2277

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

9 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allen Evans, State (INE)
         Colonel K. T. Gould, USA (JIA)
         Colonel J. C. Jeffries, Jr., USA (ACSI)
         Captain G. K. Nicodemus, USN (ONI)
         Colonel W. M. Hargrett, USAF (AFCH 2B2)
         Colonel G. R. Ronka, USAF, Chief Designate,
         Policy Staff, NSA

SUBJECT: SNIE 13-6-62: IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNIST
         CHINA'S ACQUISITION OF A
         NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY

1. The attached terms of reference have been prepared to
   meet specific planning requirements of the Department of State.
   We recognize that most of these requirements might be met through
   NIE 42-62, "Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation," already
   scheduled for completion later this quarter. However, we en-
   visage that paper as a fairly general paper which, after updating
   previous Nth country estimates on the technical and economic ca-
   pabilities of additional countries to develop nuclear capabilities,
   assessed the impact of likely French and Communist Chinese progress
   and other developments on the nuclear proliferation problem across
   the board. Given the urgency and specific nature of State's
   questions, including the emphasis on implications for Communist
   China itself, we believe it would be best to handle them in the
   presently proposed special estimate. This paper, along with the
   forthcoming estimate (NIE 22-62) on the French nuclear program
   could then be used as one of the inputs to the more general esti-
   mate on nuclear proliferation.

2. It is requested that your representatives meet with us
   at 1000, Friday, 12 October in Room 7262 Langley building to discuss
   these terms. We would hope to have contributions by the end of
   October, with a view to completing USIB action by, any, 5 December.

Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates

DISTRIBUTION B
Plus, Chnn, GMAIC, JAEIC, SIC

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MORI DocID: 402878
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

9 October 1962

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: SNIE 13-6-62: IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNIST CHINA'S ACQUISITION OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY

THE PROBLEM

To assess Communist China's progress toward acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability and to estimate certain implications of this development.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. COMMUNIST CHINA'S PROSPECTS OF ACQUIRING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY

(Contributors are requested to up-date their contributions to NIE 13-2-62, "Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons Capabilities," dated 25 April 1962.)
A. Review any recent evidence bearing on China's nuclear weapons program. Are there any developments which could drastically accelerate or retard this program?

B. When is Communist China likely to explode a nuclear device? How soon thereafter can it acquire a significant nuclear weapons capability? Estimate the probable timing of successive phases of the weapons program. What aircraft or missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons are likely to be available to the Chinese over the next decade?

II. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNIST CHINA

A. Military

1. How might Communist China's military philosophy be affected by the detonation of a nuclear device? By acquisition of a significant nuclear weapons capability?

2. To what extent and in what manner would the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability affect Communist
SECRET

China's military capabilities as a power in Asia and the Western Pacific?

B. Political and Psychological

1. What would be the probable effect of (a) the detonation of a nuclear device and (b) the acquisition of a significant nuclear weapons capability by the Chinese Communists upon:

a. Domestic policy?

b. Economic priorities?

c. Attitudes of the Chinese people toward the regime?

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

A. Communist China's Foreign Policies in Asia

1. Foreign policy outlook. In general, would Peking's leaders become more sober, or more adventurous with respect to acceptance of foreign policy risk? In what ways would the Chinese seek to exploit the new situation?

- 3 -

SECRET
2. Foreign policy in practice. In particular, what policy changes would China adopt with respect to India, Japan, and the countries of southeast Asia?

B. Impact of China's Detonation of a Nuclear Device

1. Reactions in Asia. How would the Asian governments alter their policies toward Peiping? How would these governments alter their attitudes toward the US, especially US base rights?

2. Sino-Soviet relations. Communist China's position in the world Communist movement.

3. Communist China's world position.
**POLICY PLANNING STAFF**

**ROUTING SHEET**

**OSD/ISA**

**DATE:** 10/10

**LOG NO:** F-205236

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COORDINATING DIVISION</th>
<th>CURRENT PROJECTS DIVISION</th>
<th>PLANS DIVISION</th>
<th>SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col John CHIEF</td>
<td>Dr. Mountain CHIEF</td>
<td>Col Burke CHIEF</td>
<td>Mr. Carroll CHIEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt Neill</td>
<td>Col Showalter</td>
<td>Capt Shane</td>
<td>Mr. O'Donnell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Kiel</td>
<td>Col Mcacham</td>
<td>Col Armstrong</td>
<td>Col English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Marotta</td>
<td>Capt Cotten</td>
<td>Mr. Rutter</td>
<td>Col Hostler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary</td>
<td>Nickey</td>
<td>Vivian</td>
<td>Dorothy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narge</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mary</td>
<td>Betty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CHECK ONE:**

**ACTION:** [Pr] (SUSPENSE DATE) 10/17

**INFORMATION:** Handled informally at 10/12 meeting.

**CONCURRENCE:** Project I (J) Study Group.

**RETURN TO:**

**FORWARD TO:**

**FILE:**

**FOR DISTRIBUTION:**

**DESTROY:**

**SIGNATURE:**

**RETAIN, PROCESS SNOWFLAKE AND RETURN TO:**

**REMARKS:** H.W. Ford of CIA needs sanitized version could readily be prepared & will include some material on the sources & reliability of the estimate, as in the April one. NWDD 9/5/22-79

**ORIGINATOR:**