vessel of less than 7 years old having been launched in April, 1947, and is now in good conditions to navigate. The age of the boat is not particularly old, since about 40 per cent of the boats of this type are in the similar age, and it is not unusual that boats of this age operate alone.

(7) a. The alleged news report that other boats which went to the area near the Marshall Islands came back in groups is not true. Tuna boats usually operate alone unless they operate under a mother-boat, which was not the case here. Although fishing boats from the same base do occasionally return together even if their fishing grounds are different, they do not usually come back in group because of the consideration of the prices of fish in the market.
b. Therefore, it is customary that the fishing boats of this type operate alone and return alone, and this practice is not limited to the fishing cooperative of Yaizu.

(8) a. When they saw the explosion, the boat was in the course of fishing operation, 30 minutes after the setting of lines.

b. It is the customary method of fishing for the boats of this type to haul in lines 3 to 4 hours after lines are cast, and it is said that the biggest catch can be expected when the lines are set at midnight and hauled in at dawn.

(9) Having left Yaizu on January 22 with 60 days' provision of fuel, food, fresh water and ice, the voyage was approaching its end although the boat had not completed its scheduled catch by March 1. Having seen the flash of explosion it started hauling in lines and completed it around 10:30 A.M., giving up further operations.

(10) a. About three (3) hours after the explosion, ashes started falling (the wind blew from east-north-east). The crew felt uneasy and, having finished hauling in lines, started to north with the normal speed of 7 sea miles per hour and left the area.

b. Since the scheduled operation had almost been gone through, they decided to return home, directed its course to north-west after 4:40 A.M. the next day (March 2), and returned to Yaizu Port at 6:00 A.M., March 14.

(11) a. The boat did not navigate to south-west after the explosion, but it is possible that the vessel, kept drifting at the time of explosion, was slowly carried away to the west by east-north-east wind and west-ward current.

b. It is reported that the boat ran to north-east for about ten minutes after it had completed setting the lines, then stopped its engine and drifted until the hauling in of lines. (This is a general practice in the fishing operation of this type of vessels.) Because the lines were set to the south-west, the boat kept almost all the time moving to north-east to haul in the lines, except that at the beginning of hauling in the lines, it moved slightly to south-west.

II. Wireless Communication

(1) a. It was not obligatory that the boat contact the fishery wireless station in Japan twice a day — the rule was that the boat should make necessary wireless communication during the allotted hours, except in the case of shipwreck or other emergency.
b. The negligence in reporting on the accident was accounted for the following reasons.

(i) The fishermen's lack of proper knowledge about radioactivity and their underestimate of its effect.

(ii) The crew did not know about the danger area around the Bikini Atolls although they had the knowledge of the danger area around the Brown (Eniwetok) Islands. Having met the accident, they were afraid that the position of their boat might be within a danger area which might have been expanded without their knowledge and, if so, they might be punished. This fear had been nursed by their previous experience with the Indonesian authorities. (On December 29, 1953, the boat was searched and captured, on its way back from south sea fishing ground, by an Indonesian watching vessel at a point near Lat. 1°03'N. and Log. 126°29'E., towed away to Ternate Island for investigation and released the following day. The present Skipper, Fishing Master and Chief Radio Operator were on board at that time.)

(iii) Their fear that wiring about possible atomic bomb experiment by the U.S. might cause trouble later.

(iv) Although some members of the crew felt nausea on the homecoming voyage, the same happened in the previous voyage, when engineers and oilers had felt sick. Therefore, they interpreted the sickness as caused by the flow of melted ice into the engine room, and did not pay much attention.

(v) Their consideration not to worry the owner of the boat by sending out such information, taking into account the fact that their condition were not so serious (in their view) and that the catch amounted only to 2,200 kans (18,187.4 lbs) compared to usual requirement of at least 10,000 kans (82,670 lbs) for making profit.

b. After March 1, however, the boat sent to the ship's owner 15 wireless information about the movement of the boat. (See Annex No. 1)

(2) No contact was made with other boats. Generally, fishing boats of this type seldom contact others except in case of emergency. In this case, the boat was the only one owned by the owner (Nishikawa), and no contact with other boats are expected during operation.
III. Skipper and Crew

(1) Skipper and crew are all full-time members of the boat. (For their duration of employment, see Annex No. 2).

(2) For the recent change in the membership, see Annex No. 3.

(3) a. As to the career, travel overseas, education, behavior and political activities of the crew members, investigation is being conducted by Yaizu Municipal Police, but no unusual information has been obtained so far.

b. According to the information acquired so far, there is no Communist Party member nor communist sympathizer among the crew.

The Shizuoka Shimbun (local paper) reported (March 19) that sailor Shinzo SUZUKI made anti-war, anti-American remarks in the Yaizu Hospital, although unconfirmed. He had had the experience of POW during the last war and is said to understand a few English words, but no detail has been obtained yet.

(4) No particular instruction is usually given to the Skipper either by the Fishing Cooperative or by the owner of the boat before departure. The owner does not give any instruction on the fishing ground either. The choice of fishing grounds is made by the Fishing Master after consultation with the leading members of the crew (in the case of the Fukuryu Maru, the Skipper, Chief Radio Operator, Chief Engineer and the Boatswain).

(5) The Fishing Master of this type of fishing boat is always a fisherman of ample knowledge and experience and it is largely the practice on the Japanese fishing boats that the Fishing Master supervise the navigation of the boat and control the crew. Therefore, even a young man can be employed as a Skipper if only he has a navigator's license. In this case, Y. Kenzaki, the Fishing Master of the Fukuryu Maru, did not have qualification for a Skipper. So a young Skipper was employed in order to keep the cost of salary at a minimum possible. It is also the practice in many cases not to employ an aged Skipper because he may disobey the Fishing Master's instruction.

(6) Not all of them are from Yaizu. See the LIST OF CREW MEMBERS attached to the Aide Memoire of March 27.
IV. Report and Investigation

(1) a. On March 15 at around 2:00 P.M., Mr. Iida of the Fuji Maritime Products Co., Ltd. (former owner of the Fukuryu Maru No. 5 and the present joint contributor) asked Shimizu Local Station of the Maritime Safety Agency about the danger area around Bikini Atolls on the phone, but did not mention the accident.

b. The said Local Station knew the accident in the morning of March 16 through the Yomiuri Shimbun and asked the owner of the boat Nishikawa to report, who arrived at Shimizu by the 4:22 P.M. train together with Mr. Iida. He brought the ship's log-book, astronomical observation records and the charts.

c. Several members of the crew, accompanied by Mr. Kondo, Director of Fishing Cooperative Association, reported the incident for the first time to Yaizu City Police Station at around 10 A.M., March 16.

(2) Barbed wire was set at 8:00 A.M., March 16, and a watch was stationed around the Yaizu eastern pier.

(3) The cargo was unloaded in the early morning of March 15.

(4) a. The first people with whom the crew contacted after their return were the owner of the boat, Nishikawa and the Director of the Fishermen's Union.

b. On March 14 (the day they returned), those crew members who were seriously affected consulted the doctor at the Kyoritsu Yaizu Hospital, but were told not to worry much about it. However, two of them, Yamamoto and Masuda, who were in most serious condition, left Yaizu on March 15 by the first train for Tokyo to visit Shimizu Surgical Department of the Tokyo University Hospital. After Prof. Shiozawa's investigation of the boat in the afternoon of March 16, which detected the radioactivity, all the crew members consulted the doctor.

(5) The boat was first moored at the usual anchoring place—the western pier of Yaizu Port (No. 1 selling-place of the fish market on March 14, then to No. 3 selling-place after unloading on March 15.)

But after the danger is detected it was moved to the present mooring place on the eastern pier (March 17). There were other boats around the Fukuryu Maru No. 5 but no unusual movement was detected.

(6) Most of the crew had gone home but a few stayed in the boat before they were hospitalized.
(7) All of those who have family brought fish home. Their clothing were also brought home but were collected later and now stored in the Fukuryu Maru.

V. Political Activities

(1) No unusual movement was recognized in Yaizu City before the entry into port of the Fukuryu Maru, though an investigation is still under way on this point.

(2) Press reporters, study groups from the Tokyo and Shizuoka Universities approached the crew. Details are now under investigation.

(3) On March 18, at around 2:00 P.M., the following two Communists visited Yaizu City and handed over statements ("Immediately ban atomic bomb which leads to destruction of human being!" "We protest U.S. on the Fukuryu Maru No. 5 Accident!") to the Director of the Fishing Cooperative, chairman of the City Council, chairman of the City Council Relief Committee, and Maritime Products Manufacturing Cooperative. No information has been obtained as to their contacts with the crew.

Ryoichi Sunama, Chairman, Tokai District Committee, C.P.
Koichiro Chashi, Shizuoka Prefectural Committee, C.P.

(4) On around March 22, many leaflets had been distributed in the name of Shizuoka Eastern District Committee, C.P., in eastern part of the Prefecture. These leaflets stressed, in line with above statement, (i) movement to send representatives to World Peace Convention and Japan Peace Convention to be held in May (ii) movement to defend land, people and peace under the leadership of trade unions (iii) movement to collect signatures.

(5) On March 19, around 10 A.M., the following leftist two persons visited the crew at the Yaizu Hospital with gifts and made anti-American remarks.

Hideo Namba, Vice Chairman, Central Committee, National Association for Relief of the Japanese People (Kokumin Ryouen Kai)

Kaneo Kubo, Secretary General, Permanent Director, New Japan Doctors' Association (Shin Nippon Ishi Kyokai)

(6) On March 19 at around 3:00 P.M., six leftist people (three of them identified below) visited the City Council Secretariat and asked for permission to investigate the Fukuryu Maru, but were refused.
Toshiaki Kosugi, Director, Democratic Science Association, Shizuoka Branch.

Shigeo Tsuchiya, Head, Tsuchiya Hospital
Member, Japan-China Friendship Association.

Hiroshi Hasegawa, Assistant Professor, Science Department, Shizuoka University,
Member, Group for Peace.

(7) There is a rumor that a certain communist cell has reportedly collected ashes, employing children, but so far it has not been confirmed.

(8) In Yaizu there are two or three Communist Party members and about 30 sympathizers, but they have shown no significant activities so far.

(9) There is no sign of personal connection between communists, and crew members and their families. The families of the crew members have no complaint and are rather grateful for the relief activities of the Shizuoka Prefectural Government. It is reported that an offer of launching relief fund collection from seemingly Communist sources was rejected by the families.

(10) As to the alleged badge of Mao Tse-tung, no information has been obtained either by the Yaizu City Police or by the National Police. They did not see the badge then or before worn in Yaizu. This badge was reported in the Yomiuri Shimbun of March 21 which referred to the visit of Mr. Furuchi of the Foreign Office to Yaizu, and it is believed that the Yomiuri reporter who accompanied Mr. Furuchi saw the four leftist doctors at the hospital and must have described badges these doctors were wearing as bearing the sign of Mao Tse-tung.

(11) The police sources had not received any information on the communist conspiracy or desire for this kind of accident at the time of the departure of the Fukuryu Maru.

(12) Other Informations

  a. The Akahata (Red Flag) of March 18 reported that the League of Victims of the United States Forces in Japan of the Communist Party sent a letter of consolation to the owner of the boat (Nishikawa), but such a letter has not been received by Nishikawa.

  b. There are reports that a request was made through a third person to the owner of the boat of the ashes for the purpose of study at a certain University or that the victims of the atom bombing at Hiroshima asked for the ash because the ash was good for the treatment, but they have not been confirmed.
c. On the Yaizu Wireless Station.

The station is run by the Yaizu Fishing Cooperative Association, all the employees are from Yaizu city, and the station is under complete control of Kunichiro Kondo, the director of the Cooperative Association and a Liberal member of the Prefectural Assembly.