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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Israeli Nuclear Program

I recommend you sign the attached memorandum to The Secretary on this subject, which he will discuss with the President, Secretary Rogers, Henry Kissinger, and Dick Helms, at 10:00 a.m., on Wednesday, 16 July.

[Signature]

Attachment a/s

[Handwritten notes]

In reply refer to: 1-35583/69

14 JUL 1969

SECRET

OSD Copy
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Israeli Nuclear Program

I recommend you sign the attached memorandum to the Secretary on this subject, which he will discuss with the President, Secretary Rogers, Henry Kissinger, and Dick Helms, at 10:00 a.m., on Wednesday, 16 July.

(Signed) G. Warren Nutter

Attachment a/a
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Israeli Nuclear Program

The attached represents the general consensus of Henry Kissinger, Elliot Richardson, General Wheeler, Dick Helms, and myself as to how we should deal with the Israelis on this subject. I believe you are sufficiently familiar with this matter for the scenario to be self-explanatory. There are a few points, however, which I believe should be explicitly mentioned.

a. Certain important aspects of our conclusions and agreed objectives have been deliberately omitted from the written material for the President; I believe we should discuss before the meeting.

b. There have been no differences on this subject in this Department. There have been differences, however, in State. While Elliot Richardson and I have been in accord, Joe Sisco has been lukewarm at most toward our recommendations because of the alleged effect on his peace-seeking efforts. We do not yet know Bill Rogers' attitude.

c. The choice of decision before the President is to lean on the Israelis or not to lean on them. In my opinion, not to lean on them would, in effect, involve us in a conspiracy with Israel which would leave matters dangerous to our security in their hands.

I am also attaching a copy of a memorandum to me from Harry Schwartz, describing where we stand with respect to Ambassador Rabin's request to you for August -- rather than September -- delivery of the first Phantoms.

2 Attachments
1. State Scenario (T5/NODIS)
2. Memo for DepSecDef dt 27 Jun 69
   (T5/NODIS -- 1-35555/69)

[Signature]

7/11/69
TOP SECRET/NODIS
(CONFIDENTIAL WITHOUT ATTACHMENT)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Secretary of State Rogers
Secretary of Defense Laird
Chairman, JCS, General Wheeler
Under Secretary of State Richardson
Director of Central Intelligence Helms

SUBJECT: Paper for July 16 NSC Meeting (NSSM 40)

Attached is a paper describing a possible course of action which represents a consensus of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Review Group on NSSM-40.

The discussion at the meeting of the special committee of the NSC on Wednesday, July 16, will be based on this paper, along with the basic paper distributed by the State Department on May 30 and the Policy Alternatives paper considered by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Review Group on June 26.

Jeanne W. Davis
Secretariat

Attachment
SCENARIO FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELIS
ON THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAM

A. US Objectives

1. Our objectives are to persuade Israel to:

   a) Sign the NPT at an early date (by the end of this year) and ratify it soon thereafter.

   b) Reaffirm to the US in writing the assurance that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Near East, specifying that "introduction" shall mean possession of nuclear explosive devices."

   c) Give us assurances in writing that it will stop production and will not deploy "Jericho" missiles or any other nuclear-capable strategic missile.

2. Early signature and ratification of the NPT must be our minimum objective. The NPT provides the best basis for international confidence in Israel's intentions.

   Bilateral assurances are equally important. They are also a desirable adjunct to the NPT because of the time factor. The Treaty does not enter into force until the three nuclear signatories and 40 others sign and ratify (present score is one nuclear and about 20 others) and this may take another six months to a year. Even after the Treaty is in force it gives a signatory six months to enter negotiations with the IAEA for a safeguards arrangement, and it gives the signatory an additional 18 months to conclude those negotiations. We need the bilateral assurances to cover the interim and we should do our best to get them.

   *In presenting our requirements to the Israelis, we would not go beyond this formulation. For our own internal purposes, we would decide that we could tolerate Israeli activity short of assembly of a completed nuclear explosive device.*
Israeli agreement to stop production and not to deploy strategic missiles is important because the deployment of a delivery system that is militarily cost effective only as a nuclear weapons carrier would seriously vitiate confidence in Israel's adherence to the NPT. We should therefore make a determined effort, at least initially, to achieve this objective. However, if the Israelis show a disposition to meet us on the nuclear issue but are adamant on the Jericho missiles, we can drop back to a position of insisting on non-deployment of missiles and an undertaking by the Israelis to keep any further production secret.

B. Scenario

1. General Approach. The venue for our negotiations with the Israelis should be kept in Washington. Ambassador Barbour in Tel Aviv would be kept informed in detail of the negotiations as they proceed and would be asked to reinforce our representations to Rabin whenever this appeared desirable.

2. First Meeting. Ambassador Rabin would be asked to call upon Under Secretaries Richardson and Packard meeting jointly. The Under Secretaries would say that in connection with Israel's request to advance the delivery date for the first Phantoms to August, we wish to tie up loose ends left after the Warnke-Rabin negotiations in October, 1969, which led to our agreement to sell the aircraft. Accordingly, we would like to open discussions in Washington on Israel's adherence to the NPT and related questions concerning Israel's intentions with respect to nuclear weapons.

The Under Secretaries would stress the importance the US attaches to Israel’s adherence to the NPT. Israel told us last December it was studying the implications of adherence to the NPT; we would be interested to hear what conclusions the GOI has reached. The Under Secretaries would also refer to the Warnke-Rabin exchanges last November and say we feel there are some unanswered questions concerning Israel's assurances to us on nuclear weapon forebearance. Specifically, we would wish to have Israel's confirmation that possession of nuclear weapons as well as testing and deployment would constitute "introduction" of nuclear weapons. We would also like to pursue the question of the purpose of Israel developing and deploying a nuclear weapons delivery system — the "Jericho" missile — which can only cast doubt on its nuclear assurances.
At the first meeting with Rabin the US side would not explicitly link deliveries of the F-4s to the Israeli response on the nuclear question, but our reference to the request for early deliveries and the Warnke-Rabin talks would clearly convey the direction of our thinking. Rabin's tactic will probably be to test how serious we are by refusing initially to go beyond the line Israel has taken with us in past meetings: that the GOI has not made up its mind about the NPT, that it has already given us assurances that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area, and nothing further is required. If he is unresponsive in this fashion, the Under Secretaries would make clear their dissatisfaction and ask Rabin to call again in five or six days time to continue the dialogue.

3. Second Meeting. If Rabin tries to stonewall us at the second meeting the US side would tell him that Israel's uncommunicativeness on the nuclear question does not strike us as consistent with the high level of cooperation which Israel expects of us in support of its security. Israel's nuclear policy also impinges directly on US worldwide security concerns and responsibilities. By the end of the meeting we should lay before Rabin precisely what we need, as outlined in section A above. We would make it clear to Rabin that a lack of response on Israel's part raises a question regarding our ability to continue meeting Israel's arms requests.

4. Subsequent. Having presented our needs, we would let the GOI formulate its response in its own time, allowing the approaching date for delivery of the F-4s to produce its own pressure on the GOI. Whenever and wherever the Israelis raised the subject of the F-4s, the response would be that, given the terms of the sales agreement and the uncertainties surrounding Israel's nuclear intentions, there are serious doubts about our ability to proceed with deliveries of the F-4s so long as the matters under discussion with Under Secretaries Richardson and Packard remain unresolved.

This would have the effect of turning down the Israeli request for advancing delivery to August. However, no decision would be taken to alter the scheduled September delivery of the F-4s until we get an initial reading on Israeli attitudes and intentions.

5. Mrs. Meir's Visit. When Prime Minister Meir gets here, the President and other senior US officials would bear down on

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**TOP-SECRET/NODIS**
this subject, stressing that Israel's decisions in the nuclear weapons field have an important bearing on US security and global interests, and reinforcing our objectives as they have evolved in the meetings between Rabin and the Under Secretaries. The possibility should also be kept in mind that Mrs. Meir may make a special appeal to the President, saying that it is impossible for her government to sign the NPT or give us a bilateral commitment on non-possession of nuclear weapons until after the elections in Israel this October, and that in the meantime non-delivery of F-4s in September would hurt the Labor Alignment's chances. Our response to such an appeal would have to be decided in the light of the way the earlier negotiations had gone with the Israelis.

6. Public Confrontation. The USG would take no initiative to make this a public issue. In the event that the Israelis maintain an unresponsive line with us and show signs of going to Congress in an attempt to undermine our position on deliveries of the F-4s, we should have ready a range of actions that the Administration might take to counter this move.
April 11, 1969

TO: The Secretary of State
    The Secretary of Defense
    The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program

The President has directed the preparation of a policy study on the Israeli nuclear weapons program.

As a background for this study, a thorough intelligence study should be provided, describing our best estimate of the current state and future prospects of the Israeli program. The intelligence estimate should be provided on a selected basis to the named individuals of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Review Group and of the National Security Council listed below.

The policy should (a) discuss as specifically as possible the implications of Israel’s nuclear weapons program for U.S. objectives in the Middle East, in arms limitation and in non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and (b) describe the principal policy alternatives for the U.S. and the full range of possible U.S. actions in the situations we are most likely to face. For instance, the paper might consider alternatives (a) in the present situation, (b) in a situation where Israel is known by us but not by the Arabs to have completed a nuclear device, and (c) in a situation where Israel is known by us and by the Arabs to be ready to deploy nuclear weapons. After analysing alternatives, the paper may state a viewpoint on a preferred course.

The President has directed that this study be prepared by an Ad Hoc Group chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State and including representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The paper should be submitted by April 25, 1969, to the Ad Hoc Committee of the NSC Review Group comprised of Elliot L. Richardson, Under Secretary of State; David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence; General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The special committee of the National Security Council will be comprised of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

This is in response to your request, conveyed to me through Captain Wilson, for information on where the U.S. Government stands with respect to early delivery of F-4s to Israel.

In January 1969, President Johnson told Prime Minister Eshkol at the ranch that if the decision were made as late as December 1968 to sell F-4s to Israel, the U.S. Government would put itself in a position to be able to deliver, at the rate of four a month, starting in January 1970. This would mean about cutting in half the usual lead-time for F-4s. In December 1968, the decision was made to sell the F-4s, and the Israelis asked for an even earlier delivery. Although there were some objections to this, particularly from the Air Force, who did not believe the Israelis could be ready to handle the aircraft earlier, the decision was made to start delivery at the rate of four a month, starting in September 1969. There is attached an exchange of letters between Mr. Varnke and General Rabin to this effect. You will note that in Mr. Varnke's letter, he makes two points in addition to the agreement on early delivery. The first point is: "Unexpected developments could, of course, necessitate a change in the delivery schedule." Secondly, he said that the U.S. Government is not recommending that Israel take delivery of any of the F-4s prior to the time such personnel are adequately trained to operate and maintain them."

On 18 June 1969, General Rabin, the Israeli Ambassador, wrote a letter (attached) to Secretary Laird, stating that McDonnell Douglas was able to deliver earlier than September and requesting that the planes be delivered to Israel as they become available from the factory. We know from the factory that this means August. Less formally, the Israelis have told us that if we cannot agree to the delivery of four in August, that they would appreciate receiving eight in September. This request of General Rabin's has not been answered.

We understand that the Air Force that it may be technically possible to make the earlier deliveries the Israelis now request, but we also understand that the Israelis are behind schedule in their maintenance training. One of the things that we worried about last year with respect to early delivery as September was that the Israelis would possess the planes but be unable to
maintain them sufficiently to fight them and, in a crisis, ask us to send Air Force technicians to assist them at what would be the worst political time for us to do so.

Given this background, I believe that

1. We have the right to delay delivery through the promised September date, drawing on two arguments as necessary:
   
a. The "unforeseen developments" clause in Mr. Warnke's letter, and
   
b. The inadequacy of maintenance training.

If actual deliveries are delayed much beyond October, however, we will then begin to run the risk of public knowledge of this fact, due to press stories, etc.

Rodger Davies of the State Department is preparing a draft "scenario" at the request of you, Mr. Kissinger, and Mr. Richardson, for onward transmission to Mr. Laird, Mr. Rogers, and the President. Hopefully, this scenario will cover the subject much more comprehensively than this memorandum pretends to do. It should be in your hands, and Mr. Laird's, by the end of next week. As you have requested, I will continue to represent Defense in this endeavor.

3 Attachments

DISTRIBUTION
Orig = DepSecDef
cc: ASD/ISA/Hr. Nutter
     JCS/Gen Doyle
     NESA/Gen Boer