SUBJECT: Visit of Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger to Canada; Luncheon at 24 Sussex Drive

PARTICIPANTS:

CANADA

Pierre E. Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada
Allan J. MacEachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs
Basil Robinson, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs
J. H. Warren, Ambassador of Canada
Ivan Head, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister

US

The Secretary
William J. Porter, Ambassador to Canada
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Richard D. Vine, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs (notetaker)

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The Secretary and the Prime Minister met together privately for some 15 minutes prior to the luncheon.

The Secretary: Did Juneau's loss in the election the previous day have any national significance?

Prime Minister: It is probably a combination of circumstances in Quebec and the riding. We also won one yesterday in New Brunswick.

Ambassador Porter: We wondered whether Juneau's failure to be re-elected would soften the Canadian position on substitution-deletion.

Concurrence: EUR - Mr. Hartman
Prime Minister: You wouldn't say that if he went back to CRTC.

The Secretary: According to our intelligence reports Madame Gandhi is terrified of an assassination attempt.

Head: Her feeling is probably magnified after the assassination of her Railway Minister in January.

Prime Minister: Assassination?

The Secretary: Our Ambassador in Delhi sees nothing good in developments there. But our relations with India are nevertheless better.

Porter: How about relations with the Canadians?

The Secretary: They seem to be restrained.

Prime Minister: That's because they are mad at us. (to MacEachen) Do we have an agreement yet with them on nuclear supplies?

MacEachen: No.

Prime Minister: What do you think the chances are of getting safeguards on the entire fuel cycles? The Germans and others seem to be opposed.

The Secretary: I feel strongly that an effort must be made. The long-run consequences of failure would be disastrous. Nevertheless the Nuclear Suppliers Conference seems to be going fairly well.

Sonnenfeldt: We are hung up now on the talks. The dilemma is basically whether we should take no agreement or settle for the best we can get.

Prime Minister: The best arrangements possible would certainly slow down proliferation.

MacEachen: Any agreement at all would be even more difficult later on.
The Secretary: The temptation seems strong on many sides to act as if a certain number of countries will make a nuclear breakthrough within the next twenty years no matter what we do. This is a short-sighted policy.

Prime Minister: I had personal experience with this dog in the manger attitude at the Commonwealth Conference in Kingston. Our quarrel with India was treated very gently but the less-developed Commonwealth countries were on India's side. There was a cozy assumption that they might want to do the same thing themselves. I felt that there was a great misunderstanding. They could not see the quantitative difference between the technology required to make a bomb and that required to produce a peaceful nuclear explosion.

The Secretary: This feeling also enormously magnifies insecurity in the world. If there were a realistic possibility of nuclear war between third countries, the nuclear powers would surely be tempted to adopt a neo-imperialist role. I do not see how we can control nuclear exports indefinitely.

Prime Minister: I agree. There is an element of mistrust among the Western powers that is magnified by crass business interests. They think the proliferation problem is insoluble and consider that they ought to go ahead on a business basis.

The Secretary: They will not accept the proposition that a quantum jump is involved.

Sonnenfeldt: Well, a lot of money is involved. This is one of the leading areas of high technology in Western Europe and the prevailing psychology is to capitalize on that technology.

Prime Minister: Money doesn't seem to be the absolute qualification. They just don't see the need.
Sonnenfeldt: On the question of safeguards I think there has been a breakthrough with the Germans.

The Secretary: The Germans have been very good on this.

Prime Minister: Isn't there a flaw in their position, however? Aren't they only prepared to observe safeguards to the extent they're bound by the NPT Treaty?

The Secretary: The Germans have not been bad on the safeguards issue.

MacRachen: Did they agree to full cycle safeguards?

Sonnenfeldt: For the cycles involving materials that the Germans sell, yes. They would not go beyond that to the use of technology developed independently by the Brazilians.

The Secretary: We have a similar problem with Egypt. Egypt has agreed to full cycles safeguards if Israel accepts them as well. If the Israelis will not accept this, the Egyptians will feel free to use plutonium from reactors received from other than the United States. Thus the question is to sell or to lose any control or influence whatsoever. You have the same problem.

Prime Minister: With India, yes.

MacRachen: With Pakistan even more than India.

The Secretary: So many governments are prepared to push off the problem for decision by future governments.

Head: The LDC's seem to have a hang-up about PNEs. They believe that one advantage of PNEs is that they are cost-effective, a hangover from the days when we all argued that it was. The US should be
in a position to disabuse them of this misconception. False accounting by the Soviets continues to make it appear that cost effectiveness is an advantage. They also seem to believe that, by acquiring nuclear technology for military purposes, this is a solution to all their other problems. They must be made to realize that this is a destabilizing factor and not a factor for stability. This is a question of education.

MacEachen: Yes, this is something that US experts might achieve through consultations.

Prime Minister: Yes, if you can do that honestly. If you can't, you're better off acquiescing. You can't blame the LDC's for subscribing to your own belief.

Sonnenfeldt: It's a paradox since the Soviets in the negotiations on PNEs are actually helping a certain number of states toward a nuclear threshold.

The Secretary: The practical applications of PNEs is in any case sharply limited but the range of debate on this subject is limited as well. Perhaps one solution would be to create an international stockpile of peaceful explosive devices on which non-nuclear states could draw.

Prime Minister: Isn't that covered in the NPT?

The Secretary: Only in a general way, the general obligation for assistance.

Prime Minister: How do the various countries line up? The Germans, British, and French appear to be opposed.

Sonnenfeldt: The British are with you. The French are largely opposed and the Germans seem to take the French viewpoint.
The Secretary: The Germans are hiding behind the French position.

Prime Minister: Why are their positions linked?

The Secretary: For commercial reasons.

Sonnenfeldt: There is a Cartesian quality to the French position. The French are not signatories of the NPT and don't wish to be bound by it. If they start from a position which is based on the NPT and build on that, it suggests in some way that they accept it.

Head: They view the strictures on other countries as a form of economic imperialism.

Prime Minister: If it's as important as we think it is, can we do more? Can we argue the matter at another level? At the CSCE meeting in Helsinki I had the impression that only the French and Germans were not interested in making progress.

The Secretary: Perhaps we could spend an hour or so on this subject at the Economic Summit in November.

Prime Minister: Perhaps we haven't gotten across enough of the technical implications.

The Secretary: The problem is not technical, it's conceptual.

Prime Minister: Can we get across the point on PNEs that they really can't be used?

The Secretary: The Soviet Union is engaged in an enormous project to construct a canal through the use of PNEs.

Head: It's interesting that there has been a two year delay since their last explosion for this purpose. That suggests that they are having difficulties.
The Secretary: When they are prepared to talk about FNEs, but they don't even accept the 150 kiloton limit.

Prime Minister: How about the Law of the Sea? Perhaps Mr. Kissinger could tell me what is happening in Congress about this.

The Secretary: You are under a lot of pressure from the maritime provinces to make a unilateral declaration. How long can you hold out?

MacEachen: If unilateral legislation is passed in the United States, it is generally considered that we would do likewise. There are many who don't understand why we don't work out an arrangement with you in any event. If there were US unilateral action soon, however, it would be inopportune.

The Secretary: We want to go the multilateral route and we are still not sure what the position of the Senate would be. Senator Gravel tells us he has 49 votes lined up to oppose the legislation. No one else believes that the Administration can win.

Head: It's hard to believe that it could be defeated.

Prime Minister: (To MacEachen) Could we sit back and wait from 6 to 12 months?

MacEachen: I haven't thought it through in those terms. I would have to re-think the issue.

The Secretary: The President would have to assess the problems connected with a veto, whether he would be over-ridden and the domestic problems that a veto might cause.

Prime Minister: When I see the President next Thursday I will urge him to use his veto power.
The Secretary: That would be helpful. We must have one-third of both Houses plus one to over-ride the veto and that is a tough hurdle, although it is not overwhelming in the House. We were honestly surprised at how fast this pressure built up.

The Secretary: That is largely because the Congress is so disorganized. Organized pressure groups are able to produce extraordinary results. It is embarrassing the extent to which the Greek constituency was able to influence the Congress. The whole tradition of authority in the Congress has collapsed.

Prime Minister: I saw how much support we had at the Conference of Provincial Premiers. Premier Regan of Nova Scotia and the other premiers of the maritime provinces are prepared to wait for a multilateral solution.

MacEachen: We have been able to tell them that we can't get unilaterally what can be gotten in a multilateral framework.

The Secretary: It will be one year before the machinery can even begin to operate.

Prime Minister: We don't even have the machinery, never mind the Navy.

The Secretary: What was the agreement in ICNAF? To reduce the catch by 43 per cent?

MacEachen: By 40 percent. We were terribly surprised how easy it was to get agreement.

Head: The threat of unilateral action played a big role.

MacEachen: The Law of the Sea negotiations have gotten countries used to the concept of extended jurisdiction. But only Norway has agreed to accept a 200 mile zone.
The Secretary: In the absence of a multilateral settlement there will be a plethora of different concepts and regimes, all conflicting with one another. It would be a nightmare.

Head: We would lose the ability to negotiate on sensible rules.

Porter: Each country could negotiate directly with other parties.

Prime Minister: We have seen the profitability of doing this. When we established fisheries closing lines in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and elsewhere, we were surprised at how little reaction there was and how easy it was to negotiate that matter.

MacEachen: But that was negotiated after we had declared the fisheries closing lines. Norway is prepared to negotiate in anticipation of a 200 mile zone.

Head: A multilateral solution would provide all the necessary safeguards and eliminate the inconsistencies in various fishing regimes. Here we would have to go it alone without multilateral support.

MacEachen: Don't you have a similar problem with the Mexicans?

The Secretary: Yes, there is a problem and we are trying to prevent that happening in the Caribbean.

MacEachen: Well, take the Mexican case—what do they do if they make a unilateral declaration and what do you do in response.

Hartman: We have already experienced that on the West Coast of Latin America.
The Secretary: We strenuously resisted the position, paid the fines of the fishing boats, cut off aid to Ecuador.

MacEachen: Suppose you take unilateral action. Would you send in the Navy if Soviet fishing boats would not move away?

The Secretary: The Congress would say yes. The problem is how to enforce it.

MacEachen: Perhaps you can negotiate a technique of enforcement.

The Secretary: Previous efforts at testing enforcement have proved to be unworkable. A unilateral declaration opens up a real can of worms.

MacEachen: That's why we'd like to wait a year if we can.

The Secretary: If you see the President you might mention the sympathy you have for that position.

Prime Minister: Perhaps I can act as a lightning rod with the Congress, etc. pointing out we Canadians have the same problems with the same ocean and a unilateral solution is not the way to go about it.

MacEachen: You'd have to find a good platform for that. The ICNAF meeting was a start.

Warren: Didn't that help calm down the Congress?

The Secretary: I spoke at some length to a group of responsible Republican leaders and this was not a singular success. They wanted the Law of the Sea Conference to fail and hoped that we can keep stalling. They don't want the International Deep Sea Bed Authority.
Prime Minister: That would be the same category that opposed progress in the Seventh Special Session.

The Secretary: Just about.

Hartman: They want to maintain the narrowest possible territorial water.

The Secretary: The fisheries issues are widespread and the notion of a unilateral approach is spreading. Sometimes it is linked with an economic zone. The Mexicans want to declare the Gulf of California a "patrimonial sea."

Head: The definition of straits can only be arrived at on a multilateral basis. We, of course, would want some important exceptions.

The Secretary: This can only be done internationally; the unilateral approach makes no sense. We will pay for it later.

Prime Minister: How about the new economic order? I have the impression that the group of 77 was mollified. Are they more willing to change the rules?

The Secretary: The atmosphere was certainly better in the first two days of the preparatory commission.

Prime Minister: The Latin Americans were precluded from carrying the meeting. Seems like the Africans are no longer so anxious to be aligned with the oil producing countries.

The Secretary: We have to make clear that we have to resist the organization of producers by having the consumers organize themselves. The Africans are primarily interested in handling of raw materials and are now prepared to talk.
Prime Minister: I saw the turnaround on this point at the Commonwealth Conference. It became clear that the rules would not work the way they said they would. At least half the developed countries like Canada are major raw materials exporters.

The Secretary: Many of the developed countries are developed because they had raw materials.

MacEachen: The atmosphere in the Producers-Consumers Conference was obviously much improved.

The Secretary: I had that impression too. I don't like what is happening in the last couple of days, however.

Prime Minister: I suppose that's one of the difficulties of a great power. We were supposed to host the UN Conference on Crime in December. In July, we indicated that we would postpone this because of the issue of PLO participation. It would have turned the whole thing into a forum on debate on Israel. The reaction was better than we thought and it's clear that many of the countries concerned respect toughness.

The Secretary: That's right. It also gives the moderates something to appeal to.

Prime Minister: At Helsinki I didn't notice any particular recognition of the political realities, particularly on the South African issue. It's difficult to know when you must give in and when you must be firm. After Vietnam, you took a realistic look at your policy so that you would be known to help your friends rather than your enemies.

The Secretary: The problem is to establish a credible pattern of conduct.
MacEachen: Speaking of helping friends, we note the support you have been giving us on the Economic Summit.

Prime Minister: Yes, I want to say a word of thanks for that but I don't expect you to use up all your credit with the others. We would not get on our knees to participate.

The Secretary: It's not just that, there is an issue of principle involved as well. We can't allow the French to exercise a veto on the Summit. (The Secretary shows the Prime Minister a telegram from Helmut Schmidt based on his talks with the French.) The French are not convening this meeting; they proposed the idea but we in fact convened it. The issue is not whether there will be 14 or 21 participants.

Prime Minister: If Canada participates, won't other European countries want to participate as well?

The Secretary: The issue is basically where the democracies are going. The issues would not be technical. A forum of 12 to 21 countries is certainly a possibility but it would be too large. We initially opposed the Italian participation but if Italy participates we feel that Canada must as well.

The Secretary: The discussion would be semi-philosophical -- to try to establish a sense of direction. Giscard felt that he had to convince the French population that there was a sense of leadership and that they were not the victims of blind economic forces.

Prime Minister: He's right. The problem is the same all over the world.

The Secretary: What's really at issue is the future of democracy in Europe.
Prime Minister: We don't want to be parochial about this and we would accept a meeting of the 6. I think, however, that a more balanced discussion would be along the lines that I proposed at the NATO Summit meeting. Certainly Tindemans and Den Uyl could make a contribution to such a discussion.

The Secretary: Giscard, of course, has a problem with attending a NATO Summit.

Prime Minister: It's still not enough to explain a group of 5. It is not a question of 5 or 14. On nuclear issues for example it would be good to have the views of a guy like Palme.

The Secretary: A guy like who?

Prime Minister: Palme.

The Secretary: When we get to the Swedes we have to draw the line. Our relations have improved but not to that point.

Porter: He didn't help very much in Paris.

The Secretary: On the Vietnam issue? Oh, we had no problem with Palme on that.

MacEachen: We had a major demonstration on the steps of Parliament yesterday.

The Secretary: During the period of greatest student militancy on Vietnam the White House was always being picketed by groups who protested the depths of human depravity. Their knowledge always seemed to be in inverse proportion to their militancy. I would always call in 15-20 of them to talk and ask them to come back and meet me again in 6 weeks time. No group ever came more than twice. I recall one bright young lady who accused me of a credibility gap and I pointed out since I knew what we would be doing in 6 weeks time and she didn't, it was she who had a credibility gap.
Prime Minister: These students aren't prepared to debate the issues. They are protesting against the green paper on immigration. But none of them had any knowledge of what was in it.

The Secretary: They don't appreciate the complexities of modern problems.

Prime Minister: I'm delighted to see you maintain your professorial habits. I still find it so rewarding to convince a group of 20 or 50. I wanted to talk a little bit about the subject of disarmament and SALT talks in Geneva. The Soviets are very distrustful of you and vice versa. I wonder if you could tell me if you are thinking of something beyond détente, in the field of conventional disarmament. I have the feeling the Soviets would support you if you were looking for peace and détente.

The Secretary: The one segment of our opinion which is against détente is basically the vigilant anti-communists who deplore the lack of tension. They need and want a Berlin crisis and really don't understand or care about reductions of SA-5 radars or SS-15 missiles. I basically agree that in order to maintain support we must maintain momentum. The only thing on the horizon at the moment is the MBFR discussions.

Prime Minister: I gather they are making little progress.

The Secretary: In order to get everyone on board to start the negotiations we had to establish an initial negotiating position which was absurd. Now you make changes in it and it becomes sacrosanct. For example, one proposal is to reduce 29,000 individual soldiers for 1500 tanks. It is not related to units or the way Soviet divisions are organized and there is no way they can accept this. Any modification of this is immediately read as a unilateral Western concession. That's why we have generally favored the nuclear option.
Prime Minister: Those who oppose the MBFR negotiations appear to be a small minority. I think we would all be satisfied if both sides spent less on arms.

The Secretary: The constituencies for SALT and MBFR are not the same. There is no generalized constituency. The controls on nuclear weapons would be acceptable only if an agreement could command public support and understanding. In the absence of that, concessions cause a problem, that is on SALT. On MBFR we have to watch carefully to assure that the results not become a unilateral result. There is no sizeable opposition to MBFR in the United States. Our problem is with our allies.

Sonnenfeldt: There are a few professional strategist and military thinking people.

The Secretary: They will oppose a MBFR agreement anyway. You have to put the matter on an intellectual basis and make the arguments respectable. The opposition stems from Jewish sources, human rights sources, and from partisan sources who still see this as a Nixon initiative.

Head: Diefenbaker would represent that kind of constituency here with his strong interests in the Ukrainian minority.

Prime Minister: In our contacts with the Soviets we have the distinct impression they want a smaller defense budget.

The Secretary: Yes, I think the Soviets are sincere on SALT. There are certain bureaucratic pressures that the leadership has to overcome but I don't think there is any deliberate dithering by the Soviets on MBFR.

Prime Minister: When they talk to us about you they say very much the same thing and lay the blame on the military industrial complex as a reason for increases in the defense budget.
Sonnenfeldt: When the moment of truth comes there is no point in having spilled blood and getting nothing for it.

The Secretary: I was struck by the damage done by the reception given the Vladivostok agreement last year. Here the Soviet Union made massive concessions and it was greeted in the United States as if we had knuckled under to the Soviet Union. I am convinced that is why the Soviet Union turned against the trade agreement.

Prime Minister: That is an impossible route to follow.

The Secretary: The Chinese thought it was a mistake although it was publicly greeted well.

Prime Minister: It is actually your deterrent strength that prevents a nuclear holocaust.

The Secretary: I consider it inconceivable that any responsible politician, except a total psychotic, could authorize the use of nuclear weapons. We never fired a missile from an operational silo, the Soviets have fired two or three. The thought of all these missiles being fired simultaneously and landing accurately on their targets is out of the question. I recall in the Saigon evacuation the Joint Chiefs sent a message that 18 helicopters would arrive for the final evacuation and Ambassador Martin was to be on the 18th.

Prime Minister: So they only sent 17?

The Secretary: No, but I announced at a press conference after the 18th helicopter came back that the evacuation was complete. As I walked out I was handed a piece of paper saying that 160 marines sent in to manage the evacuation were still there and we had to send several helicopters to pick them up.
Prime Minister: If a war were to break out in the NATO area and hostilities started with the use of conventional tactical nuclear weapons how long could it reasonably last? Either the force de frappe or the losing side would step in at a certain point and go to the use of strategic missiles. Wouldn't it be better to have some idea when this threshold might be reached?

The Secretary: I'm impressed by the efforts NATO is making in trying to get answers to these hard questions. NATO now has more than 7,000 tactical weapons and I have never seen plans for the use of more than 50. How do you coordinate political plans and military actions? We have supplies in Europe for a 90 day period but some stocks are for 110 days, others for only 60. The average is for 90 days but we can only operate on the basis of the lowest stock available. There is no standardization either on the rate of expenditures of stocks and ammunition. NATO must have an agreed strategic plan. Haig is making progress on this. We would have to determine how we would fight without getting too specific and inviting a Soviet attack.

Prime Minister: The question is how you get the biggest bang. You can't do this with no acceptable strategy.

The Secretary: It's clear that you have to maintain conventional forces.

Sonnenfeldt: You don't necessarily want the biggest bang, since this can produce overexpensive weapons systems without the necessary flexibility.

Prime Minister: That's right.

The Secretary: Our present thinking involves ferrying divisions in by boat. This implies a war of over 120 days and in that period there would be no Europe left.

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Prime Minister: That of course implies expensive techniques for the military defense of convoys.

Sonnenfeldt: That means considerable expenditures for ASW.

Prime Minister: But funds for ASW could be more usefully spent somewhere else. It could be more available for other tasks if less were spent for ASW techniques.

The Secretary: Hal, what is your view on that.

Sonnenfeldt: There is now a large sea based deterrent and the absence of ASW capability would encourage this. Fixed land based deterrence is now rare. If a war were to break out, maritime control by the massive Soviet submarines would block sea lanes not only for convoys but also for passage of strategic necessities such as oil supplies.

Prime Minister: This is based on a war, not a peace time situation.

Sonnenfeldt: Much of our thinking is predicated on a lasting war.

The Secretary: Based on a lasting war in which missiles would not be used in Europe.

Prime Minister: That's a hard scenario to accept. Whichever side is losing will pick up the hot line, make a phone call and say the last ship was one too many and we are going to go strategic.

Sonnenfeldt: Our massive aircraft carriers and major vessels are all sitting ducks. With just the 12 nuclear aircraft carriers, there is enormous incentive to keep them afloat.

Prime Minister: It is worse than I thought.
The Secretary: Probably not. Whoever heard of developing supersonic aircraft to fire subsonic missiles.

The Secretary: If we can maintain the SALT limits the situation would be a lot better with an agreement.

Prime Minister: That's a function of the democratic system. The Europeans cannot understand why you would use your nuclear deterrent. This undermines their own resolve. They must know that a conventional war is limited in time: The French force will not cross the Rhine because they do not believe it. They would not want to sink all of their forces in it.

The Secretary: This is where previous military strategy becomes discontinuous. In the past it has never occurred to the military mind that one could have too much power. They don't see that it is in their own self-interests to limit the defeat of the enemy.

Prime Minister: That's another reason not to delay the SALT talks.

The Secretary: My own experience is that you cannot squeeze out the last drop of blood in diplomatic negotiations. For both sides there is a level of defeat that the other side cannot accept. But that's where the problem appears since each side will want to shoot the works.

Sonnenfeldt: There are other options but they cost money.

The Secretary: And they have to be geared into a political proposal.
Prime Minister: The essential problem is the control of nuclear weapons.

Head: You're going to China next, how do you see your relations with China.

The Secretary: Our basic relationship is good. They understand the necessity of our engaging in Vietnam. This gave the Chinese the necessary freedom for maneuverability they needed with the Soviet Union. What the Chinese need from us is diplomatic protection, that is, our ability to preserve the world power balance. China is our best NATO ally since they were always lecturing our NATO partners on the importance of NATO defense. Our defeat in Indo-China was a major set back. Our actions on Turkey were also unhelpful and it has shaken our relations with them. Our problem with Portugal is beyond their conception; they cannot see how a country so far removed from the Soviet Union could be influenced by Soviet power. The worse our relationship becomes with the USSR, the worse it becomes with China. They will respect us if we appear to be generally competent in managing our affairs. If we are weak they will have no interest in us. The Chinese are the most unsentimental people I know.

Prime Minister: And if you are too aggressive?

The Secretary: They would not be drawn in by our recklessness. The best situation for them is for us to have an irreconcilable conflict with the USSR.

Sonnenfeldt: They view the Taiwan problem as minor.

The Secretary: It is only Congressional delegations that have built up the Taiwan problem. They never want to discuss it with me. I always give them a list of 10 subjects for discussion. Taiwan is inevitably last.
Prime Minister: Do our relations with China give you any problem?

The Secretary: Your problem is different. You don't have a defense treaty with Taiwan which, if you renounce it, would make available an area for conquest.

Prime Minister: It would be regrettable. If you did that it would be too costly in human terms.

The Secretary: It would be very painful and we don't plan to volunteer it. We couldn't have a defense treaty with a part of a country that we do not recognize.

Head: Tell that to the academics in Quebec.

Prime Minister: Or the Quai d'Orsay.

The Secretary: It was the chant of the crowd.

Prime Minister: He claims he was carried away by the events of the moment.

The Secretary: DeGaulle destroyed me the first time we met him. He was speaking with eloquence of Europe when President Nixon called me over and I pointed out a mistake in his reasoning and asked him how he would cope with Germany if he carried out his plans. He looked at me and responded civilly "par la guerre." I then mentioned Vietnam and pointed out that we were having a credibility problem. He responded that he thought our enemies were having the credibility problem.

Prime Minister: But he was right.

The Secretary: I know, but it took me two years to catch on.