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Preface

On July 15 high-level discussions will open in Moscow. At that time, the U.S. Government should be prepared to discuss not only a nuclear test ban, but also joint measures to limit the development, production, and testing of atomic weapons to the existing four nuclear powers.

There has been some discussion of the five-alternative approach to Moscow where the alternatives were:

1. Test Ban
2. Non-Diffusion Declaration
3. Non-Diffusion Agreement with Sanctions
4. Limitations on Strategic Vehicles
5. European Non-Aggression Pact

It is the conclusion of this paper that in view of the limited time prior to the President's departure for Europe, the Deputies and Principals Meetings should be focused on alternatives 1 and 3. On the other hand, it is clear that we cannot control the issues which the Soviet Union will raise in the Moscow discussions. Therefore, we must continue our studies on items 4 and 5 in order to be in the best possible position. The Soviet Union is almost certain to bring up these subjects in Moscow.

A non-diffusion agreement in which the nuclear powers agree not to assist in the development or procurement of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear powers and call upon the non-nuclear powers to agree not to obtain weapons might have some marginal utility. Unfortunately, this policy is one of hope rather than action. No one seriously believes that such an agreement
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would in itself stop the Chinese, Israeli, or other nations from developing weapons. The issue is not what we are prepared to say about nuclear diffusion but what we are prepared to do to stop nuclear diffusion. Therefore, we should shift our emphasis from alternative 2 to alternative 3.

ALTERNATIVE #1. TEST BAN.

During the past nine years, the U.S. Government has carefully analyzed the test ban issue and shifted its position to a point where, in the absence of broader agreements, further movement toward the Soviet position does not appear strategically sound. There appear to be three primary options which can be considered with respect to the test ban:

a. If agreement on other measures are achieved, the number of on-site inspections for test ban might be included in a larger total number of on-site inspections.

b. We could drop any requirement for unmanned seismic stations, or "black boxes." Analysis to date indicates that while the "black boxes" may help seismic identification, they can be rendered useless by the Soviet Union. Therefore, there is little advantage for unmanned stations over Soviet stations in the same areas which can be visited from time to time.

c. We should be willing to formulate the number of on-site inspections in terms of a 3 or 4 year period. One cannot underestimate the changes in political climate which may occur between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the next few years. It is conceivable that relationships may deteriorate. It is also conceivable that a significant political realignment might occur. In any case, flexibility to utilize our on-site inspection rights as frequently or infrequently as we choose, would be a
distinct advantage. To take an extreme case, if tension rapidly increases, we might use half of a three year allotment in the first twelve months of a test ban if we had significant indications that covert testing was being conducted.

ALTERNATIVE #3. DIFFUSION AGREEMENT WITH SANCTION

When Averill Harriman visits Moscow in mid-July, he should be authorized to make the following statement:

"Premier Khrushchev, the United States believes that it is in the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States Government to take appropriate measures to insure that the development, production, testing, and possession of nuclear weapons does not extend beyond those nations presently possessing these weapons. A test ban would be a useful step in this direction and we hope that we may come to some agreement with you on that matter.

However, we are prepared to discuss broader measures to limit the diffusion of nuclear weapons. We are willing and prepared to cooperate with the Soviet Union to achieve such an objective. We are here to exchange views on this problem in considerable detail.

"The President has given me instructions and authorization to negotiate in detail a draft agreement to limit nuclear diffusion. We hope that we can complete such negotiations and return to Washington with a draft agreement for consideration by the President."

There is much work to be done if we are to be prepared for such negotiations. We must begin by identifying the issues.

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 Issue #1. Incentives and Sanctions.

 We must recognize that while we must be prepared to utilize sanctions to obtain compliance by the non-nuclear powers, we must also formulate incentives. Even after we have applied sanctions we should keep the offer of incentives open in order to make compliance attractive and thus hopefully to obtain compliance with minimum utilization of pressure. Certainly, for example, if we could obtain agreement from China to abandon nuclear weapons and permit adequate inspection, we should be prepared not only to grant UN membership but provide significant aid grants such as the Food for Peace program. We cannot afford to think of incentives merely in terms of our enemies, if economic sanctions have to be used against China, Canada undoubtedly would lose over $100 million in credits on her wheat purchases, we may well have to compensate her for a portion of these losses.

 Issue #2. Soviet Reversal of Policy Following Agreement.

 For both the United States and the Soviet Union, agreement to stop nuclear proliferation would represent a political decision of major magnitude. The political price would be paid in large measure the moment the shift became known, therefore, if the Soviet Union agreed to such a program and then reversed their policies, the United States could be left with a divided alliance and no benefits whatsoever. On the other hand, it will be extremely difficult for the leaders of either the Soviet Union or the West to turn back once they became publicly committed to such a policy. Nikita Khrushchev, is undoubtedly reluctant to embark on another abortive policy such as occurred in Cuba. The principal danger would occur if a change of Soviet leadership occurred in the midst of negotiations before
international agreement had been obtained on these programs.

In order to protect itself against a Soviet policy reversal, U. S. policy and U. S. discussions must be based on a contingency basis. That is, if the Soviet Union obtains certain results then the U. S. Government will either respond or refrain from certain other contingency measures. It is important in our discussions with our NATO allies that we formulate this problem on a contingency basis -- that is, if the Soviet Union is willing not only to agree to such a thing but to carry it out -- then what should we in the West be prepared to do? A careful, chronological sequence of events between the Soviet Union, NATO, China, and the West should be prepared and analyzed.

Issue #3. The Basis for an Agreement

It is almost certain that the Soviet Union would not agree to exercising sanctions against other nations, unless there was an explicit agreement between the Nuclear powers limiting the production and testing of nuclear weapons. The Harriman mission therefore must be authorized to agree to: a) a test ban; b) a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for military purposes; and c) a declared and inspected inventory of nuclear warheads under adequate inspection. This would include permanent parties at key installations and a number of on-site inspections of suspected test or production facilities. (The inventory and control of the stockpiled warheads would be a low confidence measure due to our uncertainties in the existing stockpile, nevertheless these measures would increase our confidence in our stockpile figures.)
Issue #4. MLF and the NATO Nuclear Policy

There seems to be little doubt that the Soviet Union would not agree to join measures against China without significant modification or abandonment of a current U.S. position on the multilateral force. We are not prepared to argue the pros and cons of this case but it must clearly be recognized as an issue. We should face it and without prejudging it, prepare alternative plans which might provide a basis for meeting European security requirements. One formulation would be through an extension of U.S. commitment to Europe for a period, say 15 years, to attempt to freeze the distribution of nuclear weapons. Thus hopefully allowing the emergence of a unified Europe which could accept responsibility at the end of that time. Perhaps at that time nuclear weapons would not appear to be the major problems they appear to be today.

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This series of papers is not an attempt to provide answers. It is an attempt to formulate the issues we must face in such negotiations. Guidance and further analysis are clearly required.
Conclusions:

1. The U.S. and Soviet Union have adequate economic and military power to force the Chinese to abandon the nuclear weapons program.

2. Prior consultation with our NATO allies is absolutely essential to gain their agreement to such a policy. Agreement can be obtained if we are prepared to offer added inducements to France and Germany in particular.

3. Soviet decision will be based upon their estimate:
   a. Soviet leadership of the World Communist Party.
   b. Soviet national security.
   c. Sino-Soviet relations.
   d. Soviet estimates of U.S. steadfastness when the inevitable crisis will arise. (If they believe that we would reverse our course once begun, this estimate in itself would be sufficient to kill any possibilities for such a plan.)

4. Chinese concurrence will be based upon:
   a. Chinese estimates of U.S. and Soviet willingness to use the powers available to them.
   b. Chinese estimates of their ability to win the leadership of the World Communist Party.
   c. The incentives which are provided for compliance.

5. If compliance can be gained from China the remaining nations of the world do not appear to pose major problems.

Time:

If we embark upon this course, we may know whether we have succeeded or failed within 6 - 12 months; certainly, we will know for certain within 24 months.
Introduction to NSAM 239 Review

Subject: Can the Genie Be Put Back in the Bottle?

The smooth road down versus the rough road up.

In NSAM 239, the President wrote to the Committee of Principals and the Director of ACDA calling for "an urgent reexamination of the possibilities of new approaches to significant measures short of general and complete disarmament." In doing so, he said: "The events of the last two years have increased my concern for the consequences of an unchecked continuation of the arms race between ourselves and the Soviet Bloc."

The first problem of such a policy review must be the identification and formulation of U. S. national interests. To date, U. S. nuclear policy for armament and disarmament has been based primarily on a bilateral analysis of U. S. and Soviet military capabilities. Accordingly, we find within the government a debate among those who argue for strategic superiority vis-a-vis the Russian's to advance national security and others who argue that we should negotiate reduction of strategic forces by 50 to 75% to increase our national security. Actually both may be profoundly wrong.

A bilateral analysis is not a sound basis for formulating U. S. thermonuclear policy. The world is no longer bilateral. Indeed, the most significant and potentially most dangerous fact of the nuclear world is that it is on the verge of forever losing its essentially bilateral character. The acquisition of even a small number of atomic weapons by China, Israel, or the UAR decreases the power, influence and security of both the U. S. and
the Soviet Union. Chinese development of 5 fifty kiloton weapons decreases the security of the U. S. more than the addition of 5 one megaton weapons to the current Soviet inventory. The enforced limitation on the diffusion of atomic and thermonuclear weapons is therefore the prime question of U. S. national strategy and consequently a major portion of the NSAM 239 review should be focused on this problem. Clearly, if the U. S. can take steps to insure that other nations do not build atomic weapons, it would be in our interests to do so and we should be prepared to pay a significant price to achieve this objective. The overriding question is whether or not the U. S. government can stop diffusion. The honest answer is that we don't know. It is equally clear that it would be irresponsible not to try.

Such an agreement, to be meaningful to the U. S. and of interest to the USSR, should consist of three parts:

a. The nuclear powers should agree not to assist any non-nuclear power in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. (The acceptance by the USSR of France as a nuclear power is a mandatory requirement and is considered feasible provided the FRG is clearly estopped by the terms of the agreement from acquiring such weapons.

b. The nations not currently possessing nuclear weapons would have to agree not to acquire such weapons.

c. Initially on the basis of a private understanding between U. S. and USSR (to which we should make our principal NATO allies privy) and later through agreement by all states which have acceded to the treaty, there should be application of constraints adequate to insure that non-signatory states would not only sign but abide by the terms of the treaty. The non-signatory
states would be induced by a combination of political and economic rewards and pressures to sign. The primary problem would, of course, be Communist China. In this case, it would probably be necessary to work out an arrangement with the USSR in which that country sought first to win Communist China's accession, but with the understanding that, should she fail, both superpowers would endeavor to apply trade restrictions including POL, chemical fertilizers, food stuffs, etc. Later, if necessary, military attacks could be carried out against nuclear production plants with the tacit consent of the USSR. In the case of the smaller nations such as Israel and the UAR, there would probably have to be a joint super-power guarantee of their borders or other satisfactory arrangements coupled with a clear signalling of intent by the super powers that these states must accede.

To date, there has been relatively little analysis of the possibilities of an enforced international agreement against the diffusion, testing, or production of nuclear weapons. Current strategy appears to be based on the assumption that modest steps such as the test ban are the best means to stop diffusion. There is little evidence to support this assumption and considerable evidence that it is not true. A broad U. S. - USSR agreement on an enforced diffusion treaty may be easier to achieve than the piecemeal approach which we are currently pursuing.

It is clear that the Soviet Union would not agree to enforcing a non-proliferation agreement without agreement on at least some of the other major issues. Therefore, it is the view of the Department of Defense that Presidential interest and the pace of events require a new initiative consisting of a four part inter-related proposal which should be communicated to the
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Soviet Union at a high level at the appropriate time and place.

This package should consist of:

a. A non-proliferation agreement including appropriate sanctions to win accession from recalcitrant states.

b. An agreement to limit strategic vehicles to agreed force levels.

c. An agreement on force levels in Europe combined with a European Non-Aggression Pact.

d. A nuclear test ban.

In subsequent papers we propose to analyze such a set of proposals.

We recognize that it is easier to ignore these questions than to face the difficult issues they raise. Nevertheless, we would do well to remember the words of Winston Churchill shortly before World War II:

"Still, if you will not fight for the right when you can easily win without bloodshed; if you will not fight when your victory can be assured and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a precarious chance to survive. There may be even a worse case; you may have to fight when there is no hope of victory and it will be better to perish than to live in slavery."
ABORTING THE CHICOM NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Problem: To develop a sequence of progressively scheduled coordinated US-USSR moves to abort the ChiCom nuclear capability.

Assumptions:
- The US and USSR are agreed that elimination of a ChiCom nuclear capability or potential is mutually desirable and are prepared to work in common to achieve this end.
- The NATO nations are sympathetic to such an undertaking and will support it at least in its economic aspects.

Discussion:
In a sequence of cooperative US-USSR moves to abort a ChiCom nuclear capability, respective US and Soviet roles should be worked out in advance as far as possible. Actions taken by either government should be agreed beforehand by the other. Some sort of combined politico-economic-military means of cooperation would probably have to be set up.

The USSR would serve best as the principal initial advocate vis-a-vis the ChiComs (as would the US in discussions aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation in the West). Application of
economic and possibly later of physical sanctions against the ChiComs would involve coordinated, mutually underwritten, but not necessarily always joint action.

The USSR can more convincingly than the US initiate discussions with the ChiComs concerning a quid pro quo for their abandonment of nuclear weapons development and the USSR might just possibly be able to negotiate an adequate and face-saving formula (acting somewhat in the role of a double agent or honest broker).

Collaterally, the US could seek through indirect channels, to backstop the Soviet presentation and to signal clearly the determination to carry the matter as far as necessary to achieve the objective.

If it became clear that discussions on the political level would not be productive by themselves, which would probably be the case, then later successive phases of increasingly strong concrete pressure by the US-USSR on the ChiComs would follow, each taken so closely in step that neither principal would be able credibly at any point to dissociate itself from the process.

The sequence of applications of incentives and pressures (progressively emphasizing the latter) would be designed to achieve through as low a level of coercion as possible the abortion of a ChiCom nuclear capability. With the progressive raising of the ante the public commitment of ChiCom prestige
would mount, resistance would stiffen, and the risk of an irrational ChiCom response would correspondingly increase.

**First Level: Political Persuasion** -- The initial level of pressure would involve principally persuasion. Moscow, speaking for itself and the US but also as one element of the Sino-Soviet Communist axis, would seek to demonstrate to Peking the general advantages of an over-all curtailment of nuclear proliferation. The persuasiveness of this argument would be strengthened if the USSR could point to a US-Soviet agreement to cut back progressively existing stocks of strategic nuclear weapons.

The Soviets could make attractive specific offers: the removal of US and Soviet nuclear weapons from the Far East, and the offer of steps toward easing both Soviet and Western trade controls and barriers. ChiCom UN membership should be included as a possibility. The US, meanwhile, would have the task of giving firm and convincing reassurances to the GRC, the ROK and US SE Asian allies.

Underlying the Soviets' effort at persuasion would be a clear intimation of the firmness of the collective US-USSR resolve to halt nuclear proliferation. Privately, through appropriate channels, the US could complement the Soviet approach, corroborating both the determination on the main point and the readiness to offer valuable and meaningful advantages in exchange.

It would be a surprise, however, if the ChiComs did not scream bloody murder. They would tax the Soviets with final
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total apostacy, with cynicism, with white supremacy. Among
themselves, as well as publicly, they would almost certainly
not consider the quid comparable to the quo. The ChiComs could
be expected to strike a righteous pose, seek to compromise the
USSR's Communist standing, proclaim themselves the legitimate
leaders of world Communism, and "logically" counterpropose im-
mediate total nuclear disarmament and US withdrawal from the
Western Pacific.

Second Level: Embarro -- The second level of pressure
involves the application of economic sanctions not through
blockade but through a range of political and economic measures
to control China's foreign trade.

China imports somewhat over a third of the POL she uses.
The US, USSR and NATO countries control most world petroleum
sources. These countries and Japan control almost all tanker
shipping. Appropriate pressures and incentives should be avail-
able, if needed, to restrain the few independent producers (e.g.,
Indonesia) from furnishing petroleum. A POL embargo would be
damaging but not fatal to the Chinese economy.

The ChiComs depend on annual imports for about 6 million
tons of food grain. Canada, Australia and France are the chief
suppliers. The cooperation of these and other producers of
consequence could be secured without undue difficulty. Depend-
ing upon weather, loss of this grain to China would produce
grave but probably not catastrophic nutritional problems. The

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ChiComs, making the propaganda best of a bad thing, would cry genocide.

China depends on foreign sources for technology and capital goods: chiefly on the Bloc, Europe and Japan. A tight and sustained embargo here would decelerate if not almost stall economic progress. To organize and maintain such an embargo would be more complex than cutting off petroleum and grain, but it could probably be made effective.

An embargo on Chinese exports, if reasonably effective, would deprive China of foreign exchange. Most shipping is controlled directly or indirectly by the US, the NATO nations, the Bloc and Japan. With persuasion by the US and USSR, a reasonably effective shipping embargo could be organized.

The ChiComs will be alert to judge how determined, how comprehensive and how sustained an embargo their opponents will be able to mount. They will probe for and exploit soft spots or signs of faltering or even indications of distaste for the undertaking. They will intensify their all-out effort to discredit the Russians to world Communism. They will seek to mobilize at least moral and hopefully some political support among former colonial nations. At the same time, they will seek to strike at their opponents' economies and policies by fomenting widespread economic and political disruption and sabotage in such regions as Latin America and Malaysia. There would be a marked step-up in aid to the Viet Cong and

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Pathet Lao in SE Asia. A policy of sweet reasonableness toward India would seem reasonable at this juncture.

The ChiCom capacity for economic reprisal is not great. They would try, however, by attractive economic offers, to split off fragments from the opposing camp, perhaps taking advantage of the resentment of countries like Israel which also would be undergoing denuclearization. If the embargo became thorough and sustained, Hong Kong could expect harassment, possibly insurrection, conceivably direct attack.

If the embargo held and circumstances began to seem desperate, the ChiComs might reason that a major military clash between them and the West (principally the US) could generate sufficient US-Soviet strain to bring about a rupture, or at least to overshadow and perhaps stymie the joint anti-proliferation enterprise. An attack on the offshore islands could be the prelude. An attack through Korea (though the North Koreans might demur) or a deliberate invasion (as against support to locals) of SE Asia are other possibilities. [A separate paper setting forth ChiCom military capabilities is being prepared and will be available shortly.]

Third Level: Blockade — A third level of pressure would be a physical blockade of China. This would close loopholes in the embargo and would increase the pressure on China. It would also markedly raise the level of commitment and of danger of an armed clash. By conventional standards of international law
it would be provocative and indefensible. It would have to be identified by a clear and persuasive exposition as a measure in the powerful and overriding international interest to prevent nuclear proliferation.

The blockade should if possible be mounted by a multinational force: the more participants in addition to the US and USSR the better, including if possible Japanese.

Initiation of a blockade should be accompanied by political and physical moves to provide clear evidence of a determination to defend China’s neighbors against aggression.

It is emphasized that initiation of a blockade would be the most decisive step thus far in the sequence of moves under discussion. It commits almost irrevocably the US and the USSR and their principal associates. Not to carry through, thereafter, to neutralization of the ChiCom nuclear assets would not diminish the enmity already generated but would only earn contempt.

Initiation of a blockade should hasten the tempo of events. It might precipitate a violent Chinese reaction. There is an outside chance that it might bring the Chinese to the point where a negotiated and reasonably face-saving settlement could be undertaken and the effort to achieve this should be made with all permissible urgency at this point, perhaps with the good offices of a third power. This exploration should not,
however, compromise our freedom of action. If however the Chinese take no major moves and seem to be determined and able for some time to sit out the blockade, the US and the USSR must decide whether their own combination, a rather unstable entity in many ways, can in fact outlast the primitive and basically tough society which they seek to bring to its knees. They may well determine that an endurance contest contains too many dangers. This would lead to the fourth level of action -- the surgical excision of the nuclear installations.

Fourth Level: Destruction of Nuclear Installations

The fourth level of action thus might be taken either deliberately or in connection with a containment of ChiCom offensive action. Jointly conducted US-Soviet air strikes, using conventional rather than nuclear weapons, would destroy a selected minimum complex of installations in China that would together constitute the actual or potential nuclear capability. This action would not involve invasion or land combat in China.

ChiCom military initiative taken at any point before this fourth phase would ease the justification for the strikes.

Continuing US-USSR Responsibility -- The US and USSR task of policing China would not necessarily end with the
destruction of the nuclear installations. So long as the ChiComs continued intransigeant, the need would remain to contain them through continued application, as necessary, of selective military and economic sanctions.

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12 June 1963
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A USSR-US Enforced Non-Proliferation Agreement -
the probable positions of the FRG, France, Italy,
Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands.

1. Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy:

The positions of these four countries would be essentially similar.
None of them seeks national nuclear forces of its own; each of them is con-
cerned about the consequences of German nuclear weapons. Although precise
positions would vary depending upon the breadth of the treaty, the methods
of its enforcement, the manner of its negotiation, and the nature of any
other US-USSR and US-NATO country agreements which might be associated with
it - factors discussed below - their positions would be favorable and
probably strongly so.

The reactions of Norway, given its strongly anti-nuclear views,
would be least equivocal. Some elements in the Netherlands and more
importantly in Belgium (La Libre Belgique) would be responsive to the
likely French argument that any such agreement was proof of a "special
relationship" between the US and USSR, and a US wish to dominate Europe.
Neither the Netherlands nor Belgium, however, would regret the almost
certain death of the MLF which such an agreement would involve - Belgian
Francophile elements, in fact would take satisfaction in it. Italy, though
more deeply involved in MLF planning, would also welcome its demise as the
price of an assurance against FRG nuclear weapons. And such a development
might well strengthen the center-left coalition by dampening the difference
of views between its two wings as to Italy's military posture.
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As to each of these countries, however, although a non-proliferation agreement would be viewed as an inherently favorable development almost irrespective of its terms, the manner of its negotiation would be important. The greater the degree of prior consultation with the US, the smaller the possibility of its bilateral nature having a divisive effect upon the alliance.

2. France.

It is necessary to distinguish the probable French government position toward a US-USSR Non-Proliferation Agreement from the probable French internal reaction to it; the latter would be largely favorable, the former is not likely to be.

A variety of French interests would be well served by such an agreement. Assuming that it was addressed to stopping additional nations from becoming nuclear powers, and not to stopping the present nuclear powers, of which France deems herself one, from producing additional or more sophisticated weapons, such an agreement would suit French interests in the following major respects. First, it would solidify the French position as a member of the now exclusive nuclear club, and in doing so appear to justify the expensive effort to qualify. Second, in preventing German acquisition of national nuclear weapons it would solve a problem which has concerned the French as deeply as the other NATO nations. Third, in precluding (as presumably it would) creation of the MLF, it would eliminate a device which would have tended to isolate France from the Five, and especially from Germany. Fourth, in placing responsibility for German exclusion from the nuclear club on the US, it would tend to orient more
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firmly toward France those German elements which favor a nuclear role for the FRG, and might increase German interest in sharing at least in the technology - and in the costs - of the French nuclear program. Finally, such an agreement could be used, to a greater or lesser extent depending on its terms and methods of negotiation, as a further proof of US "collusion" with the USSR at the expense of its Allies, and US desire to maintain its nuclear dominance, and hence as a lever for the further reduction of US as against French influence on the Continent.

The official position taken by France might therefore be highly critical of the form of the agreement, especially if there is little prior consultation with France, and if bilateral enforcement provisions put the US in the role of monitor over the other NATO nations. It seems certain at least that France would insist on the inapplicability to itself of any such agreement to which it had not been fully a party. While both reserving its rights, and gaining whatever propaganda points it could, however, France would probably not seek to oppose the substance of the agreement, or its implementation.

If this analysis is correct, it suggests that seeking to make France a party to such an agreement would pay substantial dividends and involve little cost; French interests themselves argue for its support, and such support would undercut many if not all of the anti-US arguments that could be based upon it. If French concurrence were made conditional upon US nuclear concessions, the concessions required would probably be relatively minor, and agreements to provide a limited number of Polaris or Minuteman missiles, for example, or Polaris submarine technology would probably be both sufficient and, given the usefulness of French support, worthwhile.
3. **Germany.**

Of all the NATO nations, the FRG would be most sensitive to the consequences of such an agreement; among the Western nations it would be directed primarily at Germany. It is therefore necessary to distinguish more exactly the context of such an agreement, and the other arrangements, both between the US and the USSR and the US and Germany or NATO, which might accompany or follow it.

If the Non-Proliferation Agreement were restricted solely to the prevention of new nuclear forces wholly controlled by nations not now possessing nuclear weapons, the FRG would probably neither oppose it nor seek significant new US-FRG or US-NATO arrangements as the price of its support. Germany formally renounced independent nuclear weapons in the WEU Agreement, and a variety of high officials have since reiterated that pledge both publicly and privately. The CSU is even more firmly committed to this policy than is the government.

Although there are undoubtedly German elements which will not be satisfied with anything short of absolute German control of nuclear weapons, and although there is industrial interest in the technology - and in the profits of a German nuclear program, it seems clear that the mass of German opinion would look with equanimity upon an agreement which precluded independent German nuclear forces so long as German military security seemed unimpaired. This is the key point: the German government and military establishment are now convinced that the effective defense of Germany against any significant Soviet attack requires the early use of nuclear
weapons. The ownership and control of these weapons is of little importance so long as their use is assured. It would seem, therefore, that so long as such an agreement did not preclude a continued buildup and modernization of the nuclear forces under bilateral and multilateral control which were deemed necessary to German defense, German agreement could be secured. This would be as true for the renunciation of an MLF as for the renunciation of independent national nuclear forces. In return for such renunciation the Germans would probably seek at least the continued and perhaps increased presence of bilaterally-controlled nuclear weapons on German soil, and closer and more comprehensive German involvement in overall NATO and US nuclear planning and targeting. In addition, new US assurances of German security, probably extending beyond the 1969 termination of the initial NATO Treaty period, might be necessary. Both would seem acceptable prices, assuming that no new treaty commitments were to run more than 10 or perhaps 15 years.

It is important to note again that the manner in which such an agreement were negotiated and the nature of the provisions related to its enforcement might be critical. These are related problems; it is difficult to see how the US could agree to assure or to participate in the enforcement of such an agreement against the FRG without prior German agreement at a minimum, and formal German accession to the agreement itself would be preferable and might be necessary.

Although this paper is addressed only to the problem of a Non-Proliferation Agreement alone, it seems fair to speculate that unless, prior to such an agreement, the USSR had become convinced that Communist China must be dealt with as a potential enemy rather than as an ally, the
Soviets would be unlikely to undertake the burden of enforcing or participating in the enforcement of such an agreement against China unless it achieved from the West at the same time a number of additional agreements. These might range from a NATO-Warsaw Non-Aggression Pact upward through modest European force reductions or a de-nuclearized Central Europe through some form of general and complete disarmament agreement. The German reaction to any such package cannot be even crudely estimated within the compass of this paper, but it is relatively clear that, depending upon their terms, any of these agreements, and particularly one creating a de-nuclearized zone to include Germany, might so undercut German confidence in the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons in her defense as to make the whole package unacceptable unless the US were prepared to make very sweeping guarantees of German security.
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SWEDEN

1. Estimate of the Situation

Sweden has thus far avoided making any clear-cut decision in regard to a nuclear weapons program, but basic nuclear research is of such high quality that the country is clearly nearing the threshold of a weapons capability. Sweden, around 1965, will be faced with the decision whether or not to go ahead with the development of nuclear weapons. If the decision to continue is made, the Swedes could start testing by 1967–68. Moreover, if the Swedes decide to press ahead after the first detonation, Sweden could probably have a weapon deliverable by aircraft by about 1968, and a missile system carrying compatible fission warheads by 1970.

2. Assets

a. Reactors. Sweden has been operating research and test reactors for several years. A 65 MW natural uranium fueled power reactor is expected to reach full power by mid-1963, while a 385 MW power reactor is scheduled for completion by 1967. A plutonium separation plant is under construction.

b. Personnel. Sweden is generously endowed with nuclear personnel of high caliber.

c. Industrial Resources. Sweden's economy can provide a base for developing a nuclear weapons capability without serious dislocation.

d. Foreign Assistance. Sweden's peaceful atomic program has benefitted from U.S. assistance and European cooperation, but is headed toward at least partial self-sufficiency. No military assistance.
3. Political Motivation

The present Social Democratic Government, which is likely to remain in power for several more years at least, has indicated that some time this year and possibly again in 1965, Sweden will consider whether or not to direct its nuclear production toward the production of weapons. Given Sweden's strong disinclination to develop nuclear weapons, it is likely that the government will procrastinate in a final decision until the very last moment.

The basic pressures for and against Sweden's entry into the nuclear weapons field are quite evenly balanced. Favoring development of nuclear weapons is the argument that Sweden should not be without a nuclear deterrent capability to protect its independent status in Europe. Pressures against developing a nuclear capability rest in part on an expressed concern about the implications for arms control and disarmament, and more basically on a rarely spoken but deep awareness of implications for Sweden's delicate balancing act between Eastern and Western Europe, and particularly on concern about Finland's position.

4. Agreement on Non-Proliferation

Sweden has been an active proponent of nuclear disarmament measures, including some going beyond U.S. desires. She has been careful, however, to reserve her final decision on nuclear weapons until the final context of the decision becomes clear. With a tradition of armed neutrality and a pervasive concern for her own (and Finland's) independent position between the bigger powers, Sweden will not rashly commit itself to forego these possibly effective arms.
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A non-proliferation agreement might face Sweden with the necessity for a final decision which it is not prepared to make. When a choice is demanded, however, Sweden would most likely go along with the proposal.

In any event, Sweden may be trusted to make the choice which it believes will best support its tenuous position between East and West. The direction of this choice could be effectively dictated by the Eastern and Western major powers, of whose ability to exert pressures Sweden is only too well aware.
1. **Estimate of the Situation.** Switzerland has a capability of acquiring nuclear weapons sometime after 1970. Despite internal pressures to obtain a nuclear capability, the Swiss have declined to do so in order to pursue their neutralist, peaceful policy, as has done Sweden. On the other hand they recently rejected by popular vote a proposed law which would have forbidden the development of atomic weapons.

2. **Assets**
   
   a. **Reactors**
      
      (1) 1 teaching reactor, negligible power, 1959.
      
      (2) 1 megawatt reactor, 1959.
      
      (3) 1-20 watts reactor, 1959.
      
      (4) 1 KW reactor, 1959.
      
      (5) 1-20 MW reactor, 1962. (Test reactor)
         Nuclear power program planned.
      
   b. **Personnel.** Adequate scientific and technical personnel are available for a modest atomic weapon program.
      
   c. **Industrial resources.** In a good economic position to support such a program. Has large industrial resources but dependent on imports of critical raw materials.
      
   d. **Foreign assistance.** The U.S. has provided assistance to the Swiss in establishing a teaching reactor in 1958 and has built three of the four operable reactors. In addition it is supplying fuel subject to U.S. safeguards. No military-nuclear assistance.

3. **Political Motivation.** Has relatively low motivation for acquiring weapons capability. However, tradition of armed neutrality could spill over
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into drive for atomic weapons if Swiss felt their neutrality threatened by
an atomic power. Their position is less tenuous than that of Sweden, with
which there are many parallels.

4. Agreement on Non-Proliferation. As with Sweden, can act independently
in acceding to any agreement and would probably accede if agreement is
reached. Some chance that the Swiss could take a second look at atomic
weapons, and perhaps try to save the option of producing them, if a
neighboring country (such as Germany) gained atomic weapons and adopted
a more aggressive foreign policy.

Landlocked position and reliance on foreign imports provide almost
ideal circumstances to exercise sanctions although unlikely that they
would be required.
14 June 1963

TO: Holders of Briefing Book on US - Soviet Non-Diffusion Agreement for Discussion at the Moscow Meeting

Time did not permit me to include a personal note when the copies of the briefing book were delivered. I do wish to emphasize that much of the information is sensitive and should be handled on a need-to-know basis; certainly the Preface is in this category.

We are now in the process of revising this book and would appreciate your comments, if any, by Friday, 21 June 1963.

Arthur Foster
Deputy Assistant Secretary