Consultations with the Soviets on Non-Proliferation Strategy

In response to your request, we have prepared a brief analysis of a possible approach to the Soviets on the question of multilateral nuclear safeguards. Talking points are attached (Tab A) for you to broach, with either Gromyko or Dobrynin, the ideas of greater supplier coordination and a suppliers' conference. We have also attached (Tab B) an informal paper which could be handed over at the same time.

While the Soviets could become major exporters of the full range of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, their exports have in practice been quite limited. They have exported a few research and power reactors, and, in the past few years, have agreed to perform uranium enrichment services for foreign customers. They have not, however, exported highly-enriched uranium or (at least since their experience with the Chinese) uranium or reprocessing technology.

Since the NPT, the Soviets have required IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear exports (with the temporary exception of enrichment contracts with certain Euratom countries) and they have agreed to abide by the export guidelines evolved by the Zangger (Nuclear Exporters') Committee. They did not, however, formally join in the deliberations of that Committee whose members were mainly Western suppliers, and their initial reaction was that the guidelines should apply to a larger range of nuclear-related exports. Finally, they have strongly supported the view that exports to non-nuclear weapon states must not be diverted to PNES.

This background, which is consistent with the Soviet interest in preventing further proliferation and promoting wide adherence to the NPT, indicates a high probability that...
the Soviets will be receptive to a non-proliferation strategy based on tighter export controls among suppliers. They might have greater difficulty, however, in agreeing to a conference in which all other participants are U.S. allies -- despite the fact that the Soviet Bloc nations are not commercial nuclear exporters.

This difficulty might be mitigated by making clear that any such conference would simply be a first step, and that the small number of major suppliers represented in it could form the nucleus of later, more widespread efforts. Alternatively, if the Soviets prefer, the conference could be held without Soviet participation but with the understanding that we would keep in close consultation with them on the matter and see that their views were taken into account (as we did in the case of the Zangger Committee), since we consider their cooperation vital to the implementation of the policies agreed upon.

Attachments:

Tab A - Talking Points
Tab B - Informal Paper
Drafted: S/P: JHKahan/JHKalicki: mn x28995 9/18/74
ACDA: JBoright/CVanDoren

Concurrences:

C - Mr. Sonnenfeldt
EUR - Mr. Armitage
PM - Mr. Goodby
1. As I discussed with you last month, we believe an essential element to strengthen non-proliferation efforts is coordinated action by all the major suppliers of nuclear materials and equipment.

2. While we have been encouraged by the efforts of the Zangger (Nuclear Exporters') Committee in Vienna, in whose recommendations your government recently indicated concurrence, we think it would be desirable for the major suppliers (some of whom were not included in that group) to consult soon with a view to further coordination of nuclear export and safeguards policies.

3. The general nature of the nuclear export and safeguards policies we believe should be discussed is indicated in a brief paper I will give you.

4. We would hope that the Soviet Union would join in a discussion with other major nuclear suppliers with a view to reaching agreement on such coordinated policies. As a beginning, we are considering a private conference of the major nuclear exporters -- including, in addition to ourselves, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, FRG and Japan, and, if agreeable, the Soviet Union.

5. We would appreciate hearing your reaction to this approach.

6. [If the Soviets indicate that there should be greater representation from other than U.S. allies.] The criterion for participation in such a conference would be technical rather than political. Other potential candidates do not have the nuclear export capabilities of the original seven participants. While this would be a conference of major suppliers, we would expect to consult all interested parties to assure that a fully effective international safeguards system be instituted. Such a conference would play a small, but we believe constructive, part in assuring more widespread efforts by all nuclear industrial states.

7. [If the Soviets indicate that they would not be interested in participating in such a conference.] A possible alternative arrangement would be to keep in close
consultation with your government on this matter, and see that its views are taken into account at the conference (as we did in the case of the Zangger Committee). In any event, we consider Soviet cooperation in any policies evolved to be vital to an effective non-proliferation strategy.

[8. ACDA suggests that you make the following additional point: Apart from this multilateral approach, we presumably share an interest in persuading India not to become a source of further proliferation, and in not helping it to acquire a long-range delivery capability.]
Potential Common Nuclear Export and Safeguards Policies

The USG envisions undertakings among suppliers to establish common restraints and conditions on nuclear supply, with a view to minimizing the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation. We are considering a small, private conference of key suppliers as a means of working out such understandings. All suppliers would of course be free to apply more restrictive policies.

Suggested Policies for Discussion:

1. Nuclear cooperation would be undertaken with non-nuclear weapon states only under agreements as to peaceful uses, which would explicitly exclude use in any nuclear explosive devices.

2. Nuclear supply would be undertaken only when covered by IAEA safeguards, with appropriate provisions for duration and coverage of produced nuclear material.

3. Supply of weapons-grade material, or of uranium enrichment or chemical reprocessing equipment or technology, to non-nuclear weapon states should be subject to special restraint. Such special restraint might include supply only for multinational enterprises, or only to those non-nuclear weapon states which have made a general commitment to non-proliferation, and which have accepted IAEA safeguards on their entire nuclear fuel cycle.

4. Nuclear supply would include appropriate requirements for the physical protection of materials and facilities against theft, seizure or sabotage.

5. Stringent conditions might be developed on the supply of sensitive nuclear material, equipment, or technology to countries or regions where such exports would contribute to particular risks of conflict or instability.

The above list of possible policies is intended to illustrate the types of issues where understandings might be reached. It is not intended to represent an exhaustive examination of the issues.